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INTRODUCTION: As one of the more elusive social phenomena, corruption is 
notoriously difficult to investigate or measure, due to its clandestine nature. 
Within this work, corruption is conceptualised and addressed by focusing on 
sociological elements of cultural pressure, learnt behaviour, historical 
perspectives, and Central European regional idiosyncrasies of post-communist 
practices, all impacting on modern corrupt practices.  
METHODS: This thesis examines the applicability of the ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ 
corruption distinction to a real-life understanding of corruption by qualitatively 
analysing the data collected during fieldwork in Slovakia. The main research 
question addressed reads as follows: To what extent is the theoretical 
difference between grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life 
understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health care? Interviews and focus 
groups are analysed in the work using thematic and textual analysis, and utilising 
the NVivo12 software to identify trends and commonalities in regard to views of 
the prevalence, mechanisms, and barriers associated with corruption. The 
empirical part of the work is centred around the interpretivist approach to data 
analysis, emphasising the relevance and indispensability of the participants’ 
natural narrative in their real-life understanding of corruption, shaped by 
experience, rather than theory. 
RESULTS: The research demonstrates the shortcomings in corruption scholarship 
so far with regards to classification, measurement, and presentation of data. 
The existing bias towards economic and financial angles of corruption 
investigation is mitigated by applying a qualitative research design, focused on 
language and understanding. The research identified cultural nuances of 
acceptance of gift-giving, and the prevalence of corruption brokerage in 
everyday corruption in Slovakia. The roles of trust, fear, communist legacies, 
and networks in day-to-day corruption instigation, and deterrence in corruption 
reporting, are presented as instrumental in promoting corrupt practice in the 
Slovak health care sector. 
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CONCLUSION: The thesis concludes that the labels of grand and petty corruption 
apply to real-life understanding only marginally and that all theoretical 
terminology relating to corruption disaggregation should be verified in similar 
research designs, with emphasis on qualitative data analysis. Such analysis is 
upheld as able to encompass complexity of corruption understanding, inclusive 
of regional specificities and circumstances. Specific recommendations on 
incorporating real-life language and understanding are made regarding policy 
and legislation changes in Slovakia, as well as transparency of language within 
healthcare insurance re-drafting, and healthcare professional oversight.  
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‘I can imagine reporting something like law enforcement or judicial corruption. 2 
But for healthcare and education we are delving into basic questions of survival 3 
and if I reported those cases, I would be going against myself. Because today it’s 4 
your neighbour who does it and tomorrow it will be me’ (INT2) 5 
‘The very first thing you do when something happens is you pick up the phone and 6 
you start calling who you know, hoping that someone knows someone else and 7 
that something can be done in that situation’ (INT13) 8 
‘Health is your most precious commodity…health care is something that touches 9 
everyone on a basic, personal level- you can’t just buy it in a store. So that’s why 10 
it [corruption] is more frequent there’ (INT1) 11 
These quotes offer a taste of the stark image of real-life understanding of 12 
corruption displayed by my participants in the course of their interviews and focus 13 
groups for this project. They paint the picture of corruption as an everyday reality 14 
and a frequent occurrence in the realm of public service, linked to insecurity, 15 
fear, and personal connections. These are, consequently, some of the central 16 
tenets that I explored in relation to corruption. The thesis will show, in its later 17 
chapters, that this narrative is also representative of the prevalence and endemic 18 
nature of corruption in the Central European region as a whole, buttressing the 19 
impact of deeper understanding of corruption for the region. Research shows that 20 
the Central European countries (especially the countries of the Visegrad group) 21 
have similar standing in corruption perception measurements to date 22 
(Transparency International 2020), share occurrences of corruption in similar 23 
public sectors of education, healthcare, law enforcement, or the judiciary (Fric 24 
1999, Batory 2012, Batory 2012, Grochova 2013, Kohlami 2013, Koudelková, 25 
Strielkowski et al. 2015, Wysmulek 2017), and have a special proclivity for 26 
corruption to be pronounced in the healthcare sector (Puček 2014, Wierciński 27 
2017). Specific focus on healthcare corruption is recommended by official bodies 28 
(Eurobarometer 2017) in order to successfully tackle corruption as a whole in the 29 
20 
CE region, and offer unique insight into a public sector accessed by everyone, 1 
regardless of personal circumstance. 2 
‘These post-socialist countries have a different kind of experience with 3 
corruption…but on the other hand it’s also a matter of choice, of decision, and of 4 
societal pressure and cultural context. Your individual decisions matter though’ 5 
(INT4) 6 
Besides the similarities of sectors affected by corruption, any study into this region 7 
and its social phenomena must grapple with the socio-historical context the 8 
interviewee aptly describes above. How then, can corruption be addressed in a 9 
manner than does not shy away from implications of collective memory juxtaposed 10 
with personal decision-making? Combined with the theoretical distinction between 11 
grand and petty corruption presented in the literature review, the 12 
Soviet/communist legacies of the past, along with the practical realities of 13 
engaging with corruption (e.g., the roles played by social networks and customs), 14 
these elements comprise the central themes informing the main research question, 15 
which asks: To what extent is the theoretical difference between grand and 16 
petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in 17 
Slovakia’s health care? I found this inquiry into real-life understanding fascinating 18 
precisely due to the multitude of elements to explore, to get a holistic picture of 19 
corruption as it is viewed and understood in this particular part of the world. I 20 
seek to understand not only the angle of historical impact, but also the shape 21 
corruption takes in real life, how it operates through everyday interactions, and 22 
also where the motivations for getting involved in corruption originate. As 23 
participant INT4 articulated, a focus on the system and the circumstance is one 24 
dimension to consider, but, from a sociological standpoint, individual choices, 25 
pressures, responsibility, and culture all play a significant role in the extent of 26 
corruption in Slovakia historically and today. 27 
This introduction will now outline the complexity of corruption as far as its 28 
definition and classification, which led to the rationale for this research and its 29 
scope within the selected case study. I will also outline the methods that were 30 
21 
used to address the research questions generated and provide a brief overview of 1 
findings and the individual chapters. 2 
Rationale for research 3 
Corruption in the Central and East European region has already been the subject of 4 
rigorous scholarly research (Goel and Budak 2006, Ivanov 2007, Ledeneva 2009, 5 
Rose-Ackerman 2016). Goel and Budak (2006) outline that within this region, 6 
corrupt activities had managed to evade rigorous scrutiny at first and those that 7 
came to the fore, while noted by official bodies and within accession criteria to 8 
the European Union, were treated relatively leniently throughout the early 9 
nineties as a result of the post-communist ‘honeymoon period’. Going forward, 10 
however, the spread of corruption was recognised more pressingly by official 11 
bodies such as the EU and the World Bank as the ‘single largest obstacle to 12 
development’ in the region, which has prompted an interest in the idea that 13 
corrupt practices within this region may be particularly potent due to its post-14 
communist past (Goel and Budak 2006). The idea is that countries such as Slovakia, 15 
for example, have a unique set of conditions; a) the benefit of learning the best 16 
practices of government and anti-corruption from other countries, but also b) 17 
facing massive structural adjustments needed in the transition phase, able to 18 
create unique opportunities for rent-seeking activities (Goel and Budak 2006).  19 
In 2016, Transparency International (TI) ranked Slovakia as the 6th most corrupt out 20 
of the European Union’s 28 Member states (Sipos 2016), and this ranking has not 21 
significantly improved since (TI 2020). One area where corruption is recognised to 22 
be acutely present is the Slovak healthcare system, and TI drew the conclusion 23 
that as many as 3,000 Slovaks may die unnecessarily every year due to corruption 24 
in the healthcare system (Sipos 2016).The Slovak government has taken numerous 25 
measures to address the issue of corruption (e.g. the 2011 Strategic Plan to tackle 26 
corruption, the establishment of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, the establishment 27 
of specialised corruption-focused courts), however, these have often been 28 
criticised for merely ‘alleviating surface symptoms’ (Alexa 2007), rather than 29 
tackling the core problems enabling corruption. A 2017 Eurobarometer showed the 30 
22 
problem is still present despite steps taken on a governmental level- it lists 1 
Slovakia among the seven ‘striking’ exceptions of countries (Greece, Cyprus, 2 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) where health care is most frequently 3 
mentioned as the sector with greatest levels of corruption. 4 
Corruption is a phenomenon that is notoriously difficult to categorise and even 5 
more difficult to generalise. Contextualising it within cultural circumstances is 6 
important not only because corruption will adopt a different façade depending on 7 
its location, but also because it has the potential to erode democracy itself 8 
through eroding the public’s trust in official institutions, figures, and other 9 
members of the public themselves (Warren 2004, Linde and Erlingsson 2012). 10 
Research stipulates that if democracy is the ultimate avenue for inclusion within a 11 
society via institutions that facilitate it, corruption is the ultimate tool of 12 
exclusion in a democracy (Warren 2014). While corruption across cultures may 13 
share a ‘single normative core, its practical meanings will depend upon domain-14 
specific institutions and practices’ (2014:43). In other words, while corruption may 15 
share some generic characteristics of informality or illegality, it will manifest 16 
differently depending on its domain/ environment. As a result, all of these 17 
‘domains’ or environments, in my case the case of Slovakia’s health care, require a 18 
‘conceptualisation appropriate to the kind of corruption to which they are 19 
susceptible’ (2014:44). This specific study of different domains or environments is 20 
under-investigated in current research, which focuses mostly on the economic 21 
angle of corruption study, quantifying the financial impact of corruption as one of 22 
its few measurable attributes. However, understanding of corruption as arising 23 
inductively from lived experience, as opposed to absorbed from terminology, is 24 
rarely documented in depth. My research contributes to this existing gap and 25 
provides a meticulous level of detail in its qualitative analysis of corruption in the 26 
Central European context. This level of detail is achieved by my thematic and 27 
textual analysis approach, which I selected to scrupulously take apart the language 28 
and expression used by the participants to describe what they mean under 29 
‘corruption’ and how they understand its impact, which is then compared to the 30 
theoretical underpinnings of scholarly understanding of corruption. My case study 31 
of a post-communist, transitional society, and economy such as Slovakia therefore 32 
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offers a unique opportunity to examine the development and the understanding of 1 
corruption by those affected, while taking into account all the factors that have 2 
enabled corruption to flourish in this region.  3 
Research questions and aims 4 
In its essence, corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans the remits of 5 
sociology, anthropology, economics, politics, and history. Its continuous 6 
disaggregation into binary pairs, such as private/public, individual/institutional, 7 
grand/petty (as outlined in Chapter 1 and 3), may aid in its measurement in 8 
theoretical terms, but does not present corruption in a real-life perspective. In a 9 
real-life perspective, such levels are often not the only two that exist to any one 10 
type of corruption (i.e., there is a whole spectrum of grey between where private 11 
gain finishes and public gain begins), nor are these levels observable independent 12 
of one another. My research is inspired by showing that such levels are artificial in 13 
their conceptualisation and investigates to what extent such labels are valid 14 
representations of how people perceive corruption to behave in real, practical 15 
terms. 16 
Consequently, the thesis addresses the following research question throughout its 17 
analysis of the case study of corruption in Slovakia’s healthcare sector: To what 18 
extent is the theoretical difference between grand and petty corruption 19 
reflected in the real-life1 understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health care? 20 
This question encompasses several sub-questions relating to specific aspects of 21 
corruption as listed in table below, but in its core, it is focused at eradicating any 22 
artificial boundaries between labels of corruption through a deeper understanding 23 
of corruption. A focus on real-life narratives has the potential to elicit language 24 
and understanding from the general public that has not been considered before, 25 
 
1 Real-life understanding is based on the definition laid out by Schwandt (2001:84) as a human lived 
experience: ie ‘the life-world as it is lived, felt, undergone, made sense of, and accomplished by 
human beings’ Schwandt, T. A. (2001). Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms. Thousand Oaks, CA, 
Sage. 
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especially in theoretical endeavours to categorise corruption, nor in practical 1 
endeavours to curb it through legislation and policy. 2 
Research Questions (RQ) Hypotheses or Theoretical assumptions 
RQ1: How does awareness of 
grand corruption inform/justify 
individual engagement in petty 
corruption? 
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption will have no 
impact on the engagement of individuals in 
petty corruption and vice versa.  
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption will 
inform/justify individual engagement in petty 
corruption. 
RQ2: How does awareness of petty 
corruption inform/justify 
individual engagement in grand 
corruption? 
H0b: Awareness of grand corruption will have no 
impact on the engagement of individuals in 
petty corruption and vice versa. 
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption will 
inform/justify individual engagement in grand 
corruption.  
 
RQ3: What are the strategies 
utilised to carry out grand and 
petty corrupt practices? 
Theoretical assumption: There will be 
similarities in the strategies utilised to carry out 
grand and petty corrupt practices. 
RQ3a- subquestion: What is the 
significance of trust as a pre-
requisite for corrupt interactions? 
Theoretical assumption: Trust is understood as 
one of the processes of corruption that links the 
corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as 
such it is seen as a condition more often than it 
is understood as a result of corrupt practice. 
RQ3b- subquestion: To what 
extent are social rules and 
customs important in the carrying 
out of corrupt practices? 
Theoretical assumption: Social rules and 
customs are understood as one of the processes 
of corruption that links corrupt practices on 
grand and petty levels; as such they will prove 
as important determinants in carrying out 
corrupt practices. 
 3 
These research questions are addressed through a single case study analysis of 4 
corruption within Slovakia’s healthcare sector. As previously suggested and as will 5 
be explored in following chapters, Slovakia presents an illustrative example of a 6 
country within the CE region that has a specific set of socio-economic and 7 
historical factors impacting on corruption. It is also a country with a particularly 8 
rampant level of corruption and with healthcare as a sector that is uniquely 9 
affected. It therefore has the potential to produce results that could provide 10 
25 
unique levels of insight into corruption broadly, and into corruption specifically 1 
within public sectors of the CE region.  2 
Methods 3 
The most known measure of corruption today is undoubtedly the Transparency 4 
International’s (TI’s) Corruption Perception Index (CPI). However, when corruption 5 
is addressed through the prism of perceptions, we must consider the main 6 
criticisms of perception-based data collection (Miller 2001, Kenny 2006, Knack 7 
2006, Weber Abramo 2007). It has been suggested by Pinkova (2016) that surveys 8 
such as the CPI show that citizens may form their opinions on corruption based on 9 
their overall dissatisfaction with politics, rather than on their personal experience. 10 
The role of perceptions altering or taking the place of experience-based behaviour 11 
is therefore a social constructivist issue. The main criticism of perception-based 12 
index corruption, such as CPI, is that the index reflects mere perceptions rather 13 
than experiences, reported cases or proven incidents of corruption (Weber Abramo 14 
2007). 15 
It was therefore imperative that I adopt a different methodology, one focused on a 16 
qualitative, real-life basis for understanding corruption that would stem from 17 
experience. I utilised volunteer and snowball sampling for in-depth interviews and 18 
focus groups of over 40 participants in total, with a nearly perfectly even gender 19 
split, varied age groups from 20 to 80, comprising over 1,000 minutes of recorded 20 
material. The participants were recruited largely from two regions of Slovakia, 21 
which does not make for a representative national sample, but the congruence of 22 
responses across these two regions (the west Bratislava region, and the central 23 
Banská Bystrica region) suggests potential similarities throughout the country. The 24 
objective behind the qualitative research strategy was to obtain the level of 25 
linguistic detail and specific expression that has not been captured before. 26 
Interviews and focus groups were deemed to be effective tools for data collection, 27 
mainly for their ability to process sensitive topics in an ethically sound manner, 28 
but also their inherent flexibility and ability to respond to ad hoc situations, 29 
scheduling changes, and other challenges. Most importantly, however, I wanted to 30 
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obtain a natural narrative of the participants that would enable them to describe 1 
and conceptualise corruption in ways that felt organic to them and that did not 2 
feed them any theoretical concepts. It was paramount that they should be able to 3 
convey their understanding of corruption in their own words, based on their lived 4 
lives and experiences.  5 
I collected and transcribed acquired data myself and carried out the translation of 6 
the original language. The analysis was conducted using qualitative methods of 7 
thematic and textual analysis in the original language of Slovak (but providing 8 
translations throughout the work), with the help of the NVivo 12 software. Due to 9 
my focus on language and expression, the process of question selection and 10 
wording was rigorous and underwent piloting and rewording of questions to their 11 
final shape as seen in Appendix 3. Of course, true to the flexibility of semi-12 
structured questions, I was able to rephrase and add follow up questions according 13 
to the participant needs.  14 
Scope of project 15 
Health care rationale 16 
Healthcare is a public sector accessible to all and, with a pronounced problem of 17 
corruption in Slovakia, it presents a feasible case study2 for the investigation of 18 
corrupt practices and behaviour. This investigation is able to include a discussion 19 
on the impact of economic transition, culture, history, and regional idiosyncrasies 20 
on corruption. Moreover, the official EC 2014 EU Anti-Corruption Report on 21 
Slovakia specifically calls for the need to first and foremost ‘develop policy to 22 
fight corruption in health care’, as an official recommendation for the country to 23 
successfully tackle corruption as a whole - the thesis responds to this strategy. 24 
 
2 Unlike for example education with high regional variations in early school leaving, from 3.6 % in the 
Bratislava region to 10.4 % in the east of the country (EC (2016). European Commission 
Education and Training Monitor 2016. European Commission.) 
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With several EU member states struggling with corruption in health care 1 
(particularly those with a post-communist past), it would be prudent to believe 2 
that such recommendations could have not only cross-sectoral but also trans-3 
national applications (Eurobarometer 2017). 4 
Since early 2010, corruption research has mostly focused on the typology and 5 
mechanisms of corruption (Bussell 2015, Sommersguter-Reichmann, Wild et al. 6 
2018). The exclusively typological approach contributes to a greater understanding 7 
of types of corruption, but empirically unintentionally obscures the real-life data 8 
on engaging in corruption that would provide for a more evidence-based 9 
understanding of corruption. Through the work presented in this thesis, I seek to 10 
show that in real life, and health care in particular, top-down and bottom-up 11 
corrupt processes feed off one another to provide for a perpetual 12 
interdependency, sustaining corruption.  13 
Overview of findings 14 
My research addresses the shortcomings exposed by the measurement issues 15 
employed by TI’s CPI. Instead, the thesis focuses on a qualitative data collection 16 
and analysis conducted among both elites and general population, to counter 17 
sample selection bias and provide results that fill in the blanks of quantitative 18 
macro-report research. The qualitative data collected and analysed addresses the 19 
research question and suggests that the theoretical distinction between labels such 20 
as grand and petty corruption only applies to real life understanding of corruption 21 
to a certain extent.  22 
Empirically, I present several crucial findings. These relate to: the importance and 23 
ubiquitous nature of the broker in everyday corrupt transactions, disproving the 24 
reliance on the principal-agent model of corrupt transactions in previous studies 25 
(Rose-Ackerman 2016); importance of customs and traditions in gift-giving; 26 
importance of trust and fear in both incentivising and reporting corruption; and 27 
finally health-care-specific findings. These are most prominently the prevalence of 28 
bribery in specialty branches of medicine, as opposed to primary care previously 29 
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suggested by research (Mužik and Szalayová 2013), and the pressing need to 1 
revamp the health insurance system to clarify the standard of care for the lay 2 
person in plain language, in order to eradicate the perceived need for extra 3 
payments to receive basic quality of care. The re-conceptualisation of the 4 
principal-agent model in real-life corruption understanding to be less prevalent 5 
than that of the brokerage model is emphasised as a crucial and a novel finding in 6 
this context. Equally, the potential effectiveness of professional regulatory bodies 7 
(and ensuing disciplinary action) as an alternative to criminal proceedings in 8 
curbing corruption in health care is a crucial finding, alongside the need to 9 
investigate the novel findings of differences in bribe and gift payments in a 10 
primary care versus specialist context. The findings and their implications are 11 
discussed at length in the final chapters of the thesis.   12 
Synopsis of thesis chapters 13 
Chapters 1&2 14 
The thesis begins with a discussion of the literature on corruption as a theoretical 15 
phenomenon and also provides an outline of literature relating to the case study of 16 
Slovakia and healthcare itself. I present in detail the research conducted into 17 
corruption in Slovakia and also into the region of the Visegrad Four countries and I 18 
situate this particular research into existing literature. Slovakia is frequently 19 
considered merely as a point of comparison for regional research into the Visegrad 20 
countries, as opposed to the point of focus. The thesis responds to this trend and 21 
makes Slovakia the point of focus instead, while also bringing to the forefront 22 
several pieces of research conducted on a national level without being translated 23 
into English, thus showcasing the impact of the existing research for the 24 
international community.  25 
Chapter 3 26 
This chapter conceptualised corruption and its measurement to date, and argues 27 
for why corruption research should be conducted on a national, or at least a 28 
29 
regional, basis and with a qualitative element, if not focus. This is in order to 1 
encompass cultural specificities and provide room for incorporating these into the 2 
vernacular used by respondents when describing and understanding corruption. 3 
The limited quantitative measurement conducted to date is presented with several 4 
methodological shortcomings, and the need for greater qualitative focus is 5 
demonstrated, primarily through the indisputable benefits that open-ended 6 
questions and detailed answers provide when looking into sensitive topics such as 7 
corruption.  8 
Chapters 4,6&7 9 
This examination is outlined in the research design of the thesis which follows the 10 
conceptualisation chapters, as well as in the data analysis chapters. These 11 
chapters clearly lay out the data collection and analysis processes, which included 12 
a volunteer and snowball sampling, in-depth interviews and focus groups with over 13 
40 participants, and thematic and textual analysis undertaken after the 14 
transcription and translation of the original language. I analysed several hundred 15 
pages of text in this manner, both in the original language and in translation into 16 
English. The analysis itself, both manual and with the use of NVivo 12 software, 17 
was therefore conducted in the original language, but translations were necessary 18 
to make the research accessible, transparent, and relevant for a wider audience.  19 
Chapter 5 20 
A specific chapter situating anti-corruption measures and legislation into Slovak 21 
governmental agenda is sandwiched between research design and data analysis, as 22 
it is crucial to be able to situate the understanding of respondents into context. 23 
Later juxtaposition of respondent views and the legislation in place reveals the 24 
shortcomings of anti-corruption measures to-date, which in some cases fail to 25 
reflect the respondents’ real-life views of corruption and their experiences. 26 
Unveiling of this discrepancy lies at the heart of the impact of this thesis, which 27 
seeks to ascertain to what extent the theoretical depiction of corruption, and the 28 
anti-corruption guidance derived thereof, have permeated the understanding and 29 
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viewing of corruption in real-life scenarios. As was recently pointed out on a panel 1 
discussion on bribery in health care in Slovakia, ‘words live organically in real life, 2 
they carry content and meaning’3. I aim to show how the meaning of words such as 3 
‘bribe’, ‘corruption’, ‘gift’ evolves in real life. I want to show how this meaning is 4 
shaped by customs and traditions, socio-economic situation, and by learnt 5 
behaviour. 6 
Chapters 8-13 7 
Empirical chapters which outline how data were collated and categorised follow, 8 
and individual categories of data are presented thematically. The results are 9 
situated in existing literature, as well as within the research questions of the 10 
thesis. The individual categories collated from the respondents relate to the 11 
general awareness respondents have about corruption in Slovakia, the practices 12 
employed in corrupt transactions in the healthcare sector, the nuance and 13 
distinction a lot of them draw between gift-giving and bribery, the reasoning and 14 
justification of corrupt behaviour, and also their views on disaggregating petty and 15 
grand corruption as effective or not. 16 
Chapter 14 & Conclusion 17 
Finally, the thesis provides a discussion of these results and the implications of 18 
findings for both Slovak health care provision and corruption in Slovakia. I then go 19 
on to suggest recommendations for real-life anti-corruption measures based on 20 
data trends and the understandings of, and attitudes to, corruption, as revealed in 21 
the study. 22 
  23 
 
3 The full debate is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vMQh8VVfW0 [last accessed 
13/3/2021]. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review Part 1 1 
1.1 Introduction 2 
 3 
The literature review considers published material on the topic of corruption and 4 
anchors the investigation of corruption in the Slovak healthcare sector. It also 5 
presents the need to perceive corruption as a holistic phenomenon; thus eradicating 6 
the artificial boundaries between petty and grand corruption typologies. The review 7 
highlights several gaps in the contemporary understanding of, and the approach to, 8 
the study of corruption.  9 
The literature review is structured as follows: a general overview of literature 10 
addressing the definition of corruption as a phenomenon, its position within social 11 
sciences and its individual facets; and a specific review of literature published on 12 
corruption in Slovakia and in the healthcare sector. The latter part of the review 13 
will inform and justify the selection of Slovakia’s healthcare sector as a feasible case 14 
study for the investigation of corruption.  15 
Part one of the literature review informs all the research questions as outlined in 16 
the previous Introduction chapter and serves as a basis for the formulation of the 17 
thesis structure and its hypotheses, discussed in the research design section. 18 
This literature review section presents corruption as a phenomenon of several fields 19 
of study, including anthropology, economic theory and sociology, and presents its 20 
position within a host of communist legacies for the region of Central Europe. It 21 
addresses the particular difficulty of separating corruption and ‘informal practices’ 22 
or ‘informal institutions’. Finally, it discusses challenges surrounding the 23 
measurement of corruption, empirical capturing of elusive phenomena within 24 
corruption, such as trust, and the inherent difficulty of separating corruption 25 
experiences and corruption perception.  26 
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The conclusion demonstrates the reasoning behind the particular research 1 
questions, the complexity of the phenomenon, and the need to promote a combined 2 
approach to its investigation. It also sets out my own definitions of grand and petty 3 
corruption based on the literature reviewed.  4 
  5 
1.2 Types of corruption 6 
 7 
‘Studies and projects often begin with a caveat about the contested definition of 8 
corruption, and then proceed to treat it as though it were an unproblematic 9 
concept’ (Ivanov 2007) 10 
From a typological perspective, corruption is a widely studied phenomenon. It has 11 
been addressed by scholars who have provided varying levels of distinction of the 12 
scope of corruption, mechanisms utilised to engage in corruption, or conceptual 13 
distinctions between several kinds of corruption (Nye 1967, Holmes 1997, Rose-14 
Ackerman 1999, Shehu 2005, Bussell 2015, Holzer 2016, Suleiman 2017). The 15 
problem, as highlighted by recent works (Bussell 2015, Rose-Ackerman 2016) is that 16 
while the field is rich with typologies, there is no universal guidance as to when we 17 
should utilise a specific corruption typology, or how this typology should be applied 18 
to the specific kind of corruption at hand.  19 
Perhaps the most widely-known definition of corruption is that provided by 20 
Transparency International: ‘abuse of public office for private gain’ and variations 21 
thereof, for example: ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Transparency 22 
International, 2015). The British Medical Journal (Moszynski 2006) points out that in 23 
health care, for example, this encompasses a much wider array of issues, namely 24 
‘bribery of regulators and medical professionals, manipulation of information on 25 
drug trials, the diversion of medicines and supplies, corruption in procurement, and 26 
overbilling of insurance companies’ (Moszynski, 2006:332). Moszynski makes a valid 27 
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point that the ‘diversity of health systems worldwide, the multiplicity of parties 1 
involved, the paucity of good record keeping in many countries, and the complexity 2 
in distinguishing among corruption, inefficiency and honest mistakes make it 3 
difficult to determine the overall scope and costs of corruption’ (Moszynski, 4 
2006:332). This poses several problems in terms of both defining the phenomenon 5 
itself, and, for the purposes of the thesis, within health care.  6 
Even more comprehensive definitions than that given by Transparency International 7 
include the consistency of a public-private dichotomy: Nye (1967) defines corruption 8 
as ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 9 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains’ 10 
(Nye 1967). Suleiman’s (2017) definition of corruption is even more comprehensive 11 
(2017:103): ‘a commission or omission of an action, an abuse of trust, or vice which 12 
ultimately changes the legal, as well as the ethical obligations of a public function 13 
to the pursuit of private objective of political, social or economic benefits’ 14 
(Suleiman 2017). Corruption, therefore, cannot be reduced to a merely mechanical 15 
exercise of a quid pro quo exchange, but must also be understood from the point of 16 
view of interpretation of ethics and the inclusion of moral struggle within the 17 
overarching equation. These notions of ethical justification of corrupt behaviour are 18 
explored further in Bohn’s work on ‘rational corruptors’ (Bohn 2013), and in the 19 
latter sections of this review.  20 
The differences in scales and measurable degrees of corruption must also be 21 
defined. Rose-Ackerman is one of the pioneers of the distinction between ‘grand’ 22 
and ‘petty’ corruption, the latter referring to bribes (1999:91) ‘citizens pay to 23 
lower-level officials either to speed the delivery of services or to bribe officials to 24 
bend the rules’, while the former refers to ‘large sums of money with multinational 25 
corporations frequently making the pay-offs’ (Rose-Ackerman 1999). However, Rose-26 
Ackerman’s definition of grand versus petty corruption presents visible issues with 27 
narrowing the definition down to a monetary framework, thus embedding this 28 
theoretical approach in the field of economics, relating corruption mostly to its costs 29 
for the society and general fiscal incentives. Holzer (2016) concurs with this view 30 
and suggests that corruption is mostly synonymous with bribery in Central Europe 31 
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(Holzer 2016). However, the thesis regards this as a reductionist approach and aims 1 
to target a wider range of corrupt activities, such as gift giving, tokens of gratitude 2 
or service exchange; equally or more popular in the Central European context, and 3 
unaccounted for in Rose-Ackerman’s definition.   4 
Among other typologies of corruption we can include an emphasis on clientelism as 5 
the ‘central variety of corruption’ (Debiel and Gawrich 2013), identifying specific 6 
features within it, such as dyadic networks, asymmetrical clientelism, personal and 7 
enduring clientelism, reciprocal or voluntary clientelism. This shows the level to 8 
which corruption has branched out to a meta-analysis of individual components of 9 
the phenomenon, encompassing a wide range of subjects. Among other types of 10 
corruption explored to date, it is possible to identify bribery, electoral corruption, 11 
favouritism, nepotism, procurement scams or budget corruption (Nye 1967, Agbiboa 12 
2012, Ijereweme 2015). There are also theories on classifying corruption along the 13 
broader lines of political, economic, bureaucratic, judicial, moral/ethical, 14 
educational and social corruption (Osoba 1996, Berlinski 1997, Rumyantseva 2005, 15 
Yaru 2009, Sadiq and Abdullahi 2013, Berkovich 2015). Heywood (1997, in Bussell 16 
2015) introduces some other types of corruption identified by scholars to date on a 17 
more specific basis: ‘local v. national level corruption, personal v. institutional 18 
corruption (ie that aimed at personal enrichment and that which benefits an 19 
institution), traditional v. modern corruption (for example nepotism and patronage 20 
as opposed to electronic fraud and money laundering)’ (Bussell 2015). There is 21 
therefore clearly a tendency in several typologies, to perceive corruption in binaries 22 
and opposites. There does appear to be a lack of impetus towards eradicating the 23 
distinctions between these pairings and even less effort to present a more holistic 24 
understanding of these dichotomies, as utilising similar strategies and mechanisms. 25 
With regards to specifically petty v. grand corruption, Shehu notes that this 26 
dichotomous distinction is ‘at its best artificial and therefore at worst it is 27 
misleading’ (Shehu 2005).  28 
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1.3 Corruption as a multidisciplinary phenomenon within 1 
political sciences 2 
1.3.1 Economic science & grand v. petty corruption distinction 3 
Whilst we have seen specific understandings and aspects of petty v. grand corruption 4 
based on either monetary or legal grounds, I argue for a broader understanding of 5 
grand v. petty corruption. There is no one way for corruption to be defined and no 6 
one dimension within corruption that can be targeted in isolation. Therefore, a more 7 
holistic approach is needed, making corruption conceptually a broader phenomenon. 8 
Some scholars explicitly state the need to ‘identify the degree of corruption and list 9 
different criteria for locating an exchange on a corruption continuum, rather than 10 
offering one-sentence definitions’ (Zaloznaya 2012). It is precisely this type of 11 
argument, responding to the need for such a ‘corruption continuum’, that the thesis 12 
will adopt. The thesis will, on a theoretical level, attempt to show that all kinds of 13 
corruption of the corruption continuum (for example the above mentioned local, 14 
national, educational, bureaucratic, nepotistic, clientelistic and many more), can 15 
ultimately be investigated under the conduct of the ‘umbrella’ ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ 16 
levels. This is specifically pertinent in response to corruption research having 17 
produced a lot of typological ground to be covered, but little endeavour to show 18 
how the bottom-up (petty) and top-bottom (grand) levels of corrupt activities 19 
interact in an organic and culture-specific environment. Warburton’s language 20 
(2013:231) confirms the theoretical potential of such a link by stating that 21 
‘corruption will tend to flow upwards through the authority hierarchy to the next 22 
level of management, in order to gain access to greater discretional authority’ 23 
(Warburton 2013). It is this ‘flow’ of corruption that is of utmost interest as it implies 24 
an organic, fluid process of interaction and permeation of all levels by one, highly 25 
infectious phenomenon. To take this theory further the thesis will argue that not 26 
only does this flow happen upwards, as suggested by Warburton, but also downwards 27 
and these ‘flows’ simultaneously feed off of one another in the strategies they 28 
utilise, in order for corruption as a whole to sustain itself at all times of its duration 29 
(Figure 1.1). The thesis does not claim that all petty corruption must inevitably 30 
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morph into grand corruption and vice versa- hence the intermittent arrows in Figure 1 
1.1. It does however, theoretically expect to find a significant similarity between 2 
the strategies utilised to carry out both types of corrupt activity, which will 3 
ultimately link the two types into one approach to corruption as a whole (as shown 4 
by middle arrow), directly informing RQ1 and RQ2. The ‘flow’ arrows depict the 5 
expectation that based on selected strategies which are in fact the same, one type 6 
of corruption serves as a justification for engagement in the other; thus creating a 7 
perpetual vicious circle of engaging in corruption.  8 
  9 
 
 10 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of grand and petty corruption interaction. Source: Author 11 
 12 
Literature up to this point has popularly presumed that corruption can be presented 13 
in its disaggregated individual types, which construes a major gap in the 14 
understanding of, and the literature on, corruption. On the contrary, I argue that, 15 
just like any controversial cultural phenomenon, it needs to be studied as an 16 
interaction of all its specific components, lest it be continuously reduced to its 17 
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individual facets that together interact and create a complex whole. Consequently, 1 
it would appear that rather than distinguishing and measuring each type of 2 
corruption on its own, finding a link of similarities between the different levels of 3 
corruption could provide a conceptual basis for an improved, more holistic kind of 4 
corruption understanding and measurement. The thesis aims to identify such a link 5 
following this literature gap. It is obvious from Figure 1 that such a link is not one 6 
straightforward, linear connection. 7 
Addressing corruption from an economic angle is the preferred approach of 8 
economists like Susan Rose-Ackerman, as outlined in the previous section. This 9 
approach is intertwined also with the division of grand and petty corruption. She 10 
suggests that in both petty and grand corruption, the individuals with direct control 11 
and indirect influence over allocation of a resource are those most likely to benefit 12 
from corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999 in Bussell, 2015). Several scholars have 13 
adopted Rose-Ackerman’s economic view of grand corruption in their investigation 14 
into corrupt practices; for example Bauhr and Charron (2017) broadly define grand 15 
corruption as a ‘collusion among the highest levels of government that involves 16 
major public sector projects, procurement, and large financial benefits among high-17 
level public and private elites’ (Bauhr and Charron, 2017:416), transactions which 18 
are rarely directly observed by the general public (Bauhr and Charron 2017).  19 
Bracking (2007) in her understanding of the economic angle invokes Mishra (2005) 20 
when stating that ‘classical economic theory of corruption sees it as one way among 21 
several of allocating scarce resources, where the rational behaviour of market actors 22 
in respect to incentives and rents explains corruption outcomes’ (Bracking, 23 
2007:10). Corruption in this sense then spurs anticorruption efforts that target the 24 
government’s specific role in economy or the specific investigation of the banking 25 
or the investment sector. This is done in order to create a financial environment 26 
with greater checks and balances that benefit investment but are not necessarily 27 
healthier for the populace. However, as Bracking correctly points out, with such 28 
efforts the ‘political culture of a country is largely left intact, ready to exploit the 29 
renewed opportunities for corruption’ (Bracking 2007). Hindess (2013) outlines what 30 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) sees as the remedies to economic dimension of corruption: 31 
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first Rose-Ackerman suggests that for less corruption there should be less 1 
governmental involvement in certain spheres and secondly she suggests that high-2 
level public sector salaries should be competitive with private sector salaries, thus 3 
eliminating the incentive to commit corrupt acts. However, as Hindess correctly 4 
points out, the idea inverts on itself because such an increase of salaries would only 5 
create a significant income gap with the rest of the populace. That, in turn, creates 6 
opportunity for ‘factionalism’, which, as Hindess explains by invoking James 7 
Madison, is the self-destructive ‘corruption of the people by the people’ in a 8 
democracy (Hindess 2013). An extension of Rose-Ackerman’s definition is provided 9 
by Debiel and Gawrich’s (2013:7) understanding of petty corruption as two strata, a 10 
‘small-scale corruption among public servants during the implementation of policy’ 11 
in separate institutions such as the police, post offices, administrative buildings; and 12 
grand as a superior, ‘large-scale corruption involving decision-makers during the 13 
formulation of policy’ on a governmental or legislative level (Debiel and Gawrich 14 
2013). Clearly, the key element for these is policy-making and a more legislative 15 
framework of corruption, as well as its enforcement in everyday situations. These 16 
two examples alone point to a wide variation of interpretation of corruption labels 17 
within the scholastic community and within the field of economics. Therefore, the 18 
idea that somehow those who are better off will automatically be less susceptible 19 
to bribery or other forms of corruption is not plausible and further research into the 20 
topic is needed. Literature on this subject is also inconclusive, suggesting that in 21 
some cases, topping up salaries will in fact increase the level of corrupt activities 22 
(Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015) 23 
Ivanov develops the notion of public v. private sector gain further by stating that 24 
‘most econometric studies and global policy projects tend to sidestep definitional 25 
debates by referring to the World Bank’s (1997:8) standard and pithy ‘abuse of public 26 
office for private gain’ (Ivanov 2007) later taken over by Transparency International. 27 
Krastev (2000) underlines the criticism that such a short and generic definition could 28 
encompass as complicated a concept as corruption by further implicating economic 29 
theory as the main culprit: ‘The measurement of corruption facilitated the 30 
dominance of economics, marginalising the policy relevance of qualitative 31 
approaches that treat corruption in its specific local context (Krastev 2000:8; in 32 
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Ivanov 2007). Ivanov (2007) is therefore right to point out the obviously reductionist 1 
nature of a definition anchored exclusively in economic science and while the 2 
motivations for using such a definition are obvious to institutions such as the World 3 
Bank, foreign investors, and country risk assessors, there are clearly shortcomings 4 
to this rationale. If the primary economic outcome behind CPI’s approach to 5 
corruption is to evaluate the economic and governmental health of the given 6 
country, and therefore inevitably serve as an indicator of business incentive, then it 7 
is important to highlight the shortcomings of causality. Iloie (2015) in her work, for 8 
example, shows absolutely ‘no correlation or strong connection between a country’s 9 
perceived corruption and investment inflows to that country’ (Iloie, 2015:631). She 10 
illustrates this on the examples of two Central and East European countries, Poland 11 
and Ukraine. These, while significantly corrupt (according to the Transparency 12 
International’s Corruption Perception Index) (CPI), gathered bigger amounts of 13 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from 2008 to 2013 than Austria or Slovenia, both far 14 
more successful in their CPI (Iloie 2015). While there are factors other than CPI that 15 
drive competitiveness in the market, such as population size or business opportunity, 16 
from a purely corruption perspective, it would appear economic understanding of 17 
corruption presents with difficulties of validity in justifying its own approach to the 18 
phenomenon. 19 
While I do not ignore the economic component of corruption in my investigation or 20 
definition insofar as bribery and embezzlement are dominant features of corruption, 21 
there is clearly need for a more whole-rounded approach to the problematic. 22 
1.4 Sociological approach to corruption 23 
 24 
Most political and/or sociological understandings of corruption return to the 25 
foundations of political theory (Clarke 1983, Bracking 2007, Hindess 2013). Scholars 26 
invoke the teachings of Aristotle and his several forms of government: of oneself, of 27 
a household, and of a slave or of a state; all of which present with their own forms 28 
of corruption potential (Hindess 2013). This is why Aristotle’s understanding of 29 
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corruption goes back to the basic principle and essence of corruption- simply 1 
described as ‘damaging impurity, some kind of intrusion or distortion which 2 
prevented something from being as it should’ (Hindess, 2013:5).  3 
Bracking (2007) invokes the teachings of Machiavelli and a slightly more callous 4 
understanding, whereby one has a ‘natural tendency to ignore the claims of our 5 
community as soon as they seem to conflict with the pursuit of our own immediate 6 
advantage’ (Bracking 2007). She explains that modern political understanding of 7 
corruption builds on these traditional ideas and therefore includes the notions of 8 
good governance and, inversely, also the phenomena that disrupt it, such as ‘weak 9 
political competition, underdeveloped civil society, insufficient public service 10 
integrity and ethics and weak democratic structures’ (Della porta and Vannucci 11 
1999, Doig and Theobald 2000, Bracking 2007, Heidenheimer 2009). Bracking 12 
addresses the ideas of two abstract ‘countries’ or layers present in every real state: 13 
pays legal and pays réel, one a legal structure and the other a structure where real 14 
power is wielded (Bayart 2000; in Bracking 2007). She explains that following on 15 
from this model, politically, corruption always takes place in the latter structure; 16 
also referred to as a realm of politics called the “shadow state” (Reno 1995; in 17 
Bracking 2007). Similarly, Lampert (1983) labels corruption a major ‘political issue 18 
not only because it undermines the conditions needed for effective planning, but 19 
also because it erodes the legitimacy of the whole political structure’ (Lampert, 20 
1983:286). All of the above-mentioned reasonings outline the understanding of 21 
corruption by political and social science as a necessarily clandestine endeavour 22 
subject to human nature that takes place behind the scenes and is somehow an 23 
intangible phenomenon that destabilises an otherwise potentially well-functioning 24 
system. One particular challenge of studying corruption therefore comes from its 25 
opaque and secretive nature and the difficulty of access.  26 
This is not a sufficient conclusion for Bracking (2007), however, and from her 27 
perspective a post-structuralist and a sociological angle is preferred. Bracking’s 28 
outlook is that of investigating corruption, ‘as a wide range of discrete and differing 29 
social practices’ (Bracking, 2007). Bracking’s main issue with understanding 30 
corruption in political theory is that it has become a ‘ubiquitous normative labeller 31 
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of different economic behaviours, within contested political discourses on privilege 1 
and power’ (Bracking, 2007:12) and becomes an empty concept without the 2 
sociological complexity she believes it encompasses. I concur with this emphasis on 3 
the sociological, behavioural, and inherently empirical approach to the study of 4 
corruption, as it is necessarily tied in with the development of a particular society- 5 
in other words, corruption is as varied as societies themselves and requires an 6 
individual approach. Warburton (2013) identifies this as a major gap in corruption 7 
literature and one that the thesis addresses by its empirical data collection and 8 
analysis in the cultural context of the field. Warburton specifically argues that it is 9 
‘essential to understand it [corruption] firstly from the individual’s perspective and 10 
to then build the individual into a complex social world…[we need to] understand 11 
corruption as a social process and to understand the individual actors who are the 12 
participants in this social system’ (Warburton, 2013:221). He goes on to add that 13 
this has not been done to date and there is therefore demand for this approach to 14 
give corruption its due consideration, rather than a reductionist anonymous label of 15 
a ‘universal diagnosis for a nation’s ills’ (Ivanov, 2007:40).  16 
At this point it is important for us to expand our horizons of understanding corruption 17 
and become aware of Ivanov’s argument that corruption does not exist in a vacuum 18 
but within a social formation of other phenomena. It is therefore apt to point out 19 
that the classic approach to anti-corruption techniques, ie the illusion that removing 20 
the ‘venal officials currently in power would automatically generate progress’ and 21 
curb corruption for good, is at worst naïve and at best incomplete (Ivanov, 2007:41). 22 
Instead, Ivanov (2007) calls for the understanding of corruption in sociological and 23 
cultural terms as a ‘value-ridden concept that should not be treated as though it 24 
were essentially the same phenomenon around the world…A more contextualised 25 
analysis of corruption as a social construct could inform more successful policies’ 26 
(Ivanov, 2007:42). The idea of anchoring corruption research in a real-life 27 
understanding of it, as the thesis does, therefore directly responds to this gap in 28 
corruption understanding. 29 
Kaufmann (2018) furthers the idea of corruption as a social construct and weaves in 30 
the cultural factor shaping behavioural patterns of those involved in corruption 31 
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(Kaufmann, Hooghiemstra et al. 2018): ‘culture guides human behaviour as it 1 
provides members of society with schematic, mental models about what is 2 
appropriate versus inappropriate, legitimate versus illegitimate, and good versus 3 
bad’ (2018:391). Meyer (2008) expands on this idea by indicating that corruption and 4 
informal practices are all subject to both subjective (e.g. values, needs, interests, 5 
attitudes, habits, emotions) and objective factors (political, legal, economic) (Meyer 6 
2008). These factors then, according to Meyer, inform ‘collective memory, 7 
history…and influence mentality of how people, elites, as well as ordinary citizens, 8 
have learned to deal with the sphere of politics’ (Meyer, 2008:22). This behavioural 9 
aspect of understanding corruption most prevalently informs my research design and 10 
questions, along with the aforementioned urge of literature to employ a more 11 
qualitative approach to investigating corruption. Warburton’s idea of anchoring 12 
corruption in Social Network Theory (SNT) is consequently very compelling, as it 13 
represents corruption as constantly evolving, possessive of the ever-expanding lease 14 
of life it has within society (Warburton, 2013). He understands corruption as 15 
fundamentally a ‘technique of goal achievement, not an end in itself’ (2013:224) 16 
and that all who participate in it have a fundamental access to a resource and wield 17 
some form of power (Warburton 2013) that can be exchanged for another resource. 18 
In this way social networks develop, expand and even have the potential of capturing 19 
an institution or organisation entirely, if the resource and power wielding of 20 
corruptors reach a critical mass.  21 
The most important idea here is that this approach to corruption ‘allows the 22 
investigator to conceptualise the operation of corrupt networks in terms of power 23 
flows and relationships, rather than the attributes of actors’ (Warburton, 2013:235). 24 
This fluid interpretation of corruption, invoking ‘flows’ for a second time in the 25 
review, is the basis for informing my research questions RQ 1-3, because the 26 
rationalisation and justification of involvement in corruption is just as important 27 
theoretically, as the empirical strategies utilised to carry out corrupt acts. What my 28 
RQ3 labels as ‘strategy’ can easily be understood as Warburton’s idea of ‘dynamic 29 
networks and relationships’. This is because these networks and relationships are 30 
the gateway to Reno’s (1995) “shadow state”, where a whole new set of norms are 31 
employed to ‘eliminate competition, create a charmed circle, an inside track’ 32 
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(Clarke, 1983:xvi). Put simply, these networks and relationships are crucial to 1 
accessing corrupt practices and therefore crucial to the empirical investigation of 2 
corruption.  3 
Ultimately, what this section has discussed and explored is the need to move away 4 
from classical theories of political and social science and move towards a more 5 
combined, modern approach to social science- i.e., combining sociological factors, 6 
cultural, behavioural, and ultimately individual factors contributing to a complex 7 
whole. The thesis attempts to address this gap in literature, resulting in an empirical 8 
study, as opposed to a purely theoretical contribution to the debate. The 9 
investigation embraces, rather than rejects, the overlap of cultural and individual 10 
factors in corrupt practices and accepts it as axiomatic within any society, namely 11 
the society of Slovakia within the healthcare sector. In sum, the sociological and 12 
political debate about corruption raises questions about what the concept of 13 
corruption does as much as what it is (Bracking, 2007). The thesis addresses this 14 
through a rigorous investigation of experiences of corruption in a living and a 15 
dynamic social setting. Giordano (2013) sums up the objective of an effective study 16 
of corruption in a comprehensive way that I follow in the thesis (Giordano and Hayoz 17 
2013): ‘The point is to find a behaviour’s underlying sense in line with the social 18 
logic of the culture to which the actor belongs’ (2013:13). In this framework, it is 19 
my goal to understand in qualitative terms this intentionality behind corrupt 20 
behaviour and to place it within the ‘logic of the culture’. This means to identify 21 
the strategies utilised to access corrupt behaviour and the ‘logic’ behind it; 22 
expecting to find a connection between the ‘logic’ for grand and the ‘logic’ for petty 23 
corrupt behaviour. 24 
  25 
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1.5 Anthropological approaches 1 
 2 
While anthropology offers a fairly niche outlook on corruption and does not hold as 3 
much theoretical prowess as that of sociology, there is an interesting facet to 4 
economic anthropology that presents corruption within the framework of ‘rules’. 5 
Andvig (2001:46) describes corruption as ‘fluid and always negotiable ‘rules of the 6 
game’, multiple norm systems, … gift-giving practices, networks of solidarity and 7 
collusion, extended family solidarity and predatory forms of authority’ (Andvig, Odd-8 
Helg et al. 2001). This broadens the understanding of corruption as it takes into 9 
consideration the earlier contestation of economic theory being based solely on 10 
bribery, as opposed to immaterial gifts, gift giving or exchange of services. The rest 11 
of the mentioned aspects of corruption in this rule-based definition also hint at the 12 
rationale behind RQ3 and a much more empirical inquiry into corrupt practices, 13 
attempting to capture the precise accessing of these ‘networks of solidarity’, be it 14 
friends or family, that I believe create a gateway into corruption involvement. Gerd 15 
Meyer (2008) concurs with the essence of this understanding of corruption by 16 
emphasising the role of rules in the emergence of “Informal Politics”. Meyer (2008) 17 
outlines several cases in which rules give way to informal politics, for example when 18 
‘formal rules or institutions do not exist, are weak, inconsistent or loose’, when 19 
‘there is a lack of democratic traditions with respect for formal rules’, when there 20 
are ‘rapid or permanent changes of rules’, when ‘there is an overload of rules to 21 
understand’ , when ‘rules are inflexible’, and when ‘there is a large gap between 22 
the actual functioning of the formal rules and normative claims of institutions’ 23 
(Meyer, 2008:24). Giordano and Hayoz (2013) also point out a similar concept of 24 
corruption only ‘existing in the presence of formal rules’ (2013:12), as one defines 25 
itself against the other. Gallina (2013) concurs with this dominant role of rules when 26 
she argues that ‘the general meaning of a negative form of informality is the use of 27 
informal practices in order to outweigh independent institutions, to ignore formal 28 
rules and so forth’ (Gallina, 2013:142). She goes on to elaborate on such a ‘rule-29 
based framework’ and provides us with three dimensions to consider when 30 
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identifying whether negative informal practices (ie corruption) have taken hold over 1 
independent institutions and are more likely to be utilised by the populace as a 2 
result (Gallina 2013):  3 
• A lack of rules- implying negligence in establishing rules 4 
• Façade rules- either rules that are too weak or too complicated and their subsequent 5 
inevitable ignorance 6 
• Rule capture- strategic placement of an agent to capture rules for personal gain 7 
(2013:143).  8 
This kind of theoretical approach to corruption as a rule-breaking or rule-9 
manoeuvring exercise is also very close to theories of red tape, informal practices 10 
and rational choice (see Kaufmann, 2018; Bohn, 2013), further showing that 11 
corruption presents the field of social sciences with multiple dimensions. A certain 12 
amount of overlap in conceptual understanding therefore does appear necessary to 13 
accept, which is why my distilled understanding of corruption does not limit itself 14 
to one specific area of study. The thesis includes a theoretical assumption on the 15 
role of rules in corruption involvement, since this appears to be an effective manner 16 
of relaying conceptual elements of corruption to respondents and facilitate their 17 
understanding. However, it is important not to lose sight of the shortcomings of a 18 
merely rule-based understanding of corruption, for example the difficulty of 19 
separating the rule-breaking factor from the human decision-making factor, which 20 
may not always share a direct relationship. Also, the implications and negative 21 
connotations of rule breaking could make respondents uncomfortable to share their 22 
experiences, which is why the wording of questions had to be very careful and 23 
considerate. Therefore, a rule-based anthropological approach is merely one of the 24 
elements informing the understanding of corruption for this investigation. This 25 
approach also feeds into the understanding of corruption within the framework of 26 
informal practices below. 27 
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 1 
1.6 Informal institutions and practices 2 
 3 
‘Sticks and carrots alone cannot explain human behaviour’ (Batory, 2012:74). 4 
Informality is defined by a lack of formal rules and structures; thus, informal 5 
practices exist as an antithesis to formal practices. Lauth (2000) explicitly states 6 
that informal institutions are dependent upon the existence of formal institutions. 7 
They live, as it were, at the expense of the former, by exploiting them for their own 8 
purposes, by either partially occupying or penetrating them. In this sense, they are 9 
‘parasitic institutions which, for example, find their expression in corruption’ 10 
(Lauth, 2000:26). Informal institutions and corruption, while two separate concepts, 11 
are therefore intertwined in their theoretical and practical manifestation. Especially 12 
within Central and Eastern Europe, Giordano (2013) emphasises the need to highlight 13 
not only the differences between the two, but mainly ‘similarities between the 14 
various disciplines’ approaches [to them], which are nevertheless characterised by 15 
family resemblances4 (in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s terms) due to shared cognitive 16 
interests’ (Giordano, 2013:10). These “family resemblances” are best illustrated by 17 
Pejovich’s (1999) understanding of formal versus informal institutions: formal 18 
including constitutions, contracts and form of government; while informal 19 
institutions include ‘traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs, and all 20 
other norms of behaviour that have passed the test of time’ (Pejovich 1999:166; in 21 
Kaufmann, 2018). As we have seen, the idea of corrupt behaviour reaches as far 22 
back as Aristotle, so it would be fair to assume corruption has also passed the test 23 
of time, which, according to this definition, would make it a subsection of informal 24 
practices and institutions. In other words, all corruption should then take place as 25 
 
4 Emphasis mine. 
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part of informality, as opposed to formality. Corruption has therefore been 1 
considered both as a subset, and a manifestation of, informal practices- which evade 2 
any quantitatively oriented empirical analysis (Lauth 2000). The overlapping nature 3 
is obvious here and it is necessarily taken into consideration with further 4 
investigation of corruption.  5 
Meyer agrees with this classification and in a meta-analysis distinguishes two levels 6 
within informal practices themselves: power structures on the one hand, and 7 
‘efficient, ‘unwritten’, often customary rules, values and norms as well as conscious 8 
or unconscious patterns of perception, interaction and communication’ on the other 9 
(Meyer, 2008:17). Institutions are defined by Meyer (2008) as ‘stable patterns of 10 
interaction and social relations’ which is why I believe, for practical and empirical 11 
purposes, we can speak of corrupt practices and corrupt institutions almost 12 
synonymously, since both require forms of interaction and take place within social 13 
relations. Meyer goes on to elaborate his argument into institutions being 14 
‘embedded in society and their cultural norms and patterns, working according to 15 
dominant values, conventions and group interests’ (Meyer 2008:18). This, to Meyer 16 
(2008), is a part of a new theory addressing institutions, neo-institutionalism, which 17 
suggests that within such institutions, each actor of the institution uses these as a 18 
mere mechanism and individual strategy of rational action to achieve their own 19 
advantage, ie the ‘rational choice approach’ (Meyer, 2008:18). Meyer’s 20 
understanding of informal institutions, and within them corrupt institutions, feeds 21 
into the definition of corruption as ultimately a way to achieve personal profit and 22 
an advantaged position within society in Machiavellian terms.  23 
However, in order not to accept this rather cynical outlook on informal institutions, 24 
and alongside them corrupt institutions, we need to take a closer look at the 25 
connotations behind informality and the ultimate reason why in this thesis we speak 26 
of corruption rather than informality. Giordano (2013) points out that informality is 27 
a phenomenon that works with several connotations depending on different social 28 
situations. It can either evoke the idea of an open agent or environment and thus 29 
have a definitely positive connotation; or, when linked to the so-called public 30 
sphere, informality can take on a different meaning altogether. In this case it 31 
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becomes synonymous with dishonesty, illegality, double-dealing, dysfunction, 1 
unreliability, irregularity, nepotism, corruption’ (Giordano, 2013:30). Clearly, 2 
corruption is here synonymous with the negative sphere of informality. Giordano’s 3 
ultimate definition of informality as ‘entailing an extra-institutional resource based 4 
on interpersonal transaction and exchanges of reciprocal services between 5 
interacting actors’ (Giordano, 2013:30) ties together all of our previously mentioned 6 
ideas, central to the understanding of corruption: ie resources, exchange, 7 
interpersonal relations, services, interaction, and social settings. It is therefore 8 
essential to realise the overlapping nature of specific social phenomena and the 9 
need to investigate corruption from as wide an outlook as possible.  10 
Lovell, Ledeneva and Rogatchevski (2000) provide a comprehensive overview of 11 
corruption, bribery, and the concept of informality, or “blat”, which theoretically 12 
serves as most helpful for investigating corruption within Central and Eastern 13 
Europe, due to its origin in the region (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000). Most 14 
significantly, they point out the confusing nature of distinguishing rigidly between 15 
the public and the private spheres in post-Soviet ideology (which stems from the 16 
ideological norm of self-identification with the purposes of the organisation, the 17 
Party, and the Soviet state) that helped to create a favourable environment for 18 
‘give-and-take’ practices in the Soviet period’ (Ledeneva et al., 2000:4). These 19 
practices are what the authors claim to be not strictly-speaking corruption, but a 20 
Soviet version of informal practices, called “blat”. The authors explain that ‘in 21 
common parlance, “by blat” took root as meaning “by acquaintance” (po 22 
znakomstvu) and was used to refer to ways to obtain (dostat’) or arrange (ustroit’) 23 
access to goods and services by the use of connections’ (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 24 
2000). In this sense they claim that blat had less of a negative connotation of bribery 25 
or corruption. On the contrary, blat was seen to be more a form of ‘cooperation and 26 
mutual support with a long-term perspective and implies trust, rather than 27 
compensation for risk’ (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000). The authors refer to the need 28 
for one to be in possession of a network or a ‘chain of blat’ to be able to access 29 
corrupt practices, such as bribery. As such, blat was considered less morally 30 
reprehensible than bribery itself, serving as a mediating agent.  31 
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In my understanding of corruption practices, this idea forms one of the central pillars 1 
for addressing corruption. It is these informal networks and blat that I believe exist 2 
not in isolation, but are in fact inseparable, and form the core of the strategies 3 
utilised to engage in corrupt activities. Therefore, my understanding of corruption 4 
is not that it is a mere subsection of informal practices as suggested above, but 5 
that in a Venn diagram (see Figure 1.2), corrupt practices would be at the 6 
overlapping centre of informal institutions, informal networks, and the post-Soviet-7 
specific blat practices, typical for the region investigated. It is the belief of this 8 
thesis that only as a truly overlapping concept can corruption be investigated in 9 
sufficient depth and that future qualitative studies on corrupt behaviour should 10 
adopt a similar approach with the variable of ‘blat’ being replaced in the diagram 11 
by whatever label is relevant and prevalent to the region at hand to describe 12 
informal attitudes and networks (e.g. guanxi in China (Fan 2002, Ledeneva 2008).  13 
 14 
Figure 1.2 Corruption presented as a cross-section point of multiple labels addressing 15 
informality, Source: Author 16 
 17 
The concept of informality within the understanding of corruption is key in order to 18 
form a whole-rounded picture of the complexity of the phenomenon. The 19 
implications behind informality relate to customs, behavioural patterns of choice, 20 
trust, and the unwritten rules behind the functioning of society as a whole. RQs 3 & 21 
3a,3b in particular are informed by this understanding and phrased specifically to 22 
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include notions of customs and rules, as well as trust to reflect the holistic 1 
investigation that corruption demands. Specific field questions are included for the 2 
respondents to be able to determine qualitatively the level to which informality and 3 
corruption are understood as synonymous by the respondents or what differences 4 
are observed.  In this manner the thesis will further inform the literature on the 5 
subject of informal practice versus corruption, which has clearly failed to draw a 6 
clear distinction so far. 7 
 8 
1.7 Trust and ethics 9 
 10 
Having already touched upon the notion of morality and values embedded in 11 
corruption earlier, it is no surprise that the investigation of corruption brings along 12 
with itself a discussion of ethics and moral values. Clarke (1983:x) states: ‘You are 13 
corrupt’ is a moral and a political cry more than it is a legal accusation- the 14 
connotations of decay, depravity, secretiveness and self-interest are well 15 
understood as grossly incompatible with official position’ in public sector (Clarke 16 
1983). Rothstein and Eek (2009) interpret social trust as people’s moral evaluation 17 
of the society in which they live (Rothstein and Eek 2009) and argue that ‘the 18 
behaviour of public officials is one important device that people use when forming 19 
beliefs about to what extent people in general can be trusted’ (2009:89). In a 2018 20 
BTI report on Slovakia, up to 85.6% of over 1,000 respondents said that corruption 21 
contributed the most to mistrust (BTI, 2018:11)5. Trust therefore appears to be 22 
strongly correlated with corruption and therefore cannot be overlooked in this 23 
investigation. In my research of corruption, it is the behaviour and public conduct 24 
of the officials in the healthcare sector context that will get addressed as one of the 25 
 
5 BTI 2018- Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index Report of 2018; Slovakia-specific section. 
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issues pertaining to RQ1, targeting awareness of grand corruption. Batory (2012) 1 
suggests that a World Values Survey conducted in CEE countries has shown that when 2 
respondents were asked if they thought their compatriots engaged in corrupt 3 
practice, over 76% of respondents thought ‘almost all’ did (Batory, 2012:75). 4 
According to Batory, such lack of trust and lack of belief in integrity as a social norm 5 
creates conditions for a general downward spiral of ‘self-fulfilling expectations 6 
about corruption’ (Batory, 2012:75). Furthermore, pertinent to RQ1, Batory makes 7 
the observation that ‘even for citizens who recognise that corruption is harmful and 8 
find it morally objectionable the question that often arises is: who are they, our 9 
politicians, to tell us not to bribe or accept a bribe?’ (Batory, 2012:76). This 10 
rhetorical question is perhaps the closest I have encountered the existing literature 11 
to hint at the essence of my RQ1 and RQ2, i.e., searching for a link and justification 12 
of petty corruption by awareness of grand and vice versa.  13 
A Slovak-specific example of untrustworthy behaviour of public officials is ex-Prime 14 
Minister Fico’s unfulfilled promises of curbing corruption and his three consecutive 15 
governments failing to do anything about greater media transparency or increased 16 
media pluralism (BTI 2018). The BTI states that trust in political institutions has 17 
continued to stagnate and decline since the 2012 elections. Boardman and Klum 18 
(2013), for example, make a salient point about unethical and corrupt public 19 
behaviour such as this compromising not only the value of services but also affecting 20 
the cost, quality and availability of these services (Boardman and Klum 2013). 21 
Besides the moral implications and Bracking’s observation (2007) that the concept 22 
of corruption is indeed ‘morally loaded’, there is also empirical evidence that links 23 
lack of trust to higher levels of dysfunctionality in systems (Morris and Klesner 2010). 24 
Boardman and Klum (2013) concur with this observation and, most importantly, for 25 
services such as health care they emphasise the role of trust as instrumental: ‘Loss 26 
of public trust can further undermine the ability of public sector agencies to provide 27 
effective and equitable services, especially to those in need’ (2013:82). Morris and 28 
Klesner develop this notion in their comprehensive study of Mexican political and 29 
interpersonal trust, and suggest a ‘vicious circle’ of trust, wherein low level of 30 
interpersonal trust nurtures corrupt practices, which in turn undermine trust in 31 
government and other institutions (Morris and Klesner 2010). More rigorously, they 32 
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show that low trust in politicians joint with perception of corruption creates an 1 
expectation of corruption, which in turn reinforces and feeds corrupt behaviour. If 2 
this concept is to be applied to health care, the presumption would be that in our 3 
context, low trust in healthcare officials joint with perception of grand corruption 4 
creates an expectation of corruption and would in turn feed petty corrupt behaviour. 5 
Similarly, if we expect to find a link between petty and grand corruption behaviour 6 
on this spectrum, the presumption would be that awareness of petty corruption 7 
would feed grand corrupt behaviour as well.  8 
Kubbe in turn emphasises the instrumental role of interpersonal trust in thinking 9 
about corruption in the modern sense- lack of interpersonal trust increases 10 
perceived political corruption (Kubbe 2013). Political corruption, in turn, according 11 
to Kubbe’s research, lowers trust in political institutions. Therefore, it follows that 12 
high degrees of political corruption foster low levels of trust in political institutions 13 
and erode general trust in the whole community. High levels of trust in individuals 14 
shows positive view of their democratic institutions, which has already been linked 15 
to lower corruption levels. Kubbe (2013) ultimately concludes that trust is a key 16 
phenomenon with regards to corruption, and argues that, overall, there is a strong 17 
negative correlation between the two, whereby societies with more trust tend to 18 
have less corruption (Kubbe 2013). However, Kubbe also emphasises the intrinsic 19 
difficulty in fully grasping and measuring abstract and subjective concepts such as 20 
trust. Additionally, Kubbe states that in light of this complicated relationship 21 
between corruption and trust, corruption measurement cannot in itself realistically 22 
encompass all kinds of corruption to be able to accurately quantify the pervasiveness 23 
of corruption in the country. 24 
Scholars clearly show that low levels of trust are both a cause and a consequence of 25 
corruption, which firmly solidifies the role trust plays in corrupt practices (Rothstein 26 
and Eek 2009, Morris and Klesner 2010, Kubbe 2013). Giordano (2013) concurs with 27 
this conclusion and reinforces the notion that ‘lack of trust in formal organizations, 28 
of both the state and of civil society, will also characterize the future horizon of 29 
expectations’ (Giordano, 2013:14). It is this notion of expectations of others that 30 
seems to be key to understanding the role of trust in the perpetuating dynamics of 31 
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corrupt behaviour. Warburton (2013) points to a mechanism of the corrupt parties 1 
‘locking’ one another in a corrupt relationship as a result of trust, which, he 2 
believes, is both the outcome but also a necessary predisposition for corrupt 3 
practices, since trust is required to engage in informal or illegal activity but will also 4 
result after a successfully carried out corrupt act (Warburton 2013). In this context 5 
Luhmann (1979) describes trust as ‘a generalised expectation that the ‘other will 6 
continue to behave in accordance with the way they have portrayed themselves’ (in 7 
Warburton, 2013:225). Kubbe similarly sees trust in the context of corruption as 8 
defined by certainty of expectation, ie laying the basis for cooperation with people 9 
who are not like oneself (Kubbe 2013). The detrimental effects of lack of trust 10 
ultimately leading to corruption, as well as resulting in corruption, are what informs 11 
the RQ3 of this investigation into corruption. We have established that trust is 12 
explored as both a precondition and a result of corrupt practices, but the literature 13 
has so far failed to determine which end of this spectrum interacts with trust more 14 
prevalently- the origin or the result of corruption. The relating ‘trust assumption’ is 15 
formulated to try and determine whether the notion of trust as a pre-requisite or a 16 
result of corruption is more prevalent.  17 
Assumption about trust: Trust is understood as a condition of corrupt practice more 18 
often than it is understood as a result of corrupt practice.  19 
Within the context of trust, on a theoretical level, the thesis investigates abstract 20 
strategies of trust in corrupt practices, such as collective rules manoeuvring and how 21 
these interact on both grand and petty levels. 22 
On an empirical level it investigates the concrete role of trust in accessing 23 
corruption, such as friendship networks, acquaintances, agreements. Trust is 24 
therefore seen as one of the strategies that links grand and petty corruption 25 
practice, as shown in Figure 1.1. 26 
 27 
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1.8 Corruption as a result of soviet/communist legacies 1 
 2 
In his comprehensive study on corruption, ‘Corruption around the World’, Tanzi 3 
(1998) addresses not only the origins and causes of corruption, but also the problems 4 
with its measurement, generalisation of its causes, as well as insufficient measures 5 
taken to counter corruption in various societies. Building on the previous sections of 6 
the literature review, Tanzi shares his own classification of acts of corruption as the 7 
following: 8 
• Bureaucratic (or ‘petty’) or political (‘grand’) 9 
• Cost-reducing (to the briber) or benefit enhancing 10 
• Briber-initiated or bribee-initiated 11 
• Coercive or collusive 12 
• Centralised or decentralised 13 
• Predictable or arbitrary 14 
• Involving cash payments or not (Tanzi 1998). 15 
Clearly Tanzi stays within the tradition of thinking of corruption in binary terms, but 16 
also introduces yet another, incentivising dimension of petty and grand corruption. 17 
Furthermore, Tanzi describes the need for corrupt practices in communism 18 
specifically and links them to the breakdown of communism and to the requirements 19 
of post-communist transitions. He points out that these corrupt phenomena become 20 
more normalised as time progresses and they are emulated enough within society to 21 
resemble a kind of ‘contagious disease’ (Tanzi, 1998:562). For this ‘disease’ to latch 22 
on to society, specific incubation conditions have to be met, and post-communist 23 
transitional societies, Tanzi argues, provide the best environment for the symptoms 24 
of corruption to eventually present themselves. Specifically, Tanzi speaks of the 25 
processes of privatization, the abuses of which ‘appear to have been particularly 26 
significant in the transition economies’ (Tanzi, 1998:563) and other forms of asset 27 
stripping and nomenklatura privatization practices; all specific for post-communist 28 
societies. Other issues identified by Tanzi are, for example, the heavy regulations, 29 
authorisations, and confusing taxation policies of post-communist transitional 30 
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governments, provisions of goods and services below market prices, non-transparent 1 
party financing, and bad investment and spending decisions by governments with 2 
little to no experience with capitalism. These are inseparably linked to challenges 3 
such as low public sector wages, lack of transparency in rules and regulations, and 4 
bureaucratic practices. Tanzi shows a clear negative correlation between rising 5 
wages and decrease in corruption, but he does emphasise an important issue of not 6 
being able to generalise corruption incentives, as realistically, ‘not all officials 7 
respond in the same way to the same incentives’ (Tanzi, 1998:572). 8 
Katsenelinboigen (1983) also suggests that income was a key issue in USSR corruption 9 
and its legacy, contributing to his interpretation of corruption genesis (1983:234): 10 
‘The lower the ratio of the population’s legal income to its semi-legal and illegal 11 
income, the higher the amount of  corruption’ (Katsenelinboigen 1983). 12 
Mirroring Tanzi’s views of corruption being a specifically prominent phenomenon in 13 
transitional societies are scholars such as Kostadinova (2012), Holmes (2006), 14 
Haughton (2013) or Neuman Stanivukovic (2010). Holmes is more explicit in her 15 
assertion, stating plainly that ‘the very nature of post-communism encourages 16 
corruption’ (Holmes 2006), invoking habits of informal connections and distrust of 17 
the state, specific for the communist era. Grodeland et al. (1998:655) concur with 18 
this view and describe the ‘total bureaucratisation which the socialist ideology has 19 
tended to promote in practice [having] made the problem of corruption particularly 20 
central to these regimes… problems associated with the individual behaviour of 21 
Soviet officials- corruption, bribe taking, patronage, false reporting to superiors and 22 
so on more closely reflected the rational responses of these officials to a 23 
bureaucratic structure that logically encouraged such behaviour’ (Grodeland, 24 
Koshechkina et al. 1998). Kostadinova outlines in her literature review the ‘rise in 25 
corruption after communism’ (Kostadinova 2012), and invokes Schmidt (2007) and 26 
his view that the origin and spread of corruption are strongly linked to the ongoing 27 
process of democratic and economic transformation, presenting new opportunities 28 
for embezzlement when privatization and economic restructuring were launched, 29 
while older ‘practices managed to survive and adapt’ (Schmidt, 2007 in Kostadinova, 30 
2012). Kostadinova’s main argument is that while the problem of corruption is 31 
complex and realistically cannot be reduced to communist legacies alone, corruption 32 
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is indeed much more serious and systemic in transitional, than in consolidated 1 
democracies. Sakwa (2012) explains this phenomenon, similarly to Ledeneva’s 2 
outlining of blat, by distinguishing between the fall of the Soviet system as opposed 3 
to the fall of the Soviet order, which he believes survives in insufficient 4 
democratisation processes and also in the corrupt practices that live on (Sakwa 5 
2012). Interestingly, rather than a simple handing over of legacies from communist 6 
leadership to the transitional governmental leadership however, Kostadinova 7 
describes the ‘multifaceted character of the transition, political, economic and in 8 
some cases state-building, offering even more opportunities for improper behaviour 9 
and enrichment’ (Kostadinova, 2012:5). Therefore, the process of transition and 10 
economic shift itself seems to be more important in this context for the 11 
encouragement of corruption growth than the presence of explicit communist 12 
legacies. In support of this view, Miller et al. (2001) suggest, on a theoretical level, 13 
that the legacy of communist past has a strong impact on political corruption in CEE 14 
countries (Miller 2001). They, however, specify on a practical level, that rather than 15 
cultural attitudes, it is economic pressure that causes and encourages the most 16 
widely-spread corrupt trend of gift-giving; a phenomenon already addressed by the 17 
thesis as a gap in economic literature on corruption.  18 
Tim Haughton (2013) concurs with this view and also perceives the main origins of 19 
corruption in its current form in the Central European states in connection with 20 
financial and economic transition and development, particularly with EU funds 21 
embezzlement. He suggests that the Central and East European (CEE) countries are 22 
still just ‘reckoning with the past’ and corruption is therefore politically mostly tied 23 
to party financing and economically to EU funds embezzlement. He believes 24 
transitional societies are forever stuck in a vicious circle of receiving funds to correct 25 
the trends of the past and boost old infrastructure and outdated agricultural 26 
systems, but not utilising them in the intended manner, therefore always needing 27 
more (Haughton 2013). Scholars like Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) suggest that Haughton’s 28 
view is based on an expectation of these transitional systems moving from a 29 
universalistic system (i.e., communism, socialism) to a particularistic system 30 
(capitalism), but realistically they are all currently in the mid-stage of a 31 
‘competitive particularism’ of this process. This mid-stage, Mungiu-Pippidi argues, 32 
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would economically situate the corruption practices we see today on a trajectory 1 
moving away from communism, bound to eventually abandon the practices of 2 
informality, but clearly requiring some time still before the process is complete 3 
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). 4 
In a more country-specific research, Neuman Stanivukovic (2010) focuses on the 5 
former Czechoslovakia, suggesting that as far as democratisation and reforms are 6 
concerned, these were much more turbulent in Slovakia than the Czech Republic 7 
after their dissolution. She describes the weak character of the institutions in EU 8 
applicant states, and therefore suggests Europeanisation has been a more cyclical 9 
process than a static independent variable, occurring based on domestic 10 
institutional and historical path tendencies (Neuman Stanivukovic 2010). She 11 
suggests that while Europeanisation has tried to overcome a deeply-rooted societal 12 
division in Slovakia, this has been unsuccessful precisely due to corrupt practices, 13 
as shown by the constant division in the coalition governments of Slovakia (Neuman 14 
Stanivukovic 2010). The Slovak process of transition and Europeanisation therefore 15 
has been more cosmetic than substantial, and this raises questions as to whether 16 
the theory that communist legacies are generically responsible for corrupt practices 17 
in transitional democracies is merely a partial explanation, as some countries (e.g., 18 
the Baltic states) took to democratisation processes easier than others, albeit 19 
sharing a communist past. The BTI report of 2018 suggests that Slovakia indeed 20 
‘remains split over the legacies of two authoritarian regimes (fascist and communist) 21 
and the process of reconciliation has been more complicated than in neighbouring 22 
countries’ (BTI, 2018:35), further supporting the idea that legacies of the past have 23 
the potential to strongly influence the current political and social climate. A more 24 
detailed look into Slovakia’s reckoning with corruption is explored in the second part 25 
of the literature review. 26 
Other scholars have an opposing view on communism as the origin for corrupt 27 
practices. Krastev (2001) suggests that corruption is merely another tile in a 28 
multifaceted mosaic of discourse in post-communist countries. He suggests that 29 
while corruption is a way for the post-communist public to ‘talk about politics, 30 
economy, past and future’, it is also a ‘black myth of transition, an explanation of 31 
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last resort for all failures and disappointments of the first post-communist decade…it 1 
is a set of discourses expressing painful processes of transition and social 2 
stratification’, but it is not a new phenomenon and not intrinsic to communism in 3 
and of itself (Krastev 2004). Krastev raises an interesting sociological point of the 4 
communist legacies explanation serving as a therapeutic mechanism and a scapegoat 5 
for all negative occurrences within the young democracies, essentially stripping the 6 
political leadership of their agency in their own policy-making decisions and 7 
economical failures. Other scholars such as Gallina concur with this view and move 8 
the focus away from a generic label of ‘communist legacies’ to individual 9 
personalities that bear more of the responsibility (Gallina 2013), in Slovakia’s case 10 
the notorious 1990’s Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar.  11 
Bohn (2013) also tries to move away from shifting the responsibility purely onto 12 
communist legacies and rather suggests that the transitional difficulties faced by 13 
post-communist societies are associated with the youth of the democracy, rather 14 
than the communist legacy. This, for example, includes issues such as low judicial 15 
independence and prosecutorial ability (Bohn 2013). Strong judiciary, according to 16 
Bohn, is always linked to stronger democracy and less corruption (Bohn 2013). 17 
Interestingly, in connection to Slovakia, prominent political commentators, such as 18 
Marián Leško counter Bohn’s suggestion due to the relatively well-functioning 19 
judiciary in the early 1990s Slovakia, before the government leadership had a chance 20 
to realise and take advantage of the most important agent of the state- the 21 
constitutional court. Until then, the judiciary actually functioned as the bulwark of 22 
democratic values in the early 90s (Lesko 2017). He suggests that it is not until later 23 
in the 90s where the judiciary starts to become ineffective, and judges are not 24 
selected on merit but on political affiliation; suggesting that the true origins of 25 
corrupt practices must lie somewhere between succumbing to communist legacies 26 
and exploiting weak judiciary powers of young democracies.  27 
Bracking (2007) suggests that corrupt legacies have everything to do with the wealth 28 
of the country, and therefore levels of poverty are key (Bracking 2007). Bracking 29 
claims that it is the continuous misappropriation of aid for poor countries which is 30 
key and poverty is inseparably tied to corruption, as it will always inspire more donor 31 
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help and thus end up in a vicious circle of financial aid delivery and its 1 
misappropriation. Bohn (2013) concurs with poverty and low GDP positively 2 
correlating with corruption; especially considering over-complicated systemic 3 
regulations as seemingly the highest predictor for creating what Bohn labels a 4 
‘rational-choice corruptor’ (i.e. someone who partakes in corruption because the 5 
circumstances dictate it to be a rational choice, in order to receive what they should 6 
normally be entitled to by a functioning system) (Bohn 2013). Zakaria (2012) 7 
presents another dimension, for example, when she quite openly dismisses 8 
communist legacies as being key for issues such as inactive civil society. Instead, she 9 
suggests that communist legacies have not caused corruption, but that corruption 10 
has emerged instead of communist legacies to fill the void in society that would 11 
cause detrimental effects that the politicians could capitalise upon to seize and 12 
maintain power (Zakaria 2012). It is necessary to point out here that the factors 13 
mentioned by Bohn, Zakaria, and Bracking are not to be dismissed as they are 14 
relevant to post-communist societies and societies of other young democracies, 15 
where communist legacies often do not apply to the extent that they do in Central 16 
and Eastern Europe. 17 
While it is reductionist to imply that corruption could not exist without communist 18 
legacies, as it is present and detectable in several mature democracies, there is 19 
evidence that post-communist transitional societies face their own specific set of 20 
challenges tied to their transition from centralised systems of governing that 21 
influence the shape corruption has taken in these countries.  22 
These challenges also include sustainability of other public sectors, such as 23 
education. The BTI report of 2018 has shown that there is insufficient 24 
implementation of progressive teaching and learning methods as well as total 25 
spending on the education sector across all four Visegrad countries, with Slovakia 26 
having the lowest spending in this regard (BTI, 2018). With regards to spending and 27 
monetary issues relating to development in Central and East European countries, 28 
Batory (2012) states that while corruption control has been high on the agenda of 29 
all CEE countries, she targets large-scale privatization of state assets as a ‘hotbed 30 
for corruption in most CEE countries’ (Batory, 2012:66). She further describes 31 
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frequent media reports of EU funds disappearance in these countries, politicians 1 
resigning (or refusing to) based on corruption scandals in Poland and Hungary and 2 
bribes extorted by the Czech police frequently (Batory 2012). Following on from the 3 
economic argument connected with corruption in CEE, Batory invokes Kornai’s term 4 
‘economics of shortage’ (1980) as a common factor shared by CEE transitional 5 
economies as a remnant of communist legacies, which is potentially the main reason 6 
behind the rise of patronage, cronyism, nepotism, and an unhealthy ‘symbiotic 7 
relationship’ between politics and business (Batory, 2012:68). It is, however, worth 8 
noting that Batory’s investigation relates primarily to the case study of Hungary, 9 
which she chooses as a suitable case study to represent its neighbouring countries 10 
and claims the theoretical approach can apply to all Visegrad 4 countries. 11 
Nevertheless, hers is a compelling argument within scholarship, justifying the idea 12 
that there is a more present communist legacy in the formation of corruption in the 13 
CEE than elsewhere from an economic perspective. Dimitrova-Grajzl (2010) supports 14 
this view and expands it to another specific feature of the CEE, which lends itself 15 
well to the communist legacy argument- that of weakness of institutions and the 16 
state which is in a unique position after communism (Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon 17 
2010). Howard (2002) also speaks of a ‘peculiar apathy’ in the region of citizens 18 
toward ‘joining civic associations’ that would have the potential for curbing 19 
corruption and notes that this is specific for the region precisely due to the 20 
‘communist legacy of distrust of organisations’ (Howard 2002). Fazekas and King 21 
(2018) speak of the typical ‘sliding on measures of democracy and openness and 22 
integrity’ within the CEE region, again finding the cause to be specific to the 23 
regression into communist legacies (Fazekas and King 2018).  24 
Batory (2012) makes another interesting connection between the nature of 25 
corruption in CEE countries and Slovakia specifically, which is the endemic problem 26 
of ‘gratitude payments’ in health care- according to her, this is a prevalent issue in 27 
the Hungarian health care as well (Batory, 2012:73). The research of the thesis, 28 
therefore, is clearly relevant for the CEE region as well as for Slovakia specifically. 29 
However, Batory calls for more ‘comparative empirical evidence’ to compare her 30 
conclusions and this research responds to that need. Fazekas and King (2018) also 31 
warn against any research into case studies within CEE region being able to apply to 32 
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the whole context and thus call for individual studies to be conducted, such as this 1 
one into Slovakia’s health care corruption. 2 
Slovakia has had its own journey in this context and this country-specific problematic 3 
will be addressed in a later section of the thesis. 4 
  5 
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1.9 Measuring corruption 1 
 2 
The issues related to measuring corruption have become notorious over the years, 3 
with a lot of criticism aimed at international perception-based indices such as TI’s 4 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the World Banks’ Index (WBCC) (Miller 2001, 5 
Kenny 2006, Knack 2006, Weber Abramo 2007). The perception-based indices such 6 
as these fall within what the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, along with Education 7 
for Justice, label as ‘indirect’ measurements of corruption. The main criticism is 8 
that with the absence of any universal agreed-upon definition of corruption that 9 
would encompass all kinds of corruption (as discussed in the previous section of the 10 
review), the perception-based indices fail to account for any other than very select 11 
kinds of corruption, such as bribery (Ko and Samajdar 2010). Ko and Samajdar 12 
further point out that the CPI specifically is an index focused on measuring bribery 13 
in particular, and to this end the CPI uses sources designed for a general or overall 14 
assessment of ‘country risk, competitiveness and governance’ (Ko and Samajdar 15 
2010). Weber and Abramo (2007) also emphasise the same bias towards economic 16 
and financial corruption measurement, which leaves other forms of corruption such 17 
as health care, the judiciary, education, and public services unaccounted for in the 18 
perception indices (Weber Abramo 2007). Ivanov (2013) also questions the validity 19 
of the CPI, ‘given the clandestine nature of corruption’ (Ivanov, 2013:33) and the 20 
fact that the CPI ‘reflects the prejudices of outsiders who misunderstand local 21 
customs’ (Ivanov, 2013:33). While some would argue that these indices can then be 22 
applied to both generic and specific corruption studies, the critics point out the 23 
obvious flaw in this logic- the perception of corruption is rarely the same as the 24 
actual extent of corruption (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Seligson, 2002 in Ko and 25 
Samajdar, 2010). Olken (2009) emphasises the lack of accuracy of corruption 26 
perceptions and the lack of transparency in which these are surveyed in the first 27 
place (Olken 2009). Therefore, we inevitably face issues of validity, reliability and 28 
definition problems that are dependent on political, cultural and historical contexts 29 
of the respective corrupt environments. Knack (2006) points out that household 30 
surveys such as the World Values Survey or the International Crime Victimization 31 
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Survey designed to counter the issues associated with perception indices are also 1 
less than perfect, as they are of limited use and made public ‘only with a time delay 2 
and suffer from comparability problems’ (Knack 2006). Ledeneva (2009) points out 3 
that in addition to the aforementioned issues with indices such as the CPI, the data 4 
of this composite index, made up of 17 surveys from 13 independent institutions, is 5 
collected as opinions of businesspeople and country analysts (Ledeneva 2009). There 6 
is an intrinsic bias to expert assessments, which should be reduced by combining the 7 
opinions of experts and those directly experiencing corruption (Ledeneva 2009). 8 
Ledeneva also points out that such a combination in approaches to data collection 9 
can reduce the margin of error that exists for them. Ko and Samajdar concur that 10 
perhaps the greatest shortcoming facing the indices, and the CPI specifically, is the 11 
lack of consideration for the perceptions of lay people as opposed to analysts, 12 
skewing the image of the country’s corruption levels in the eyes of the global fora 13 
(Ko and Samajdar 2010).  14 
Kubbe (2013) also supports the established view of CPI not being a suitable enough 15 
measure of corruption, emphasising that the index ‘measures the perception of 16 
corruption, not the actual level of corrupt activity and therefore the index includes 17 
a highly subjective evaluation’ (Kubbe 2013). Even the limited reach of CPI into the 18 
reflection of business and economic corrupt practices cannot take into account the 19 
increasingly popular practice of engaging in corruption abroad, a practice preferred 20 
by many businesses (Kubbe 2013). Instead, Kubbe suggests that a new approach 21 
should be honed for the accurate measurement of corruption: a ‘multi-level 22 
approach to analysing the predictors and outcomes of corruption and taking more 23 
account of the individual level’ of data collection (Kubbe 2013). Other indices used 24 
to measure corruption with different levels of focus and higher levels of accuracy 25 
include, for example the Global Corruption Barometer, the Gothenberg Quality of 26 
Government Institute reports, Index of Public Integrity, or the Bertelmann Stiftung’s 27 
Sustainable Government Indicators which I refer to in later parts of the thesis. The 28 
main strengths of these indices include their moving away from perception-based 29 
measurements and moving towards more experience-based measurements. This is 30 
why these measurements are classed by the UN as ‘direct’ measurements. Having 31 
addressed their strengths, there are also weaknesses associated with these 32 
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measurements. For example, the Global Corruption Barometer is criticised for the 1 
prevalence of bribery-based questions in their surveys, pointing towards the existing 2 
financial bias in corruption measurement. The Index of Public Integrity, on the other 3 
hand is perceived to capture more of a risk assessment than measurement of actual 4 
levels of corruption (www.unodc.org). All of these measurements, while more 5 
grounded in experience than the CPI or the World Bank rating, also lack the specific 6 
qualitative data of individual, country-level approach.   7 
It is worth mentioning that the call for country-level hard data on corruption analysis 8 
is also supported and called for by other scholars (Bohn 2013) and the thesis aims to 9 
aid in filling this specific gap in literature and corruption research demand. Goel et 10 
al (2012) conducted an interesting study trying to determine the deterrent effect of 11 
corruption awareness on corrupt acts through an internet survey and conclude there 12 
is a considerable effect the awareness of corruption as presented by media has on 13 
deterrence within corrupt acts (Goel 2012). The thesis takes this investigation one 14 
step further into a focus on individual experience, as opposed to media presentation 15 
thereof, and utilises qualitative methods to get a more rigorous set of results, as 16 
opposed to internet surveys. 17 
Gallina’s study on the Czech Republic and Slovakia’s anti-corruption measures from 18 
the 90s to 2013 encompasses several country-specific issues of both corruption 19 
definition and measurement. She provides a comprehensive overview of all Slovak 20 
governmental anti-corruption measures taken and evaluates their respective 21 
success. In Slovakia’s case, these are most notably the dark years of Vladimir Meciar, 22 
the ‘wild privatization of the 1990s that culminated in high-scale scandals with a 23 
huge financial loss for the Slovak state’, Meciar’s misappropriation of the 24 
constitution, the Dzurinda government reforms, along with the creation of Special 25 
courts designated for corruption cases (Gallina 2013). Gallina emphasises the 26 
politicisation of anti-corruption measures and agencies in the country and 27 
‘dependent police presidents as well as state prosecutors and judges who close their 28 
eyes at suspicious tenders’ (Gallina, 2013:209) as some of the main problems facing 29 
corruption measures today. She also underlines the lack of research conducted on 30 
the subject with Slovak-specific focus, most notably the seminal work of Sicakova-31 
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Beblava in 2011. It is this lack of country-specific data and the huge amount of 1 
uncovered ground in terms of corrupt practices in Slovakia that, according to 2 
Gallina, calls for Slovak-specific research, but also renders corruption ratings and 3 
indices like the CPI immaterial in countries like Slovakia. Her language suggests that 4 
whatever research the TI has conducted is not enough for this region, as 5 
‘undiscovered cases remain beyond corruption ratings such as Transparency 6 
International’ and ‘further in-depth investigation is necessary’ to follow the long-7 
term development of political and other kinds of corruption (Gallina 2013). The 8 
thesis responds to this need for a structured approach to corruption-specific data 9 
collection on Slovakia and conducts a thorough in-depth investigation of petty and 10 
grand corruption practices as a result.   11 
In order to provide greater validity for the field work undertaken for this thesis, the 12 
work takes the above recommendations and criticisms of perception-based studies 13 
on board and approaches the study of corruption through a multi-level qualitative 14 
means of interviews, combining in-depth interviews with ‘lay people’, with elite 15 
interviews with experts in the field of health care, in order to reduce the margin of 16 
error, as suggested by Ledeneva and recommended by Kubbe. 17 
 18 
1.10 Definition of grand and petty corruption 19 
 20 
This work’s definition of both petty and grand corruption is a response to Gallina’s 21 
and Bracking’s call for more ‘composite explanations collecting a lot of factors 22 
together’ (Bracking, 2007:7) and also a ‘case-by-case approach…based on a 23 
combination of categories of informality’ (Gallina, 2013: 144). Bracking (2007) 24 
differentiates between several kinds of corruption: Petty, administrative corruption, 25 
graft, influencing, bureaucratic, political, patronage and nepotism, high-level 26 
corruption and state capture, all comprehensively described in the table below and 27 
also combining of several factors outlined in the literature review so far.  28 
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The definitions employed by Bracking (2007) as seen in the below Table 1.1, provide 1 
a comprehensive basis for summarising the different kinds of corruption discussed in 2 
the literature review so far. The definitions set out for the thesis below constitute 3 
a unique combination of approaches to corruption, with carefully distilled language, 4 
capable of addressing corruption as a holistic phenomenon and underlining the 5 
Table 1.1 Types of Corruption: Source: Bracking, S. 2007:5,6 
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similarities between grand and petty corruption, rather than differences. These are 1 
of course anchored in the provision and the delivery of services for the public, and 2 
are to be applied to the context of health care and the case study of Slovakia. 3 
Grand corruption 4 
Abuse of power and/or distortion of policies or resources at an overseeing level 5 
within public services, with the purpose of the few benefiting at the expense of 6 
the many. 7 
Example: Inflated prices for procurement of hospital equipment or outsourcing 8 
hospital services such as a CT scan or an MRI scan by insurance companies to private 9 
facilities for a much greater price than the market standard.   10 
Petty corruption 11 
‘Everyday’ customary payment of bribes, or other material and immaterial 12 
means of motivating officials to amend their behaviour, in order to facilitate 13 
higher quality or faster reception of service provision. 14 
Example: Paying a bribe to a nurse/doctor to skip waiting times for check-ups or 15 
minor procedures; offering a gift to the health professional for preferential 16 
treatment in the respective hospital ward. 17 
My definition of petty corruption, based on the discussion outlined in this literature 18 
review combines the economic side of petty corruption defended by Rose-Ackerman, 19 
while also taking into consideration notions of behaviour, immaterial motivators, 20 
and the desired benefit to be gained by corruption. The chosen language of ‘amend 21 
behaviour’ and ‘facilitate’ encompasses elements of what Bracking in Table 1.1 22 
describes under ‘Administrative corruption’, ‘Influencing’, ‘Graft’ and also 23 
‘Bureaucratic corruption’. Within this definition the strategies utilised to access this 24 
corrupt behaviour are explored, as well as traditions altering behaviour, and trust 25 
as an inseparable ethical dimension of corruption. 26 
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For grand corruption, rather than playing exclusively on the political notions, the 1 
language of my definition includes both ‘power’ and ‘distortion of centralised 2 
policies or resources’. In this way it includes connotations of what Bracking describes 3 
under ‘High-level corruption’ as ‘misuse’ of both power and resources and also the 4 
amending of ‘rules, decrees or regulations’ under her heading ‘State capture’ (see 5 
Table 1.1). My wording is more suitable for the context of services such as health 6 
care, as it implies a clear benefit of the resulting status quo and the word 7 
‘distortion’ is less loaded with implication, as opposed to Bracking’s ‘abuse’ of both 8 
policy and resource. In that sense it is more suitable to enveloping administrative 9 
and monetary side of corruption into one entity. 10 
In effect, the definitions follow Larmour’s positioning of corruption as an antithesis 11 
to the democratic norm (Larmour 2011). If, Larmour argues, the democratic norm is 12 
‘the inclusion of those affected by a decision in deliberations about it’, then 13 
corruption ‘lies in the exclusion that is both duplicitous (hypocritical) and harmful 14 
(to the interests of those excluded, and the legitimacy of the system more 15 
generally)’ (Larmour, 2011:52). It is the objective of the thesis to investigate the 16 
strategies utilised to carry out such duplicitous and harmful exclusion of the many, 17 
which by proxy erodes the system as a whole; more specifically, health care in 18 
Slovakia. Based on the distilled definitions of grand and petty corruption, these two 19 
levels will be investigated individually as to their sociological motivators and 20 
intricacies, but also in conjunction with each other to show similarities in 21 
approaching corrupt practices within their remit; and finally, the potential for one 22 
to justify/influence the other. 23 
  24 
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1.11 Conclusions  1 
 2 
The literature review has presented several dimensions of the corruption 3 
phenomenon. It has laid out the difficulty in defining corruption comprehensively 4 
enough to encompass all of its separate aspects, as well as its complex nature which 5 
stems from its culturally, historically and politically-bound roots. No one case of 6 
corruption is the same as another, nor is the perception of corruption the same from 7 
one country to another. The review has emphasised the need to treat corruption 8 
with rigour and conduct country-specific research and the essential need not to 9 
confuse perception of corruption with real-life experience of corruption. The review 10 
has presented the popular scholarly tendency to classify corruption in sets of binary 11 
terms, most importantly the distinction between petty and grand corruption levels, 12 
although these also receive multifaceted interpretations. It has also emphasised the 13 
need to eradicate this artificial distinction and instead search for a theoretical 14 
similarity in corrupt activities, mechanisms and strategies utilised in grand and petty 15 
corruption alike. A more holistic approach to the phenomenon, while maintaining 16 
the need for appreciation of country-specific aspects of corruption seems to be 17 
necessary.  18 
This section of the review has shown the importance of combining several fields of 19 
study, such as economics, sociology and anthropology in order to encompass all 20 
facets of corruption. Corruption was presented as both a subsection and a dimension 21 
of these fields and the discussion of corruption within these frameworks has 22 
informed several research questions of the thesis. The review highlighted the role 23 
of trust, ethics, and informality when discussing corruption and this discussion has 24 
then informed the definitions for grand and petty corruption for the purposes of the 25 
thesis. These include ideas discussed in the individual understandings of corruption, 26 
i.e., monetary as well as immaterial motivation for corruption; trust and rule-27 
manoeuvring in order to tap into informal networks of friends or acquaintances; and 28 
finally, the notions of resource manipulation and power wielding.  29 
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The review has further tied the understanding of corruption together with the 1 
discussion on the origins of corruption as perceived today. Several scholars have 2 
made persuasive cases for corruption being either predominantly a legacy of 3 
communism or at least communism contributing strongly to the emergence of 4 
corruption in transitional societies. There seems to be strong evidence to support 5 
the statement that post-communist societies (more specifically for us, those of 6 
Central and Eastern Europe) have greater experience with informality due to the 7 
forced, centralised system of socialist rule and this experience has survived to adapt 8 
to capitalist structures. While western societies also present themselves with 9 
corruption, scholars argue that the scale of corruption in post-communist societies 10 
is significantly higher, more endemic, and perceived as a coping mechanism of the 11 
development of young democracies. Other scholars, however, present opposing 12 
views, showing factors such as poverty, political agendas, or the process of 13 
transitioning from centralised to market economies as much more important factors 14 
in corruption spreading. The answer undoubtedly lies somewhere in the middle of a 15 
Venn diagram of all factors contributing to corrupt practices and it is important not 16 
to discount any of the theories, rather interpret them as a part of a complex whole.  17 
The literature is clear on the difficulties that the measurement of a complex 18 
phenomenon such as corruption presents. The established perception indices appear 19 
to be insufficient when addressing corruption in an experience-based, qualitative 20 
manner. They also often work with a skewed sample of respondents, focusing on 21 
experts and pundits, rather than citizens. The literature review views this as a 22 
significant gap in the literature on corruption, which it aims to fill with a rigorous 23 
qualitative investigation of real-life corruption observations. The aim of the 24 
perception indices commissioned by supranational and transnational bodies is often 25 
to target a specific sector of investment potential in the respondent countries, which 26 
then causes issues with survey questions being focused on economy, finances, or 27 
banking possibilities. An effective measurement of corruption must therefore be 28 
country-specific, sector-specific, and comprised of a combination of quantitative 29 
and qualitative measurement tools, in order to provide as objective and as 30 
comprehensive a reflection of corruption practices as possible.  31 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review Part 2 1 
 2 
2.1 Corruption in Central European states 3 
 4 
2.1.1 Market transition in the CEE 5 
While elements of communist legacies have been introduced in Part 1 of the review 6 
as possible explanations of corrupt practices today, there is a wealth of information 7 
on the topic available from different vantage points. These mostly begin at the point 8 
of transition from centralised economy to market economy and all the social and 9 
policy changes this brings along in the respective countries (Ellman 2005, Kornai 10 
2006, Cox 2013). Cox (2013) argues that the social inequalities that manifest 11 
themselves in the CEE countries in the form of rampant corruption today have origins 12 
in the state-managed system already. He argues that sources of inequality regarding 13 
income policies and also privileged access to certain goods and services, based on 14 
the individual’s positioning within the sytem, were always present but are 15 
augmented by the transitional policies (Cox 2013). Cox further argues that all CEE 16 
states experienced a dilemma of the government to impose transitional reforms and 17 
policies that would inevitably face a lot of unpopular feedback, due to pressures for 18 
‘reduction in employment and cuts in expenditure on social services, but on the 19 
other hand too afraid to cut too deeply from a fear of losing electoral support’ (Cox, 20 
2013:243).  21 
These pressures and subsequent misallocation of resources and finances to sectors 22 
in an inefficient manner, paired with the corrupt practices employed in the 23 
privatisation and lustration processes (Kornai 2006), resulted in demographic 24 
changes and inequality rise in the society. Grochová and Otáhal (2011) concur with 25 
this assessment and point out that the privatisation processes led to the ‘legalization 26 
of the ex-communist private property claims’, reinforcing the theory of communist 27 
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legacies as breeding ground for corruption. Ellman (2005) notes significant increase 1 
in mortality rates due to drop in social security and medical care funding as a result 2 
(Ellman 2005) and Cox (2013) notes the rise of poverty across the region6, as well as 3 
unemployment (Cox 2013). The scholars mostly agree that it is this particular 4 
economic climate which prompted the ‘increase in corruption’ due to vast 5 
‘opportunities for enrichment and the widespread failure to introduce and enforce 6 
appropriate legal and cultural measures’ (Ellman, 2005:601). Cox notes that the 7 
strain on economy which gave rise to kleptocracy is best demonstrated by the ratio 8 
of the working to the pensioner, which by the late 1990s has risen to two pensioners 9 
for every three workers in most CEE countries and to a ‘ratio of around one to one, 10 
or worse, in Ukraine and Albania’ (Cox, 2013:245). Cox concurs with Ellman’s 11 
conclusion that not only has crime and widespread criminalisation of society 12 
(Ellman, 2005:602) come as a part of the economic transition, but also that the 13 
deepening of the income gap, whereby opportunities were created for a very ‘small 14 
number of people to become very wealthy’ (Cox, 2013:252) caused the creation of 15 
a ‘grey economy’. By this Cox means an economy that has been labelled as ‘informal’ 16 
or ‘shadow’ in Part 1 of this review; completely dependent on unregistered casual 17 
work or growing own food to complement the official insufficient income of the 18 
populace (Cox 2013). Koudelková et al (2015) also refer to the ‘grey economy’ as an 19 
umbrella term, describing corruption from an alternative perspective as a ‘tax on 20 
the profits of the productive sector…increasing efficiency and helping economic 21 
growth’ (2015:28). This theory comes back to the ‘grease in wheels’ argument, 22 
whereby corruption is in fact beneficial to economic growth and reinforces the 23 
impetus for CEE societies to safeguard communist legacies which secure this 24 
economic continuity. Koudelková et al (2015) reinforce this claim by stating that 25 
eastern countries like ‘Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic 26 
have a higher shadow economy than ‘old’ countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium 27 
and Italy (2015:32). More worryingly, Cox (2013) makes a generalisation for all the 28 
 
6 Ellman puts the statistic of the share of the poor in the total population of former Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union in the 1990s as rising from 3% to 25%, or in real numbers from 7 to 89 million 
(Ellman, 2005:600).  
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CEE countries which works in favour of the communist legacies argument, whereby 1 
the seeds of modern corruption in the CEE region can be found in the conversion of 2 
political capital into economic capital, thus becoming the new economic elite and 3 
thus the ruling class of the new capitalist system. Ellman (2005) believes that for 4 
this region the somewhat ‘textbook economics’ that has been employed has failed 5 
to take into account specific traditions within the region and failed to tailor 6 
transitional policies to the respective countries. As much as transitional economy in 7 
a vacuum was imagined to be a straight-forward and linear transformation of one 8 
state of economy to another (Kornai 2006), within this region there are ‘important 9 
differences between countries and multiple outcomes possible’ that should have 10 
been taken into account in the first place, in order to avoid detrimental effects such 11 
as corruption (Ellman, 2005:612). I, naturally, do not expect the participants to have 12 
this level of expert insight, but the thesis is interested in what their real-life 13 
experiences are, especially in the 50+ age bracket, as these participants would have 14 
experienced and remembered both regimes. 15 
With regards to economic transition, Kornai (2006) makes a valid observation about 16 
the intertwined mutual dependency of democracy and good governance and 17 
capitalism. Kornai (2006) describes the efforts of the CEE countries, and especially 18 
the V4 countries, having worked under the pressure of the EU conditionality on their 19 
rushed economic reforms, along with the inherent loss of leverage post accession to 20 
push for the enforcement of the reforms. The issues of inequality and grey economy 21 
that can and have progressed in the shape of corruption (Cox, 2013; Ellman, 2005), 22 
are, according to Kornai, issues that are inherent to capitalism, which is necessary 23 
for the fostering of corruption. In other words, in order to progress with democracy, 24 
a country needs to be able to cope with the negative elements of capitalism, such 25 
as ‘economic winners and losers, unemployment, and also excessive advertising’ 26 
(Kornai, 2006:238). For these and other factors related to capitalism, Kornai (2006) 27 
believes that while corruption used to be in the background much more in the 28 
previous regime, in this new economic era it has come to the forefront and has 29 
become ‘ubiquitous’ in the CEE countries, permeating all strata of society. This 30 
includes the ‘economic and cultural sphere, private transactions, low and highest 31 
levels of the governmental and social hierarchy’ and it is becoming almost impossible 32 
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for these countries to carry out any social or economic transaction without a ‘shady’ 1 
practice or a ‘phony’ scheme of some sort (Kornai, 2006:232).  2 
2.1.2 Development of corruption in the CEE and V4 region 3 
Grochová and Otáhal (2011) develop the argument of communist legacies being valid 4 
as the reasoning behind the growth of corruption in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 5 
They point out that it was the slow rate of privatization and retaining control over 6 
legislature and law enforcement in the process that ultimately put Slovakia’s 7 
corruption rate at a much higher level than that of the Czech Republic. They note 8 
that informal institutions have in fact not changed face much in the period of the 9 
countries‘ independence and while the Czech Republic started off with a better 10 
outlook on curbing corruption, the development of corruption became the ‘same 11 
level throughout the period from 1998-2006) (2011:133). One of the notorious 12 
arguments of supranational bodies such as the EU having a strong impact on curbing 13 
corruption is dismissed by the authors as having only a ‘slight and temporary impact 14 
on corruption perceptions in the short run’ (2011:134).  15 
With regards to the countries’ own definition of corruption for their legislative 16 
purposes, the definitional debate appears to be particularly fruitful. The countries 17 
put the theoretical typologies and classification of corruption to practical use and 18 
empirically prove that the definition for corruption is not only impossible to be 19 
reduced to the popular TI version, but also show the need for regional specifications. 20 
Grochová and Otáhal (2011) note that the ‘malfeasance connected with corruption 21 
is defined by the Czech and the Slovak law as the misuse of power by state officials, 22 
disturbing the objectives of the governmental officials through malpractice, 23 
receiving bribes, bribery and indirect bribery’ (2011:124). Koudelková et al (2015) 24 
are even more specific than that, citing the Czech Interior Ministry which offers a 25 
more detailed definition: ‘corruption can be characterised as a relationship between 26 
two subjects, both individuals and institutions, in which one party offers, or serves, 27 
the other party some form of remuneration for providing or committing to provide 28 
an unjustified favour. The providing party then expects some form of tangible or 29 
intangible favour for the favour it provided’ (2015:26). It is therefore obvious that a 30 
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more nuanced approach to corruption is not only necessary but has also already 1 
begun to emerge in these countries on an official level, independently of watchdogs 2 
or overseeing supranational bodies. Koudelkova et al (2015) make a further 3 
observation that, while this may be the case, most of academic research into 4 
corruption focuses on state-level corruption and ‘very few’ researchers study 5 
corruption at the firm level or any other micro level. This is a direct call for further 6 
research into the topic on a micro level in the region and the thesis addresses this 7 
literature gap of micro research through its case study of one public sector.  8 
 9 
Table 2.1 Areas with the largest share of corruption in the Czech Republic, Source: GfK 2010, 10 
in Koudelková et al, 2015:33 11 
In the post-communist Czech Republic, according to Koudelková et al (2015), 12 
corruption is still a ‘deeply rooted problem’ (2015:32). This can be seen in Tables 13 
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 (overleaf) which showcase the level of distrust caused by corruption 14 
in the country and also provide a helpful breakdown of the most affected sectors by 15 
corruption; data that are difficult to find in a similar format on Poland and Hungary. 16 
However, as a similar-sized economy with a very similar transition journey to that 17 
of Slovakia, the data on the Czech Republic provides by far the most valid 18 
comparison in sectoral corruption. From Table 2.1 it is obvious that the trends are 19 
similar to those of Slovakia (described in further sections of this review), including 20 
corruption in the judiciary, the police, education, customs, and health service. 21 
Grodeland et al. (1998) concur with this in their study into corruption in Slovakia, 22 
the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Bulgaria, indicating that the scope for corruption 23 
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is most prevalent within the health sector, social sector, educations, housing, law 1 
enforcement and local administration. It would appear that the scope for corrupt 2 
practices is therefore fairly similar across the CEE region.  However, there is a 3 
marked increase in corruption share in the governmental and political sectors as 4 
well as the judiciary and a drop in corruption share in the health service, indicating 5 
an interesting and significant level of heterogeneity of sectoral corruption in the 6 
region of CEE and the V4 more specifically. Grodeland et al. (1998) conclude that 7 
corruption is on the whole more widespread in Ukraine and Bulgaria than in the 8 
Czech Republic and Slovakia for example. Most importantly for the thesis however, 9 
Naxera (2015) and Karklins (2005) indicate that in post-communist Central and 10 
Eastern Europe, there is not only a high level of small-scale corruption, but also that 11 
in some cases the public’s belief that the elite are corrupt is sometimes used to 12 
justify their own involvement in small-scale corrupt transactions (Karklins 2005, 13 
Naxera 2015). This is essentially at the core of the interest of the thesis, which takes 14 
this finding a step further, looking for an inverse link between the elite’s belief that 15 
small-scale corruption justifies their involvement in grand-scale transactions. 16 
Moreover, however, the thesis follows through with this notion to explore how 17 
exactly this is done in practical terms for corruption to be carried out by both the 18 
public and the elites on their respective levels. 19 
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 1 
Table 2.2 Corruption/fraud as a reason for distrust in business and government in the Czech 2 
Republic, Source: Edelman 2013, in Koudelkova et al., 2015:35 (‘corruption of fraud’ sic) 3 
 4 
 5 
Table 2.3 Corruption/fraud as a reason for distrust in government in the Czech Republic, 6 
Source: Edelman 2013, in Koudelkova et al., 2015:35 (‘corruption of fraud’ sic) 7 
While all the countries share the similarities of corrupt practices in individual 8 
sectors, different sectors are more affected respectively, which once again 9 
underlines the argument for more rigorous micro-level sectoral research into 10 
corruption in these countries. This phenomenon is clearly culturally and socially 11 
specific to the given country and society affected- it is not enough to generalise 12 
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based on quantitative outputs produced and commissioned to give an overarching 1 
picture of corruption in the region; the problematic is in fact much more complex.  2 
Having said this much, however, there are scholars who place the V4 countries into 3 
an acceptable and successful bracket, quoting Bulgaria as a comparative study which 4 
exhibits four times higher individual corruption than the average in the Czech 5 
Republic, and public procurement corruption 1.77 times higher than the Czech 6 
Republic (Placek et al, 2018:12). Plaček et al (2018) quote that there is a culture of 7 
‘scarcity’ dominated by unsatisfied demand for goods and services and corrupt 8 
practices provide the quickest route to the supply of such services- this culture 9 
according to them is greater in countries beyond the V4 but also present in the region 10 
itself (Plaček, Puček et al. 2018). Lee and Guven (2013) support this statement by 11 
singling out the Ukraine as the country with the highest probabilities for being asked 12 
for a bribe (29 % for females and 38% for males) and also the highest probability for 13 
offering a bribe (14% for females and 16% for males) (2013:290). The authors believe 14 
that this trend which manifests itself most in the Ukraine is also present in the 15 
Visegrad Group (V4) countries since all post-communist countries struggle with the 16 
discrepancy between internal values against external pressures (Lee and Guven 17 
2013).  18 
Puček (2014) identifies the most frequented areas of corruption emergence in the 19 
Czech Republic, which are congruent with those in the rest of the V4 with varying 20 
levels of corruption prevalence across the four countries- health care, traffic 21 
violations, preference given to child for nursery acceptance, driver’s licence tests 22 
and driving schools, preferential processing of mortgage, higher education grades 23 
(Puček 2014). All of Puček’s data comes from official state sources, so there are 24 
issues of reliability when taking his report at face value. However, he makes an 25 
interesting observation, whereby Germany or Austria have comparable state costs 26 
per employee to those of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, related to social security 27 
and pension payments, but much higher quality of institutions and better results in 28 
corruption perception studies (Puček 2014). This raises questions as to the true 29 
motivators behind corruption involvement, as systemic care for employee is similar 30 
in terms of expense pro rata in the respective countries, so the scarcity argument is 31 
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clearly not the entire picture for the countries with high corruption levels. Puček’s 1 
recommendations are in line with this discovery, suggesting that the best way to 2 
tackle corruption on a systemic level in the region is firstly to increase oversight 3 
measures7, secondly to penalise any sign of corruption radically, and in third place 4 
to increase salaries for state employees (Puček 2014). This is in direct contradiction 5 
with an earlier work conducted by Theobald (1990) in which he implies it is precisely 6 
job security and stability that are the most effective counters to corrupt activity of 7 
officials (1990:86): ‘insecurity and instability are hardly conducive to high levels of 8 
morale and efficiency, to the development of a strong ethic of service… Under such 9 
circumstances it is inevitable that those who are able to resort to informal influence 10 
get what they want. Strings are pulled where personal contacts exist, bribes placed 11 
where they do not’ (Theobald 1990). Naxera (2015) concurs with Puček’s findings 12 
however, and interestingly points out that in the Czech Republic the awareness of 13 
corruption has been spurred on by the media and television in a period of growth for 14 
reports and articles on the topic, culminating in 2012; suggesting that a grown 15 
economy still has not curbed corrupt activity despite greater job security and 16 
economic stability across the board (Naxera 2015).  17 
Wiercinski (2017) reviews the changes and corruption perception within the Polish 18 
healthcare sector and identifies the primary care physicians as those most affected. 19 
He specifically says that the true reason behind the rampant corruption is the 20 
‘distorted’ reforms of the healthcare system from the transitional period, which 21 
require primary care physicians to be subjected to a huge amount of bureaucratic 22 
proceedings and thus become the ‘gatekeepers’ to the healthcare system as a 23 
whole, as opposed to only physicians (Wierciński 2017).The respondent doctors 24 
specifically referred to ‘endless adaptations to new directives’ and a smothering 25 
 
7 Grodeland et al. (1998) had suggested however that oversight is not a deciding factor since there 
are always two sides to any official’s behaviour, depending on the respondent’s view; i.e. some 
think officials have gotten better with their work efficiency and lack of bribe-induction because of 
high levels of competition and unemployment in the labour market serving as natural oversight, 
and others think that officials are worse nowadays because of less formal oversight that used to be 
stronger in Communist times. 
80 
effect of new legislature, which has had the opposite effect to ridding them off of 1 
the ‘outdated centralised healthcare’ (Wierciński, 2017:45). Wysmulek (2017) 2 
conducts a similar interview and survey-based research into corruption in Polish 3 
schools and concludes that based on a victimisation survey data, 7% of respondents 4 
gave a bribe in the healthcare sector and 32% agree that corruption is prevalent in 5 
the local healthcare system, which is a much higher figure than that declared for 6 
corruption in local schools (Wysmulek 2017). Her research therefore indirectly shows 7 
the salient need to address health care as a matter of urgency not only for the 8 
chosen case study of Slovakia, but for the region alike. Wysmulek makes an 9 
assumption that further touches upon the core reasoning behind the investigation of 10 
the impact of grand corruption on petty and vice versa, when she suggests that ‘the 11 
perception that grand corruption on a country occurs on a high level may in itself 12 
create a “culture of distrust” towards some institutions, even without personal 13 
experiences of petty corruption. This could constitute the justification and 14 
acceptance of corrupt practices on “lower levels”’ (Wysmulek, 2017:42). The 15 
literature gap between the mutually-impacting levels of grand and petty corruption 16 
on one another is therefore not only obvious in her work, but openly highlighted, 17 
and the thesis responds to this gap identified in a Polish context by addressing it in 18 
the relevant sector in the same region. The potential for the results obtained in 19 
Slovakia to be valid cross-border is strongly suggestive of the pressing relevance of 20 
this project.  21 
Leven’s (2005) research into corruption in the Polish medical sector further 22 
buttresses the correct selection of sector for the investigation of corruption in this 23 
region. She suggests that, in line with the idea of communist legacies, corruption in 24 
the sector became prevalent because of wage (in)equality, whereby in the previous 25 
regime, wages of factory workers often matched, or exceeded, those paid to doctors 26 
and other health care providers (Leven 2005). She states that corruption in the 27 
healthcare sector in Poland is a response to scarcity in a ‘mutually reinforcing 28 
dynamic of health care scarcities, political expediency and societal expectation that 29 
has outlived Polish socialism’ (2005:449). She confirms the methodological choice of 30 
health care as a suitable case study for corruption investigation due to its ubiquitous 31 
nature, since ‘little is so fundamental in a person’s life than good health and the 32 
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demand for it remains steady’ (2005:449). While overly focusing on the monetary 1 
side of corruption, Leven’s investigation of the phenomenon in the Polish 2 
environment is invaluable for this thesis as a whole. She identifies the impetus for 3 
patients to pay bribes due to the never-ending and overlapping circle of insufficient 4 
funding, lack of institutions overseeing medical conduct, and low sectoral wages. 5 
This results in bribes being accepted and facilities still being overcrowded, long 6 
delays being endured for several procedures, and sub-standard care being provided 7 
to patients (2005:450). Leven addresses the idea of receiving expedited health care 8 
and quicker referrals by the ‘gatekeeper’ physicians and broaches the idea of 9 
‘gratitude payments’, all of which is addressed in a more organised and rigorous 10 
fashion in this thesis.  11 
Fric (1999) addresses the problematic from a Czech-centred perspective, which 12 
emphasises the giving of bribes or ‘presents’ and ‘kickbacks’ without the bribed 13 
party even having to request one; instead this is done ‘out of habit’  and is encoded 14 
into society (Fric 1999). Leven’s investigation does not provide the reader with any 15 
recommendations as to curbing corruption short of ‘meaningful sanctions’ applied 16 
to corrupt conduct (2005:454). These have since been worked into the legislation of 17 
all the V4 countries but without proper enforcement, it would seem that the 18 
regulations remain toothless and there is need for a more rigorous level of research 19 
to be able to truly uproot corruption on a deeper, societal level. This view is 20 
reinforced by Naxera (2015) who states that the necessity to combat corruption and 21 
remove ‘old corrupt elites’ has appeared as a flagship issue in the programmes of 22 
several newly-formed Czech political parties (e.g. Veci Verejne, ANO), but these 23 
have not provided any specificity past non-binding declarations. Grodeland et al. 24 
(1998) also invoke the idea of the ‘old elites’, or nomenklatura, as detrimental 25 
because they are the virtually uncontrolled arbiters of the distribution and use of 26 
state property’ (1998:651).  27 
With regards to reform evaluation in health care, Lawson et al (2012) conducted a 28 
seminal study into the health care reforms in the Slovak and the Czech Republics in 29 
the period 1989-2011. Their work focuses on the evaluation of access, quality and 30 
costs and these are also at the heart of my investigation of corruption in health care. 31 
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They describe the reforms undertaken by several governments of the Czech and 1 
Slovak Republics in the time period and present in detail the pros and cons of each 2 
(see publication for further details). The most important trends they pick out are 3 
those of bringing the private health insurance companies into the picture, the need 4 
to produce healthcare systems ‘clearly different’ from the communist era model, 5 
and also the difficulties of marrying public interests with private interests of some 6 
‘significant government supporters’ of the time, especially in light of the 7 
privatisation efforts of both governments in the 1990s (Lawson et al., 2012:23). As 8 
a result, health care administration became highly decentralised and created 9 
discrepancies in health care delivery- for example, in the case of Slovakia, out of 10 
172 hospitals in 2009, 67 were state owned, 22 were run by local governments and 11 
83 were privately owned and run on either profit or not-for-profit lines (Lawson et 12 
al., 2012:24). From the following evidence (see Table 2.4, 2.5), which shows the 13 
progression of healthcare expenditure from early 2000s up until 2018, it is obvious 14 
that Slovakia stayed within the general trends of the V4 countries in terms of its 15 
health care expenditures and resources per capita.   16 
Table 2.4 Resources for health care in Central Europe (2008), Source: OECD, 2010, in 










Slovakia is, however, experiencing the greatest cost control problems among the 2 
Visegrad countries, in regard to hospital solvency and medicines (Lawson, Nemec et 3 
al. 2012). In fact, they show Slovakia to be having one of the highest shares of 4 
pharmaceutical costs to total health expenditure in any OECD country (2012:27). 5 
The final table (see Table 2.7 overleaf) presents Slovakia and Hungary as the two 6 
out of the four V4 countries with the highest prevalence of unofficial payments and 7 
Slovakia also as the highest percentage of respondents wishing more public spending 8 
went into health care as a priority (2012:29). This further reinforces the point that 9 
from a financial and a functioning perspective the sector leaves a lot to be desired 10 
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and serves as breeding ground for informal practices in order to obtain adequate 1 
service.  2 
 
Table 2.6 Patient health care experience, perceptions and preferences: 2010, Source: EBRD, 
2010, in Lawson et al., 2012:29 
Several scholars (see Batory 2012) agree that Hungary presents with rampant 3 
corruption in similar sectors to those most impacted in Slovakia, i.e., health care, 4 
the police, and the judiciary. Other authors (Kohlami 2013) tend to focus on a more 5 
political angle of corrupt practices in Hungary. Kohlami (2013) divides corruption 6 
into ‘everyday’ and ‘political’ spheres, one referring to a ‘small gratuity tip’ or a 7 
sum in an ‘envelope’ to a police officer or warden by a civilian, and the other as a 8 
‘betrayal of norms that serve public interest’ (2013:68).  9 
It is therefore obvious, that within the CEE, and namely the V4 region, while certain 10 
experiences are shared and there are similarities in the sectoral spreading of 11 
corruption, there is still a marked variability in the understanding of corruption, the 12 
perception of corruption, and in the manifestation of, and research into, corruption. 13 
There is little recent research into corruption mechanisms and what research exists 14 
tends to be conducted in the respective mother tongue, which limits its reach into 15 
the general corruption literature. From what I was able to find and derive from 16 
original language sources, research into the mutual impact of grand and petty 17 
corruption on one another is original for the region and fills a literature gap created 18 
by investigating corruption on a disaggregated basis. It is clear that corruption in 19 
health care exists in all of the V4 countries and is seen to be problematic for the 20 
society in the region. It is therefore apparent that research into corruption in health 21 
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care can produce valuable information on the mapping of the phenomenon and 1 
unique results for an entire region, as opposed to just the case study itself. 2 
2.2 Slovakia-specific literature on corruption 3 
 4 
‘In countries characterised by systemic corruption the problem is that almost 5 
everything needs to change, and needs to change more or less simultaneously with 6 
a “big bang”’ (Rothstein 2011). 7 
A study conducted by Associated Slovak Press (SITA) found corruption and 8 
perceptions of corruption to be growing in Slovakia. 43% of respondents identified 9 
corrupt practices to be increasing and 18.5% admitted to having been involved in 10 
some level of corrupt practice. The survey carried out by the Slovak Business 11 
Association in 2017 shows that over 47% of respondents have called for an easier way 12 
to report and prove corruption and greater whistle-blower protection, and 59% of 13 
respondents have called for greater transparency in corruption prosecution (SITA 14 
2017). The Global Perception Index for 2021 shows that 11% of respondents have 15 
paid a bribe for a public service and public clinics and hospitals are in second place 16 
right after the police force in bribery rates for 2021 (transparency.org). What is 17 
more, respondents in another survey, conducted by the BTI in 2018 have linked their 18 
perceptions of corruption to the quality of democracy- 43% think the quality of 19 
democracy has worsened in the past five years and 40% consider democracy in 20 
Slovakia to be in bad shape (BTI 2018). Clearly, there is no question that Slovakia is 21 
a country with near-endemic presence of corruption and that a further investigation 22 
into corruption is sorely needed. Moreover, as stated by the analysts in BTI, 23 
effectively tackling corruption is a way to effectively counter ‘social pessimism and 24 
passivity’, which have also been linked to further societal issues in a domino effect, 25 
such as increasing polarisation of the society, widening distances between social 26 
groups in Slovakia, as well as fear of migrants and other social groups (BTI, 2018:17). 27 
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The main shortcoming identified with regards to corruption research on Slovakia is 1 
that it is relatively sparse and difficult to access. Currently there is little published 2 
research available in international journals on this issue.  Only in anonymous reports 3 
for supranational bodies such as the European Commission and transnational bodies 4 
such as the World Bank, or in Slovak exclusively, are there data on the subject. 5 
There is a considerable literature gap with regards to Slovakia in several fields of 6 
expertise, not only corruption: be it Slovakia’s involvement in EU flagship policies, 7 
such as for example the Neighbourhood Policy, or with regards to its role within 8 
regional sub groups, such as the Visegrad Four (V4).  9 
Even within regional structures such as the V4, Slovakia is mostly observed as a point 10 
of comparison for the three bigger players (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), 11 
rather than a point of focus for its individual involvement in policy-making 12 
processes. This is mostly due to the relatively smaller size of the country and 13 
economy, compared with the other three, and due to the relative sparsity of data 14 
published, which usually makes for a good set of comparatives but is not sufficient 15 
for a concrete focus. Slovakia’s position seems to be ambiguous- for example, Tim 16 
Haughton’s chapter in Developments in Central & East European Politics (2013) lists 17 
Slovakia among ‘The Other New Europeans’ with geographically distant Estonia, 18 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, rather than in a chapter with its immediate 19 
neighbours of Central Europe with whom Slovakia shares its EU and NATO accession 20 
journeys and similar historical, ethnographic, and demographic makeup (Haughton 21 
2013). Another chapter in the same publication introduces Central European states 22 
listing Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, but leaving Slovakia out, albeit its 23 
geographical position would be more appropriately classed with these countries than 24 
the southern Slavic states or the Baltics (Millard 2013). It is worth questioning why 25 
Slovakia has proven so problematic to categorise in this manner and what the 26 
individual features that underline this taxonomical difficulty are. There is a clear 27 
lack of publication efforts and qualitative research to date for the V4 members and 28 
their corruption-specific efforts (EU-commissioned macro reports notwithstanding) 29 
but an even more accentuated lack of these conducted with Slovakia as a centre of 30 
focus.  31 
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Gallina’s 2013 publication provides a exception from this norm with her specific 1 
study of Slovakia and the Czech Republic’s anti-corruption measures. Gallina (2013) 2 
argues that these corruption measures have been, and continue to be, heavily 3 
politicised and therefore depending greatly on single personalities, rather than a 4 
serious political base to bring these to effect. She states that all the measures taken 5 
to date- be it government strategic plans, special courts establishment, the 6 
restructuring of regional administrative directors, or the National Memory Institute 7 
instatement conducted mainly by the Dzurinda government8- have all been 8 
implemented inefficiently at best. This is because these have not translated into 9 
any significant improvement in Slovakia’s position in the CPI, nor have they ensured 10 
a significantly greater prosecution of corrupt cases (Gallina 2013). As testament to 11 
this, Transparency International offers some interesting statistics. Even though 12 
corruption is perceived to be endemic on the grand scale and corruption scandals, 13 
such as the Gorila scandal9, or the most recent Bonaparte development complex 14 
scandal10 (both widely covered by popular press and include politicians, abuse of 15 
power, and EU funds embezzlement), it is still more regular citizens that are charged 16 
 
8 The most pro-European government Slovakia has had, which implemented the reforms needed for 
the early 2000s accession to both NATO and EU. 
9 The Gorila scandal is a corruption scandal containing files spanning from 2005 onwards, implying 
partial state capture by a single oligarchic group embedded in the government. It outlines the 
opaque party financing of the government leaders, offered in exchange for: specific rulings in civil 
and criminal proceedings, specific individuals sympathetic to the goals of financial groups or 
organised crime to be embedded in governmental structures, specific projects receiving amounts 
of EU funding, the ‘dealing with’ uncomfortable members of the public, and much more. For more 
details, see https://slovensko.hnonline.sk/2024714-gorila-prepis-spis-gorila [last accessed 
17/3/2021]. 
10 The Bonaparte scandal is a corruption scandal involving embezzlement of funds by the financier 
and developer L. Bašternák, currently serving his prison sentence. The flats of the Bonaparte 
building complex were bought and rented by government officials and members of organised 
crime groups. Most famously, the ex-PM Fico and ex-Chancellor Počiatek rented a flat from Mr 
Bašternák, as well as Marian Kočner, the named defendant in the murder case of journalist Ján 
Kuciak, who is currently also serving a 19-year sentence for financial fraud. For more information, 
please visit https://www.trend.sk/spravy/kocnerov-byt-bonaparte-je-opat-predaj-stoji-takmer-4-29-
miliona-eur [last accessed 17/3/2021]. 
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with corruption, as seen in Figure 2.1. A 2018 BTI report states that ‘no political or 1 
businessperson was sentenced or convicted up to now’ (BTI, 2018:4).  2 
 3 
Figure 2.1 The ratio of ordinary citizens to public figures charged with corruption in Slovakia. 4 
Black colour represents ordinary citizens, orange public figures. Source: Transparency 5 
International, 2017 6 
The thesis responds to this trend by focusing on real-life experiences with petty 7 
corruption and with putting greater emphasis on the number of in-depth interviews 8 
conducted with ordinary citizens- expecting around 40 in-depth interviews to around 9 
20 elite interviews. An even more interesting statistic is that which depicts the bribe 10 
amount that people are usually charged for- these are prevalently small sums of up 11 
to 20 EUR, as shown in Figure 2.2 overleaf, again pointing towards petty corruption 12 
as a more frequent phenomenon in the eyes of the respondents. This is emphasised 13 
by the BTI report (2018), which states that ‘high-level corruption seems almost non-14 
punishable in Slovakia, the courts may easily catch a “small fish”, but big ones go 15 
on unpunished’ (BTI, 2018:12).  16 
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 1 
Figure 2.2 Corruption cases ordered by the size of the bribe in Slovakia. Orange columns 2 
represent the period of 2011-2014 and blue columns show period 2014-2017. Source: 3 
Transparency International, 2017 4 
 5 
The decrease of prosecution of corruption cases of up to 20 EUR and an increase in 6 
those of over 5,000 EUR however, in the later examined period, does show some 7 
potential for the cases of grand corruption to receive greater attention in the future.  8 
Shortcomings in the corruption prosecution can be seen in the lack of transparency 9 
shown by the Slovak Special Court in its relatively fast (most cases get sentenced 10 
within 1 year), but closed, way of sentencing. Three quarters of sentencings end in 11 
a court order or by an agreement between the court and the accused on guilt and 12 
punishment; most perpetrators get a probationary period and a fine (Šípoš and 13 
Šimalčík 2017). However, neither of these types of sentencings includes any factual 14 
basis or objective justification for the sentencing, and there is also no legal 15 
requirement for any transcripts or witness statements to be released, which makes 16 
the court proceedings appear non-transparent and subject to manipulation (Šípoš 17 
and Šimalčík 2017). Over 90% of those sentenced for corruption never see any prison 18 
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time (Šípoš and Šimalčík 2017), which, according to Transparency International‘s 1 
analyst Gabriel Šípoš (2017), does not create enough of a deterrent environment.  2 
For comparison, Batory (2012) makes a very similar observation with regards to 3 
Hungary, whereby criminal statistics for 2009 show 1,237 registered investigations 4 
in corruption-related cases, i.e. less than 0.03% of all investigated crimes (Batory, 5 
2012:71). The same endemic issue of ‘lenient penalties such as fines or suspended 6 
prison sentences’ is at the root of lack of accountability in Hungary, too (Batory, 7 
2012:72). Therefore, even though there are several ‘layers upon layers’ of anti-8 
corruption legislation (Batory, 2012:69) present in Slovakia and other CEE countries 9 
that are a result of EU accession conditions and other standardised international 10 
regulations, there is a significant problem with compliance and implementation of 11 
these effectively. Despite my project focusing on only one case, the broader findings 12 
and lessons could travel across the broader CEE region11. A 2018 BTI report shows 13 
that over 60% of respondents do not find courts trustworthy in Slovakia (BTI 2018). 14 
A different approach to tackling corruption is necessary, as legislative attempts at 15 
curbing corruption only act as a cosmetic façade for the international community. 16 
The thesis targets this need for a bottom-up approach to corruption and rather than 17 
looking at sweeping, generalised measures that fail at the implementation stage, it 18 
looks at the motivations behind corruption to be able to produce a Slovakia-specific 19 
mapping of the phenomenon, which could potentially deepen our understanding of 20 
what anti-corruption measures could eventually make a difference.  21 
Gallina (2013) presents Slovakia as having made excellent strides towards 22 
international standards of anti-corruption measures during the two ex-PM Dzurinda 23 
governments, but presents ex-PM Fico and the social democrats most recently in 24 
power as reversing these by drafting laws to restrict media freedom (Gallina 2013). 25 
Gallina points out that the running trend of corrupt behaviour in governmental 26 
structures is first and foremost the needs of elites. This view is also supported by 27 
 
11 Although my findings cannot be strictly speaking generalised, they could serve as a framework for 
analysing petty and grand corruption across other CEE countries.  
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several political commentators from Slovakia openly stating that the efforts of 1 
individual governments are forever tied to personal agendas, most visible in the 2 
‘greatest economic crime’12 in the history of the country- the privatisation scandals 3 
of Mečiar’s nineties that were supposedly controlled by Mečiar personally (Lesko 4 
2017). Leško claims these have robbed the country, in his humble estimate, of at 5 
least a hundred million Slovak crowns that could subsequently not have been 6 
invested to education and healthcare - sectors the country is still lagging behind in 7 
comparison to its closest neighbours and the rest of the EU (Lesko 2017). Leško states 8 
that Slovakia is still ‘bailing hospitals out’ because of the privatization stunts of the 9 
90s that redirected cash flow from vital sectors to private political and economic 10 
agendas of the few, promoting an oligarchic rule of very few governmental 11 
stakeholders (Lesko 2017). Gallina states that these needs of elites act as 12 
determinants for corrupt practices, similarly to Della Porta’s (1999) work on Italian 13 
corruption networks gathering exclusively around individuals (Della porta and 14 
Vannucci 1999). The BTI report of 2018 underlines this trend and defines the 15 
‘traditional polarisation between the government and the opposition’ as the real 16 
reason why there is no longevity to legislative measures, no governmental 17 
cooperation, and why the actions of governmental individuals become ‘completely 18 
unpredictable’ (BTI, 2018:15). This ‘structural weakness in Slovakia’s party system’ 19 
(BTI, 2018:33), along with self-interest of elites, is presumably the reason behind 20 
the failure of elites such as PM Fico to propose effective measures to fight 21 
corruption. These have predominantly been focused on ‘prohibition and prosecution, 22 
as opposed to prevention’ (BTI, 2018:34).  23 
Gallina suggests that the reason her article is better informed about the Czech 24 
Republic’s anti-corruption measures than the Slovak ones stems from the fact that 25 
there is a ‘methodological disadvantage of a distorted media landscape in Slovakia 26 
and most information therefore comes from TI, Freedom House, or Czech sources’, 27 
rather than original work on Slovakia itself (Gallina 2013). It is therefore obvious 28 
 
12 Translations of Mr Leško’s quotes are my own. 
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that there is need for further research into the field of corruption, in the interest of 1 
anti-corruption measures advancement for the Slovak-specific context. Gallina also 2 
points out a paradox between the corruption measures taken by the Czech Republic 3 
and Slovakia, whereby Slovakia first adopted the Czech measures of corruption 4 
repression post-1993, while the Czechs realised that Slovak measures of corruption 5 
prevention were more effective and adopted those; indicating their lack of 6 
experience with democratic, anti-corruption measures implementation in the 1990s 7 
and a very ‘hit or miss’ strategy employed by both countries. Gallina emphasises 8 
that ‘further in-depth investigation is necessary’ (Gallina 2013) and the thesis aims 9 
to address the need for in-depth research by employing in-depth interviews and a 10 
rigorous NVivo analysis of data obtained.  11 
Gallina (2013) states that there is only one truly comprehensive, Slovak-specific 12 
corruption publication, that of Sičáková-Beblavá et al. from 2011. The study employs 13 
a simple but effective linguistic coding analysis of election programme declarations 14 
of individual election seasons and parties from the 1990s to 2011, identifying the 15 
governments with the most and the least amount of dedication to battling corruption 16 
and advancing democratic values in the country (Sičáková-Beblavá, Šípoš et al. 17 
2011). While this report shows the expected results, with ex-PM Mečiar (1990-1991, 18 
1992-1994, 1994-1998) and ex-PM Fico’s (2006-2010, 2012-2018) governments 19 
trailing far behind that of ex-PM Dzurinda (1998-2006) and the most reform-driven 20 
and anti-corruption focused government of ex-PM Radičová (2010-2012), it is 21 
relatively inaccessible, as it has not yet been translated into English. Its relatively 22 
out-of-date information (capped at the end of year 2011) not encompassing all of 23 
PM Fico’s second government for example, only adds to its difficulties in validity, 24 
applicability, and reliability. Nevertheless, it provides valuable material for the 25 
thesis in the original language, which expands the richness of data by a linguistic 26 
dimension, analysing in detail the phrases used and promises made from government 27 
to government. This then enables the thesis to trace governmental agenda into anti-28 
corruption much more effectively. However, this will only provide a part of the 29 
picture, as the report does not address any original data collection from citizens or 30 
experts, nor any analysis of media outlets. 31 
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In addition to the work by Sičáková-Beblavá (2011), the efforts to publish research 1 
on corruption in Slovakia have been mostly undertaken by the team employed by 2 
the Slovak chapter of Transparency International, who publish short reports on anti-3 
corruption measures, and have also published a report on health care corruption in 4 
2016. Additionally, Alexa’s 2007 paper evaluates the effectiveness of the anti-5 
corruption measures taken up to the year 2006; Alexa labels these as merely dealing 6 
with ‘surface symptoms’, rather than addressing the underlying causes of 7 
corruption, which, according to her, have roots in the governmental structures 8 
(Alexa 2007); as confirmed by Gallina in her later work (2013).  9 
Overall, it is clear that research on corruption is lacking specifically with regards to 10 
individual member states, especially in relation to Slovakia. Such research is close 11 
to non-existent, predominantly marginal, and always presented in comparison with 12 
other countries, as there is not enough material and data collected yet to conduct 13 
a rigorous project on Slovakia itself. The thesis aims to overcome the language 14 
barrier by publishing in English, while at the same time ensuring the richness of data 15 
collected by conducting field work in the original Slovak language, thus preserving 16 
cultural and linguistic authenticity and overcoming language limitations with 17 
translation. The thesis aims to fill indisputable gaps in literature on Slovak anti-18 
corruption measures, corruption experience and corruption structures, as well as 19 
contribute to the research on corruption in Central Europe and globally as a whole.  20 
2.3 Corruption in the healthcare sector 21 
 22 
Having established why corruption is a phenomenon that needs further investigation, 23 
it is necessary to present why health care constitutes the ideal case study for close 24 
inspection of corrupt behaviour in Central Europe. The 2006 Lancet editorial entitled 25 
‘Corruption in health care costs lives’ demonstrates clearly the severity of the issue. 26 
The editor speaks about health care not only as a service, but also from an economic 27 
point of view as an ‘enormous business affecting people’s lives’, worth an estimated 28 
US$ 3 trillion per year worldwide, a business which is strangely ‘exempt from 29 
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scrutiny’ that other business sectors receive in order to tackle corruption. The 1 
author warns that very little is known about the extent to which corruption affects 2 
health-care systems and providers and the word ‘corruption’ in health care is too 3 
frequently softened to ‘unethical or unprofessional behaviour’ (Lancet 2006).  4 
Mackey and Liang (2012) concur with the view that health care is a part of the global 5 
market, estimated to be worth 10% of global gross domestic product in 2009 (Mackey 6 
and Liang 2012). They emphasise that health care corruption not only leads to waste 7 
of scarce financial resources, but also has an adverse effect on health care access 8 
and provision. Their article establishes the principle of a ‘global health governance’ 9 
with a unified set of rules that would be applicable to all healthcare systems and 10 
transferable across borders in order to improve health care provision worldwide. 11 
They define health care corruption as ‘bribery of health professionals, regulators 12 
and public officials; unethical research; diversion/theft of medicines and medical 13 
supplies; fraudulent or overbilling for health services; absenteeism; informal 14 
payments; embezzlement; and corruption in health procurement’ (Mackey and Liang 15 
2012). From this definition, it can be argued that corruption in health care is a 16 
perfect medium for investigating corruption itself because, just like corruption 17 
alone, health care corruption encompasses several phenomena and cannot be 18 
limited to only bribery, theft, or unethical behaviour. It also has to include the 19 
tackling of grand corruption, ie embezzlement and health procurement. Health care 20 
corruption is, of course, not solitary in the corrupt trends it exhibits. While health 21 
care and the business sector are classified as the most corrupt of all sectors, the 22 
police force and the judiciary, along with administrative corruption and education 23 
are not far behind (as seen in Figure 2.4 towards the end of this section). Since both 24 
petty and grand corruption walk hand in hand in health care, according to Mackey 25 
and Liang (2012), it follows that comprehensive research into corruption strategies 26 
and their complex interplay between petty and grand corruption is ideally situated 27 
in the healthcare sector (Mackey and Liang 2012). The authors claim that as much 28 
as 56% of Russian Federation total health expenditures are informal payments and 29 
emphasise that transitional economies like those of the former USSR are most 30 
affected in the healthcare sector and should therefore receive special focus. The 31 
thesis fulfils this need by providing a close investigation of health care corruption in 32 
95 
the transitional economy of Slovakia, which fits the authors’ profile of the most 1 
affected countries (Mackey and Liang 2012).  2 
The authors present a model of global governance of health care, whereby 3 
corruption uncovered by a whistle-blower should be verified by an independent 4 
auditor and national judicial commission that would detail misappropriation, 5 
forgeries, nepotism, and lack of accountability (Mackey and Liang 2012), as was the 6 
case of the Global Fund misappropriation in Uganda. However, the fundamental 7 
issue in trying to achieve such a model of international cooperation is the lack of 8 
any global, legally-binding, corruption-tackling instrument in place. They emphasise 9 
that while the presence of corruption has been recognised by the U.N. Office on 10 
Drugs and Crimes 2003 document and in the U.N. Convention against Corruption 11 
(2003), there has not as yet been any delineation of a global anti-corruption health 12 
care instrument (Mackey and Liang 2012). What they call for in their article is a 13 
comprehensive approach to corruption in health care that would include the 14 
following: 15 
• Transparency and audit policies 16 
• A common framework for corruption monitoring and evaluation of public health 17 
programs and funding 18 
• Codes of Conduct for public and private sector actors 19 
• Minimum standards for member state laws to specifically prevent and prosecute 20 
health-based corruption 21 
• Health financing improvements to curtail the need for an informal health sector 22 
• A centralised surveillance and data repository system to report and investigate 23 
global health corruption 24 
• Multilateral processes to freeze proceeds from corruption and aid in recovery of 25 
diverted assets 26 
• Commitment to earmark portions of seized assets to fund and develop these anti-27 
corruption systems among members (Mackey and Liang 2012).  28 
While the proposed model of the authors seems all-encompassing and rigorous, the 29 
sheer scale of such a mechanism to be applied to a global setting is beyond any 30 
notion of practicality. Such a global governance would require a standardisation of 31 
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all anti-corruption strategies that vary country to country, due to corruption being 1 
a culturally and a historically bound phenomenon that manifests differently in 2 
individual settings. It is interesting to see the general outline of what a global-scale 3 
anti-corruption mechanism would have to include, but the ambiguity of the language 4 
and the lack of definition of what ‘minimum standards’ or ‘Codes of Conduct’ should 5 
entail for each country, the lack of country-specific application, and most of all, the 6 
reconciliation of these measures with country-specific corruption perceptions, puts 7 
the model firmly in the realm of the fantastical.  8 
Bernd and McKee (2009) emphasise the need for health care anti-corruption 9 
strategies to be stronger in the former USSR and point out that there is very little 10 
evidence for whether health reforms have achieved their intended results. They 11 
make the point that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) display great 12 
‘diversity in socioeconomic development, culture, and politics, extending to their 13 
health systems and capacity for and direction of reforms’ (Bernd and McKee 2009). 14 
Their article conducts a selective overview of health reform in the CEE countries 15 
from the fall of the USSR and provides an interesting insight into the provision of 16 
health insurance in the CEE countries (for the case of Slovakia a competing fund, as 17 
opposed to an entirely national fund of Croatia or Latvia). The authors conclude that 18 
corruption and ‘under-the-table payments’ pose the greatest challenges to 19 
healthcare and are pervasive in CEE- however the real extent and magnitude of 20 
these is still ‘unknown and incomplete’, calling for more research to be conducted 21 
into the corruption in the healthcare sector of the CEE (Bernd and McKee 2009). 22 
They identify the greatest problems of corruption, endemic within the healthcare 23 
systems of the CEE countries as the ‘failure of governments to enforce regulations, 24 
weak systems of accountability, and confusion of patients about which payments are 25 
official and which are not’ (Bernd and McKee 2009). It is therefore apparent that 26 
Bernd and McKee focus on both the systemic failure of effective reform-making of 27 
these countries, and on the petty side of corruption, mostly involving informal 28 
payments. They identify specific problems with primary care practice and the 29 
general confusion of progress of health care in these countries, which were 30 
encouraged to abandon all previous established avenues of health care perceived as 31 
socialist in nature, for example the use of polyclinics. The same concept of 32 
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polyclinics has paradoxically later been adopted by the UK Health Service as a 1 
modern, practical solution to cooperation between primary and secondary health 2 
care. The authors believe more research from the specific countries needs to be 3 
conducted into health care reform and anti-corruption mechanisms because the 4 
involvement of foreign health care experts in the early 90s concentrated on the 5 
‘transfer of ideas rather than on building domestic capacity for policy analysis and 6 
planning’, with these experts equipped with ‘little insight into local situations’ at 7 
the time (Bernd and McKee 2009). The thesis responds to the issue raised by the 8 
authors by conducting a rigorous, country-specific research into these “local 9 
situations” of health care provision, as seen by both the recipients of health care 10 
and the providers.  11 
Ensor (2004) also focuses primarily on the petty corruption encountered in the CEE 12 
healthcare systems and concludes that there are elements of communist legacy in 13 
health care corruption. According to Ensor, this suggests that in the Soviet Union 14 
prices and outputs were strictly regulated and queuing, rather than price, was the 15 
normal way of rationing (Ensor 2004). Individual connections and barter deals were 16 
much more important than the actual cash paid for the product, a system already 17 
introduced in Part 1 of Literature Review as “blat”, which has laid the foundations 18 
for the in-kind payment of service rendered in contemporary corrupt practices 19 
(Ensor 2004). Ensor believes that this informality is most pronounced in the 20 
healthcare sector and that is why there was still 60% of respondents paying for public 21 
care in Slovakia in 2004 and why there has been an absolute reduction for funding 22 
for health facilities in rural areas, increasing the need for rural inhabitants to 23 
receive and pay for healthcare informally (Ensor 2004). Ensor’s primary point is 24 
centred around the petty corruption of payments made because resources are 25 
inadequate, with patients even having to purchase medical supplies in many cases. 26 
He speaks of informal payments being a sophisticated operation, sometimes 27 
involving a broker, sometimes made directly to medical staff, who either keep the 28 
payment or even share between other staff (Ensor 2004). These payments, Anon 29 
(1999) argues, invoking a Bulgarian example, are higher the more specialist 30 
procedures are required, for example heart surgery being one of the most expensive 31 
(Anon 1999). He suggests that there is an entire market of informal payments 32 
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existing in parallel to the official healthcare market, thriving off of the constraint 1 
for official medical services funding (Ensor 2004). Thompson and Gorbunova concur 2 
and argue from a Kazakh perspective, that the ability to pay for medical services is 3 
much less important than the willingness to pay, creating an inequity between the 4 
rich and the poor, with the rural households spending significantly more than those 5 
in urban areas (Thompson and Gorbunova 2003). Ensor concludes that it is not only 6 
the formalisation and the standardisation of some of the informal payments that will 7 
create positive impact, but also increasing the competitiveness within the market, 8 
motivating specialists to remain in the country and thus relieving the pressure of the 9 
vast patient numbers and insufficient facilities, which motivates informal routes of 10 
receiving adequate care (Ensor 2004). Most importantly, Ensor concludes that while 11 
corruption research exists, little of it is ‘health sector specific, which means it does 12 
not address the nature of much of health care corruption, such as the essential 13 
nature of health care, the difference between corruption and survival strategies etc’ 14 
(Ensor 2004). Therefore, more health sector specific corruption research, 15 
determining the validity of concepts such as standardisation of informal fees, is 16 
necessary and called for in the CEE countries.  17 
Habibov’s 2016 work on health care corruption satisfaction raises similar points to 18 
those of Ensor (2004). His investigation also focuses on petty corruption, mostly 19 
informal payments, and concludes that corruption in health care exists as a rampant 20 
issue specifically in post-socialist countries, with literature notably lacking 21 
consensus regarding the effect of corruption in developing and transitional countries 22 
and within health care in particular (Habibov 2016). Habibov notes that petty 23 
corruption in health care is more likely to be prevalent than other public sectors due 24 
to the necessity of accessing health care, compared to the options of circumventing 25 
other sectors through personal connections. He also points out that corruption is 26 
associated with lower propensity of using health care when needed and bribes often 27 
constitute ‘catastrophic expenditures for the poor’ (Habibov 2009; in Habibov 2016). 28 
Habibov points out the incomplete nature of corruption in health care, often being 29 
only associated with ‘petty’ corruption, ‘rather than large-scale corruption 30 
schemes’ and calls for the need to investigate both at the same time, which is the 31 
focus of this thesis (Habibov 2016). From the perspective of satisfaction with health 32 
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care, Habibov investigates an interesting notion of corruption falling under either 1 
the “grease in the wheels” theory, whereby corruption produces positive results and 2 
facilitates satisfaction with health care, or the opposite, “sand in the wheels” 3 
theory, whereby corruption has a negative effect on health care satisfaction. His 4 
investigation concludes that the “grease in the wheels” notion is rejected in favour 5 
of the “sand in the wheels” notion, emphasising the need for reducing corruption in 6 
health care (Habibov 2016). Grodeland et al (1998) reach the same conclusion, 7 
despite presenting the view that a case can be made for corruption being functional 8 
to the process of building capitalism (Grodeland, Koshechkina et al. 1998). 9 
Eventually the authors agree that corruption within the CEE context is ‘dysfunctional 10 
and is both a moral and an economic problem’ (1998:652).  11 
Stepurko et al. (2013) conducted a study into several CEE countries, including 12 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania, as well as Ukraine, but do not 13 
include a section on Slovakia or the Czech Republic. They conclude that informal 14 
payments are indeed an ‘important payment channel’ which facilitates the 15 
avoidance of waiting lists and reduces waiting times, as well as ensures the obtaining 16 
of better care and more attention from the medical staff (Stepurko, Pavlova et al. 17 
2013). The key idea in Stepurko’s research is that the communist past of the 18 
countries in question has brought the collision of ‘new and old values’ and the 19 
informality of payments is an old value that survived in order for patients to be able 20 
to receive ‘adequate’ quality of health care to date (Stepurko, Pavlova et al. 2013). 21 
The idea of ‘adequate quality’ is recurrent throughout Stepurko’s work and also 22 
mentioned in the data collected through in-depth interviews in the thesis, which 23 
lends credence to the idea that perceptions of the quality of health care match the 24 
citizen expectations of what they should be entitled to within their health care 25 
provision. Since Stepurko’s article does not include Slovakia within its case study, 26 
the thesis fills this gap by providing insight into what the Slovak health care recipient 27 
considers ‘adequate’ health care provision and to what extent they feel they must 28 
pay for it informally. Stepurko makes an important and a very interesting distinction 29 
between cash payments and in-kind gifts, and shows that the perception of in-kind 30 
gift giving is much less negative than that of hard cash (78% of respondents see hard 31 
cash payment as negative, only 51% see in-kind gifts as negative) (Stepurko et al., 32 
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2013), which however poses theoretical problems of defining where corruption ends 1 
and a mere token of gratitude begins, and how the society’s perception of this 2 
distinction is formed. The thesis tackles this issue in the following sections by 3 
providing an analysis of the distinction between gift giving and informal payments, 4 
as expressed by the participants of focus groups and in-depth interviews. Stepurko’s 5 
research seems to show a clear distinction between the negative perception of 6 
corruption by those who have been requested to pay informal payments, as opposed 7 
to those who have volunteered them, with the latter group seeing this as a less 8 
negative phenomenon than the former. There is also an important distinction 9 
between gift giving before and after the service provision- Stepurko stipulates that 10 
while informal gifts after health care provision cannot be encouraged, they do not 11 
‘adversely affect efficiency in healthcare provision’ (Stepurko, Pavlova et al. 2013) 12 
and as such should not be viewed as a traditional, detrimental corrupt technique. 13 
The article concurs with all previous research presented that the main reason that 14 
gift-giving and informal payments are considered necessary is the low funding of the 15 
public healthcare sector. The key to tackling informal practices in health care 16 
corruption, according to Stepurko et al (2013), is the creation of public opposition 17 
which can in turn enable the effectiveness of policy strategies aimed at eradicating 18 
corrupt practices. As a point of comparison to the Slovak case study of the thesis, 19 
Batory (2012) invokes Hungary as another CEE country that struggles with health 20 
care corruption, with 26% of Hungarian respondents claiming to have either made 21 
a bribe themselves or someone they know, to a healthcare professional (2012:74). 22 
Comparisons such as this make the research and potential results of the thesis even 23 
more relevant for not only Slovakia but also comparable economies, such as 24 
Hungary.  25 
Investigating the same gift-giving phenomenon in Slovakia, a 2016 article by Rudolf 26 
Straka outlines in detail the legal measures taken and the implications of gift giving 27 
in the healthcare sector in Slovakia. Legally the article outlines the conditions that 28 
have to be fulfilled for a transaction to become legally covered as a gift- these are 29 
the voluntary nature of the transaction, the exclusion of any monetary element out 30 
of the transaction, and that the transaction has to always have two sides: the gift 31 
giver and the gift receiver (Straka 2016). Straka reports that the healthcare sector 32 
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is rigorously regulated in general and that these regulations apply to gift giving too. 1 
Technically, doctors are only allowed to receive gifts in an informal capacity (such 2 
as birthdays) and with a strict rule applied that these gifts should not be from 3 
current patients and should not constitute an incentive of any kind to provide 4 
preferential care to the gift giver (Straka 2016). However, there are already obvious 5 
issues with this reasoning, as there is no way to monitor gift giving in private 6 
settings, nor is there any restriction on past and/or future patients giving gifts. 7 
Theoretically, once the patient is released from a doctor’s care, there is no longer 8 
any restriction on gifts legally and there is also no restriction on a verbal agreement 9 
as to the timeline of gift giving, which creates several loopholes for the gift giver 10 
and the gift receiver to access. The knowledge of the process acquired by the gift 11 
giver can then also be transferred within underlying corrupt networks to any future 12 
patients, thus eradicating the need for doctors to have similar conversations in the 13 
future; making the process much opaquer and more difficult to track down. Straka 14 
lists several legal measures in Slovakia that are in effect supposed to be preventing 15 
any gift giving of this nature, for example the directive 2001/83/ES and 16 
the regulation number 726/2004 of the Law on medicines and the Law on commerce, 17 
which outline strict rules that protect doctors from prescribing specific drugs and 18 
prevent the lobbying of companies with individual doctors to prescribe based on 19 
a bribe (Straka, 2016:397). Furthermore, Straka also invokes the rules of the Ethical 20 
code of a healthcare worker number 578/2004 as a part of the Law on service 21 
providers and also the Law on health care provision number 577/2004 that all outline 22 
ethical behaviour, but, Straka notes, no punitive measures in terms of gift reception 23 
are mentioned. Straka notes that the Czech Republic has recently included 24 
such measures (Straka, 2016:398). The greatest problem, according to Straka, when 25 
it comes to punishing gift giving is the opaque nature of the transaction and the 26 
presence of already-existing networks of patients who pass information along as to 27 
the specific strategies of gift giving to specific healthcare professionals. He states 28 
that there is not always ‘sufficient room’ to investigate gift giving and that the 29 
patient is by nature in a ‘subservient’ position to the physician who holds a particular 30 
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monopoly over a vital resource (Straka, 2016:398)13. As a point of comparison, Batory 1 
(2012) states that similar ‘gratitude’ payments and gifts are perhaps the ‘most 2 
common type of petty corruption in health care’ in Hungary as well and that in a 3 
recent survey only a ‘third of the public and a tenth of surveyed physicians’ found 4 
giving and accepting such payments as morally reprehensible (Batory, 2012:76). 5 
Once again, this problematic is relevant for the region of Central and Eastern Europe 6 
as a whole14. Straka urges the society not to taboo the subject of gift giving but 7 
instead calls for research to bring this subject to light, in order to tackle it head-on, 8 
which is the aim of the thesis.  9 
A 2014 European Commission report on Slovakia as a part of its country-specific Anti-10 
Corruption Initiative concurs with Straka’s and Stepurko’s findings and calls for the 11 
fortification and protection of the actions of the free press and civil society 12 
initiatives, all of which provides the foundation for tackling corruption from the 13 
bottom up, through public opposition. According to the 2013 Special Eurobarometer, 14 
90% of Slovak respondents believe that corruption is widespread in their country, 15 
with the EU average being 76%. Petty corruption is more widespread than grand, the 16 
report argues, with 40% of respondents claiming to have been affected by petty 17 
corruption, with the EU average being 26% (Eurobarometer 2017). However, with 18 
regards to grand corruption, especially in the field of public procurement, 57% of 19 
respondents of those who participated in public procurement in the past three years 20 
before the report was published said that they were prevented from winning because 21 
of corruption. In the healthcare sector, there have been several public procurement 22 
scandals in recent years and the report states that Slovakia’s healthcare system is 23 
‘particularly vulnerable to corruption’ (Eurobarometer, 2013:9). A more recent 2017 24 
Eurobarometer shows the problem of corruption in health care is not improving 25 
 
13 The legal implications and realities of gift giving are addressed further in Chapter 8. 
14 Grodeland et al. (1998) further confirm this and provide examples of the most frequent gifts given; 
such as ‘chocolate, coffee, bottle of wine, flowers etc’ as the most frequent ones (Grodeland et al. 
1998:662). 
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despite steps taken on a governmental level - it lists Slovakia among the seven 1 
‘striking’ exceptions of countries (Greece, Cyprus, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and 2 
Slovakia) where health care is most frequently mentioned as the sector with greatest 3 
levels of corruption (Eurobarometer 2017). This is reflected in Figure 2.3 below 4 
which lists doctors as the largest group of public officials charged with corruption. 5 
 6 
Figure 2.3 Ratio of those charged with corruption in Slovakia. Light blue- doctors, orange- civil 7 
service, black- the police, yellow- local administrative services, dark green- elected officials, 8 
light green- prison staff, purple- universities, red- lawyers. Source: Transparency International, 9 
2017 10 
The Slovak branch of the European Commission has published a summary of the 11 
results of the latest Eurobarometer 2018 on corruption. According to the survey, 83% 12 
of respondents think corruption is most prevalent in public services and institutions 13 
and 55% think corruption is most endemic in health care (EC 2018). 24% of 14 
respondents think it is acceptable to give money to motivate behaviour and 43% 15 
think it is acceptable to give a gift with the same objective (European Commission, 16 
2018). Finally, over 48% of respondents believe that corruption has increased in the 17 
country in the last three years (EC 2018). The Slovak Business Association (PAS) 2017 18 
poll has mirrored this alarming rate of corruption spreading, with over half of 19 
respondents having encountered corruption particularly in the healthcare sector, 20 
only beat by its presence in the business sector, as seen in Figure 2.4 overleaf (Slovak 21 
Business Association 2017). The most recent BTI (2018) report also states that even 22 
despite ‘spectacular corruption scandals, most notably in the healthcare sector’ 23 
(BTI, 2018:4), there are no signs for a reform of public expenditures in health care, 24 
social affairs, or education at all. A possible explanation behind the patterns as 25 
shown in Figure 2.4 overleaf is potentially the large increase in entrepreneurship in 26 
the CEE countries, eager to move away from state structures and ‘shortage’ 27 
economy into market economy and the promise of capitalism, using the ‘grease the 28 
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wheels’ economy practice (Kornai, 2006:232). While there are some who would 1 
suggest that transition into market economy should therefore curb corrupt practices 2 
in the CEE as rejuvenation of economy inevitably happens, Grodeland et al. (1998) 3 
suggest that bribes can take a different form, for example goods in short supply. 4 
Therefore, market reforms may not eliminate corruption entirely: they may simply 5 
monetarise it (Grodeland, Koshechkina et al. 1998). The healthcare pattern, also 6 
connected with privatisation and inefficient handling of health care funding which 7 
suffered more than other sectors from an economic decline, suffered what Ellman 8 
calls a ‘surprise of transition’ it is still trying to find its way out of (Ellman, 9 
2005:599). Ellman claims that the remnant of socialist legacies of informal payments 10 
marries itself with a badly funded public care system which requires more direct 11 
payments on top of the indirect (taxes) payments already made to the healthcare 12 
sector- the increasing need to pay directly for medicines and better (or faster) care 13 
has in turn created a ‘sharp socio-economic differentiation’ in access to quality 14 
medical care (Ellman, 2005:606). Such differentiation presents itself in the 15 
economic prowess of the citizens and, in a domino effect, prevents them from 16 
accessing quality service in other sectors as well- corruption therefore sustains itself 17 
in a vicious circle, whereby unofficial payments cause poverty, which causes lack of 18 
access to tax-funded services, in turn calling for more unofficial payments. 19 
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 1 
Figure 2.4 The prevalence of corruption by sector in Slovakia. Descending order- Business, 2 
Health care, State administration, Courts, Politics, The Police, Education, The Labour market, 3 
Banks and insurance companies, Other, the Army. Source: Richard Duchaj PAS, 2017 4 
There is no question that the research on corruption in the healthcare sector is 5 
incomplete worldwide. This section leaves no doubt that a more rigorous 6 
investigation of health care corruption will inevitably lead to tackling corruption 7 
more effectively as a whole. Most importantly, within the Slovak context, health 8 
care corruption is addressed sparsely and with the official recommendation of the 9 
European Commission specifically, health care provides a rich environment for 10 
investigating corrupt practices of petty and grand nature and presents itself as a 11 
suitable case study for the investigation of the phenomenon of corruption as a 12 
whole.  13 
  14 
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2.4 Conclusions  1 
 2 
The review has by this point justified why more research is needed into corruption 3 
and why the to-date measurement of corruption has not proven to be complete. The 4 
review ties the need for further corruption research with the prevalence of 5 
corruption in CEE countries and proposes Slovakia as a feasible case study for 6 
corruption research. This claim is justified by Slovakia sharing the legacies of post-7 
communism, thus feasible for testing the validity of the ‘corruption as communist 8 
legacy’ interpretation, as well as its unique position as a transitional economy, a 9 
new EU member state, and a member of all aforementioned supranational and/or 10 
transnational bodies commissioning anti-corruption reports (ie the EU or the World 11 
Bank). In a study conducted by Grodeland et al. (1998) Slovakia has come out as 12 
higher than other studied countries (Bulgaria, Ukraine, the Czech Republic) in the 13 
percentage of personal experience with bribe givings, using contacts to circumvent 14 
the system and others (Grodeland et al. 1998:661). This suggests that there is 15 
a potential for respondents in Slovakia to have a particularly rich awareness and 16 
knowledge on the subject of strategies utilised for corrupt activities, relevant to the 17 
CEE region as a whole. Slovakia is also generally understudied in several fields of 18 
expertise, be it as a member of sub-regional groups such as the V4 or as a member 19 
of CEE countries generally. There is little research conducted into Slovakia on its 20 
own, as the country is mostly presented as a point of comparison to its neighbouring 21 
Czech Republic; and there is also a vast problem of research conducted in Slovakia 22 
on Slovakia rarely reaching audience abroad, due to lack of translation facilities. 23 
Last but not least, Slovakia is one of the leaders in negative corruption perception 24 
and has some of the least effective anti-corruption measures, which some scholars 25 
argue seem to be contingent upon separate political personalities, rather than 26 
displaying longevity by effective measures from one government to another. The 27 
need for corruption research in Slovakia is therefore socially relevant, important for 28 
its international standing and reputation, and essential for the country’s proper 29 
systemic functioning for its future generations. 30 
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The most rigorous part of the review is presented in the last section of ‘Corruption 1 
in health care’. This section shows in no uncertain terms that while there has been 2 
a lot of theoretical research conducted into corruption, health care specific 3 
corruption is an understudied field which lacks international consensus, 4 
international legislative support, and tackling mechanisms. Since the review shows 5 
that such international mechanism would require an immense generalisation of the 6 
phenomenon and the opposite of country-specific measures, the need for country-7 
specific health care anti-corruption measures is emphasised. Health care is 8 
presented as an ideal case study for the investigation of corruption as a whole due 9 
to its ubiquitous nature, its need to be accessed by the largest amount of 10 
respondents, and the most varied demographic makeup, providing for as objective 11 
an investigation of the phenomenon as possible. Moreover, due to its nature of 12 
operating on a lower level of patient-doctor interaction, as well as a upper level of 13 
equipment procurement and embezzlement, it presents itself as a feasible case 14 
study for the investigation of grand and petty corruption interaction. Finally, the 15 
review presents health care to be internationally classed as the most corrupt sector 16 
in Slovakia, beating the police, the judiciary, or education in corruption perception 17 
polls. An official 2014 European Commission report makes a specific call for health 18 
care corruption to being the key sector within which to tackle corruption practices 19 
(not merely bribery but also the widespread gift giving), which would in turn 20 
potentially produce recommendations for tackling corruption in other public sectors 21 
and also across borders (EC 2014). An in-depth investigation of Slovakia’s health care 22 
corrupt practices will have beneficial implications for the country’s anti-corruption 23 
research, as well as for the investigation of corruption as a worldwide phenomenon.  24 
25 
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Chapter 3: Conceptualising and Measuring 1 
Corruption  2 
 3 
3.1 Introduction 4 
 5 
In order to produce an effective measurement of corruption, it must first be 6 
defined in measurable terms; however, because of its ill-defined nature, 7 
corruption is historically difficult to quantify.  8 
Brooks (2016) suggests that this is due to corruption ranging from unethical but 9 
legal acts (such as lobbying by pharmaceutical companies with doctors in the 10 
United States) to illegal acts, and can therefore be considered deviant and/or 11 
criminal (2016:2). As such, corruption should be understood on a ‘continuum’ 12 
(Brooks, Walsh et al. 2013), as it encompasses not only criminal acts but also 13 
immoral acts such as nepotism. This means that corruption is not always a simple 14 
matter for the explicit study of criminology or legal measure enforcement, but a 15 
more nuanced set of challenges, which do not have to transgress legal rules, but 16 
perhaps just societal rules; or a way of life practiced and accepted in respective 17 
societies. Some scholars suggest, that similarly to criminal behaviour, corrupt 18 
behaviour is observed and taught and is subject to key influences, namely that of 19 
institutionalisation, rationalisation and/or socialisation of corrupt behaviour 20 
(Ashforth and Anand 2003). Others suggest that there need be no negative 21 
influence, merely enough of an opportunity and return value; and that such actions 22 
are subsequently neutralised through avenues such as denial of responsibility, 23 
denial of injury to others, disbursement of blame, and similar (Sykes and Matza 24 
1957). It would therefore be erroneous to always equate what is corrupt with what 25 
is illegal, because social norms are defined by values similarly to laws, but these 26 
do not necessarily emerge from equal ideologies or foundations (Brooks, Walsh et 27 
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al. 2013). This concept becomes relevant in practice especially when discussing 1 
the difference between normal lobbying and unethical forms of trading in 2 
influence. The managing director for the European Healthcare Fraud and 3 
Corruption network makes this point when evaluating the status of healthcare 4 
corruption in Europe and explains the individual nature of healthcare corruption 5 
‘within a country largely depends on the extent to which corruption is embedded 6 
in the economy and society’ (Vincke 2016). He emphasises there is no hard data 7 
available on this embedding of corruption within individual societies and that a 8 
change in healthcare will only be able to stem from general changes in norms and 9 
attitudes, inclusive of a bottom-up as well as top-down approach.  10 
There is a call among corruption scholars to recalibrate our understanding of 11 
corruption (Heywood 2014, Heywood 2014, Brooks 2016). The role of context is 12 
constantly emphasised as the main ingredient in how people interact in corrupt 13 
exchanges. The difficulty in capturing context is where qualitative methods step in 14 
to be able to encompass the many different forms that corruption takes. These are 15 
often mistaken for the political science premise of understanding corruption in a 16 
principal-agent role of monetary transactions (Drugov, Hamman et al. 2011). Such 17 
understanding  fails to capture the different forms of corruption and also assumes 18 
that bribes are only given if requested, rather than proactively, to secure a social 19 
contract (Heywood 2014). Principal-agent frameworks often assume that the 20 
interests of the principal and the agent are divergent and that one is corrupted by 21 
the other, as the principal typically prescribes the rules and sets the tone of the 22 
transactional relationship (Groenendijk, 1997). This model fails to address the fact 23 
that many corrupt exchanges occur as a part of a collective effort, involving more 24 
members than just the principal and the agent and that often the separate parties 25 
can have convergent interests, as opposed to one corrupting the other. Facilitators 26 
to corruption, such as third parties or brokers, can take part either directly or 27 
through dissemination of relevant information to others. The thesis aims to 28 
contribute to this recalibration of corruption understanding through comparing the 29 
theoretical delineation of corruption to its real-life understanding.  30 
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The literature review has already outlined the numerous definitions that 1 
corruption has adopted across several fields; these are most frequently based on a 2 
distinction between the public and the private capacities of individuals or 3 
institutions. The limitations of partitioning corruption into these individual 4 
elements fails to consider that corruption in a real-life setting is likely to permeate 5 
multiple strata of society, including both the public and private sectors at grand 6 
and petty levels alike.  7 
The assumption of the thesis is that the real-life understanding depicted on a case 8 
study is likely to erase the notion of corruption delineated into binaries. On the 9 
contrary, it is likely to show that no matter what form corruption assumes within a 10 
given sector, service, or interpersonal exchange, it is possible to identify it based 11 
on societally embedded understanding of fairness. Conceptually this would mean 12 
that corruption can start being investigated in a qualitative manner more 13 
frequently and habitually, focusing on cultural nuances and specific historical and 14 
economic conditions of a given case study through empirical research. The thesis 15 
gives foundation for corruption to be studied in a manner that addresses the 16 
problem at its roots of societal understanding of the concept, as opposed to 17 
focusing on the resulting effects of corruption, such as embezzlement schemes or 18 
bribery scandals, which are often presented and investigated in a socio-cultural 19 
vacuum.  20 
In this section, the thesis outlines the importance of corruption perception when 21 
generating models for measuring corruption, the roles of both quantitative and 22 
qualitative methods in the evaluation of corruption, discussion of the complex 23 
social challenges inherent within corruption research, and final evaluation of 24 
current and previous corruption measurements employed within Central and 25 
Eastern Europe to date. 26 
  27 
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3.2 Consideration of the perception of corruption 1 
 2 
The subjective nature of perceptions is at the crux of the problematic nature for 3 
effective and objective measurement of corruption. It cannot be presumed that 4 
perceived and measured corruption are directly proportional to one another, and, 5 
indeed, Olken (2009) highlights this in his study of local villagers’ perceptions of 6 
corruption on a road construction project, taking place in a rural setting. His 7 
findings confirm that the correlation between perceived corruption and actual 8 
corruption observed in the project is actually quite weak. However, even Olken’s 9 
conclusions of the downfall of corruption perception in this context are made on 10 
mostly a monetary perception of bribes or embezzlement within this project. As 11 
Weber Abramo (2007) points out, this bias towards financial corruption 12 
measurement within perceptions of corruption, such as the Corruption Perception 13 
Index (CPI), The Business International Index (BII) or the World Governance 14 
Indicators (WGI), constructs a meta-analysis problem, whereby not only are there 15 
issues of perception inconsistencies from one respondent to another, but also 16 
issues of these perceptions ignoring other corrupt practices within, which might 17 
not bear a monetary character. These may instead manifest in different ways (such 18 
as exchange of services or gifts in health care, the judiciary, or education). 19 
Emphasis is placed on the role that social relationships play in low-level corrupt 20 
practices precisely for this reason. The issues most prevalent are the informal 21 
networks accessed, patronage, gift-giving, reciprocal exchange, kinship and 22 
clientelism (Jancsics 2013). The CPI particularly is criticised most among the 23 
scholarly community, recently also from a neo-colonialist perspective, suggesting 24 
that it can be used to undermine public administration in favour of Western 25 
economic interests (De Maria 2008). The argument here is that perception-based 26 
operational definitions of corruption are used to produce annual indices (CPI, WGI, 27 
BI) that are commissioned with a clear agenda at their centre. This is visible when 28 
examining the incentivisation of foreign investment into some countries, while 29 
discouraging investment in others (Wei 1997). It has been shown that a rise in tax 30 
rate on multinational firms, as well as rise in corruption levels of a host country, 31 
112 
reduces the inward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Wei 1997).  There is impetus 1 
now for corruption indices to be conducted and published at least four to five 2 
years apart rather than annually, in order for any anti-corruption measures to have 3 
the necessary time to bear fruit. However, it is worth pointing out that corruption 4 
levels are not the only factor considered and oftentimes other factors such as 5 
common linguistic ties between the source and host countries, as well as 6 
geographic proximity can be associated with positive trends in FDI flow that could 7 
outweigh the impact of corruption levels (Wei 1997). These perception-based 8 
indices also constitute merely a fraction of corruption measurement indices and 9 
there are more accurate, experience-based measurements available, such as the 10 
Global Corruption Barometer which is able to identify global trends and 11 
comparisons- however, even these indices are criticised for overly focusing on 12 
petty bribery focus and are unable to draw causal links between reforms and their 13 
impact (Johnson and Hardoon 2012).  14 
The perceptions of corruption and the physical extent of corruption rarely overlap 15 
(Montinola and Jackman 2002; Seligson 2002 in Ko and Samajdar 2010). In light of 16 
this, the objectivity of measurements based on surveys and expert questionnaires 17 
is called into question and the subjectivity of answers to these is the greatest flaw 18 
in perception-based corruption measurement (Kubbe 2013). That is not to say that 19 
any qualitative data collected within this or other projects will not suffer from 20 
several accounts of subjectivity, be it the accounts given by the participants or the 21 
data analysis filtered through the researcher’s interpretation. However, the 22 
research conducted within this thesis does fill a void of qualitative data collected 23 
from lay people and elites alike (rather than separately) and will present an angle 24 
of investigation with a depth of inquiry, language and text analysis not yet 25 
encountered. The research accepts and embraces the impossibility of capturing 26 
objective reality (Denzin and Lincoln 1998) and that within cultural studies of any 27 
nature, the most accurate observation of corruption can only be attempted by 28 
qualitative research due to its ‘interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary [and] a 29 
multipragmatic approach’(Nelson, Treichler et al. 1992). 30 
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To complicate matters further, despite its connotations, corruption is not always 1 
necessarily viewed in a purely negative light. As already outlined in the literature 2 
review, Grodeland et al. (1998) show that at first revisionists would have 3 
advocated the ‘grease in the wheels’ theory, whereby corruption can at first 4 
glance appear to be functional in the building of a new capitalist economy. For 5 
example, in a partially privatised healthcare system like that of Slovakia, this 6 
would mean that if a state-run surgery can provide a service at an expediated rate 7 
for a small bribe of around 20EUR, the private practices which charge more for the 8 
same service or another state practice which does not charge, would need to 9 
compete for patients with increasing the service quality and/or decreasing waiting 10 
times. On the other hand, the opposing ‘sand in the wheels’ rationale indicates 11 
that the opposite may be the case, whereby those willing to act in a corrupt 12 
manner may simply be the ones most willing to compromise on the quality of the 13 
service or goods received (Brooks 2016). Using the example of Slovak healthcare 14 
again, the competitiveness between aforementioned surgeries would not occur, 15 
due to the patient not caring about the quality, but only about waiting times- this 16 
may particularly be the case for routine check-ups, which are mandated by private 17 
insurance companies, but not seen by patients as a medical necessity/emergency. 18 
As a result, corruption may therefore lead to a skewed image of economy, fuelled 19 
by shadow economy, and may also lead to public investment in overall 20 
unproductive sectors. This gives foundation for research such as this thesis 21 
outlines, which looks into the mechanisms of petty corruption to identify clearly 22 
whether it is bribes, use and misuse of contacts, as well as exchange of immaterial 23 
goods such as services, that affects the proper functioning of the given society. My 24 
respondents in several linguistic variations alluded to corruption being practiced as 25 
a way to ‘even the keel’ or ‘get the same standard of care as everybody else’ and 26 
therefore the principle of inequality and ‘grease’ or ‘sand’ in the wheels of the 27 
public sector embeds itself as a central tenet of the phenomenon. Grodeland et al 28 
(1998) also rightly point to this inequality being subject to cultural norms and 29 
traditions; in other words, there is no one face of inequality across the board. 30 
Based on this assumption, a study of people’s opinions on the subject is bound to 31 
provide invaluable insight into the individual manifestation of corruption in the 32 
given country, culture, and sector. 33 
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3.3. The Role of brokerage in corruption 1 
 2 
The traditional definitions of corruption tend to present corruption as exchange 3 
transaction between two actors. However, in the real world there are often third-4 
party intermediaries present. The role of brokerage in corruption research is 5 
integral to its holistic understanding. Perceptions of corruption often mention a 6 
third party within a corrupt exchange, be it as a directly engaged intermediary of 7 
a corrupt deal, or as a facilitator who relays information that leads to a corrupt 8 
exchange. Brokerage in corruption is most frequently described as the flow or 9 
exchange of valued resources from one actor to another via an intermediary 10 
(Gould and Fernandez 1989, Stovel and Shaw 2012). This perspective of a 11 
corruption ‘middleman’ or ‘broker’ is in direct opposition to the principal-agent 12 
model, because it considers a third party in the corrupt exchange. There are, of 13 
course, other conceptualisations of corruption beyond the principal-agent model, 14 
which consider the role of several actors, such as the collective action theory, 15 
whereby group dynamics and notions of trust are emphasised. In this theory the 16 
individual’s decisions are conceptualised as a result of group dynamics, with the 17 
specific emphasis on the role of trust in the collective corrupt concept, and 18 
reforms are deemed to be less effective if corruption is thus ‘normalised’ within a 19 
collective setting (Rothstein and Teorell 2014, Marquette and Peiffer 2015). There 20 
is also the social exchange theory, which posits that customarily internal dynamics 21 
created by social structures reduce uncertainty and risk; however, in the specific 22 
corrupt context, the opposite is the case which results in destabilised trust within 23 
social structures and increased probability of additional illicit exchanges (Lawler 24 
and Hipp 2010). In the remit of social exchange theory, corruption is seen as a 25 
repeated pattern of socially embedded exchanges, dependent on ongoing networks 26 
and ties among members of social groups. This is congruent with the theoretical 27 
conceptualisation of corruption by the thesis more broadly, except for the missing 28 
emphasis on the broker figure as outlined by my participants.  29 
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Therefore, brokerage seems to be a more pertinent conceptualisation for the 1 
Slovak understanding of corruption. This is due to every Slovak governmental legal 2 
and regulation guideline on corruption specifies that in order to fulfil the criminal 3 
and civil code definition, a corrupt act has to be carried out either directly by 4 
public or private person(s) or through a ‘sprostredkovatel’, broker. The role of the 5 
broker becomes even more integral to determining the variation of sentences that 6 
the criminal code specifies, ranging anywhere between 2-8 years of imprisonment 7 
across the various branches of the crime (Trestné činy korupcie podľa zákona 8 
č.300/2005 Z.z. Trestný zákon, §328-336a). (Code 2005) 9 
It is obvious that for this particular case study, brokerage is a concept that should 10 
not be overlooked and there are several questions included in the list of questions 11 
in Appendix 3, which tackle the role of the broker. For example: How do you think 12 
corruption is carried out? Who do you think gets approached for a corrupt 13 
transaction to take place? How do you think the behaviour of healthcare 14 
professionals facilitates corruption? The idea of a broker was also tackled from a 15 
socially more acceptable perspective, more akin to that of ‘blat’ (Ledeneva 2009), 16 
whereby informal practices are carried out through a network of exchanging 17 
favours brokered through contacts. This question: ‘Do you consider the use of 18 
personal contacts and connections to be a form of corruption?’ addressed this 19 
angle of inquiry into corruption by the field work.  20 
The assumption is that for post-communist societies the model of brokerage is 21 
more likely due to the historical necessity for informal networks to help one 22 
another as a survival technique in a bureaucratic systemic overload. A thorough 23 
study of corruption should therefore include the ideas of entrepreneur brokerage, 24 
gatekeeper brokerage, extra service brokerage, representative brokerage and 25 
multiple insider brokerage models within corrupt exchanges (Jancsics 2015)15. The 26 
key principle to bear in mind when discussing brokerage types is the discovery of 27 
 
15 For definitions of these types of brokerage, see Jancsics, D. (2015) “A friend gave me a phone 
number”- Brokerage in low-level corruption, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 
(Elsevier).  
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an ever-expanding, complex blueprint of corruption, which in reality strays beyond 1 
a straight-forward principal-agent understanding. Jancsics’s suggestion of personal 2 
relationships reproducing socio-cultural systems outside organisations lays bare the 3 
fundamental need for a better understanding of corruption and the structures and 4 
micro-dynamics of actual corrupt exchanges in a real-life setting. Empirically, this 5 
means that direct questions were asked about how one administers a bribe- 6 
whether this is given directly or through an intermediary- and also how one finds 7 
out about the necessary sum or form of a bribe- be it directly from the recipient or 8 
via intermediaries. My findings relating to the role of the broker in the corrupt 9 
exchange are among the key findings of the thesis and are explored in depth in the 10 
latter chapters, as well as the discussion chapter. I conceptualise corruption from 11 
a holistic perspective, presuming that the broker will be present and potentially 12 
significant, as corruption tends to thrive in an environment of networks (Jancsics, 13 
2015) and networks tend to conduct themselves based on societal norms. As such, 14 
my conceptualisation does not discount the role of the broker and does not anchor 15 
itself only within financial terms, but sees corruption as adaptable to its 16 
surroundings and capable of capitalising on material as well as immaterial terms. 17 
3.4 Measurement of corruption 18 
 19 
The thesis defines grand and petty corruption as follows: 20 
Grand Corruption 21 
Abuse of power and/or distortion of policies or resources at an overseeing level 22 
within public services, with the purpose of the few benefiting at the expense of 23 
the many. 24 
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Abuse of power- understood by drawing on the definition presented in the Oxford 1 
reference16: misuse of a dominant position to undertake unlawful activities. The activities 2 
here do not necessarily have to be unlawful but can be in breach of social rules and 3 
regulations of good practice. 4 
Distortion of policies or resources- understood as any action that misappropriates resources 5 
from their intended destination or alters/bends rules set out by policy to be different from 6 
their intended purpose. 7 
Example: Inflated prices for procurement of hospital equipment or outsourcing 8 
hospital services such as a CT scan or an MRI scan by insurance companies to 9 
private facilities for a much greater price than the market standard 10 
 11 
 12 
Petty Corruption 13 
‘Everyday’ customary payment of bribes, or other material and immaterial 14 
means of motivating officials to amend their behaviour, in order to facilitate 15 
higher quality or faster reception of service provision.  16 
Material means- understood to be any tangible means of payment, be it bribe or ‘gift’ 17 
Immaterial means- understood to be any service or favour exchange, information provision 18 
that leads to a corrupt activity or is provided/supplied as a return for corrupt 19 
engagement. 20 
 
16 For ful details, visit 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/search?q=abuse+of+power&searchBtn=Search&isQuickSearch=
true [last accessed 18/3/2021]. 
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 Example: Paying a bribe to a nurse/doctor to skip waiting times for check-ups or 1 
minor procedures; offering a gift/favour to the health professional for 2 
preferential treatment in the respective hospital ward. 3 
As with all fields, the designs for measuring corruption can be both qualitative and 4 
quantitative in nature, with both methodologies having strengths and weaknesses.  5 
 6 
3.4.1 Benefits of quantitative measurements 7 
Quantitative research is vital for the study, monitoring, and measurement of 8 
corruption and similar phenomena. Blumer’s early 20th century observations set 9 
out that such techniques are extremely useful as a stepping-stone towards the 10 
further elaboration on the subject by qualitative research. He suggests that 11 
quantitative approach (and in this case perception-based approach, and other 12 
quantifiable questionnaires, surveys, reports etc) is an important ‘preliminary 13 
instrument’ (Blumer 1928) and it suggests ‘possible significant factors [and] in 14 
suggesting a relation…it makes it possible to come back to the individual case 15 
within the aggregate and study them in the light of the suggested relation’ 16 
(Blumer, 1928:395). Transparency International and the World Bank alike have 17 
been effective in raising awareness about corruption worldwide, embodying 18 
precisely what Blumer describes here and suggesting significant factors influencing 19 
and/or fuelling corruption and relations between them. However, these indices 20 
have no possible way of covering these suggested factors in sufficient depth 21 
without including the dimension of qualitative research. As an example, he 22 
presents the theoretically arbitrary basis for selecting variables to be measured 23 
within quantitative research on social phenomena- oftentimes selected because 24 
they can be easily measured and are quite generic in nature and irrespective of 25 
context (Blumer 1939). Most importantly, the main failing of quantitative research, 26 
in light of the Chicago Tradition’s observations, is the oversimplification and 27 
operationalisation of sociological concepts. By this, Hammersley (1989) means the 28 
quantitative research breaking down complex concepts to those parts that can be 29 
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measured, but subsequently erroneously applying these incomplete measurements 1 
in reverse to the original wider concept, when interpreting results (Hammersley 2 
1989). 3 
This understanding applies perfectly to the concept of corruption, as demonstrated 4 
by the literature review, whereby corruption is also continuously being pulled 5 
apart to its individual facets and therefore continues to be studied on a reduced 6 
scale and inherently deconstructed. In the same thread of thought, Heywood 7 
(2014) argues that this deconstruction of corruption has also led to the issues of 8 
‘no authoritatively agreed-upon definition of what counts as corruption and why’ 9 
(2014:137). Rothstein and Teorell (2014:82) take the matter further by suggesting 10 
that, synonymously to Blumer’s understanding nearly a century ago, one must 11 
move away from the simplistic strive to identify causality of phenomena such as 12 
corruption, and instead, one must be able to ‘unravel the social mechanism that 13 
gave rise to it’(Rothstein and Teorell 2014). In that sense, theories and research 14 
approaches should act as complementary, since neither can work on its own to 15 
provide a satisfactory explanation of a given phenomenon.  16 
  17 
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The thesis addresses the aforementioned disaggregation-based measurement 1 
limitations of quantitative studies by not discriminating against any one definition 2 
of corruption and does not prioritise any one corruption mechanism as more 3 
prevalent than others. Instead, it seeks to deepen the conceptual understanding of 4 
corruption in real-life terms based on real-life examples, demonstrating the 5 
respondents’ thought processes through textual analysis of qualitative interviews 6 
and focus groups. 7 
3.4.2 Benefits of qualitative measurements 8 
Qualitative studies approach corruption by studying phenomena in their ‘natural 9 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 10 
meanings people bring to them’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998:3). Denzin and Lincoln 11 
(1998) indicate that there are multiple reasons for qualitative methods being 12 
beneficial for social science research and especially for socially embedded 13 
phenomena, such as corruption. Qualitative research combines several approaches, 14 
including semiotics, narrative, phenomenology, discourse, archival and phonemic 15 
analysis, deminism, rhizomatics, ethnographies, interviews, cultural and 16 
participant observation, hermeneutics and others (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). 17 
Subsequently, it is able to encompass several facets of research, such as case 18 
studies, personal experience, interviews, and also visual text. Grodeland and 19 
Aasland (2011) successfully conducted 85 in-depth-interviews in conjunction with 20 
quantitative surveys to indicate that post-communist societies compensate for 21 
systemic shortcomings in transitional societies with the use of informal practice- 22 
both out of habit and to secure favourable outcomes (Grodeland and Aasland 23 
2011).  Similarly, Miller et al. (2001) were able to investigate the culture of gift 24 
accepting through interviewing junior officials and state employees in Ukraine, 25 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Their conclusions suggest that gift 26 
giving and accepting is culturally embedded but also depended on bargaining 27 
power vis-à-vis clients. Helpfully, their chosen example of such illustration is that 28 
of a doctor-patient relationship and their conclusion is that attitudes of patients 29 
who offer gifts are more related to their sense of powerlessness than their sense of 30 
gratitude to the doctor (Millet et al. 2001). Miller et al. in fact conducted 31 
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numerous studies into health care corruption with focus on post-communist 1 
countries utilising focus groups and interviews as preferred methods of data 2 
collection in order to illuminate the allegations against healthcare staff taking 3 
bribes indicated by previous studies (McKee 1991, Tishchenko and Yudin 1996). It is 4 
therefore obvious that multiple elements of what the thesis focuses on have 5 
successfully been investigated with the use of qualitative methods before. This 6 
flexible approach appears well-suited to an inquiry into a socially embedded and 7 
societally constructed corruption, as opposed to the widely used quantitative 8 
approach that so often focuses on the monetary side of corruption, rather than 9 
other immaterial facets of the corrupt mechanism such as facilitation, brokerage, 10 
networking, connections, trust and others.  11 
Conversely, quantitative research into corruption (such as polling techniques or 12 
distribution of surveys) seems to be more focused on the tangible results of 13 
corruption, such as its impact on the state economy and/or foreign investment of 14 
the respective country (Iloie 2015), as well as strong focus on the banking sector 15 
and illicit financial cyber corruption. On top of the tangible effects that are 16 
targeted, the study of corruption also attracts a vast amount of corruption 17 
perception study, illustrated by indices such as the CPI and WBCI. As outlined in 18 
the literature review, the vicious circle of no generalised definition impacting on 19 
the effectiveness of measurement and vice versa, precludes the quantitative 20 
surveys and questionnaire studies from producing universally acceptable and 21 
ratifiable data, due to the breadth of variation in perception indices and the 22 
criteria used for measurement. To reiterate, the main criticisms can be 23 
summarised as: 24 
• an overly strong reliance on bribery and the general interchangeability of 25 
corruption with bribery in the language and perceptions of respondents,  26 
• the lack of verifiable replicability in individual perceptions of corruption, 27 
• a sample of respondents mostly consisting of pundits and experts on corruption or 28 
bribery within respondents of each country.  29 
The thesis tackles these criticisms by approaching the study without the 30 
assumption that bribery is the only measurable or visible form of corruption, and 31 
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by looking for challenging, in-depth understanding of the concept, rather than just 1 
perceptions of its form or results derived from media and public discourse.  2 
 3 
3.5 Social pressures and challenges of corruption research 4 
 5 
Aside from the issues faced by corruption research, which are of a practical 6 
measurement nature, there are also issues the research must face because of 7 
corruption’s clandestine nature. Researchers often home in on the economic side 8 
of corrupt consequences because of its most tangible manifestation in terms of 9 
monetary cost; i.e., what corruption actually costs the state economy, what the 10 
differences are between wages and bribes in private and public sectors17, or what 11 
the general awareness of the populace sees as most prevalent in publicised 12 
corruption incidents. Warner (2014) describes the popular assumption of 13 
economists who believe that entry into the EU would expose the CEE states to 14 
competitive pressures and shared rules and regulations that would force the 15 
politicians and individual actors to become less corrupt. Instead, she states, it 16 
appears that not only did the new structures not reinvigorate the economic 17 
corruption of countries such as Slovakia, but instead the ‘new competitors from 18 
other states were drawn into local corrupt practices’ (2014:121) and eventually 19 
such dynamic has led to increased corruption and lower EU institutional 20 
accountability (Warner 2014). Research suggests that access to EU funds since 21 
accession in early 2000s has also encouraged institutionalised grand corruption by 22 
both: providing additional public resources for corrupt rent extraction, and also by 23 
changing motivations for and controls of corruption as a result (Fazekas, 24 
 
17 Peter (2007) suggests that controlling for education, hours of work, job security, fringe benefits, job 
satisfaction and secondary employment, public sector workers in Ukraine received 24-32 percent 
less income than their private sector counterparts (Peter 2007, in Olken and Pande 2012:11). 
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Chvalkovska et al. 2013). In fact, Pierson (2004, in Warner 2014) suggests that 1 
fraud is an unintended consequence of creating new institutions, propelled by 2 
joining new collaborative bodies such as the EU. In Fazekas et al (2013), the latter 3 
effect described is entirely driven by Slovakia in their three-country study of Czech 4 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, which further underlines the need for a detailed 5 
study of corruption in Slovakia itself (Fazekas et al. 2013). Olken and Pande 6 
(2012:37) explain that this phenomenon thrives due to the ‘resilience of corrupt 7 
officials: over time, they adapt to changes in their environments, in some cases 8 
offsetting anti-corruption policies with new avenues for seeking out rents’ (Olken 9 
and Pande 2012). 10 
It is difficult to know whether a study is picking up perceived costs of corruption or 11 
distortions of initial prices presented, stemming from corruption. Using an example 12 
of corruption in health care, the true cost of corruption may not merely be the 13 
embezzled money from procured equipment ex-post, but may also include the 14 
pricing estimate, which was skewed before it even entered official books. There 15 
are often several, obscured transactions involved in one corrupt activity, which 16 
make the tracing to the original source of corruption very difficult. Such 17 
distortions, Olken and Pande (2012) suggest, can be traced back to the very nature 18 
of corruption being a secretive activity, as procurement officials may purposefully 19 
substitute the types of goods that make hiding corruption easier, making it 20 
impossible to trace the original intention and types of goods better fit for purpose. 21 
These facts that are lost in the corrupt apparatus due to individuals making opaque 22 
decisions on behalf of institutions are all the more reason to doubt the ability of 23 
realistically quantifying corruption with such unreliable data. On the other hand, it 24 
is all the more reason to employ qualitative methods to the study of corruption- 25 
only individuals, rumours, opinions, and collective knowledge of society can 26 
provide a truly comprehensive and in-depth study of corruption.  27 
Methodologically, the research into corruption faces several challenges. There is a 28 
valid assumption that all research into corruption bears a certain amount of bias 29 
from the very beginning, as researchers are likely to purposively choose cases to 30 
study where corruption might be already popularly overstated and thus home in on 31 
124 
situations where they expect to find it (Olken and Pande, 2012:13). It is no 1 
different in this study of corruption, which has already explained that its interest 2 
in using health care in Slovakia as a case study of corruption lies in its rampant 3 
presence within the Slovak health sector. However, while this may appear as bias 4 
to the public, there are no other effective ways to approach corruption in its 5 
clandestine nature, but to follow the leads already set out by independent reports, 6 
the media, and general feeling of the populace.  7 
  8 
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3.6 Measurement of corruption in CEE  1 
 2 
The majority of corruption study in the CEE region tends to focus on economically 3 
larger actors, leaving smaller countries like Slovakia out of the focus of studies. 4 
Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) conduct a study into anti-corruption movements, 5 
focusing on Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, addressing the role of 6 
external, as well as domestic factors in the development of corruption. In so doing 7 
their results contribute to the lack of ‘well-conceptualised and empirically 8 
grounded studies on the range of anti-corruption efforts’ in the region (2010:90). 9 
The authors polemicize as to whether governments of most corruption-affected 10 
countries act out of their own moral impetus, or whether their efforts are 11 
motivated by attracting foreign and domestic funding to generate income (Moroff 12 
and Schmidt-Pfister 2010); concluding that the EU provides nothing more than 13 
‘vague blueprints rather than effective tools’ (2010:96) in the fight against 14 
corruption. The greater success of measures implemented as ‘coincidental or 15 
spontaneous’ (2010:89) that bear societal support is emphasised and societal 16 
support itself is seen as essential. As a result, the research design for the thesis 17 
contributes to this empirically grounded compendium of studies, which address the 18 
role of societal customs and understandings as a vital pre-requisite for successful 19 
anti-corruption efforts.  20 
Therefore, while the impression might be that quantitative tools for measuring 21 
corruption are in place in order to raise awareness and make a positive difference, 22 
in reality these can be seen as creating the illusion of fluctuating stability of 23 
governmental and legal structures. Such stability is what the external actors are 24 
really concerned with, as the administrative continuity and smooth transitions 25 
around elections and staff rotations are more beneficial to them than systemic 26 
change. In the spirit of administrative continuity, it is suggested that the Soviet 27 
heritage seems to prevail in countries of the Central and Eastern bloc and that in 28 
these countries ‘corruption as well as shadow economy are deemed socially 29 
accepted forms of resistance against an all-encroaching state’ (Moroff and 30 
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Schmidt-Pfister, 2010:96). Jancsics (2015) concurs with this view and invokes 1 
Ledeneva’s concept of the post-communist countries utilising corruption to ‘get 2 
things done’ in a dysfunctional system (2015:69). However, it is important to bear 3 
in mind the varied, communist experience across the former Soviet bloc countries 4 
and the impossibility of generalising completely one country’s development of 5 
corruption to others. It is only possible to pick out trends that may apply to 6 
countries of similar circumstances and conditions, as is the essense of analytic 7 
generalisation, specific for qualitative research (Falk and Guenther 2007)- these 8 
are always subject to verification by further research, however. Similarly, while 9 
recent research (Jancsics 2015, Ledeneva, Bratu et al. 2017) suggests that 10 
corruption is still utilised as a manner of resistance to any current regime, the less 11 
tolerant view is that of using corruption as a way of enrichment, ‘not a resistance 12 
to totalitarian power but its effective reinforcement and proliferation into micro 13 
and macro social relationships’ (Tishchenko and Yudin 1996). It is important not to 14 
take these evaluations that dismiss corruption as a mere Soviet legacy at face 15 
value, and instead focus on the direct agency of current societal norms and 16 
understanding of the concept in empirical field work studies, such as this one. 17 
Having outlined the conceptualisation of corruption and its measurement as 18 
performed by previous research, the following chapter will further explain and 19 
solidify the design of my research, anchored in qualitative methods descriptive 20 
statistics.  21 
 22 
  23 
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Chapter 4: Research Design 1 
 2 
Main research question (RQ): To what extent is the theoretical difference between 3 
grand and petty corruption reflected in the real life understanding of corruption in 4 
Slovakia’s health care? 5 
4.1 Outline 6 
 7 
To answer the main research question, I adopted a qualitative framework, utilising 8 
the single case study.  Interviews and focus groups were used to generate data to 9 
answer the research question. Subsequent data analysis comprised of thematic and 10 
textual analysis of the transcripts utilising the NVivo software. Participant 11 
recruitment was carried out through volunteer sampling via social media and fliers 12 
put up in select locations was initiated in the spring of 2019 and the bulk of data 13 
collection was conducted in the summer-winter of 2019. The investigation of grand 14 
and petty corruption was conducted through a case study of Slovakia’s healthcare 15 
sector, identified as the sector with greatest potential for participant exposure and 16 
greatest recorded presence of corruption. The participants consisted of the general 17 
public, and also elites, defined for this thesis as those working in the healthcare 18 
sector or with expert insight into the workings of the healthcare sector. The study 19 
carried out 5 focus groups of nearly 20 participants in full and another separate 22 20 
in-depth interviews (including elite interviews), resulting in over 1000 recorded 21 
minutes of data. The methods elicited narratives from participants through a set of 22 
over 30 semi-structured questions (see Appendix 3 for all questions) on their 23 
understanding of corruption in real-life, having been exposed to the Slovak 24 
healthcare sector in their lifetimes. 25 
  26 
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4.1.2 Single case study  1 
The thesis literature review identified Slovakia as a feasible case study. This is due 2 
to the uniquely pressing nature of corruption in Slovakia, and the specific nature of 3 
corrupt practices in post-socialist societies of Central Europe. Slovakia is able to 4 
uncover corruption practices that may not be seen elsewhere in the region, due to 5 
its unique position among EU countries, according to the EC 2017 Report on 6 
corruption in the healthcare sector. Here, Slovakia, as the only country within the 7 
region of the V4, and also as the highest-ranking within the EU, is listed as a country 8 
with the greatest percentage of patients experiencing frequent payment of bribes 9 
for treatment (41%). For comparison, the EU average is listed as 19% in the same 10 
category (EC Updated Report on Corruption in the Healthcare Sector, 2017:10).  11 
The advantages of approaching topics through a single case study are widely 12 
recognised within literature (Yin 2015, Gustafsson 2017). While criticised for 13 
shortcomings in replicability and reliability, there are features which make the 14 
single case study an obvious choice for this project. This is because single case 15 
studies are particularly suitable for approaching issues rarely accessible to social 16 
scientists, such as illicit activities (Yin 2015). Slovakia’s healthcare sector is a 17 
relevant case study of illicit activities and this is why it presents a suitable 18 
environment for corruption study. Investigation of this sector assumes common 19 
features with other public sectors in the country and the region, such as law 20 
enforcement, the judiciary, or others. As such, it is a representative and logistically 21 
manageable case study to select and has the potential to provide deeper 22 
understanding of corruption within all public sectors.  23 
Secondly, corruption constitutes a study of a topic inaccessible and private to most 24 
research, and this study will contribute to the understanding of a largely clandestine 25 
phenomenon. At the same time, the phenomenon is sufficiently institutionalised to 26 
be amenable to systematic analysis. In line with this rationale, single case studies 27 
such as this have the potential to support research in carrying out a qualitative 28 
analysis, as opposed to the statistical generalisation which is more suited for 29 
multiple case studies (Gustafsson, 2017). Levy (2008) suggests that case studies can 30 
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be particularly useful when explaining cases which do not fit an existing category or 1 
to refine/replace an existing hypothesis or perhaps specify its scope of conditions 2 
(2008:5). The single case study was selected due to such emphasis on contextual 3 
nuance which defines the individual’s understanding of corruption, and therefore 4 
aims to specify the scope of conditions particular to corruption in public sectors, 5 
like that of healthcare (Willis 2014). This is in turn reflected in the emphasis on 6 
situational factors within the questions asked in the field (see Appendix 3, questions 7 
on the role of trust, the behaviour of patient or staff, or the scenarios presented to 8 
participants to gauge their opinion on concrete examples).  9 
While a field experiment might present itself as a viable alternative method to use 10 
due to its higher plausibility of establishing a causal relationship, and potential for 11 
greater external validity, the design of an experiment to include corrupt behaviour 12 
presents with great ethical and logistical challenges. There is also the ethical 13 
challenge of inevitably deceiving the participants in order to be able to gain sight of 14 
genuine corrupt interaction (Gerber and Green 2011). In order to observe genuine 15 
and unfiltered behaviour of such an experiment, one would have to mislead the 16 
participant into thinking that the research is focused on something marginal to what 17 
is actually getting observed- if participants knew that corrupt exchanges will be 18 
observed, they may not act as they normally would in such circumstances. For 19 
example, recent research by Shaw (2015) into memory and psychology adopted 20 
deception by making participants think that the study was focused on their ability 21 
to recall memories, when in reality the study was testing the probability of 22 
implanting false memories into participants’ minds (Shaw and Porter 2015). If the 23 
participants had knowledge of the real purpose, the study would not be able to 24 
proceed with valid results. Furthermore, my research does not concern itself with 25 
the issue of causality at its centre, but rather the real-life understanding of 26 
corruption operating within Slovakia’s healthcare system. Therefore, the methods 27 
chosen are interviews and focus groups, which, rather than inferring causality, 28 
encourage the understanding of concepts through the medium of spoken language- 29 
the most natural form of expression (Barr and Feigenbaum 1981, Seidman 1998, 30 
Lindquist, MacCormack et al. 2015). This is linguistically preferable to the use of 31 
questionnaires or surveys, which have more potential for external factors to alter 32 
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responses, potential for self-censorship of language, and for superficial answers 1 
(Eaden, Mayberry et al. 1999, Cresswell and Cresswell 2018) 2 
The research followed Robert Yin’s (2015) definition of single case study as ‘an 3 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 4 
its real-life context, especially if the boundaries between a phenomenon and 5 
context are not clearly evident’. Further to the suitability of this method, the single 6 
case study here also provides elements of convenience due to its location and 7 
financial manageability of research within a given time frame (given only one 8 
researcher and limited resources). While there are inevitable limitations of case 9 
studies, (namely the subjectivity of the views collected), if transparency is upheld 10 
within the given project, then acquiring contextually rich data into sensitive topics 11 
compensates for the lack of generalisability (Leung 2015). The research therefore 12 
does not see the limited generalisability within the case study of Slovakia as a 13 
weakness, but instead highlights the in-depth particularity of study and the 14 
inevitable colour and dimension that this adds to the interpretation of data in this 15 
thesis. As Greene and Caracelli (1997) point out, it is particularity rather than 16 
generalisability that is the hallmark of good qualitative research (Greene and 17 
Caracelli 1997). Following on from this discussion, the single case study was selected 18 
as the empirical approach most suitable. 19 
4.1.3 Qualitative theoretical framework 20 
It has been suggested that quantitative corruption-measurement designs work 21 
better if based on clearly delineated qualitative themes and areas of focus 22 
(Duncan 2006). Quantitative survey research, for example, with its numeric 23 
description of trends and attitudes is too reductionist for an in-depth investigation 24 
of corruption. Experimental research is also borderline impossible to conduct, as 25 
corruption is too complex and too difficult to isolate its individual facets. Scholarly 26 
consensus across the literature suggests that the very best approach is that of 27 
mixed methods (i.e. the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods), and 28 
there is no doubt that ideally the complementation of qualitative and quantitative 29 
techniques would be most beneficial here as well (Levy 2008). The thesis does 30 
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employ descriptive statistics, for example: picking out trends in the breakdown of 1 
demographics connected to frequent answers. However, the rationale for selecting 2 
a primarily qualitative approach is in its demonstrably lower frequency of use 3 
compared to quantitative measures in corruption research, its manageability for 4 
this particular design, and also in its indisputable potential to unveil a more 5 
nuanced understanding of corruption. It is established practice that most 6 
quantitative studies into corruption focus on measurable, monetary-based 7 
manifestations of the phenomenon (see Chapter 2 & 3). As this research 8 
investigates corrupt practices that are not just monetary in nature but can exist on 9 
the basis of exchanging services or gifts, quantitative measures would be less 10 
effective in capturing the nuances in participant narratives. The impossibility of 11 
measuring corruption directly, but rather having reports or measuring by proxies is 12 
also why quantitative measures cannot produce the desired accuracy within 13 
corruption research (Duncan 2006). Following this logic, qualitative methods of 14 
focus groups and in-depth, semi-structured interviews were selected. This is in 15 
order to obtain nuanced narrative results that can delineate how the participants 16 
understand corruption from their unique points of view, and in their own words. 17 
The limitations of subjectivity and difficult replicability are present within these 18 
qualitative methods. However, the assumption is for interviews and focus groups 19 
to be able to elicit an invaluable cross section of common themes in the 20 
understanding of corruption in a real-life setting.  21 
Qualitative methods are more suitable in this situation, where the topic is sensitive, 22 
or the existing theories don’t fully apply to the situation at hand, as is demonstrated 23 
by the misconception that corruption in healthcare should necessarily be understood 24 
in financial terms and can only have a primarily financial impact on society (Morse 25 
1991, Morse 1994).  To provide further rationale for selecting interviews and focus 26 
groups, usage of these has been an accepted practice for the investigation of several 27 
corruption-related informal networks research conducted to date (Miller, Grodeland 28 
et al. 2000, Miller 2001) The methods of interviews and focus groups, as well as 29 
textual NVivo analysis are consistent with the criteria for conducting rigorous 30 
qualitative research (Creswell & Cresswell, 2018:18).  31 
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4.2 Methods  1 
 2 
The project addressed the understanding of corruption in a real-life setting. The 3 
objective was to maximise the depth of information acquired, while also minimising 4 
the threat of a low number of responses to a sensitive topic. As sociological research 5 
shows, there can be quite a variation of responses and cooperation levels within 6 
group settings, and researcher-respondent productivity varies based on same or 7 
different-sex interactions (Balliet, Li et al. 2011). It was therefore obvious that the 8 
potential for best results would be in a combination of methods that provide the 9 
greatest variation of these group sizes and interactions, while also producing 10 
qualitatively rich results, with a low opportunity for language censorship. 11 
Focus groups and in-depth interviews were selected as the most fitting 12 
methodological approach to collecting data. Similarly to research conducted by 13 
Grodeland et al (1998) and Miller et al. (2001), there are drawbacks that are 14 
inevitable. The participants were selected through volunteer sampling and 15 
snowballing recruitment and were over 40 in total. In order to both increase the 16 
sample size and provide a rich set of results (and to increase levels of comfort and 17 
security), the participants were given the choice of participating in either focus 18 
groups or in-depth interview, with the option of following up from the focus group 19 
in an interview as well. Only a fraction of participants took advantage of this option, 20 
however. The decision to combine these methods stems from not being able to 21 
ascertain whether the participants would feel more comfortable to share their views 22 
on corruption in a group, or on a one-to-one basis. From previous research into 23 
sensitive topics (Brannen 1988, Lee 1993, Dickson-Swift, James et al. 2008) the 24 
assumption was that in-depth individual interviews would be a more popular choice 25 
for the participants. However, the ratio of participants in focus groups and 26 
interviews was a nearly even split, 20/22. This however, includes the elite in-depth 27 
interviews as well as those conducted with the general public- without elite 28 
interviews the split is weighted towards focus group participation, 20/14. As a 29 
result, the research was able to conduct both focus groups and interviews alike and 30 
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both presented a different but a valuable set of results. These varied in length of 1 
response and nature of response18. There is also the practical factor of one 2 
researcher not possibly being able to engage the number of participants that they 3 
would like to work with, and therefore the combination of focus groups and in-depth 4 





Male 12 6 
Female 8 16 
Table 4.1 Method preference split for interviews and focus groups. Source: Author 7 
 8 
There were four focus groups conducted in total. The focus groups generally 9 
consisted of 3- 5 participants each. There was one larger focus group of 7 10 
participants but there was no discernible difference to me between running the 11 
larger and smaller focus groups; they appeared to function in a similar manner and 12 
yielded similar length of responses. The gender split across participants overall was 13 
22 females and 18 males but the focus groups had a split more significantly weighted 14 
towards men, with a 12/8 split. For interviews however, women were by far the 15 
larger group, 16/6. This is consistent with sociological research and evolutionary 16 
theories on male interaction in research, whereby men tend to value groups in 17 
defining their self-concept (Baumeister and Sommer 1997) and women tend to find 18 
 
18 For example, the group tended to bounce ideas off of one another more, or there were always a 
few participants who seemed to enjoy the role of a contrarian to others. Whereas the interviews 
tended to be more sombre in nature; more serious and with a greater depth of thought and length 
of response. 
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closer interpersonal relationships more important in the same endeavour (Cross and 1 
Madson 1997).  However, this can also be due to the higher discovered rate in 2 
cultural norms for women being more cooperative, when it comes to mixed-sex 3 
interactions than men (Balliet, Li et al. 2011). Two females from the focus groups 4 
also acted as participants for interviews. This indicates a trend, which showed a 5 
tendency for men to participate in group discussion, as opposed to the individual 6 
interviews. The opposite was the case for women.  7 
 8 
Age 
range 20+ 30+ 40+ 50+ 60+ 80+ 
Male 2 6 5 3 1 1 
Female 4 2 4 9 3 0 
Table 4.2 Age split within interviews and focus groups. Source: Author 9 
 10 
Ages of participants ranged from 20-80+ but there was only one participant of 80+, 11 
which indicates a non-representative sample with regards to age. The greatest 12 







Male 1 6 11 
Female 1 9 12 
Table 4.3 Education levels split within interviews and focus groups. Source: Author 15 
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 1 
The education level split for focus groups was weighted more heavily towards high-2 
school educated participants, as opposed to university-educated participants, in a 3 
13/6 split. Overall, the educational level split was 16 high-school educated 4 
participants, 23 university-educated participants and only 2 primary-school 5 
educated participants. Such a split poses challenges of demographic sample 6 
representativeness, but, due to volunteer sampling, also realistically indicates a 7 
greater willingness to tackle complex issues by participants of higher education 8 
levels. It is important to point out that within the 23 university-educated 9 
participants there are 8 elite participants included, which inflates the number of 10 
university-educated participants. 11 
 12 
4.2.1 In-depth interviews19 13 
Interviews are an accepted practice for inquiry into sensitive topics (Grodeland, 14 
Koshechkina et al. 1998), as well as inquiry into informal networks specifically (Miller 15 
2001). Interviews with open-ended and semi-structured questions were designed to 16 
elicit as much information on a given topic as possible and the research needed a 17 
wealth of data and individual respondent’s language to be able to draw on linguistic 18 
and semantic similarities/ differences within the corruption understanding of 19 
participants. Moreover, the semi-structured interview is seen as a flexible resource 20 
which may be used in conjunction with other research techniques, such as focus 21 
groups (Byrne 2012) which was the case here. My assumption was that interviews 22 
would provide the necessary environment of confidentiality and security of a one-23 
 
19 Defined as ‘Conversations with a purpose’ Burgess, J., C. Limb and C. M. Harrison (1988). 
"Exploring environmental valkues through the medium of small groups: 1. Theory and practice." 
Environment and Planning A 20(3): 309-326. 
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on-one conversation. Equally, I hoped that they would be more conducive to sharing 1 
potentially controversial views that might carry elements of self-judgment for 2 
condoning or even participating in petty corruption. Finally, the assumption was that 3 
while conducting interviews I would be able to more effectively track my own 4 
processes as an interviewer and conduct rigorous reflexivity on these as a result. 5 
What an interview produces is a particular representation or account of an 6 
individual’s views and opinions (Byrne 2012). It provides access to attitudes, values 7 
and feelings; flexibility; exploration of suppressed views; sensitive issues; it has the 8 
potential to achieve depth; and also reflect complexity. In-depth interviews give the 9 
respondents ‘less opportunity to stay silent on a topic’ (Grodeland, 1998:661), which 10 
is a good tool to push the participants for responses, in order to acquire a rich 11 
qualitative dataset to analyse. The methodological advantages of semi-structured 12 
interviews, as opposed to structured or unstructured interviews are laid out below 13 
and explain why the semi-structured model was selected20. 14 
4.2.2 Researcher bias and reflexivity in interviews 15 
One of the main criticisms of interview techniques is the difficulty of detaching one’s 16 
personal views as a researcher from the interviews and the respondent’s answers. 17 
Following the well-documented emphasis on the researcher’s role in interviews 18 
(Oakley 1981) I had to be mindful of personal involvement in the interviews: 19 
‘Personal involvement is more than just dangerous bias- it is the condition under 20 
which people come to know each other and to admit others into their lives’ (1981:41, 21 
 
• 20 Semi-structured interviews allow for questions to be substantially modified for individuals or 
different groups of respondents to allow the researcher to improvise follow-up questions. In this 
sense the thesis employed a post-modernist approach to interviewing, which, through the ability 
of the researcher to dynamically respond to the participant, allowed for the interviewer and the 
interviewee to construct through dialogue a view of social reality Scott, G. and R. Garner (2013). 
Doing Qualitative Research: Designs, Methods, and Techniques. NJ, Pearson..  
• Structured interviewing allows the researcher to impose their own framing and categories on to 
the questions, but therefore constrains the way the respondents can address the topic. 
• Unstructured interviews offer great scope for employing grounded theory and letting themes 
emerge on their own, but pose significant problems with regards to translation, transcription 
and hypothesis testing. 
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58). It is crucial not to detach oneself too far but find the right balance in the 1 
interviewing technique. Previous researchers characterise interviews as ‘stylised 2 
social events’ and underline the importance and relevance of reflexivity when 3 
undertaking interviews (Holland, Ramazanoglu et al. 1994). Reflexivity involves 4 
critical self-scrutiny on the part of the researchers, who need, at all stages of the 5 
research process, to ask themselves about their role in the research. Following this 6 
accepted practice, I had to accept that it is necessary to move away from the idea 7 
of researcher as the neutral, detached observer that is implied in much classical 8 
survey work. It involves acknowledging that the researcher approaches the research 9 
from a specific position, and this affects the approach taken, the questions asked, 10 
and the analysis produced. Rigorous approach to reflexivity was paramount in the 11 
interviewing process undertaken, in order to mitigate researcher bias. 12 
After conducting their own research, Grodeland et al (1998) state that a detailed 13 
schedule of questions in interviews allows for a ‘more structured analysis than focus-14 
group discussions, because respondents are less likely to avoid questions by staying 15 
silent, while also allowing for a degree of privacy’ (1998:656). I concur with this 16 
view and in light of the discussion on interviewing techniques presented here, a 17 
structured set of themes and questions to address was produced and pilot tested 18 
prior to interviews. The questions included the following, in order to cover the 19 
themes such as: awareness of corruption levels, grand corruption impacting on petty 20 
and vice versa; the rationale behind gift giving, the view of using personal contacts 21 
to get ahead of the rest, the conditions necessary for corruption to take place, the 22 
kinds of environments most likely to foster corrupt strategies and others: 23 
• Have you ever heard the terms grand and petty corruption? What do you envisage 24 
under each of these terms? Do you think this is a useful distinction to apply? 25 
• What do you think is worse in general, grand or petty corruption? Does your answer 26 
alter when addressing health care? 27 
• Are you aware of the levels of corruption in health care in this country? Do you think 28 
corruption is widespread in Slovakia? If so, why? 29 
• How do you feel when you hear about a corruption scandal in the news or read about 30 
it in the paper? 31 
• What do you think are the conditions needed for corruption to take place in real life? 32 
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• Where in health care do you think is corruption at its highest level? Within GPs, 1 
specialised health care clinics, specialty doctors, state or private facilities? 2 
• How do you think corruption is carried out? 3 
• What do you think is the importance of contacts in receiving quality of healthcare? 4 
Do you consider the use of personal contacts and connections to be a form of 5 
corruption? 6 
• How do you understand the difference between a token of ‘thanks’ and inducement 7 
of preferential behaviour? 8 
• Where in health care do you think is corruption at its highest level? Within GPs, 9 
specialised health care clinics, specialty doctors, state or private facilities?  10 
4.2.3 Focus groups21 11 
Building on existing theories about differences in effectiveness of participant 12 
interaction with the researcher based on sex, and size of group (see Balliet et al. 13 
2011 for a comprehensive overview), focus groups were selected to offset any 14 
potential shortcomings arising from interviews. These related to sampling, as well 15 
as participant involvement. The assumption was that focus groups may be easier for 16 
participants to get involved in conversation on sensitive subjects, and that for 17 
certain demographics (males) this may be their preferred medium of participation, 18 
which was confirmed (Balliet et al., 2011). Not wanting to miss out on any 19 
participants, and for the purposes of a truly varied sample, focus groups were the 20 
ideal medium. Secondly, should the assumption that interviews may be a more 21 
popular choice for participation not be confirmed, focus groups were an alternative 22 
way to maximise data collected and minimise time consumption that redesigning 23 
the research would inevitably cause. Focus groups were also selected in order to 24 
provide varied kinds of expression in comparison with interviews. Stewart et al 25 
(2011) state that focus groups are particularly useful for topics considered to be 26 
 
21 Defined as: ‘A group of individuals selected and assembled by researchers to discuss and 
comment on the topic that is the subject of the research’ Powell, R. A. and H. M. Single (1996). 
"Methodology Matters V: Focus Groups." International Journal for Quality in Health Care 8(5): 499-
504. 
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sensitive and socially undesirable- corruption undeniably belongs in such a category 1 
(Stewart, Shamdasani et al. 2011).  2 
Additionally, participants may not have felt comfortable speaking about a largely 3 
taboo topic by themselves with the researcher; the security of a group may provide 4 
for a coaxing quality. Corrupt practices may indeed have ingrained themselves in 5 
societal and public discourse in post-communist societies (Ledeneva, 2009). 6 
However, the actual labelling of what people might consider to be a simple 7 
mechanism for getting by as ‘corrupt’ came as an uncomfortable label to most 8 
participants, with many combatting it. The assumption was that focus group 9 
dynamics may incite further discussion on the topic and generate questions or 10 
insights that were previously not considered by the researcher. Following Grodeland 11 
et al (1998) I recognised that a purely interview-based approach excludes the 12 
possibility of one person’s ‘confession’ encouraging the speaking up of another 13 
participant, which is the main advantage of focus group research. Morgan (2011) 14 
points out that for many participants, the best part about a focus group is the ability 15 
to ‘share and compare’ their views or experiences. 16 
This method, which has its roots in the 1940s corporate and state-commissioned 17 
research into mass media and the public’s view of products or broadcast (Stewart, 18 
Shamdasani et al. 2011), can sometimes be alternated with other group methods 19 
such as participant observation, the nominal group technique or brainstorming 20 
(Morgan 2011, Stewart, Shamdasani et al. 2011). While these methods may be valid 21 
for several other topics of research, they all require specific criteria to deliver 22 
efficacy. These criteria make the methods unsuitable in comparison with the 23 
selected focus groups method22. 24 
 
• 22 The Nominal Group Technique- requires that the group is a group only in name, but 
participants are in fact interviewed as individuals and summaries of their responses are then 
presented to the following participants. This method would however counteract the main 
purpose of focus group use which is the group acting as a catalyst for eliciting answers. 
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4.2.4 Interviews and focus groups combined 1 
The research followed the logic of Merton (1990) and Kitzinger (1994). They suggest 2 
that rather than trying to separate the individual and group method, the participants 3 
should be engaged with both methods in order to present behavioural differences 4 
between how people behave alone and in groups, as well as present different quality 5 
of responses and discourse (Merton, Fiske et al. 1990, Kitzinger 1994). This research 6 
set the gathering of a variety of behavioural patterns, as well as richness of 7 
discourse, as the paramount value in the deeper understanding of corruption.  8 
Morgan (2011) goes as far as to suggest that individual interviewing should in fact 9 
be combined with focus groups, one as a follow-up to the other, to provide precisely 10 
the balance that this research was looking for. He suggests that one can either start 11 
with a set of preliminary interviews to give the participants a feel for what will be 12 
discussed or vice versa (Morgan 2011). For this research, I started with focus groups 13 
and offered the option of volunteering for a further interview. This order was 14 
selected from an ethical perspective, in order to provide for a group dynamic first, 15 
in case participants feel more comfortable listening at first and then joining in later, 16 
due to the topic sensitivity. While there is potential for limitations to arise from this 17 
approach, whereby, for example, the focus group experience could have influenced 18 
answers during interviews, the risk taken was compensated for by the breadth of 19 
topics covered and the wealth of material acquired. No theoretical assumptions in 20 
case of qualitative research involving real-life applicants can ever be 100% certain 21 
and therefore a flexible approach such as this was selected, in order to 22 
 
• Participant observation- this method is invaluable in order to be able to observe participants in 
their naturalistic setting Corruption (which is by essence a clandestine endeavour), would be 
borderline impossible/dangerous to study using this technique.  
• Within the brainstorming technique, the participants are encouraged to generate ideas, 
approaches or solutions without regard to cost, practicality or feasibility Stewart, D., P. 
Shamdasani and D. Rook (2011). Other Group Methods. Focus Groups. Thousand Oaks, 
SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 153-161.. It is my belief that a good focus group with an engaged set 
of participants will generate elements of brainstorming regardless of the format. 
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methodologically counter as many shortcomings as possible, while also prioritising 1 
the value of the material acquired. 2 
4.2.5 Elite interviews23 3 
The procedure and execution of the elite interviews resembles that of in-depth 4 
interviews with the general public. The research followed Smith’s (2005) reasoning 5 
that elites are often problematised too much for their assumed positions of 6 
superiority and power, creating categories of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ or ‘powerful’ 7 
and ‘vulnerable’ (Smith 2005). This is why the research identified elites not as 8 
necessarily holding a lot of power and holding a factor of intimidation, but for their 9 
unique professional insight into the problematic- i.e. doctors, nurses, healthcare 10 
professionals on the same level as managerial executives with access to budgets 11 
and procurement schemes.  The only variations made for the elite interview 12 
technique have been the phrasing of questions. This was done in order not to 13 
antagonise elites from responding, or including just elite-specific questions, as well 14 
as ensuring a dynamic and flexible response to the participants’ language and nature 15 
of their expertise. Such elite-specific questions or altered questions include for 16 
example: 17 
• Have you got insight into the factors allowing for corruption to survive in this sector? 18 
• In your professional capacity and experience, how do you see corruption today? 19 
• ** Alteration from ‘Do you think health care authorities are corrupt?’ to ‘Have you 20 
ever heard of any corrupt activity within the health care authorities?’ 21 
These interviews were still semi-structured, in-depth, and of a similar length (on 22 
average 35 minutes per interview). To gain a more complete and multi-faceted 23 
insight into corruption in healthcare, elites from the health care, business, and law-24 
enforcement sectors were approached via email, phone or social media. Anonymity 25 
 
23 Defined as a facet of in-depth interviews: ‘The focus of a qualitative elite interview is on specialised 
knowledge that the interviewee possesses’ Dexter, L. A. (1970). Elite and Specialised 
Interviewing. IL, Northwestern University Press. 
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for these participants has been paramount and ethically the research had to be held 1 
up to the highest standard to counter potential danger that comes with disclosing 2 
sensitive and potentially harmful information. 3 
4 
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4.3 Fieldwork  1 
 2 
Fieldwork was conducted in Slovakia, with rigorous protocols in place to comply 3 
with the requirements of the risk assessment. I checked in regularly with my 4 
supervisors, kept diligent field notes, and reflexivity logs to mitigate any loss of 5 
information.  6 
Focus groups and in-depth interviews were carried out in the capital of Slovakia and 7 
in Central Slovakia24, where the presumption was that with the varied nature of 8 
health care available (not only hospitals or clinics, but also private practices, GP 9 
practices, specialist clinics), access to health care would be frequent and 10 
ubiquitous. The fieldwork was conducted primarily on the premises of the 11 
PanEuropean University in Bratislava, which had officially agreed to this during the 12 
summer of 2019. The reason for selecting this particular venue was its relative 13 
neutrality of setting- ie it had no connection to the topic studied and presented with 14 
a tranquil environment without distractions in the summer months. As much 15 
travelling to carry out in-depth interviews in Central Slovakia as possible was 16 
undertaken. However, expectations had to be realistic with the number of resources 17 
available to this self-funded project. The data collection methods selected were 18 
designed to collect primarily from the public audience. This approach was utilised 19 
in order to counter unrepresentative data collection for macro 20 
reports (Transparency International or World Bank), focusing solely on the opinions 21 
of experts, rather than the public (Ko and Samajdar 2010).  22 
 
24 Since several grand corruption scandals have been detected in health care establishments of 
central Slovakia (namely cardiology equipment procurement in the Banska Bystrica Rossevelt 
hospital), it presents the region as relevant for investigation, as participants are likely to be aware 
of grand corruption. Therefore, if possible, conducted interviews and focus groups were 
concentrated in this region, making the study more relevant and valid on a multi-regional level. 
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The participants were invited to attend a focus group for approximately 45 minutes, 1 
with the possibility to either continue on to in-depth interviews on a different day 2 
to tackle issues of fatigue. The in-depth interview also required at least 45 minutes 3 
of time from the participant. After initial volunteer sampling, the participants were 4 
also able to make recommendations to the researcher of other potential participants 5 
to approach, thus facilitating the recruitment process.  6 
 While there are selection shortcomings connected to snowball recruitment, 7 
according to Jancsics (2015), this approach is advocated as very effective in the 8 
scholarly community for its advantages with regards to recruitment for sensitive 9 
subjects which outweighs the downside of potential bias (Burgess, Limb et al. 1988, 10 
Holbrook and Jackson 1996, Gibson, Cameron et al. 1999). The questions asked in 11 
interviews and focus groups, along with the consent form and plain language 12 
statement templates can be viewed on request as part of the approved ethics 13 
application. 14 
  15 
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Expected location   Type of recruitment   
Focus groups   Target:  
10 x3 participants 
per group  
Bratislava region (neutral 
location of empty classrooms or 
public hire venues)   
Information notices, 
internet postings, social 
media, snowballing from 





30 participants   
Bratislava 
and Banska Bystrica (central 
SVK) region (neutral location of 
empty classrooms or public hire 
venues)   
Information notices, 
internet postings, social 
media, snowballing from  
direct participants and 





15-20 participants  
Bratislava region (as convenient 
for the elites)   
Acquaintances, 
approaching local hospitals 
for access to doctors and 
health professionals, 
cooperation with NGOs 
in gatekeeping access to 
ex-directors of regulatory 




Slovakia, Academy of 
Sciences  
Table 4.4: Recruitment breakdown, Source: Author 4 
Recruitment followed the guidelines of equitable selection, respect for privacy, 5 
unbiased presentation of information on the research and lack of pressure on 6 
potential participants. Due to the sensitive nature of the research and vulnerable 7 
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position of the patient in a doctor-patient relationship, bias was reduced by not 1 
recruiting in health care establishments by a method of direct recruitment. Such 2 
establishments like hospitals or clinics would present the research with an inevitably 3 
biased sample of respondents currently dealing with several frustrations of the 4 
healthcare system (such as lack of staff, long waits, insufficient medical equipment 5 
etc), not exclusive to corruption and could inject a negative attitude to responses 6 
overall. Therefore, accessing such a participant pool or issuing letters for referrals 7 
by healthcare professionals would present a skewed sample and was avoided.  8 
Instead, the recruitment branched out to two potential avenues: volunteer sampling 9 
from social media notices and physical flyers,and snowballing from thus acquired 10 
participants. The aim was to try and get as wide a demographic sample as possible 11 
with varying levels of education, without gender or age bias but excluding vulnerable 12 
groups such as children and minors or the disabled, purely for gaining as standard 13 
and objective a sample as possible of the majority of those who access health care 14 
typically. The convenience and time restrictions put on the study were also 15 
considered- to include vulnerable groups would mean a vast amount of extra 16 
preparation and measures to mitigate bias and counter vulnerability and would 17 
require an amendment to research methods, as well as to data analysis. The study 18 
could not afford to conduct such a wide-ranging research in its time frame, and it 19 
was beyond the capabilities of a self-funded researcher to encompass such a large 20 
sample. 21 
 22 
4.4.1 Volunteer sampling 23 
The research therefore produced information notices and internet postings on social 24 
media (Facebook, Twitter public forum ads) to attract subjects and also posted up 25 
fliers in neutral and widely frequented settings such as educational facilities, 26 
libraries, and town hall notice boards in districts of Bratislava.  The social media 27 
postings were posted on several popular and publicly accessible 28 
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Facebook groups, Twitter addresses and Instagram accounts25, without targeting 1 
those groups who are likely to be against public health care. NGOs have also been 2 
provided with the same post to be able to reach more participants and to minimise 3 
bias26. Social media recruitment was selected due to its practical nature and wide 4 
reach, with evidence showing that social media recruitment can counter low 5 
recruitment accrual and has the potential to reach a broader audience than other 6 
recruitment techniques (Gelinas, Pierce et al. 2017, Arigo, Pagoto et al. 7 
2018).  However, there are also several issues with social media recruitment, such 8 
as optimal benchmarks, sampling bias, or privacy, which needed to be 9 
countered. Arigo, Pagoto et al. (2018) suggest some measures to counter these, and 10 
I followed these techniques. I was selective with information presented in 11 
recruitment materials to avoid responses from non-targeted users; included the 12 
usernames or hashtags of high-profile users who are influencers for the target 13 
population (for example news outlets, Transparency International, etc.), as well as 14 
selected the relevant platforms for advertising carefully. In order to place physical 15 
fliers on notice boards in cultural centres, libraries and town hall notice boards,27 16 
permission was first sought from the building manager and made sure the content 17 
of these provided all necessary information about the possible dates and duration of 18 
 
25 These were namely (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram if available): Transparency International 
Slovensko [over 27,000 followers on Facebook, over 800 followers on Twitter]  (F: 
https://m.facebook.com/transparencysk/; T: @transparencysk), Nadácia Zastavme Korupciu [over 
2,000 followers on Instagram, over 30,000 followers on Facebook] (F: 
https://www.facebook.com/NadaciaZastavmeKorupciu/; I: nadacia_zastavmekorupciu) Liga proti 
korupcii [over 300 members on Facebook] (F: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1607785872822034/?ref=share) Modrý koník [over 4,000 
followers on Facebook and over 4,000 followers on Instagram] (F: 
https://www.facebook.com/Modr%C3%BDkon%C3%ADk-242192219272658/ ; I: modrykonik)  
26 These were namely: Transparency International Slovensko  
27 Locations include but are not exclusive to the following venues in Bratislava: Dom Kultúry Zrkadlový 
háj, Dom Kultúry Ružinov, Knižnica Ružinov, Knižnica Petržalka, Miestny úrad Petržalka. 
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the research, the voluntary nature of it, and the potential for refreshments, 1 
including contact details.  2 
4.4.2 Snowball sampling 3 
The study also utilised non-probability sampling, namely snowball sampling from the 4 
gained participants who volunteered, based on the social media notices and flyers. 5 
This proved most useful and produced the most significant pool of participants, at 6 
62.5%. 7 
 8 
Figure 4.1 Recruitment techniques ratio, Source: Author 9 
 10 
While both volunteer and snowball sampling present bias in terms of selecting a 11 
sample of participants who want to share as opposed to the rest, it would be 12 
unrealistic to think that the research had any leverage that would make participants 13 
who joined on a voluntary basis talk about corruption if they did not wish to do so. 14 
The study directly followed Seale’s (2012:145) recommendation of using volunteer 15 
and snowball sampling in order to access a population relatively hidden, as in the 16 
case of those engaging in illicit activities. As a mitigation of potential bias, Seale 17 
recommends multiple starting points for snowball sampling so that more than one 18 
network is accessed, and the study followed this measure as far as possible (Seale 19 
2012).  20 
Recruitment techniques ratio
Volunteer sample Snowball sample
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There was also the option of the researcher’s personal contacts (friends, co-workers, 1 
school connections) and social networks to be used to gain participants or to use 2 
these as a basis for snowballing, although the bias involved in this had to be taken 3 
into account during data analysis with transparent presentation of data in both 4 
languages and disclosing the relationship between researcher and participant. 5 
Research into similar topics has already proved, however, that personal relationships 6 
such as friendships or acquaintances can in fact be beneficial for establishing a 7 
needed connection for sensitive topics (Tillmann-Healy 2003, Owton and Allen-8 
Collinson 2013). For elite interviews, due to the sensitive and taboo nature of the 9 
research, the elites gained proved impossible to acquire through any other than 10 
these networks. Several gatekeepers were approached28, as were professional 11 
institutions29, or individuals with insight into corruption. However, no 12 
representatives of such institutions were willing to share their views. Therefore, the 13 
elites were sourced through personal networks initially and a few were snowballed 14 
from them, lowering bias through lower researcher-participant connection. Even 15 
then, the accrual rate was low, even with assurances of anonymity; this meant that 16 
the target was missed by 12 elites. This is a testament to how difficult participant 17 
recruitment is for sensitive topics and how valuable any data acquired is. Jancsics 18 
(2015) advocates snowball sampling as the best tool for corruption investigation. 19 
Despite some shortcomings of snowball sampling, as outlined by Jancsics (2015), 20 
(such as selection bias which reduces the validity of the sample and also bias towards 21 
the researcher who in some cases is vouched for with regards to trustworthiness), 22 
he maintains that the advantages heavily outweigh the disadvantages. The primary 23 
advantage of snowball sampling with sensitive topics such as corruption is the 24 
provision of access to hard-to-reach populations (Atkinson and Flint 2001) and also 25 
access in general to those willing to share their opinions on a largely taboo subject.  26 
 
28 Such as Transparency International, Slovakia chapter. 
29 Such as the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 
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4.4.3 Heterogeneity within focus groups 1 
Bloor et al (2011) warn against an artificial manipulation of participants to avoid 2 
producing a non-representative sample. The recommendation is that ‘care should 3 
be taken to avoid groups that consist of individuals too diverse to obtain a sufficient 4 
depth of information’ on the research topic (Bloor, Frankland et al. 2011). Morgan 5 
(2011) concurs and advises that it is indeed a myth that a focus group must consist 6 
of strangers, as naturally occurring groups usually present with unavoidable 7 
acquaintance. It is also not supported by anything other than anecdotal evidence 8 
that age homogeneity or heterogeneity has any real influence on group behaviour 9 
(Shaw 1981).  Because of these recommendations, particular emphasis was not 10 
placed on forcing the focus groups to be of diverse age or gender, but rather collated 11 
groups based on time availability and willingness of participants. Artificial 12 
manipulation of participants into specific groups may have reduced the sample size 13 
due to scheduling difficulties and as demonstrated above, there is no hard evidence 14 
to prove that heterogeneity of a group in various aspects of demographics produces 15 
a higher quality of results. The only real criterion, according to Morgan (2011), when 16 
selecting the sample for focus groups, is whether the particular group of participants 17 
can comfortably discuss the topic in ways that are useful to the researcher 18 
(2011:36). Therefore, the study did not view any particular composition of the group 19 
as a weakness. The study interpreted the willingness of certain demographics to talk 20 
about the topic more than others as a valuable part of the results. These kinds of 21 
trends emerging naturally in the participant response rate could provide valuable 22 
insight into the sociological make up of Slovak society and of those willing/able to 23 
be active in social change- alternatively, also those who perhaps access health care 24 
more frequently and have greater wealth of experience. The breadth of resources 25 
had to be recognised as imposing limits on what can be done in one single study. 26 
With participants of similar age to that of the researcher (and this is relevant to the 27 
interviewing ethical behaviour in general), I had to be mindful of maintaining a 28 
professional distance and had to be mindful of following purpose and procedure 29 
under the rules of confidentiality (Kvale 2011). 30 
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4.4.4 Ensuring open discussion within focus groups 1 
Stewart et al (2011) make a point of ensuring that the researcher is aware of traits 2 
that can make the group or interview dynamic unexpected, including personality 3 
traits such as assertiveness of individuals (ascendant tendencies), behavioural 4 
consistency, emotional stability, and others(Stewart, Shamdasani et al. 2011). They 5 
do not see these factors as necessarily problematic but encourage the researcher 6 
and/or moderator to be aware of the effects these can have on the group if not 7 
managed. Because of this caution I made sure to be mindful of an effective but not 8 
necessarily a controlling moderation style within focus groups. Interestingly, 9 
snowballing from participants the researcher has already met is seen as a good 10 
preventative technique from having to deal with challenging personality traits, as 11 
prior knowledge of respondents’ personalities, based on who refers them, helps a 12 
moderator understand how best to interact with said participants (2011:24). This is 13 
why I felt more comfortable recruiting using snowball technique from focus group 14 
participants on several occasions throughout the research. It is worth pointing out 15 
at this time, that such mindfulness of personality elements makes the moderator 16 
better equipped to deal with any eventualities arising throughout the focus group or 17 
the interview.  18 
  19 
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4.5 Research questions and hypotheses 1 
 2 
Overarching research question (RQ): To what extent is the theoretical difference 3 
between grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of 4 
corruption in Slovakia’s health care? 5 
Real-life understanding is based on the definition laid out by Schwandt (2001:84) as 6 
a human lived experience: ie ‘the life-world as it is lived, felt, undergone, made 7 
sense of, and accomplished by human beings’ (Schwandt 2001). In such a way the 8 
thesis investigated the understanding of corruption as constituted by the 9 
participants’ awareness based on their ‘life-world’. 10 
 11 
1. RQ1: How does awareness of grand corruption inform/justify individual engagement 12 
in petty corruption? 13 
 14 
2. RQ2: How does awareness of petty corruption inform/justify individual engagement 15 
in grand corruption? 16 
 17 
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption will have no impact on the engagement of 18 
individuals in petty corruption and vice versa. 19 
 20 
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in 21 
petty corruption. 22 
 23 
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in 24 
grand corruption. 25 
 26 
 27 
3. RQ3: What are the strategies utilised to carry out grand and petty corrupt practices? 28 
Theoretical assumption: There will be similarities in the strategies utilised to carry 29 
out grand and petty corrupt practices. 30 
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 1 
• RQ3a- subquestion: What is the significance of trust as a pre-requisite for 2 
corrupt interactions? 3 
Theoretical assumption: Trust is understood as one of the processes of 4 
corruption that links the corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as such 5 
it is seen as a condition more often than it is understood as a result of 6 
corrupt practice. 7 
• RQ3b- subquestion: To what extent are social rules and customs important in 8 
the carrying out of corrupt practices? 9 
 10 
Theoretical assumption: Social rules and customs are understood as one of 11 
the processes of corruption that links corrupt practices on grand and petty 12 
levels; as such they will prove as important determinants in carrying out 13 
corrupt practices. 14 
 15 
 16 
*strategies will be defined as both ways of accessing corrupt practices- e.g. obtaining 17 
information from friend or family networks, and as ways to carry out corruption- e.g. 18 
approaching the healthcare professional, the amount paid in bribe, the way a gift is 19 
passed on, the kind of service exchanged for preferential health care provision, 20 
gift/bribe before or after treatment received. The term is first coined by Grodeland 21 
et al (1998:660) as ‘corrupt strategies’ - ie the most effective methods utilised by 22 
people to combat the inherent inequalities within society. 23 
The questions used in fieldwork interviews and focus groups (see Appendix 3) were 24 
carefully selected upon review of similar questioning utilised by previous corruption 25 
studies (Grodeland et al. 1998, Miller et al. 2001) and in order to answer the research 26 
questions above in a targeted manner (See Appendix 3).  27 
  28 
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4.6 Research challenges 1 
 2 
4.6.1 Scheduling challenges, set targets and saturation point 3 
Scheduling requirements were anticipated to be a specific challenge with the elite 4 
interviews, which is why every effort has been made to meet the elites in their 5 
chosen venue (e.g. their office) at a time that suited or to be able to reschedule 6 
flexibly. Alternatively, if scheduling proved to be too challenging for a face-to-face 7 
interview with both in-depth non-elite and elite interviews, there was also the 8 
possibility of conducting an online interview via software such as Skype or 9 
Zoom. However, this was not opted for by the participants.  10 
The research planned on carrying out 10 focus groups of around 3 participants 11 
(lower numbers would facilitate a more intimate setting needed for sensitive topic 12 
discussion). The number of focus groups was in fact much smaller, at only 4 focus 13 
groups, but altogether these produced a fair number of participants, 20 in total 14 
which would be equivalent to five groups of four. The target was for ideally 30 in-15 
depth non-elite interviews and more if possible; time and schedule constraints 16 
dictated the capability on this front. The target was for 15-20 elite interviews, 17 
more if possible- again access and scheduling dictated the capacity. However, while 18 
the targets were set out for the research as shown in Table 4.4, these were subject 19 
to dynamic evolution of the research itself. Owing to this, the number of elite 20 
interviews ended up being much lower, at only 8 elites. As for the rest of the 21 
interviews, they were capped at 14, therefore not reaching the set-out target either. 22 
However, the quality of information extracted was high and in-depth, resulting in 23 
over 1000 minutes of recording and towards the final interviews was no longer 24 
providing new insights and information.  25 
However, research to-date shows that it is not necessary to stick to artificially set 26 
targets. Morgan (2011) states that most of the widely advocated theories on the 27 
amounts of focus group participants, (where the myth is that 3-5 focus groups are 28 
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the golden rule), are based on arbitrary goals unsupported by evidence as to their 1 
effectiveness. Ultimately, it is both the purposes of the research and the constraints 2 
of the field situation that must be taken into account when selecting (Morgan 2011), 3 
which was the case with this research as well. Group sizes may also vary, as it may 4 
prove that for specific topics big groups will be unimaginable but also vice versa- 5 
this came into play for corruption especially with groups fluctuating in numbers from 6 
3 to 7 per group. As for the fulfilment of targets, several scholars agree (Powell and 7 
Single 1996, Morgan 2011, Stewart, Shamdasani et al. 2011) that there is no value in 8 
artificially sticking to targets when ‘saturation’ point has been reached earlier 9 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967, Krueger 1993, Saunders, Sim et al. 2017). This point is 10 
understood as the point at which additional data collection no longer generates new 11 
understanding, new information or insights, or, perhaps also the point at which the 12 
moderator can accurately anticipate what will be said next in a group (Glaser and 13 
Strauss 1967, Krueger 1993, Saunders, Sim et al. 2017). The thesis stuck to this 14 
principle and the research remained flexible with this in mind; not trying to 15 
artificially reach the laid-out targets.  16 
With interviews conducted, it became obvious with the last three participants that 17 
there was only so much variation in answers to the questions asked, and therefore 18 
recognising the saturation point was easier. With regards to focus groups, the 19 
potential for answers to vary was greater and I am unable to say if saturation point 20 
had been reached, but in terms of capacity, the research had reached a point of 21 
moving on to data analysis from the sufficient, combined number of responses and 22 
respondents. There was, however, a large overlap in the answers from both 23 
interviews and focus groups once these were isolated into text units. This became 24 
obvious during data analysis, with only very few outliers to the general responses 25 
given and themes/trends raised. As such, therefore, the research had achieved as 26 
much as it could have in the given circumstances and was able to isolate clear trends 27 
to aid in answering the overarching research question. 28 
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4.6.2 Transcribing challenges 1 
While the interviews were in-depth, they were also semi-structured in nature and 2 
therefore the questions provided served merely as prompts to elicit narratives 3 
around the topics of interest to the research question. The nature of a semi-4 
structured interview (especially with sensitive topics), has the potential to 5 
limit the levels of stress and rigidity that may be elicited by a structured interview 6 
(Brannen 1988, Lee 1993). Bearing this in mind, for the participants, besides the 7 
opportunity to contribute to the research that addresses the core issues of 8 
corruption, there was also an opportunity of speaking openly about issues that are 9 
societally taboo. It was important to respect the silences and pauses of the 10 
respondents- these have been transcribed as essential parts of speech wherever 11 
caught on recording, not to be omitted through researcher/transcriber censorship 12 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998, Cameron 2005, Stewart, Shamdasani et al. 2011).  13 
Transcription of the interviews and focus groups was carried out as it occurred and 14 
not ‘tidied up’ in retrospect, with editing kept to a bare minimum if any at all 15 
(Kitzinger 1994, Charmaz 2002), in order to ensure authenticity of expression. The 16 
assumption was that as authentic a transcription as possible is more likely in this 17 
case, where the researcher is also the translator and transcriber and thus more 18 
familiar with the material from memory.  19 
 20 
The focus group environment suffered from similar potential for researcher bias in 21 
transcription but also in moderation of the groups- the researcher/moderator, 22 
much like in the process of the interviews, must exercise reflexivity at all times, 23 
and also make sure that discussion is not being dominated by them. They should 24 
not be telling the group what to do, but should merely facilitate and moderate the 25 
conversation from a position of understanding and encouragement (Stewart, 26 
Shamdasani et al. 2011). Interviewer/group moderator should therefore legitimise 27 
the members’ responsibility to manage the discussion (Morgan 2011). Following 28 
this practice, I have tried my best to amend my processes throughout the field 29 
work and reflect on my own role as a moderator within the group and bestow as 30 
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much agency on the respondents as possible. As Sieber and Stanley (1988) point 1 
out, shying away from controversial topics because of their controversial nature 2 
means avoiding responsibility as a researcher and such research is vital for 3 
addressing of pressing social issues (Sieber and Stanley 1988). The purpose of this 4 
research is to treat the sensitive topic of corruption with respect and caution, but, 5 
in the spirit of Sieber and Stanley’s statement, to tackle the underlying societal 6 
issue with a level of rigour and responsibility.  7 
 8 
4.6.3 Data management and storage 9 
A rigorous data management and data storage plan was in place which involved 10 
the contextualisation of research by keeping sufficient electronic metadata in the 11 
field, a rigorous electronic fieldwork journal, as well as continuous mapping of 12 
themes emerging from focus groups and interviews. All of this was stored on 13 
University of Glasgow servers with password protected Cloud access. Encryption 14 
has been employed for storing the recorded data, in compliance with university 15 
policy and the GDPR procedure. Further details on data management and storage 16 
can be found in the Ethics Application related to this project. 17 
  18 
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4.7 Data analysis and ethical challenges 1 
 2 
4.7.1 Data analysis outline 3 
The approach adopted was that of thematic and textual analysis, conducted both 4 
manually and with the use of qualitative data analysis software. Out of the 5 
available software for qualitative analysis, the NVivo12 software was utilised to 6 
conduct a rigorous comparison of interviews across those working in fields 7 
connected to grand corruption (such as health care, health care administration 8 
or procurement) and those receiving services connected to petty corruption (such 9 
as the everyday delivery of health provision). NVivo12 is the latest version of NVivo 10 
and was selected due to its ease of use, as well as the researcher’s existing 11 
experience with it.  12 
Interviews were conducted among elites and the general public, with the possibility 13 
of textually analysing some health care discussion fora as well to provide a point of 14 
comparison. Several public online discussion fora have already been identified (e.g., 15 
zdravie.sk or blog.sme.sk), averaging 350+ contributors to each topic relating to 16 
corruption practices in health care. With such traffic, simple search tools were 17 
employed with key words to gain valuable raw data for NVivo coding (See Data 18 
Analysis chapter section 6.3) and comparison of text-based units. These units 19 
are defined by Miller et al (2001) as the contribution (written or verbal) made by 20 
one person (or body) at one point in the survey entry/interview/text entry (Miller 21 
2001).   22 
The combination of methods used for the entirety of the research was aimed at 23 
being able to see the ‘bigger picture’ as well as deeper intricacies of the corrupt 24 
apparatus of health care. Therefore, while NVivo was used, there were also 25 
extensive elements of textual analysis and theme identification done manually, 26 
especially considering the multilingual nature of the project, which required 27 
substantial transcription and translation of spoken text. These themes were pulled 28 
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based on the areas of focus encompassed in the questions asked: for example, the 1 
definitions of corruption in real life, the understanding of grand and petty 2 
corruption, the customary way of securing high quality health care and others. These 3 
were accumulated under headings not necessarily according to the same word or 4 
language used, but the similarity of content expressed. For focus groups the coding 5 
and indexing process started off by following the three main avenues of coding 6 
(Morgan, 2011a) in order to encompass as full a picture of trends arising in the 7 
discussion as possible:  8 
• Coding all mentions of a given code 9 
• Whether each individual participant mentioned a given code 10 
• Whether each group’s discussion contained a given code (Morgan 2011).  11 
The transcription and coding was carried out by the researcher and training in 12 
translation was employed in order to provide as representative a translation of 13 
spoken text as possible. Krueger (1994) in fact recommends the transcript-based 14 
analysis of focus groups as the most rigorous analysis of spoken word out of the four 15 
possible: transcript-based, tape-based, note-based and memory-based (Krueger 16 
1994). For transparency purposes I always presented the original and translated text 17 
excerpts side-by-side.   18 
 19 
4.7.2 Ethical challenges 20 
There are several ethical issues that present themselves with the use of interviews 21 
and focus groups, most acute being those of confidentiality, anonymity and 22 
researcher bias.  I am aware of the potential of participants to feel uncomfortable 23 
speaking about taboo issues and every effort was made to give the participants the 24 
amount of time and space to feel comfortable and secure enough to express their 25 
views. This was emphasised by a verbal reassurance at the beginning of the focus 26 
groups, elite, and in-depth interviews that the data collected was strictly 27 
confidential and anonymous. Other sections of the informed consent were also 28 
reiterated, along with the caveat not to disseminate what was talked about in the 29 
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focus groups further and the ability to withdraw at any point during the study. This 1 
is particularly relevant to the focus groups, as the usual confidentiality issue of 2 
interviews becomes twice as problematic in a focus group setting, as the 3 
participants are not only concerned about the confidentiality of the researcher but 4 
also that of other participants (Cameron 2005). Other ethical challenges such as 5 
fear of self-incrimination, participant identification, and researcher’s well-being 6 
are elaborated on in detail in the Ethics Form associated with this project.   7 
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Chapter 5: Slovakia and anti-corruption policy 1 
development 2 
 3 
5.1 Introduction to policy background 4 
 5 
This chapter follows on from Chapter 4 which outlines the rationale for selecting 6 
Slovakia as a single case study for this project. Its purpose is to provide a brief 7 
overview of the existing anti-corruption legislation and measures in place in 8 
Slovakia’s short history, as well as its engagement with international anti-corruption 9 
legislation. The chapter starts with a timeline and comprehensive overview of 10 
government strategies to address corruption, in order to provide insight into what 11 
systemic measures will have shaped my participants’ views on the extent of 12 
corruption in Slovakia and how it has developed. It then continues on to provide 13 
more detail on first the international and then domestic legislation in place and also 14 
the role that various external actors played in shaping anti-corruption policies to 15 
date. 16 
 17 
Party politics of post-communist societies are often examined and correlated with 18 
effectiveness of reforms in the field of transparency, civil society, anti-corruption 19 
and good governance. Slovakia is seen by many as a microcosm of several post-20 
communist societies in its party make up since its transition in the 90s, due to the 21 
divides and conflicts which shape party politics, such as: ethnicity, religion, 22 
legacies, economic policy or corruption (Deegan-Krause 2013, Haughton 2014). 23 
Deegan-Krause (2013) labels it ‘a remarkable case study of political competition that 24 
resembles post-communist Europe in miniature’ (2013:255) in its dynamic 25 
development of party politics throughout the three decades of its independent 26 
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existence with varying degrees of stability. Haughton (2014) warns against the 1 
presupposition that all post-communist societies have developed identically and 2 
states that for the specific case of Slovakia, it may have indeed been its exit from 3 
federalism, politics of independence, or even its pre-communist past that have 4 
shaped its political agenda and its reform efforts more than its communist legacies. 5 
He also states, importantly, that from an external actors’ perspective, the CEE 6 
region was not a tabula rasa in 1989 upon which ‘anything could be drawn’ 7 
(2014:217) but it had its own agendas, agency, and influences, shaping both policy 8 
development and policy suggestions from external bodies.  9 
 10 
Effective anti-corruption efforts are often associated with decentralisation of 11 
government and greater independence of individual parts of the state (Nemec 2018). 12 
Slovakia is in fact seen as a ‘decentralisation champion’ (Nemec 2018) when it comes 13 
to its moving away from a centralised communist system with its numerous, 14 
independent municipalities, equipped with a large set of competences and 15 
responsibilities. Despite this decentralisation, we see evidence of partial state 16 
capture by governmental structures and organised crime groups (the Gorila scandal 17 
of 2012), of ‘ownership’ of politicians, and control of regulatory agencies (Skolkay 18 
2018).  Most alarming are the suggestions that the leading political party SMER, with 19 
its background of donors and associates, in fact resembles a corrupt, cartel culture 20 
(Skolkay 2018). 21 
 22 
Considering this realisation, it is important for the thesis to map out the policies and 23 
external actor influences regarding anti-corruption efforts, in order to have a fuller 24 
picture of what could constitute the understanding of the corruption status quo for 25 
the research participants. It is also helpful to have a clear outline of the regulations 26 
in place to curb and/or report corruption, or generally to facilitate transparency 27 
and effective public administration in day-to-day dealings with public officials. This 28 
is in order to be able to better understand the context and nuance expressed by the 29 
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participants who talk about experiencing petty or grand corruption on a daily basis 1 
or in specific circumstances. It is also important in order to be able to gain greater 2 
insight into the participants’ views of their own feelings of individual responsibility 3 
and behaviour when it comes to understanding corrupt exchanges. This presents 4 
Slovakia as a good illustrative case study from an interpretivist outlook, which 5 
focuses on the subtleties of tradition and discourse and views knowledge as socially 6 
and culturally constructed (Clough and Nutbrown 2002, Marsh and Furlong 2017).  7 




Figure 5.1 Breakdown of Slovak governments by anti-corruption policy (1990-2020). 12 
Governments mostly facilitating anti-corruption policy in green, governments mostly 13 

































The above figure outlines a chronological order of the governments that Slovakia has 1 
experienced from 1990, all the way to the present day. Based on research conducted 2 
mostly by Beblavy and Sicakova-Beblava (2009, 2014), the above is a visual 3 
representation of how the sitting governments approached anti-corruption policy. 4 
This includes their active engagement and implementation of policies and reforms, 5 
but also their political orientation and opinion of external factors as to their 6 
commitment to anti-corruption policies. The individual policies, anti-corruption 7 
legislation in place, and role of external actors are explored in greater depth below. 8 
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5.2 Corruption-related policies and their effectiveness 
 
Table 5.1 presents a comprehensive overview of international anti-corruption agreements and domestic reforms and legislation 
passed during each government’s tenure. It is clear from Table 5.1 that the 1998-2006 governments laid the foundations of the 
greatest amount of anti-corruption tools and legal measures. The following governments have carried out little additional formal 
anti-corruption framework implementation or enforcement. Beblavy (2009) and Nemec (2018) concur that the greatest impetus 
for reform was around the late nineties and early 2000s and while they state that several reforms would have been tied to the EU 
acquis accession criteria, they conclude that the most robust measures taken were motivated by domestic electoral pressures and 
requirements.  
Table 5.1 Breakdown of Slovakia’s governments and their anti-corruption initiatives 
Government tenure PM International anti-corruption 
agreements 
Domestic reforms and 
legislation 
Additional relevant notes 




New administrative structure 
established (district and sub-
district offices) 
1991-1992 Ján Čarnogurský      
1992-1994 Vladimír Mečiar      
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1994-1998 Vladimír Mečiar   1996 Public administration 
reform 
Regions and districts defined. 
Generally seen as unsuccessful, 















1999 Slovakia joins GRECO 
(Group of States against 
Corruption) 
2000 Freedom of 
Information legislation 
passed 
Part of EU accession reqs. Bears 
impact both ex ante and ex post 
accession. 
2001 EC provides funds as a 
part of the PHARE scheme 
(Poland and Hungary 
Assistance for the 
Restructuring of the 
Economy) to set up the 




National Program for 
the Fight against 
Corruption 
Spearheaded by the Office of 
Deputy Prime Minister for 
Economic Policy Ivan Mikloš 
1999 Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention 
on Corruption 
2001 The public are given 
access to all proposed 
legislation and are 
allowed to comment on 
it in an open web 
platform 
 




All major remaining 





Education reform HE institutions get funding 
based on the number of 
students; the market is open to 
private institutions, admissions 
thus targeted for corrupt 
practices. Number of students 
increases from 128k in 2000 to 
200k in 2006. But increased 
numbers and less scrutiny has 
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detrimental impact on quality of 
education 
  1999 The State Aid Authority 
and the Public 
Procurement Authority 
established 









Adopted 1999, entered into 
force 2002 
2002-2006 Mikuláš Dzurinda 2006 UN anti-corruption 
charter ratified in April 





2005 European Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism 
2004-
2005 
Legislation on Internal 
Audit passed 
Supreme Audit office to monitor 
all local governments and 
overall governmental 
transactions 
  2003 Company Register 
Reform- previous 
deadline of 150 days 
for processing 
shortened to 5 days 
Anti-corruption agenda moved 
from Ivan Mikloš to Daniel Lipšic 
(Justice Minister) who 
implements legal measures such 
as these for anti-corruption 
168 
targets efficiency and 
waiting times as 
frequent sources for 
bribery. 
objectives- perceived corruption 
in banking sector drops from 
29% to 13% in 2006 
  2002-
2004 
Case management in 
the judiciary reform 
Speed of the system increased 
by random electronic allocation 
of cases to judges; corruption 
opportunities in selection 
processes cut down 
  2003-
2004 
Special Court and 
Special Prosecutor’s 
Office established 
The PHARE initiative started this 
in 2001. The goal is to break 
with elites interfering in the 
judiciary by establishing an 
independent arbiter and 




World Bank contributing 





Health Reform Project 
Health sector modernisation, 
technical assistance support. 
Lowering of health care 
expenditures for medicines and 
check-ups, all hospitals were to 
be restructured- some were 
even corporatized and 
privatised; the key terms of the 
reform were liberalisation and 
privatisation. These reforms 
were however not completed, 
and corruption did not lower. 
From 62% respondents believing 
that corruption in health care 
was significant in 1999, the 
figure was 63% in 2006 (Beblavy, 
2014) 
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  2004 Specialised 
deconcentrated state 
administration system 
New administrative structures 
established (district offices 
abolished) 
  2005 Party financing revision Imposed transparency measures 
on financial relationships with 
donors, gifts declaration, donor 
declaration, campaign financing 
transparency  
2006-2010 Robert Fico 2006 UN Anti-corruption 
charter ratified in April 
2009 Civil Service Act Not received well, effectiveness 
too low, opportunities for 
nepotism and uncontrolled 




High percentage of 
funding and structural 
funds vulnerable and 
exposed to corruption 
3 ministers out of 8 forced to 
resign during this tenure due to 
corruption scandals and EU 
funds misappropriation 
  2007 New administrative 
structures 
Regional offices abolished 
2010-2012 Iveta Radičová 2011 OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business 
Transactions 
2010 Web publication of all 
governmental 
contracts, invoices and 
orders implemented 
 
2011 Accession to Open 
Government Partnership 
Initiative 
2012-2016 Robert Fico   2012 ESO programme 
(Efficient, Reliable and 
Open state 
administration) 
Integration of specialised local 
administration into one office 




    2012 marked by the Gorila files 
corruption scandal, files 
spanning from 2005 onwards, 
implying partial state capture by 
single oligarchic group 
embedded in the government, in 
line with the partial elite cartels 
corruption pattern in Slovakia 
(see Školkay, 2018) 




District offices re-established 
  2015 Slovak National Action 




2016-2020 Robert Fico/ Peter 
Pellegrini 
    Marked by the murder of 
journalist Ján Kuciak in 2018 
writing about government 
officials involved in dealings 
with the Italian mob and 
agricultural procurement fraud, 
ethnic tensions and rightwing 
extremist party ĽSNS entering 
the parliament 
  2018 Anti-corruption policy 
document published by 
the government 2019-
2023 
Outlines the need for repressive 
and preventative measures to 
complement one another for 
effective tackling of corruption 
Table 5.1 Breakdown of governments from 1990-2020 and their anti-corruption measures initiatives. Source: Author, based on Beblavy (2009), 
Beblavy and Sicakova-Beblava (2014), Nemec (2018), Skolkay (2018)
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5.3 Anti-corruption legislation in place 
 
It is important to have a clear idea of the language used by the government in 
their manifestos and official documents, such as legislation and international 
conventions signed, in order to better understand the impact of these measures 
and reforms on society. 
 
A discussion of legal anti-corruption measures and reforms in place inevitably 
invites a debate about society’s readiness and willingness to adopt these in an 
efficient manner. Blasszauer (1997) argues that the post-communist countries 
suffer from a ‘moral crisis’ with the practice of bribery and under-the-counter 
payments which has penetrated the system so deeply that reforms are very 
unlikely to succeed (Blasszauer 1997). The need for reforms, especially in health 
care, has been obvious to researchers from the early nineties, suggesting 
(1991:260) ‘large black economy, with extensive tips and gifts to healthcare staff, 
contributing up to 30 percent of their total salary’ (McKee 1991). There is an 
obvious discrepancy between how the public and the officials have always 
understood and perceived the status quo and therefore the mixed approach of 
qualitatively interviewing both officials and the public is the best-suited method 
for an objective set of conclusions. As seen in Figure 5.2 overleaf, which focuses 
on Slovakia, such discrepancy in understanding makes for a very heterogeneous 
political and cultural environment, which poses a challenge to implementing 




Figure 5.2 Discrepancy between perceptions of health care corruption in Slovakia: officials 
and the public. Source: Miller et al. 2000 
 
This section outlines the route taken to date by the governments and the 
individual wording of the measures in place so far, which is indicative of their 
future application in real life. The legislation discussed starts with the 
international policies:  
• the EU-wide 1999 Civil Law Convention on Corruption,  
• the 2006 UN Anti-Corruption Charter, 
and follows with domestic policies: 
• the 2005 and 2011 Slovak Criminal Code Section 300 on Criminal Acts of 
Corruption, 







5.3.1 International: 1999 Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
The Convention stipulates rules, definitions, and agreed preventative and punitive 
measures that all parties agree upon, as of the signing of the Convention in 
Strasbourg in 1999. Successive Slovak governments have bound themselves to 
abide by the agreed-upon rules and have agreed to the ethos of corruption being 
a threat to the rule of law, democracy, human rights, good government, social 
moral code, and stability of democratic institutions. The main definition of 
corruption lies in providing or extorting, directly or indirectly, an unfair advantage 
from a public official. The Convention goes on to lay out specific definitions of 
different kinds of bribery (first 11 articles discuss only bribery and its different 
forms, be it through brokerage, domestically, abroad, and similar), indirect 
bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation of funds and/or resources, and the 
definitions of perpetrators, accomplices and so forth. The Convention refers to 
effective and appropriate deterrent measures to be undertaken by all parties of 
the agreement.  
 
The language of the Convention is very vague and vagueness, as well as a lack of 
specificity in definitions and in descriptions of measures, is a running theme across 
all parts of legislation described in this section. In fact, in the key sections which 
outline the definitions for ‘crime’, ‘corruption’, ‘public official’ and similar, the 
Convention stipulates the right for individual countries to come up with their own 
legal definition (The Convention on Corruption 1999, Article 37). If states have 
this much room for interpretation and amendment, however, the question poses 
itself as to the effectiveness and realistic expectation of adhering to such 
conventions. The Convention is difficult to be seen as binding for the respective 
governments, or practically enforceable. No sanctions for not adhering to the 
Convention are stipulated, and in fact, any party to the agreement is able to 




5.3.2 International: 2006 United Nations Anti-Corruption 
Charter 
Very similar language is employed by the UN Anti-Corruption Charter, signed in 
New York in 2003, and ratified by the Slovak Republic only in 2006. It calls for a 
‘complex’ and a ‘multidisciplinary’ approach to corruption, but implements 
articles on not just deterrent measures, contrary to the Convention of 1999, but 
also emphasises preventative measures, the increasing of public awareness about 
corruption, and outlines the basic principles of effectiveness and transparency.  
 
The Charter specifically calls for caution when it comes to public functions that 
might be acutely vulnerable to corruption, and to make sure that officials in these 
positions rotate on a regular basis (UN Anti-Corruption Charter 2003, Article 7). 
Many political commentators would agree that Slovakia has in fact violated Article 
7 in this respect, especially in the Fico government tenure. Here the Minister of 
the Interior, Robert Kaliňák, who was associated with several corruption scandals 
(including the 2012 Gorila scandal- see section 5.4.1 for details), did not resign 
from his post which granted him unfettered access to the police force and the 
judiciary, but instead stayed in position for over 8 years, being labelled the ‘crown 
prince’ of the party, groomed to replace Mr Fico, should the PM have succeeded 
in his 2016 presidential campaign (Lesko 2017). The Charter goes into much 
greater detail than the 1999 Convention and talks about the public’s access to 
information, for protection of whistleblowers, for the construction of systemic 
measures that would protect the reporting of corruption and effective inner-state 
investigation of corruption, including robust appeal systems. Slovakia does have a 
law on whistle-blowers as of 2015, however, a 2016 Transparency International 
report assesses this law to have made very little difference to whistle-blowers in 
practical terms. Their findings show very little to no protection offered by the 
Labour Inspectorates that are to be on the receiving end of reporting corruption 
in the workplace. In practical terms, therefore, while the Law and the Labour 
Inspectorates are supposed to protect whistle-blowers from unlawful disciplinary 
sanctions such as dismissal from work or redeployment to another position as a 
result of filing the complaint, they do not offer any provisions of physical safety, 
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do not inform the whistle-blowers of any free legal assistance, and do not inform 
on all provisions in place to offer workplace protection (Dancikova, Nechala et al. 
2016). In comparison, the authors show the provisions in place in the USA by the 
Office of the Special Counsel (OSC). The OSC has a space for reporting 
malpractices directly on its website, provides clear guidelines about defence 
against retaliation (with the option of the employees to create new ones 
pertaining to them specifically), and regularly publishes reports on progress and 
its activities, which increases accountability (2016:15). 
 
Finally, the UN Charter does not outline any international sanctions for not 
complying with its set-out rules and also stipulates the possibility for individual 
states to denounce it, albeit with a longer term of denunciation ratification 
(denunciation is ratified one full year after the state submits their wish to 
denounce, as opposed to a mere three months for the 1999 Convention).  
5.3.3 Domestic: 2005 and 2011 Slovak Republic Criminal Code 
Section 300 on Criminal Acts of Corruption 
The 2005 update in the Criminal Code focuses, as is the case traditionally30, on 
corruption in the form of bribery. The updates in the Criminal Code were spear-
headed by the Ministry of Justice and its focus was on targeting drug trade- in fact 
the law itself gained the nickname ‘the drug novella’. It was initially vetoed by 
the president who believed it to be too soft on drug crime and the updated version 
had to tackle the low threshold for incarceration for drug dealers and applying 
these lower thresholds on soft drugs only, as opposed to the proposed all drugs. 
The coalition believed a softer approach would achieve less of a targeting of 
teenagers who are merely experimenting with drugs. A further update to the 
Criminal Code was implemented in 2011 which focused on a much greater scope 
 
30 See previous sections in Conceptualising Corruption and Literature Review Part 1 for the 
majority of theoretical understanding of corruption being based on a financial framework, such 
as bribery. 
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of effectiveness of the criminal proceedings. This update, for example, shortened 
the previously required full proof documentation in every hearing pertaining to 
one case, to just sections relevant to the particular issue at the time. It also 
expanded the use of agents for proceedings who no longer needed to be policemen 
exclusively, and also established the automatic allocation of counsel to those who 
are not able to afford their own legal advice. These and other measures31 have 
sped up the proceedings of criminal trials, offering less scope for deal making and 
less time for bribing particular judges. The Criminal Code Sections 328-335 specify 
the minimum and maximum sentencings for different forms of bribery, depending 
on whether the bribe is offered or taken, whether this is done directly or through 
a broker on behalf of someone else; whether an advantage is extricated for oneself 
or for someone else, and it makes a point of emphasising the misappropriation of 
public funds and resources. The sentencings span anywhere from 2 to 12 years of 
incarceration depending on the severity of the crime. The idea of a broker or 
‘middleman’ is mentioned in each section, and it is difficult to ascertain whether 
this would be seen as a mitigating circumstance or as more damaging. It does 
however reinforce an interesting point of corruption not taking place as a mere 
transaction between two agents, but a more complex endeavour, calling for 
greater scrutiny into the mechanisms in carrying out corrupt acts.  
The Code also mentions the crimes of indirect corruption, electoral corruption, 
and sport corruption. Sport corruption became a topic of interest in the young 
democracy of Slovakia mostly because of the challenges posed by international 
competitions and increasing regulations in terms of match fixing, illegal substance 
use, but also scope for public procurement of equipment and funding for teams 
that represent the country, and therefore have access to state funding as well as 
private donors. Indirect corruption constitutes influencing others to partake in 
corrupt exchanges or carry out corrupt acts. Electoral corruption constitutes 
influencing public officials to vote in any which direction, as well as deterring 
someone from voting, or coercing someone to vote in a way that provides unfair 
 
31 For further details, see http://www.ulclegal.com/sk/2994-vlada-sr-pripravuje-novela-trestneho-
zakona-a-trestneho-poriadku?year_issue=2011%2F03 [last accessed 15/02/2021]. 
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advantage. The maximum sentence for indirect corruption carries 3 years. The 
maximum sentence for electoral corruption carries 5 years. There are variations 
of the language in subsections that determine the severity of the sentence based 
on who carries out the particular corrupt act and to what personal benefit. These 
and other targeted cases of corrupt behaviour all fall under the remit of the 
Special Prosecutor’s Office, established in 2003. As it came to light in 2020, most 
of the prosecutors working here, as well as the Head of the Office personally, 
were themselves involved in corruption and arrested and charged with corruption, 
bribery, conspiracy, and other charges32 by the National Crime Agency (NAKA) in 
a series of arrests.  
Paradoxically, while at the time of these updates to the Criminal Code, there was 
no law for whistle-blower protection as of yet in Slovakia (came into effect in 
2015), there is a section in the Criminal Code that classifies not reporting a corrupt 
act, or not intervening in one, a crime. It is possible to report anonymously and in 
written form, but the law does not give any guidance on this.  
Legally, therefore, it would appear that corruption is considered in the confines 
of the monetary, the indirect, electoral and sport categories, but there is little 
mention of legislation that protects those who report corruption and there is no 
mention of considering corruption in its immaterial form. The government website 
dedicated to corruption tries to give off the impression of successfully tackling 
corruption by statistics like the one presented in Table 5.2. However, the website 
itself has not been updated for the past 5 years so there is no way for a regular 
citizen to monitor progress, save for submitting a Freedom of Information request. 
The difference between transparency of progress on these issues displayed by the 
US OSC, which provides statistics and updates on a regular basis for citizens 
visiting its website, and lack thereof for Slovakia, is stark. It is unclear whether 
the government considers the outlined statistics a success and why there is such 
a large discrepancy between corrupt acts reported, prosecuted, and convicted. 
 
32 For more details see https://dennikn.sk/2101623/ako-sa-mohlo-stat-ze-specialnu-prokuraturu-
viedol-takyto-clovek-odpovedaju-kandidati-na-generalneho-prokuratora/ [last accessed 
15/02/2021]. 
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The lack of clarity as to the mechanisms employed to process corrupt acts 
reported makes it difficult to interpret the data for an average citizen interested 
to see how the fight against corruption is progressing.  
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total recorded 
criminal acts of 
corruption 
370 468 367 547 
Total prosecuted 
(according to 
Section 206 of the 
Criminal Code) 
crimes of corruption 
57 77 79 ? 
Total persons 
convicted for crimes 
of corruption 
104 141 116 260 
Table 5. 2 Corruption statistics in the Slovak Republic. Source: Author translation of 




The website also contains a tab, informing citizens of where they can report 
corruption and provides guidance on how to recognise corruption, how to deal 
with corruption if encountered, how to define corruption, and so forth. The 
definition provided by the government once again veers towards bribery and 
anecdotal mentions of ‘envelopes’ on the governmental guidance website33, and 
explicitly emphasises ‘enriching oneself’ as the primary transgression. Therefore, 
the reliance on bribery and a financial understanding of corruption is actively fed 
to the citizens, without a consideration of other forms of corruption. The 
assumption therefore is that the participants in the interviews and focus groups 
display an overly financial understanding of corruption as well.  
 
 
33 See full text here: https://www.vlada.gov.sk/co-je-korupcia/ [last accessed 12/12/2020] 
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For reporting corruption, the government tries to encourage the public by 
seemingly protecting them from harm34. However, the only legal measures listed 
by the government are the § 13, 59 and 7/8, which refer to legislation on 
workplace conditions, on civic duty and provisions for citizen complaints. There is 
no protection for the whistle-blower stipulated, merely the right of a citizen to 
complain and to enjoy comfortable working conditions.  
There is no wonder that without effective legislation that protects the whistle-
blower and that explicitly defines what can be viewed and reported as corruption, 
(along with the lack of public knowledge as to where one would report corruption), 
corruption has been able to thrive.  
  
 




5.3.4 Domestic: Slovak Republic’s Governmental Anti-Corruption 
Policy 2019-2023 (ratified on the 12th December 2018) 
The Anti-Corruption Policy pledge35, passed by the ex-PM Pellegrini government in 
2018, contains wording on preventative and repressive measures complementing 
each other, as preventative measures lead to unveiling corruption and repressive 
measures lead to deterrence. The policy outlines that corruption can indeed be 
both the cause and the effect of bad public administration. It outlines the 
potential for corruption to undermine public trust in its institutions, the potential 
for corruption to cause political and economic instability, and the astute 
observation that a culture of integrity, honesty and trustworthiness must be 
fostered. At first glance, the government appears to be acutely aware of the 
severity of the situation and of the full impact of corruption on society. 
However, the policy does not specify at all how these goals are to be achieved. It 
goes on to stress that effective preventative measures should be based on 
effective measurement of corruption- but there is no mechanism outlined as to 
how the government is going to measure corruption in real time. The policy admits 
that corruption is in fact not legally defined and that needs to be remedied, but 
does not state how or by when (Anti-Corruption Policy, 2018:5)36. It outlines its 
ambition to eliminate corruption through raising awareness, through its 
cooperation with international institutions, and effective curbing of corrupt 
practices. However, no specific links to individual institutions that should 
presumably carry out these theoretical goals are listed for the public to follow. 
The policy goes on to outline the need for enforcing ethical codes in public 
administration bodies and says that the climate for fighting corruption has never 
 
35 See full text here: https://www.bojprotikorupcii.gov.sk/data/files/7130_protikorupcna-politika-sr-




been greater, as there is a positive relationship with international organisations 
and external bodies, ready to help Slovakia in its endeavour. We know, however, 
that this has been the case at least from the late nineties, with Slovakia being a 
part of the Corruption Convention as of 1999, so this is not a novel situation 
outlined by the government.  
The policy goes on to shift the responsibility for ineffective repressive measures 
onto the public by stating that: the tolerance for corruption by the public is very 
high, the will of the public to partake in curbing it is low, and that the non-existent 
lobbying and whistle-blower laws put the government at a disadvantage. The 
important thing to derive from this is that the culture and the public perception 
of corruption do indeed need to be addressed, but cannot be held responsible for 
the lack of legislation meant for their protection, should their efforts to report 
and curb corruption reach higher levels. The policy mentions a draft of a new 
whistle-blower law in progress, but in 2020 the legislation has still not been passed 
or implemented.  
Finally, the policy, ironically, outlines the need for governmental approach to be 
practical rather than formal, without listing any practical steps to be taken. A list 
of tasks can be found at the very end of the policy, without indicating the timeline 
of actioning these or the institutions responsible for actioning. The very last 
section states that ‘appropriate authorities’ within public administration will be 
in charge of executing the policy’s pledge, but there is no hyperlink for the public 
to access, or any address for the public to write to or to visit, to be able to monitor 
the progress of the set-out tasks (Anti-Corruption Policy, 2018:28).  
In short, the outlined policies, legislation, and pledges of the governmental 
institutions have several things in common: 
• They utilise similar, binding language lifted from the international conventions 
that they are already a part of, without any specificity as to the practical 
undertaking of anti-corruption measures. 
• They display acute awareness of the costs and effects of corruption, but provide 
no platform for monitoring of the success of their efforts, nor of their means to 
measure corruption. 
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• They are difficult to locate and not clearly signposted on the governmental 
websites. 
• The Slovak-specific documents are predominantly published in Slovak only, which 
reduces the chances of international research being able to penetrate the status 
quo of anti-corruption efforts in Slovakia. 
• They emphasise the role of the electorate and civil society in curbing corruption 
and the need to further investigate the role of cultural understanding of 
corruption- which the thesis acts upon in its research. 
 
5.4 Role of external actors 
 
Aside from the aforementioned conventions and bilateral anti-corruption efforts 
on an EU and UN levels, there are some specific areas where external actor 
influence has impacted on anti-corruption policies. It is important to investigate 
the role of this influence in contrast with the impact of domestic political 
pressures. 
 
5.4.1 Economic and horizontal reforms 
Beblavy (2009) in his analysis of the role of external actors concludes that Slovakia 
has honed its anti-corruption policy into ‘economic reform + transparency’ with 
the help of the external actors. He refers mainly to the accession/membership 
conditionality of the EU and also its aid programs, particularly PHARE (see Table 
5.1). These conditionalities include the internal financial audit of the government 
and the taking on board of GRECO group recommendations. They also include 
horizontal reforms, such as the Freedom of Information Law (FOI) (2000), or 
setting up of the Special Court and Prosecuting Office. Another significant area of 
a horizontal reform can be seen in the 2005 revamping of political party financing.  
This horizontal reform, at the encouragement of external actors (primarily the 
EU), detailed the regulations for donors and gifts, and banned any party business 
183 
activities or financial relationships with public authorities (see Table 5.1) 
(Beblavy, 2009).  
These regulations, however, seem ineffective after the unveiling of scandals like 
the Gorila corruption scandal (2012), which indicated strong links between high 
governmental officials and private Slovak financing groups such as PENTA and 
J&T37. The range of implicated officials spans from government authorities (as 
high as Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice and potentially the PM himself), 
through the judiciary (the Prosecutor General, several judges), the official state 
funding and procurement bodies, all the way to the police and infamous organised 
crime groups (the leader of the most prominent organised crime group, Marian 
Kočner, is currently facing trial for being implicated- among other things-  in the 
murder of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak in 2018). The 2012 Gorila scandal 
outlines the close cooperation between all these separate public officials and 
members of private financing groups, as well as members of the organised crime 
units operating in Bratislava and beyond. It outlines the opaque party financing of 
the government leaders spanning as far back as 2005, offered in exchange for: 
specific rulings in civil and criminal proceedings, specific individuals sympathetic 
to the goals of financial groups or organised crime to be embedded in 
governmental structures, specific projects receiving amounts of EU funding, the 
‘dealing with’ uncomfortable members of the public, and much more. Therefore, 
to say that EU-inspired, horizontal reforms addressing party financing, internal 
audit processes, and transparency in governmental dealings have been 
ineffective, is an understatement in light of this and other scandals (e.g. the state-
run hospital in Piešťany and also in Košice overpaying several million EUR for a CT 
scanner and for sonographic equipment in a series of exposed public procurement 
embezzlement scandals)38.  
 
37 These groups are outlined in greater detail in the upcoming empirical chapters. 
38 These were actually incidents costing the directors of hospitals their jobs and they were all 
charged with either gross misconduct when maintaining public property or with manipulation of 
public procurement tenders and auctions. For more details, visit 
https://www.pravda.sk/trendove-temy/kauza-ct/ [last accessed 15/02/2021]. 
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5.4.2 Conditionality and sectoral reform 
Other external factors include the World Bank operating through its grant and 
lending activities (banking and healthcare), including an element of technical 
assistance, as well as conditionality (Beblavy 2009). A positive effect of this and 
the EU impact on financing costs has been associated with substantial drops in 
perceived credit risk by external investors (Gray 2009). This ‘seal of approval’ of 
the EU is described as a phenomenon whereby the EU endorses a pre-existing 
policy mix and thus pushes the national government in the right direction of anti-
corruption policy. However, it is worth pointing out that with regards to EU 
funding, the potential for fruitful change is equal to the potential for funds 
misappropriation (Beblavy and Sicakova-Beblava 2014). For example, Slovakia only 
received limited funding from the Structural Funds up until 2006 (roughly 400-500 
million EUR), but the 2007-2013 period brought a substantial increase in the level 
of aid (1.5-2 billion EUR annually), which opened up the opportunities for funds 
embezzlement39 (Beblavy, Sicakova-Beblava, 2014:548). The increased funding, it 
is argued, has invited an increase in corruption itself, as this funding is vulnerable 
to corruption based on three specific criteria: political discretion in the allocation 
of projects, imbalances between supply and demand, and a high level of private 
sector involvement (2014:548). The misconduct on all three levels was picked up 
by the international community at the time (Castle 2010)40. From this perspective, 
the external actor influence has managed to inflate the levels of corruption. The 
three most notorious cases with allegations of corruption and clientelism that 
were declared in contravention of EU law by the European Commission, resulted 
 
39 Periodically, ministers get ‘sacrificed’ whenever a scandal becomes too prominent in the public 
eye, such as the ‘bulletin-board tender’ scandal. See https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20127801/bulletin-
board-tender-investigation-completed.html and Beblavy, Sicakova-Beblava (2014:548) for more 
details. 
40 For more details on EU Funds corruption in CEE, see Fazekas, M., L. P. King, J. Chvalkovska, J. 
Skuhrovec and I. J. Toth (2014). Are EU funds a corruption risk? The impact of EU funds on 
grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Working Paper series: CRCB-WP/2013:03. 
Budapest, Corruption Research Center Budapest. 
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in EU funding cancellation and loss of 20-30% of expenditure already pre-paid by 
government: 
• Tender to supply a toll system for commercial vehicles (600-800 million EUR) 
• Consulting services in the management of Structural Funds (120 million EUR) 
• Grants to pilot social enterprises (eight grants worth 24 million EUR) (Ragacova 
2009, Krajanova 2010, Ruttkayova 2013, Beblavy and Sicakova-Beblava 2014). 
However, the argument can be made that the acquis and EU fiscal pressures 
were among the most relevant for combining the praised sectoral reforms (such 
as bank privatisation) with horizontal policies (such as FOI legislation) for the 
first Dzurinda government, resulting in the approval and ratification of Council 
of Europe’s anti-corruption conventions outlined in Table 5.1. On the contrary, 
Beblavy’s (2009) evaluation of 12 major anti-corruption reforms in the 1998-2006 
period identified only one of these reforms as directly connected to accession 
conditionality (government internal financial audit) and this particular reform 
has been rated to have had a ‘low’ impact. Other reforms were evaluated 
positively due to their ex-post rather than ex-ante impact (Beblavy, Sicakova-
Beblava, 2014:545), further emphasising the role of domestic rather than 
external actor pressures. Finally, Table 5.3 outlines the adherence of GRECO 
members with the Council of Europe standards, and it is obvious here that the 
impact of external actors was at its most effective pre-accession. 





First round (2003) 19 15 
Second round (2006) 17 8 
Third round (2010) 16 1 
Fourth round (2013) 16 7 
Table 5.3 Monitoring of GRECO recommendations implemented by Slovakia (over three 
monitoring rounds). Source: Author, based on Beblavy, Sicakova-Beblava, 2014:546 and 
GRECO official statistics 
 
The conclusion drawn is that while the EU did have a moderately positive role in 
1999-2004 with regards to anti-corruption policy, its influence became ‘largely 
irrelevant’ thereafter and the main driving force behind anti-corruption policy 
became domestic political pressures, that mostly related to the publicised 
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scandals of embezzlement of money in hospital equipment procurement or 
scandals like Gorila in 2012, rather than those from external actors (Beblavy and 
Sicakova-Beblava 2014).  
5.5 Effectiveness of Slovak reforms 
 
The effectiveness of Slovak reforms has been seen as not overly successful. 
Meyer-Sahling (2009) actually groups Slovakia (along with Poland) among the so-
called ‘destructive reform reversal’ countries (Meyer-Sahling 2009).  
Having implemented substantial horizontal reforms and economic reforms, 
Nemec (2018) concludes that transparency of public companies as well as 
governmental financial dealings remains low. According to his findings: 
• ‘36% of public companies have not disclosed the names of managers on their 
websites,  
• only one out of seven public companies opens its economic information to 
external reviews,  
• 85% of public companies do not present CVs of their directors on their websites,  
• one-fourth of public companies did not respond to information requests of 
citizens,  
• only one out of ten public companies informs who the subjects of their 
promotional or funding support are’ (Nemec, 2018:121). 
This, in conjunction to the so-called ‘zigzag’ administrative reforms over three 
decades (see Table 5.1 for 1990,1996,2004,2007 and 2014 administrative reforms) 
that have repeatedly established, abolished, and re-established administrative 
systems and district offices, creates the impression of no longevity and lack of 
cohesiveness of anti-corruption policies. Additionally, the Civil Service Act of 
2009, gave way to increased forms and cases of nepotism, patronage, and enabled 
the break of the link between performance and salary. Formally, open 
competition for civil service posts is established, but in reality, patronage is the 
main principle for selection and there are very few enforced legal measures 
against it (Staronova et al., 2014). While basic salary is fixed, allocation of any 
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non-pre-determined premiums is completely arbitrary and subject to discretion. 
There is also the option of discretionary bonuses under this Act, and these can 
account for up to, or exceeding, 100% of basic salary grade, which has led to 
massive inflation of salaries without any link to performance on managerial 
positions (Nemec, 2018). This has in fact contributed to a general, ever-growing 
perception of inequality among the public and to an environment where 
subjectivity and corruption can thrive with little accountability.  
Finally, it is important to delve into the efforts by the government to decentralise 
its structures, in line with the traditional approach of societies transitioning from 
centralised to market economies. Decentralisation of this sort is theoretically 
supposed to support the workings of transparency and good governance, as funds 
and resources have a greater chance to be utilised for their intended purposes. 
However, Nemec (2018) argues that the decentralisation in Slovakia has reached 
such extremes, with the smallest municipality having 12 inhabitants, and most 
municipalities having around 1000 inhabitants, that the resulting fragmentation is 
not helpful, but detrimental to effective policy implementation. Such small 
municipalities are still expected to carry out administrative and logistical tasks 
such as: waste disposal, budget allocations, construction, establishment of 
ambulatory health service, leisure and tourist venues, maintenance of local 
cultural establishments, education, and training. Large municipalities have a lot 
more manpower and social capital to administer these. As a result, countless small 
municipalities (Slovakia is among the countries with the greatest number of 
municipalities in the EU) often feel overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task at 
hand, and comfortable to misappropriate allocated funds and budgets due to their 
proliferation and very little oversight. This, coupled with the passivity of the civil 
society (Buncak et al. 2009 report that over 67% of respondents believe that their 
problems need to be solved by the state), who are not ‘effective controllers of 
their politicians and bureaucrats’ and are lacking a sense of individual 
responsibility (Nemec, 2018:123), also creates an environment where corruption 





This section set out to outline and characterise the anti-corruption measures 
undertaken by the Slovak governments from its independence in the early 90s until 
present day.  
It is obvious from the research conducted that some governments placed greater 
emphasis on anti-corruption measures and legislation than others. The general 
trend is to see the pro-European governments placing greater emphasis on 
transparency and anti-corruption in their government manifestos, as well as in 
their practical implementation of measures through passed legislation or reform. 
This trend is further emphasised by the very recent election of the first female 
president, Ms Zuzana Čaputová, an independent candidate, who ran on a campaign 
of full transparency. The most recent government elected in 2020, with PM 
Matovič at its helm, has also run on a programme of tackling corruption and 
ceasing the one-party rule of SMER and its corrupt financial background. It is 
therefore fair to re-visit Bunčak et al.’s claim from 2009 that the civil society is 
mostly seen as passive- there seems to be clear impetus from the public for the 
system to change and this is encouraging from an anti-corruption perspective.  
However, it is also clear that most of the measures undertaken so far have been 
negatively impacted by the vagueness of language, weak legislation enforcement, 
sceptical acceptance of these by the public, and lax implementation by the state 
authorities. There are clearly several institutions established to promote anti-
corruption, such as the Specialised Courts and Prosecutor’s Office, several 
internet portals available to present the government’s pledge to combat 
corruption, and evidence by the government to try and cut through the red tape 
by making administrative tasks more efficient for the citizens. However, the 
official evaluation of these measures presents with results of low effectiveness, 
lack of longevity, and low impact on corruption levels.  
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The evidence also suggests that much more emphasis should be placed on the 
agency of the individual governments in their implementation of anti-corruption 
and less focus should be given to the role of the external actors. It is obvious that 
the EU and World Bank conditionality catalysed the anti-corruption efforts seen 
throughout the late 90s and in the 21st century alike, but there are indicators to 
suggest that domestic public demands and pressures have had a greater pull in 
recent times.  
The language presented in the legislation and reforms, as well as within the 
international conventions that Slovakia has bound itself to, is indicative of a 
superficial approach to the problematic (for example the recent 2015 law on 
whistle-blower protection that was found insufficient in its practical application 
by Transparency International). It is true that all public bodies have complied with 
the government measures of having published their anti-corruption ‘plan’ or 
‘ethos’- this includes even bodies such as the Slovak Postal Service41 or the 
Metrological Inspectorate42. All of these plans emphasise buzzwords such as 
‘integrity’, ‘preventative measures’, or ‘public interest’, and speak in detail 
about the general vision, values, and principles to abide by. However, there are 
no concrete rules outlined that the employees have to stick to and no update 
provided on whether the measures proposed have been implemented and to what 
extent they are effective. There is very little available to the citizens to be able 
to hold the government’s progress on this to account. It appears that the only 
measurement of corruption comes from outside actors, such as the World Bank, 
The European Commission, or Transparency International through their 
measurements. No comprehensive summary of the progress made is available to 
the public and no domestic government measurements are available. Additionally, 
 
41 See the Postal Service’s anti-corruption plan here in full: 
https://www.posta.sk/subory/39980/protikorupcny-program-slovenskej-posty-as.pdf [last 
accessed 15/02/2021]. 
42 See the Metrological Inspectorate’s anti-corruption plan here in full: 
https://www.unms.sk/swift_data/source/2020/protikorupcny_program/Protikorupcny%20program
%20SMI.pdf [last accessed 15/02/2021]. 
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the domestic measures are not made available in translation to international 
audiences. 
These conclusions serve a vital purpose of mapping out the status of anti-
corruption efforts in the case study. The section informs the theoretical 
assumptions behind questions posed to the respondents and provides insight into 
their levels of awareness about several aspects of corruption. While some 
perceptions of corruption are well documented by tools like the Eurobarometer, 
which includes both businesses’ and citizens’ attitudes towards corruption, there 
are some specifics that can only be answered in more detail within a deeper 
conversation. These include the following: knowing where and how to report 
corruption, the understanding and reasoning behind the main causes of corruption 
on petty and grand levels in Slovakia, how corruption is carried out in practice, 
the role of brokers and middlemen in corrupt transactions on the ground, the 
difference in understanding and perception of gifts versus bribes, and so on. 
Overall, there appears to be a chasm between what the government promotes, 
understands, and has implemented regarding corruption, and the implications 





Chapter 6: Data Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This section outlines the data analysis process, which was undertaken using an 
interpretivist ontology, adhering to the key principle that meaning and 
interpretation is socially-constructed and established within discourse and 
tradition (Marsh and Furlong 2017). Rigorous thematic analysis and elements of 
textual analysis of in-depth interview and focus group transcripts were employed 
to investigate corruption on the case study of Slovak healthcare. The 
interpretivist epistemology of the project focuses on how this particular region’s 
customs shape the respondents’ views and understanding of corruption. 
I undertook qualitative analysis of data collected through focus groups and in-
depth interviews from June to December 2019. Anonymised data simultaneously 
collected from health care fora were also added for a further testing of 
theoretical assumptions, but due to the anonymised nature without any 
demographic data available, the use of health care fora was limited to textual 
analysis only. All data were processed using the principle of text units- these 
units  represent the contribution (verbal or written) made by one person at one 
point in the interview and can be as large as a phrase and as short as one word, 
depending on context (Miller 2001). 
The rest of the section will outline the types of analysis used and then move on 
to describe the four steps of analysis undertaken and the challenges arising. 
These four steps are namely: data immersion (including data collection, 
transcription and translation, and basic data visualisation), coding, creating 
categories, and identifying themes.  
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6.1.1 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis is an established method of qualitative textual analysis, 
alongside narrative analysis and discourse analysis and is most commonly used 
for public health research (Green, Willis et al. 2007). Thematic analysis is a 
method that is engaged during the very early stages of research already (ie data 
collection) and as such, it facilitates thorough and early data immersion. 
Moreover, this type of analysis is often used in conjunction with in-depth 
interviews (Silverman 2006, Green, Willis et al. 2007) and following this 
established trend, thematic analysis was used to analyse the one-on-one in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions.  
Thematic analysis carries several advantages for analysis of the data in this 
project over discourse analysis: flexibility, pattern recognition, suitability for 
software analysis and relational analysis. Thematic analysis in this project 
follows the principle of carrying out a ‘form of pattern recognition within the 
data, where emerging themes become categories for analysis’ (Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane 2006) and as such the identification and search for themes for 
analysis is key to the process (Daly, Kellehear et al. 1997, Rice and Ezzy 1999). 
The particular strength of thematic analysis lies in its ability to combine analysis 
of meaning with context, as opposed to detailed discourse analysis. A limitation 
with thematic analysis is the over reliance on frequency occurrence of themes 
and topics within text. It is necessary to bear in mind, as outlined in Chapter 4, 
that greater frequency may not necessarily reflect greater importance, but 
perhaps just greater willingness or ability to talk at length about the specific 
topic (Loffe and Yardley 2004, Shields and Twycross 2008). However, since the 
focus of the thesis is aimed at investigating the participants’ understanding of 
corruption in their real-life setting, even such an interpretation yields valuable 
results. 
Rather than focusing on the discourse itself, thematic analysis is more suitable 
for identifying patterns and themes and is a more suitable method for utilising 
software pattern recognition, such as NVivo12. Software use, through thematic 
analysis, is capable of rigorously ‘tagging’ and ‘retagging’ codes and 
subsequently connecting them into themes (Crabtree and Miller 1999) 
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effectively. For this particular project, the recognition of frequency of 
expression, clustering of similarities in language, and understanding under 
thematic headings was paramount. Thematic analysis also allows for a more 
organised manner for scrutinising already-existing themes and codes and allows 
for re-clustering and re-categorisation of entire thematic headings.  
Thematic analysis also has the advantage of being used within different 
theoretical frameworks while also adding the appropriate level of focus on form 
and function of the text in question (Lawless and Chen 2018). As opposed to the 
strictly linguistic focus of Critical Discourse Analysis, thematic analysis offers the 
option of analysing relational communication between individual sets of 
expression and participants. Similarly to Owen (1984), the thematic analysis 
here followed the three criteria for rigorous thematic analysis: recurrence, 
repetition, forcefulness (Owen 1984). When coding initially and then connecting 
codes into broader categories and themes, I was guided by the recurrence of 
particular similarities of expression, the repetition of these individually and 
across participants, as well as any features of emphasis within language or tone 
used. When identifying themes and categories, I was also guided by the 
understanding of a theme as representing a level of response pattern or meaning 
within the data set (Braun and Clarke 2006), while bearing in mind that themes 
are often latent and abstract, as opposed to the more descriptive and manifest 
content represented by a category (Graneheim and Lundman 2004). I was also 
reflectively conscious of making sure that themes were identified not only based 
on quantifiable measures, but due to capturing important topics relating to the 
overarching research question (To what extent is the theoretical difference 
between grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of 
corruption in Slovakia’s health care?).  
6.1.2 Textual analysis 
Having outlined the purpose of thematic analysis in the project, it is important 
to briefly describe the role textual analysis has played. In text, we are dealing 
with the conversion of language into a set of symbols, organised to convey 
meaning to the reader (Park, Griffin et al. 2012).  Within text, the words 
perform a communicative act. I follow Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) definition 
194 
for textual analysis as a ‘broader analysis of data to evaluate the face value of 
rhetoric and discourse of a case, focusing on identifying significant patterns of 
consistency and variation.’ It is these patterns of consistency and variation that 
interested me. While there are several instances of pointing out a linguistic 
specification inherent to the region, close ‘micro’ linguistic focus of textual 
analysis favoured by the likes of Fairclough (2003) gave way to broader analysis. 
I have focused instead on a ‘meso’ level of textual analysis, which looks into 
passages and portions within the text that reveal meaning and patterns- as such, 
this level of textual analysis pairs itself effectively with a broader thematic 
analysis which also looks for patterns in a larger context (Park, Griffin et al. 
2012). This process was facilitated by ensuring that coding extended to full 
phrases or sentences, not just individual words. 
It was crucial not to decontextualise during analysis. This was achieved through 
processes, such as creating word trees in NVivo12, where I made sure more 
context was added when necessary, as seen in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 overleaf. Here 
it is obvious when looking into the topic of corruption vs. token of gratitude, 
that if we take poďakovanie (gratitude) out of context, it does not give us much 
to work with for interpretation and analysis. However, when taken in the 
context of 6 and more context words added, suddenly we get examples of what 
people consider to be tokens of gratitude (e.g., bonboniéra- box of chocolates) 
and what they consider to be a bribe (e.g., peniaze- money). In this way I was 
able to interpret data with firm association present between words and 
situations, customs, or local vernacular, which is one of the main advantages of 
using open-response questions for ensuing textual analysis (Bolden and Moscarola 
2000). In this sense the analysis follows semiotic theory of textual analysis, 
which argues that sense cannot be determined outside of its contextual 
framework and words and expressions may go beyond the surface of the text 
(Bolden and Moscarola 2000), and provide wider insight into the understanding of 
participants as parts of a specific region and culture. 
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Figure 6.1 Word tree of 'gratitude' within node 'Corruption or token of gratitude', 2 context words, translations embedded in red by author. Source: Author 
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Figure 6.2 Word tree of word 'gratitude' within node 'Corruption or token of gratitude', 6 context words, translations embedded in red by author. Source: Author 
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6.2 Initial data analysis- data immersion 
 
Qualitative data analysis conducted for this research followed a 4-stage 
approach, which included: immersion in data, coding, creating categories, and 
identifying themes- as seen in Figure 6.3 overleaf (Green, Willis et al. 2007). 
Early stages of data immersion begin in the data collection stage and are 
especially effective if, as is the case here, the same individual undertakes the 
process of data collection as well as analysis (Green, Willis et al. 2007). Initial 
theoretical assumptions emerged that were jotted down in field notes 
(journals), which have been shown to be an effective tool for initial data 
immersion (Hamo, Blunt-Kulka et al. 2004). The analysis presented benefits from 
my use of the field journal, and I made sure to cross reference it with categories 
emerging from NVivo12 analysis as well. Repeated reading and re-reading of the 
interview transcripts was employed. This was often done while listening to the 
transcripts again to ensure accuracy of transcription, as well as increase 
familiarity with data. 
Later stages of data immersion included transcription of recordings by the 
researcher and initial recognition of frequent themes arising from data. It is 
important to note that effective thematic analysis can only be performed by 
constant awareness of moving back and forth between the four steps outlined- 
constant reflexivity on the side of the researcher and a process of ‘testing the 
fit’ as new data are integrated, while re-assessing theoretical concepts used is 
vital (Green, Willis et al. 2007). In short, the process outlined in Figure 6.3 is 
non-linear as indicated by the arrows inbetween individual steps. This was the 
case with the study of corruption in Slovak health care, where new emerging 
ideas and follow-up questions meant a continuous development of codes and 
taxonomy (as outlined in section 6.3). Codes often had to be amended or 
rephrased to include a broader spectrum of an idea or be separated into 
subsections for greater clarity. The research followed the principle of analysis 
being an iterative process with continuous updates to coding and category and 
theme extraction, where category shifting and renaming was necessary 
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(Davidson 2009). This was possible due to following the best practice for 
thematic analysis, the researcher’s deep familiarity with the data (Green, Willis 
et al. 2007). This familiarity was facilitated by the researcher assuming the role 
of the interviewer, transcriber, translator, and analyst. In fact, it has been 
shown that while a greater team of researchers working on thematic analysis can 
cover more ground in terms of statistical significance due to a greater sample 
interviewed, problems of inconsistency with coding and data categorisation, as 
well as data translation and transcription emerge with more researchers 
handling the same data (Twinn 1997, Green, Willis et al. 2007, Davidson 2009). 
The thesis mitigated this shortcoming by the researcher (myself) undertaking all 
of the aforementioned tasks individually and in a consistent manner.  
 
Figure 6.3 Four steps of data analysis to generate best qualitative evidence. Source: 
Green et al. 2007 
 
 
6.2.1 Data collection 
Data were collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus groups 
over the course of several months, as outlined in Chapter 4. The collection 
employed volunteer and snowball sampling under the principle of purposive 
selection (Polkinghorne 2005). Purposive selection in this case outlines the need 
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for ‘fertile exemplars’ of the experience under investigation for the study. It 
was therefore important to employ volunteer sampling and subsequently 
snowball sampling, to ensure that the participants selected were willing and 
keen to discuss the sensitive issue of corruption. The existing literature (Gill, 
Stewart et al. 2008, Sutton and Austin 2015) emphasises the need for continuous 
reflexivity on the part of the researcher when undertaking these methods and a 
need for flexibility when it comes to scheduling difficulties, as well as follow up 
questions that can arise on an ad hoc basis.  
The challenges presented by researcher subjectivity and filters through which 
researchers perceive data are outlined in detail by Sutton and Austin (2015). I 
was acutely aware of the challenges posed by one person collecting, 
transcribing, translating, and analysing data. These were namely researcher 
bias, scheduling difficulties, the issues of collecting data on a sensitive subject, 
the challenges posed by group dynamics, and the time-consuming nature of the 
data collection. While there are official recommendations of overcoming 
difficulties relating to sensitive subjects, such as conducting more consecutive 
interviews with participants, even three, if possible, this was not possible to 
carry out- partly due to participants’ unavailability and partly due to them not 
wishing to delve into the topic of corruption repeatedly. Instead of seeing these 
as challenges only, I saw them as opportunities as well. For example, instead of 
agonising over the ‘best’ solution to a functioning group mix for a focus group, I 
was happy to work with groups that naturally welded together through personal 
connections, as it has been shown that pre-existing groups share a familiarity 
that actively facilitates discussion on sensitive topics (Gill, Stewart et al. 2008).  
There were protocols in place to counter scheduling difficulties that included 
the possibility of changing the neutral venue selected for a more feasible venue 
of the participant’s choice, phone interviews or Skype/Zoom interviews as well. 
Luckily, usually the scheduling difficulties encountered could be solved by 
selecting a more appropriate date and time for individuals. The transcription 
and translation challenges and their mitigation are outlined in the section 
below, but rigorous reflexivity and the use of a field journal were utilised to 
counter researcher bias.  
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I utilised an inductive-dominant framework for data collection and analysis and 
as such, there were theoretical assumptions and hypotheses in place before the 
data collection commenced (Armat, Sharifi et al. 2018). These are outlined 
below as a reminder: 
Overarching research question (RQ): To what extent is the theoretical 
difference between grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life 
understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health care? 
1. RQ1: How does awareness of grand corruption inform/justify individual 
engagement in petty corruption? 
 
2. RQ2: How does awareness of petty corruption inform/justify individual 
engagement in grand corruption? 
 
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption will have no impact on the engagement of 
individuals in petty corruption and vice versa. 
 
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in 
petty corruption. 
 
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in 
grand corruption. 
 
3. RQ3: What are the strategies utilised to carry out grand and petty corrupt 
practices? 
Theoretical assumption: There will be similarities in the strategies utilised to 
carry out grand and petty corrupt practices. 
 
• RQ3a- subquestion: What is the significance of trust as a pre-requisite for 
corrupt interactions? 
Theoretical assumption: Trust is understood as one of the processes of 
corruption that links the corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as such 
it is seen as a condition more often than it is understood as a result of corrupt 
practice. 
• RQ3b- subquestion: To what extent are social rules and customs important 
in the carrying out of corrupt practices? 
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Theoretical assumption: Social rules and customs are understood as one of the 
processes of corruption that links corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; 
as such they will prove as important determinants in carrying out corrupt 
practices. 
 
With the outlined assumptions and research questions, there were already 
several pre-determined themes and codes that I expected to see and appear in 
the data collected (details of which questions addressed which RQs can be found 
in Appendix 5). These would have related to trust, the distinction between grand 
and petty corruption, an attempt by the participants to show how the corrupt 
behaviour has been normalised within their culture, and so on. In order to 
corroborate the theoretical assumptions, I would expect to see the participants 
to make a distinction between grand and petty corruption in their 
understandings without prompting and treat them as separate problems. I would 
expect to see evidence of justifying corrupt behaviour by ‘those in higher 
positions’ carrying out corruption on a greater scale, or the other way around as 
having ‘learnt’ corrupt behaviour in lower levels and carrying it forward. 
Furthermore, I would expect the participants to base their explanation of 
corrupt behaviour, predominantly on the petty level, on the ingrained social and 
cultural customs and traditions, as well as conditioned by Soviet legacies. 
On the contrary, to disprove the theoretical assumptions, I would expect the 
participants not to view corruption in its separate capacities of grand and petty, 
but rather as a holistic problem that does not separate into levels. I would 
expect them to focus more on individual decision-making, as opposed to 
believing that one level causes another- instead I would expect them to view the 
levels as having a cyclical, mutual impact on one another and thus merging into 
one systemic problem. Equally, I would expect them to focus more on individual 
decision-making and concept of morality, as opposed to justifying corrupt 
behaviour with social and cultural customs inherent to the region and influenced 
by Soviet legacies. 
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6.2.2 Transcription and translation 
Transcription of data is an effective method of immersion in data and a general 
re-familiarising of oneself with the responses of research respondents (Ferrie 
2018), which ultimately aids in rigorous data analysis. Using software such as 
NVivo12 runs the risk of decontextualising text as an expression of an individual, 
turning it into a mere set of noted symbols to be categorised. Transcription aids 
in adding an element of personalising the data within textual analysis. It has 
been shown that transcription is much more than just a ‘mechanical selection 
and application of notation symbols’ (Davidson 2009:38) and is instead a 
selective activity where researchers exercise a lot of choice-making and 
selectivity as a practical and a theoretical necessity (Cook 1990, Kvale 1996, 
Bucholtz 2000, Duranti 2007). Such selectivity was applied here as well, where 
analysis was conducted using the original language of data collected (Slovak) to 
ensure authenticity, in conjunction with categories and themes articulated into 
English for practical purposes of writing in English. When presenting such data, 
as shown in Example 6.1 overleaf, the use of more than one language has 
implications for layout, and this is why early on, it was necessary to make sure 
that transcription style was considered before carrying out transcription itself 
and consistent layout was applied (Oliver, Serovich et al. 2005). Such early 
thought into the format and layout of transcription ensures an alignment of 
method with research objectives. In this transcription, for example, to ensure 
that the translations could be presented side-by-side to mitigate issues of 
transparency and trustworthiness of transcription, the decision was to undertake 
a naturalised form of transcription, as opposed to denaturalised (Davidson 2009). 
In practice, this meant that features of discourse had primacy over the oral 
expression- so, commas, full stops and paragraphing were incorporated, rather 
than adopting the denaturalised style which on paper would appear much like a 
Joycean stream of consciousness with language fillers uncensored (‘erm’, ‘um’) 
and without punctuation. Such format would be very difficult to read and 
impossible to analyse using software. 
Because it is impossible to capture everything expressed in verbal and body 
language on the recording, further decisions were made in the transcription 
process to facilitate reading, as well as translation for reader comprehension. 
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For example, for the transcription, significant pauses (over 3 seconds) were 
recorded, as well as laughs and instances of one participant interrupting 
another, to be able to capture the nuance of a heated debate. The decision was 
also made not to capture short pauses or make any notes on tone of voice and 
some denaturalised language fillers such as ‘like’, ‘hmm’ or ‘er’ were omitted to 
save time and capture clearly the idea expressed, as opposed to the mannerism, 
to facilitate clarity. Another factor to consider when selecting the naturalised as 
opposed to the denaturalised manner of transcription (Davidson 2009) was the 
subsequent use of the NVivo12 software for further coding and category 
extraction. The ‘cleaner’ and more consistent the transcript for NVivo12, the 
more effective its ability to compute matrices and cross tabulations of textual 
units.  
To mitigate the potential for being reductionist in this manner, general 
comments were made in the field journal during interviews to put across 
accurately any contextual nuance arising, should it prove to offer valuable 
insight into data analysis. For example, after Focus Group 3 the field journal 
notes: ‘heated debate between participants 3 and 4 regarding use of personal 
contacts as a form of corruption- the views here were fundamentally opposing 
and the tone of voice bordered on hostile. Clearly the topic has stimulated 
passionate discussion and dissent within the group.’ With the significant passage 
of time from the focus group being conducted several months before the data 
analysis took place, the field journal note effectively explains the unusual 
volume of discussion recorded in the transcription and emphasises the 
importance of the personal contacts topic (discussed in Example 6.1).  
Transcription and translation (applied to all examples presented in thesis 
chapters) was undertaken by the researcher alone to mitigate arising 
methodological challenges. These include ethical considerations related to hired 
transcribers, where participant responses should stay confidential, and the 
transcriber’s/translator’s potential interpretation of the data and subsequent 
omission or alteration of words and phrases (Davidson 2009). To mitigate issues 
of lack of transparency and researcher interpretation during translation of 
passages, the source text and translation produced are presented side by side in 
the thesis, as shown in Example 6.1 overleaf. While the very nature of 
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transcription is a selective process, it was important to retain transparency in 
the presentation of data this way, in order for original-language meaning to be 
preserved, increasing the validity of the analysis itself.  
The analysis followed the three pillar recommendations for enhancing the 
validity of a study involving translation: 1. Thinking and reflection processes, 2. 
The researcher acting as a translation moderator if professional translator is 
employed, 3. Not using a translator in the early stages of the project (van Nes, 
Abma et al. 2010). The first recommendation was employed throughout the 
entire process of transcription and analysis and the other two were not relevant 
concerns for the study, as these were all undertaken by one individual. To 
ensure that translation was carried out with sufficient expertise, and it was a 
fair representation of the original text, random samples of translation were 
picked out and the translation verified by a licensed translator from Slovak to 




Example 6.1 Transcription of FG3 on the topic of personal contacts as corrupt- Original language and translation. Source: Author 
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6.2.3 Basic initial data visualisation 
Once transcriptions were completed, the transcript files were uploaded onto 
NVivo12 in a Word document format. Some initial basic data analysis, primarily 
with the objective of organising thoughts within the system, was initially 
performed. The trends arising were identified during data collection and 
transcription, based on having manually noticed these in the role of interviewer 
and transcriber/translator. For illustration, these included:  
• the general perception of the public that corruption in health care is rampant, 
• the understanding of corruption not only in financial terms of bribes, but a broader 
reach into exchange of services or use of contacts,  
• the idea of corruption being equivalent to ‘arranging’ a deal and similar. 
These themes were reflected upon in later stages of the analysis. The process of 
analysis and categorisation was enhanced by taking these initial themes and 
predicted categories of data and converting them into mind maps in NVivo12, 
which served as a helpful initial visualisation of the main idea and its 
subsections. The mind map function was also able to add overarching, ‘floating’ 
ideas that apply to all subcategories in a contextual manner, as seen in Example 
6.2 overleaf. Here, based on existing literature outlined in Literature Review 
Part 1 of the thesis, the definitions of corruption are divided into two main 
categories:  
• an understanding based on a monetary exchange for an unfair advantage  
• an understanding based on the exchange of goods depending on social custom and 
convention, such as gifts or favours, for an unfair advantage.  
The financial understanding did seem to be prevalent from initial immersion into 
data and it was therefore depicted as a floating idea in the mind map. However, 
the existing literature on informal networks (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017) 
and blat (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000) does emphasise the role of connections, 
use of contacts and immaterial informal exchanges of goods or services. 
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Therefore, both definitions extracted from the respondent answers also have an 
anchoring in theory. 
NVivo12 allowed for this mind map to be converted into ‘nodes’, whilst 
maintaining the hierarchy depicted- i.e., one central node and several ‘child’ 
nodes, or subsections. Categorisation was initiated on a very intuitive and 
efficient basis, utilising the helpful tool of visualisation in the beginning stages 
of the process.  
 
Example 6.2 Example 
of a mind map 
constructed from 




Basic visualisation offered by NVivo12 included other useful visual tools, for 
example the word frequency search tool, as seen in Example 6.3 overleaf. A 
simple word frequency search within all the files uploaded revealed some of the 
shortcomings of NVivo12, which did not recognise prepositions or short words 
such as articles or conjunctions ‘and’ ‘but’ to be excluded, but put them in the 
forefront of the search. Since there were realistically at least a hundred of these 
to begin with, a more specific query had to be run, excluding these words. Even 
then, some words like ‘something’ (in the centre of Example 6.3 overleaf) would 
make it into the centre of the word frequency cloud- its size and proximity to 
the center indicating its prevalence.  
However, as shown in Example 6.3, some initial useful trends can be depicted by 
the word frequency cloud even despite its shortcomings. Example 6.3 shows a 
word frequency search within one specific node that related to all mentions and 
understandings of the definitions of corruption. The second biggest word 
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highlighted in white, ‘peniaze’, is translated literally as ‘money’, which 
indicated that the original floating idea of ‘Mostly financial understanding’ in 
Example 6.2, was not far off the verbal representation of corruption 
understanding by the respondents. However, there are several words that allude 
to finances within the word search, such as ‘všimné’ which can loosely be 
translated as ‘notice money’ or derivations of the word ‘peniaze’ such as 
‘peňažné’ or finances, ‘financie’ or derivations thereof, such as ‘finančné’. This 
occurred even after the option of ‘words derived from the original’ was selected 
in NVivo12, and this indicated that the software might not be as adept at picking 
these out in the original language, as it might have been in English. The trend 
should therefore theoretically be even more prominent than depicted in 
Example 6.3 overleaf. A level of manual analysis had to therefore be employed 
to accommodate for this - the most obvious case here with relation to both 
Example 6.2 and Example 6.3 would be the seemingly small presence of other 
corruption definitions based on service exchange or gifts. In the wordcloud 
however, while this presence may seem small, there are at least six words that 
allude to the exchange of service- all derivations of the word ‘service’ služba, 
protislužba, protislužbu, službu, službou, protislužbou. The variations here can 
easily be explained through grammatical categories and cases, rather than any 
semantical difference of meaning and for the purposes of the research these are 
all identical in meaning- and in real terms they should therefore look bigger and 
be closer to the centre. It was therefore important to be able to manually 
ammalgamate these and similar cases of words with identical meaning and their 
frequency of use, to produce an accurate image of understanding and trends 
arising from the data. 
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Example 6.3 Example of a word frequency search within the 'Definitions' node, set at 50 
words, translations embedded in red by author, Source: Author 
 
6.3 Coding 
The approach to coding was manual at the beginning, once transcripts were 
printed out and collated, and later utilised the NVivo12 software for greater 
analytical robustness and creation of categories and themes out of existing 
codes/nodes. Coding was utilised from transcriptions of whole in-depth 
interviews and focus groups, because such units of text are deemed to be whole 
enough and small enough to be kept in the mind of the researcher as a ‘context 
for meaning’ (Graneheim and Lundman 2004). The general progression of the 
coding process followed a pattern of three steps: 1. Generating many codes that 
reflect only the data (open-coding/indexing), 2. Culling the list of codes and 
deleting some and combining others, 3. If applicable, connecting the data to 
previous research and including theories and/or concepts (Charmaz 2006).  
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As for the definition of codes themselves, I followed a combination of practical 
definitions as laid out by existing literature (Dey 1993, Seidel and Kelle 1995). 
Codes are understood as tags or labels for allocating units of meaning to the 
information at hand, attached to varying sizes of phrasing, words and sentences. 
Codes are in that sense examples of phenomena tagged under specific labels to 
be able to detect commonalities, differences or patterns and are able to be re-
named, re-evaluated and re-coded during the iterative process of coding. The 
terminology of Tesch (1990) who thinks of coding and qualitative analysis as a 
‘data condensation’ or a ‘data distillation’ process was of particular relevance to 
me, as the vast amount of material to tackle required reducing the data to 
manageable tags and categories. Data reduction is not only recommended but in 
fact a necessary part of qualitative analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994) and 
facilitates return to textual material and its revision to ensure that the created 
categories are well-defined. 
6.3.1 Open-coding and indexing 
At the very start of transcription, in order to aid the initial coding process, it 
was important that uniform naming of files was employed to facilitate 
organisation of information and also subsequent upload to software. For me 
these were always ‘Transcript INTNumber/ Transcript ELITENumber/ Transcript 
FGNumber’ in a chronological manner of fieldwork taking place. The respondents 
were given respondent IDs and these ranged from ‘INTNumber.Number/ 
ELITENumber.Number/FGNumber.Number’. All this information was also stored 
in an encrypted Excel file which contained demographic information on the 
participants as well and later helped in the addition of attributes to NVivo12. 
These attributes were very useful and robust in creating matrices and cross 
tabulations for analysis and gave a basic idea of frequency of answers to a 
specific node with regards to demographic categories. The demographic 
information is laid out in Figure 6.4 overleaf with names removed to facilitate 
confidentiality and anonymity. Such early organisation of data particulars then 






Figure 6.4 Anonymised details of participant demographics and IDs. Source: Author 
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The initial stages of coding were rudimentary in principle and included manually 
going over the transcripts, re-reading them and generating understanding and 
concepts present in the data- what is sometimes referred to as identifying the 
main ‘stories’ of the data (Deterding and Waters 2018). These initial ‘index’ 
codes helped me create as accurate and broad a picture as possible of the 
themes that were addressed by the questions asked and identified some initial 
trends arising. I was conscious of not artificially looking for exceptions to arising 
topics and trends. In other words, it was not the sheer number of exceptions 
that was important, but their ability to offer additional insight and ‘colour’ into 
the majority responses. 
In line with the essence of open coding, i.e., taking down broad codes and 
headings/notes in the text while reading, several codes were identified early in 
reading through data, as shown in the randomly selected Examples 6.4-6.7 in 
yellow circles overleaf. It is obvious here that in the initial stages of index 
coding there is a wide variation of codes that pertain to similar topics: for 
example, ‘Personal contact use’ in Elite2 open coding and ‘Contacts worse than 
financial [corruption]’ in Elite1 open coding, or a simple ‘contacts’ in later 
stages of Elite1 open coding. Similarly, in Elite2 the index code is ‘grand v. petty 
connected’ and in Elite1 simply ‘grand v petty’. It was important for me to be 
able to record the different  nuances in the initial stage of coding, so that I 
would be able to return to the original data reading later on and verify that 









Example 6.6 Open coding on Elite2, Source: Author Example 6.7 Open coding on Elite2, Source: Author 
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For these initial codes that were later converted into nodes when using the 
software, it is apparent in Example 6.8 that both parent nodes of contacts and 
grand v petty corruption were, first, renamed from my hand-written notes and, 
second, contain several subcategories within which greater detail is sourced. 
Another advantage of using software like NVivo12 is the ability to code a single 
passage under several nodes and thus be able to convey more of its meaning and 
context during analysis. 
 
Example 6.8 List of nodes in NVivo12, Source: Author 
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6.3.2 Distilling codes 
Once the initial index coding was completed, I uploaded the word doc. files into 
NVivo12 which ordered them neatly into the files section, as seen in Example 
6.9. From the position of files, electronic coding could commence with the help 
of some initial visualisation and mind maps, as outlined in the previous section, 
and a list of parent nodes was created gradually, as seen in Example 6.10.  
  
Example 6.9 Text files of Transcripts in 
NVivo12, Source: Author 
Example 6.10 Parent nodes in NVivo12, 
Source: Author 
 
The creation, refinement, renaming and revision of both the parent and child 
nodes took place over several days and weeks until this stage was reached. The 
reason for this was continuous reflexive activity, rather than just premeditation, 
because codes change and develop during the course of the process. Some codes 
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can flourish into several subcodes (child nodes) and some will need to be 
absorbed by others due to their re-coding. Many segments were coded in several 
nodes and it is difficult to keep track of the boundaries of each segment which 
become very easily de-contextualised when looking at a summary of references 
in one node only, as seen in Example 6.11. It was therefore important to make 
sure that I was continuously returning to the original data and was making 
annotations within the system to re-contextualise the individual segments and 
see them as a part of a whole again (Tesch 1990, Miles and Huberman 1994).  
 
Example 6.11 Example of text de-contextualised within Petty and Grand node, Source: 
Author 
 
Following the coding process, which was ongoing and continuously revised, true 
to the principle of qualitative analysis being an iterative process, it was 
necessary to assign attributes to my individual participants. Assigning attributes 
such as age, gender or occupation provided for a more robust utilisation of 
NVivo12, which was then capable of producing matrices and picking out trends 
as far as frequency of answers was concerned. In order to assign attributes, I 
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first had to convert the list of ‘files’ into a list of ‘cases’ which were then 
capable of taking on attributes. Each case was assigned demographic attributes 
as seen in Example 6.12.  
 
Example 6.12 Example of attributes assigned to a case in NVivo12, Source: Author 
 
The ability to cross tabulate between nodes or cases and individual attributes 
then produced some valuable results and trends, as seen in Example 6.13 
overleaf. Here, for example, I cross tabulated the child nodes relating to the use 
of personal contacts with the education levels of respondents. It is clear that a 
vast majority of university-educated respondents believes that use of personal 
contacts is a form of corruption, as opposed to the opposite. 
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Example 6.13 Example of a node cross tabulated with education levels, Source: Author 
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6.3.3 Coding challenges 
The most obvious challenge when coding interviews and focus groups is the 
nature of the narrative material. As this material is not in its nature linear, the 
material will contain elements relevant to several categories and it requires 
time, vigilance, and vast amounts of revision and reflexivity to make sure that 
all material is coded under all relevant codes. I often felt uncertain with my 
labelling of codes and indexing and because qualitative analysis is always 
tailored to its specific project, there was not much material for comparison of 
my processes with another that I could find. I returned to and revised my 
wording and labels multiple times, and this resulted in a lot of node and 
category revision and renaming. While a level of tolerance with feeling uncertain 
during coding is generally admissible and required (Glaser 1978), it needs to be 
countered by returning to the data to check the reliability of codes and ensuing 
categories.  
The lack of standardised processes is another shortcoming of conducting content 
analysis (Polit and Beck 2004). There is generally not any linear model to follow 
with this type of analysis and therefore high levels of organisation, reflection, 
and keeping track of one’s own processes was required. I also had to undergo a 
period of time re-teaching myself a lot of the skills required to work with the 
software effectively. At the same time, it was important not to abandon the 
traditional manual handling of the data and I found it especially useful to keep 
returning to and re-reading the data to re-familiarise myself with the context of 
what was being coded. Whilst I found this to be incredibly time-consuming, I 
considered it necessary to ensure the results produced were as reliable as 
possible.  
Finally, I discovered when assigning attributes to the individual cases, that 
NVivo12 does not automatically discern between individual respondents in one 
document, which was particularly problematic with Focus Group transcriptions, 
which contained several respondents in one file. In order not to lose the context 
of their responses, I had to initially code from focus group files containing all 
participants. However, for these responses to be given their individual voice and 
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attributes, I then had to split all Focus Group transcripts into several files 
containing only the de-contextualised responses of each respondent individually. 
This ensured I could assign attributes to each case, and I could re-code the same 
responses I had already coded from the contextualised group file, subsequently 
deleting the group codes to avoid duplication of content. That way I was able to 
code with context and with attributes as well- although this proved a laborious 
and a time-consuming process. The impact on the final coding was reflected 
both in the codebook where the number of references per node were more 
representative of the individual participants, but also within nodes themselves 
and the percentage of coverage per reference within a transcript. In the node 
‘Examples’, for example, before disaggregation of Focus Group references, the 
coverage per FG1 with all its participants seen as one was 32.36% of the entire 
transcript. After disaggregation, for participant FG1.5, for example, the 
coverage of 4 references represented 25.04% of coverage. It is therefore obvious 
here that the ‘examples’ references per this one participant constitute quite a 
large part of the participant’s entire discourse, over a quarter of their responses 
relate to them. It also points to the fact that not all participants will have 
contributed in the same magnitude per node: for example, for participant FG1.3 
this was only 7.14% percent of coverage and for participant FG1.2, who was 
otherwise mostly quiet with short responses, the percentage was 19.56% of 
coverage. The disaggregation therefore provided a valuable way to stay true to 
the discourse recorded and ensuring that the voices of the participants were 
given the authenticity of representation that they deserve.  
To make sure that the process did not omit any nodes in the re-coding, I 
exported both the codebook (a summary that NVivo produces of all nodes and 
codes and their summative numbers) and all nodes in their entirety pre and post 
coding. This meant exporting each node as a word doc file as well as a pdf 
before and after the coding of focus groups was disaggregated into individual 
files. I then printed both sets and was able to compare the numbers in each code 
book and also the nodes themselves in their content. This was also a very useful 
thing to do for the following creation of categories as I was able to manually 
annotate the printed files and jot down initial thoughts of which nodes to 
potentially amalgamate into a category and ultimately a theme before creating 
further mind maps in NVivo. 
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6.4 Creating categories and identifying themes 
 
Creation of categories is where the debate about inductive and deductive 
content analysis became particularly relevant. It has been established that the 
labels of inductive and deductive content analysis are at best artificial and 
overly simplistic- as both approaches contain elements of one another (Armat, 
Sharifi et al. 2018). It is instead more useful to think of the chosen analysis 
method as inductive or deductive-dominant, but with elements of the other 
method included. My analysis was from this perspective inductive-dominant, as 
there were already research questions present, study aims and some pertinent 
theoretical assumptions to direct my inquiry extracted from literature (Armat, 
Sharifi et al. 2018). Extracting meaningful content, however, is a feature of 
deductive or ‘directed’ reasoning as well, which is why the blended approach is 
necessary and unavoidable.  
In light of this, the creation of categories was two-fold. Using inductive 
reasoning, some categories presented themselves through interpretation quite 
organically and were semantically congruent with a lot of the parent nodes, but 
some emerged unexpectedly (Dey 1993). The analysis and creation of categories 
was reinforced in some instances by analysing a notorious, public health care 
forum, Modrý koník (modrykonik.sk). I found several instances of referring to the 
idea of ‘gratitude payments’ (poďakovanie) or ‘attention payments’ (pozornosť) 
or even ‘reward’ (odmena), as seen in the headings within Examples 6.14-6.16 
overleaf. It was therefore obvious that the node ‘Corruption vs token of 
gratitude’ was well-identified and there was an element of terminology 
congruence with what the anonymous fora have offered. The transition of codes 
into categories was not always this straightforward and I had to make sure that 
exceptions were recorded as well as trends. However, it was obvious that 
textual analysis into the nuances of the original language was going to produce 
some valuable results for this region. Clearly the word ‘corruption’ is avoided in 
everyday vernacular and one coping mechanism for the participants, and the 
populace as a whole, appeared to be the search for a more socially acceptable 






Example 6.14 Forum 'Small attentive payment to 
an 82-year-old doctor', Source: Modrykonik.sk 
Example 6.15 Forum 'What should I give the doctor 
as a token of gratitude?', Source: Modrykonik.sk 
Example 6.16 Forum 'Reward for a doctor after 
surgery', Source: Modrykonik.sk 
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For other categories, these remained more descriptive and specific. In contrast, 
the themes arising from them became more abstract in their outlook. Following 
the diagram set out in the beginning in Figure 6.3, and following the process 
outlined by Green et al (2007), the nodes formed the foundation layer of a 
pyramid hierarchy, which then distilled into categories, which ultimately 
distilled into abstract themes. The nodes in Example 6.8 were revised with 
regards to their levels and the node ‘corruption vs token of gratitude’, which 
was originally a child node was moved to top level node upon revision of its 
volume and significance in conjunction with internet fora. Similarly, the node 
‘examples’ which was previously a child node was assigned top level node 
position, due to its significance outside of mere definitions of corruption. 
Several nodes were also re-named, for example ‘Time scale importance’ became 
‘Time scale of giving’ and ‘Sceptical that it [corruption] gets looked at’ became 
a much more concise ‘Scepticism’ which carried enough meaning under its 
parent node ‘Reporting corruption’. The nodes in their entirety and hierarchy 
ultimately stood as follows:  
• Definitions of corruption 
• Corruption vs token of gratitude 




• General perception of corruption 
o Neighbours comparison 
• Mechanism of corruption 
• Media scandals 
• Most likely occurrences of 
corruption 
• Patient or doctor 
o Patient initiates 
o Doctor initiates 
• Personal contacts 
o They are corrupt 
o They are not corrupt 
• Petty and Grand 
o Address separately 
o Distinction 
o Link between them 
o Which is worse 
 
• Reasons for corruption in Slovakia 
o Bureaucracy 
o Culture norm 
o Deficiency of services 
o Lack of morals 
o Legislative deficiencies 
o Low living standard 
o Mentality of people 
o Soviet legacy 
• Reporting corruption 
o Scepticism 
o Unlikely to report 
o Where to report 
• Scenarios 
• Systemic change 
o Change bottom-up 
o Change top-bottom 
o Combination of both 
• Trust 
• Where is corruption most frequent 
o GP 




These nodes (especially the child nodes) would represent the bottom layer of 
coding and would be merged through content similarity into categories, and 
these ultimately merged into themes. For example, the nodes ‘examples’ along 
with the node ‘patient or doctor’ both refer to the practical execution of 
corruption from different vantage points and could be grouped under the 
category ‘Carrying out corruption’. The established category of ‘Gratitude 
payments’ discussed above, which consists of its child nodes and is large enough 
to stand on its own, could be merged with the category ‘Common corrupt 
practices’, which combines nodes: ‘contacts’, ‘mechanism of corruption’, and 
‘most likely occurrences of corruption’. Ultimately, merging these two 
categories meant arriving at a theme of ‘Justification of corruption in Slovak 
discourse’. This example of construction of categories and themes is illustrated 
in Figure 6.5 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Example of creating categories and identifying themes from initial coding and 
nodes, Source: Author 
 
The rest of the thesis will present analysis of data under the extracted 
categories and will ultimately present the identified themes in its discussion, 
alongside recommendations on further tackling of corruption, as seen, 
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investigated, and understood using the case study of Slovakia’s healthcare 
sector. 
 
Chapter 7: Creating Categories 
 
The goal of this section is to provide a comprehensive overview of the creation 
of categories from nodes and their relevance to addressing the research 
questions. First, a broad analysis utilising the quantitative properties of NVivo is 
presented, such as cross tabulations and matrices, to provide for a basic 
visualisation of trends and discourse arising from interviews and focus groups 
respectively. These serve as a valuable and visually friendly general overview of 
the data trends that led to the creation of categories and provide insight into 
the success of the methods in eliciting content. The section then goes on to 
outline the rationale behind the grouping of nodes under categories, which then 
comprise the rest of the thesis as sections under their individual headings.  
The individual categories are presented in the order that they follow in the rest 
of the thesis and Table 7.1 overleaf provides a comprehensive overview of all 
research questions and categories that address them respectively. The category 
diagrams in section 7.3 of this chapter repeatedly refer back to Table 7.1.  
From Table 7.1 several categories address each research question and its 
hypothesis/theoretical assumption.   For some categories this was a transparent 
choice, for example RQ3a alludes to trust specifically and therefore the category 
which contains the node ‘Trust’ had to be selected. However, the addition of 
‘Health care corrupt practices’ to this grouping for example, is due to the 
similarities between the two categories, rather than a direct connection of the 
latter category to the RQ3a. Similarly, at first glance at the nodes tree, it might 
appear as if RQ3 would be answered perfectly just by allocating it the lone node 
of ‘Mechanism of corruption’. However, from approaching the data with an open 
mind and by first grouping together the similarities based strictly on the 
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principle of repetition, recurrence and forcefulness of content, this RQ has now 
been given the additional dimensions of ‘Personal contacts’, ‘Systemic change’, 
‘Trust’ and ‘Most likely occurrences of corruption’ along with their child nodes. 
Allocating nodes too early would have risked the RQ3 missing out on the 
additional dimensions provided by the rest of the nodes under one category. The 
possible addressing of the RQ3 has therefore been enriched by parts of the 
participant discourse that may not have been obvious at the start, but which 
arose organically from the transcripts.  
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Research Question (RQ) Hypotheses or Theoretical 
assumptions 
Categories addressing RQs 
Overarching research question (RQ): To what 
extent is the theoretical difference between 
grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-
life understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s 
health care? 
 General perceptions of corruption 
Reasoning and reporting 
Petty v Grand 
Common corrupt practices 
Gratitude payments 
Health care corrupt practices 
RQ1: How does awareness of grand corruption 
inform/justify individual engagement in petty 
corruption? 
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption will 
have no impact on the engagement of 
individuals in petty corruption and vice 
versa.  
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption 
will inform/justify individual 
engagement in petty corruption. 
Petty v Grand 
Gratitude payments 
Common corrupt practices 
Reasoning and Reporting 
RQ2: How does awareness of petty corruption 
inform/justify individual engagement in grand 
corruption? 
H0b: Awareness of grand corruption 
will have no impact on the engagement 
of individuals in petty corruption and 
vice versa. 
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption will 
inform/justify individual engagement in 
grand corruption.  
 
Petty v Grand 
Gratitude payments 
Common corrupt practices 
Reasoning and Reporting 
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RQ3: What are the strategies utilised to carry out 
grand and petty corrupt practices? 
Theoretical assumption: There will be 
similarities in the strategies utilised to 
carry out grand and petty corrupt 
practices. 
Common corrupt practices 
Health care corrupt practices 
General perceptions of corruption 
Gratitude payments 
Petty v Grand 
RQ3a- subquestion: What is the significance of 
trust as a pre-requisite for corrupt interactions? 
Theoretical assumption: Trust is 
understood as one of the processes of 
corruption that links the corrupt 
practices on grand and petty levels; as 
such it is seen as a condition more 
often than it is understood as a result 
of corrupt practice. 
Health care corrupt practices 
Common corrupt practices 
RQ3b- subquestion: To what extent are social 
rules and customs important in the carrying out 
of corrupt practices? 
Theoretical assumption: Social rules 
and customs are understood as one of 
the processes of corruption that links 
corrupt practices on grand and petty 
levels; as such they will prove as 
important determinants in carrying out 
corrupt practices. 
Common corrupt practices 
Health care corrupt practices 
Gratitude payments 
Table 7.1 Research questions and categories created to address them, Source: Author 
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All the categories will have ultimately enjoyed a similar level of enriching an 
initially skeletal set of ideas, shaped and padded out into a more complete body 
of answers, by following the principles of good practice for data collection, as 
well as thematic data analysis. It is this unexpected pairing of complex views 
that can come together with the help of qualitative analysis and its unique 
flexibility. 
Therefore, it is clear that the dataset itself has ended up dictating the necessary 
way of addressing the initial theoretical assumptions arising from literature. 
There must be a level of flexibility and researcher reflexivity when joining up 
the assumptions with the dataset. The process began with identifying the 
questions and assumptions from literature, continued by devising individual 
interview questions to provide insight into these broader theoretical problems 
(Appendix 3), went on to distil similarities, recurrences and repetitions of 
information to code the responses (nodes), and has now arrived at the point 
where these similarities are grouped based on their relationship with one 
another into categories. Matching these categories to the original step of 
identifying questions and assumptions from literature is a useful way of re-





7.1 Codebook data 
 
The codebook is automatically generated by NVivo as a summary of all nodes and 
number of files43 and references attached to them and serves as an overview tool 
for the information and trends gathered. Upon disaggregation of nodes from 
Focus Groups into individual participant transcript files, as described in section 
6.3.3, it was clear from the codebook generated (see Appendix 1) that some 
nodes got significantly more content in than others.  
The reasons behind the node content variation are twofold. First, the 
participants reacting in greater detail to some questions than others (and this is 
useful to note for any future research conducted into the topic) meant that 
some themes got more attention than others in their narrative. Secondly, the 
coding process initially presumed that some sections will be relevant for one 
node only, but they ultimately applied to several nodes, which inflated the 
content of some themes explored. As a result, the node with the greatest 
number of references ended up being the ‘General perceptions of corruption’ 
node with over 120 references. Other nodes with a large number of references 
attached to them were the ‘Corruption vs token of gratitude’ node with 61; 
‘Definitions of corruption’ with 61; ‘Examples’, ‘Personal contacts’ and ‘Soviet 
legacies’ with over 50; and it is also worth mentioning ‘Deficiency of services’, 
‘Mentality of people’, and ‘Systemic change’, which all scored over 40 
references. I expected the nodes relating to examples and definitions of 
corruption to elicit this amount of content mainly because they are difficult to 
conceptualise and require more narrative. However, themes relating to Soviet 
legacies or mentality of people being the root cause of corruption, as well as use 
of personal contacts in a corrupt context, were also expected to elicit a lot of 
 
43 For the sake of clarity, it is important to point out that the NVivo terminology of ‘file’, ‘case’ and 
our understanding of ‘participant’ is synonymous. In NVivo the individual participant transcripts 
are imported as ‘files’ and can be converted to ‘cases’ just for the purpose of allocating 
attributes for analysis. These are however always to be understood as material expressed by 
the participant. 
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content due to their controversial nature. Based on the regional idiosyncrasies 
relating to gift giving and networking, as well as the Soviet past of the country, 
the theoretical expectation was that these themes would generate lively debate 
and contentious narratives. Among the weakest nodes with single digits or very 
low double digits worth of references were the following: ‘Bureaucracy’ (7), 
‘Combination of both [bottom-up and top-bottom systemic change]’ (6), ‘Trust’ 
(11), ‘GP’ (10), ‘Change top-bottom’ (10), ‘Change bottom-top’ (12). These 
nodes probably have less content coded because not everyone may have had 
experience with bureaucracy to the extent of being able to speak about it at 
length and also because concepts of trust in corruption, as well as specifics 
about systemic change may be more challenging to address than others, which 
may have resulted in lesser engagement with these themes. 
 
However, it is worth noting here that the number of references coded against a 
node by itself may be misleading. Some nodes show several participants 
engaging with the node, even if the content is less dense. For example, 10 files 
for 10 references in ‘Change top-bottom’ shows that ten participants engaged 
with the theme with a single comment. A quarter of participants (10 files per 10 
references) reacted to the ‘Change top-bottom’, which is not to be deemed 
insignificant with this number of participants. Therefore, it is important to 
emphasise that the content generated should be considered in context of the 
number of participants who engaged with a theme. 
Only a few low-scoring nodes had fewer number of files associated in comparison 
to the number of references extracted: ‘Bureaucracy’ with 5 files to 7 
references and ‘Scenarios’ with 4 files to 8 references. Here it is fair to observe 
that only very few participants engaged with the particular question/theme 
raised and for the case of ‘Scenarios’ this is doubly relevant. The respondent 
engagement was dissatisfactory with this in the first 10 respondents 
(respondents tended to close up and offer no or very short insights after it) and 
the question (number 11 in Appendix 3) was subsequently cut to allow for 
maximum levels of engagement with the rest of the questions for future 
participants. The conclusion drawn by my field journal at the time was that the 
examples chosen for the scenarios (as seen in Appendix 3) were perhaps too 
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realistic and eliciting levels of shame and discomfort for the participants, who 
then shifted their body language to crossed arms and/or leaned backwards and 
became much less verbose in their subsequent responses.  
 
7.2 Interviews and Focus groups node cross tabulations 
7.2.1 Interviews and Focus groups 
For a more in-depth perspective of frequency and volume of responses, a simple 
cross tabulation between all nodes and all cases within NVivo was conducted in 
the software itself (see Appendix 2). This cross tabulation provides a simple but 
effective overview of the trends of responses by logging the number of responses 
against a node under the respective case (participant).  
The data extracted from the codebook is consistent in the ‘Total’ column at the 
end of this cross tabulation too, which sums up the number of responses per 
node. The cross tabulation, as opposed to the codebook, gives more detailed 
information. It shows the total of all responses per case (participant) and thus 
indicates which participants engaged more with the whole interview and also 
specifically with particular questions. It can provide insight into the 
effectiveness of interviews versus focus groups as far as eliciting depth of 
response and level of detail. As always with these qualitative cross tabulations, 
it is necessary to bear in mind that NVivo is not sophisticated enough to 
recognise duplication of content- ie several excerpts of text may apply to 
several nodes. It is therefore important to view the following results as merely 
indications of trends, as it is possible that the total numbers are artificially 
inflated by the coding process.  
From the Codes v nodes tabulation, several interesting comparisons arise. The 
participant (case) with the largest number of references coded is INT1 with 72 
coded in total. Participant FG4.4 is a close second with 66 and there are several 
more participants with scores in the high 50s: FG4.1 with 52, FG4.2 with 59, 
INT2 with 58 and INT13 with 53. Participants with the lowest number of 
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references are FG1.1 with 2, FG2.3 with 1, FG3.7 with 2 and FG1.7 with 5. This 
is indicative of the participants engaging less with the verbalising of their 
thoughts in focus groups, but from memory and the field journal, many of them 
preferred to listen and would communicate through body language such as nods 
or onomatopoeic responses, which are impossible to note on the transcript in 
real time. It is also possible that one of the overall effects of focus groups, as 
discussed in previous chapters, can indeed be participant intimidation. This is 
why participants were given the option of following up the focus group with an 
interview- which was the case, for example, for participant FG3.7, who later 
contributed via interview as ELITE7.  
It would appear from the above results that interviews have been more effective 
in eliciting responses per participant, and this confirms the theoretical 
assumption as outlined in Chapter 4 that interviews were more likely to elicit 
depth of response for sensitive topics such as corruption. Figure 7.1 overleaf 
presents the visual representation of the responses per participant in interviews 
only, as extracted using pivot table in Microsoft Excel. Figure 7.2 overleaf 
presents the same values for focus groups only. The average number of 
responses per participant is 35.36 for interviews (bearing in mind this includes 
both in-depth interviews and elite interviews) and for focus groups it is 23.42.  
 




Figure 7.2: Focus Groups: Number of responses. Source: Author 
 
Considering that there were more respondents for interviews (25) than there 
were for focus groups (19) and that some participants did indeed take part in 
both, the difference in the average is not as large as the individual participant 
figures indicate. However, for a more nuanced insight, the lowest number of 
references for Focus Groups was 1 or 2 responses per participant, whereas for 
Interviews this was 7 (which was a corrupted file and therefore only transcribed 
from memory and notes taken) and second lowest was in the low 20’s. This 
would indicate that while on average the difference between the two methods 
may seem to be of low significance, individually the difference is noticeable and 
valuable for future research method selection.  
Similar results can be observed when considering the focus groups themselves as 
a separate entity. For focus groups, FG1 of 7 participants produced 100 coded 
responses in total, FG2 with 3 participants 50 coded responses, FG3 with 7 
participants 104 coded responses, and FG4 with 4 participants 191 coded 
responses. It is obvious here as well that while on average, a focus group 
produced 111.25 responses, there is a difference of nearly 150 responses 
between the lowest and the highest-response-producing focus group. Therefore, 
there is significant variation not only between two separate methods, but also 
variation of data acquisition consistency within one method, which emphasises 
the need for a robust approach to evaluation and also a diligent approach to 
sample selection for each group. 
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Rather than focusing on the sheer numbers of averages and numerical trends, it 
is important to take into consideration the nuance of working with participants 
in focus groups, the group dynamics, and interaction levels. It is far from true 
that the more participants per group, the more fruitful the discussion- more is at 
play here. The Focus Group with participants who knew each other (FG4) and 
had only 4 taking part produced the highest number of references. 
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7.2.2 Cross tabulations 
Cross tabulations in NVivo serve as a useful tool for finding cross sections and 
trends between two or more variables of any kind. The Table 7.2 serves as 
another example of a cross tabulation and includes all attributes of the cases 
(participants) juxtaposed with all the nodes coded.  
 
Table 7.2 Cross tabulation of all nodes and all attributes. Source: Author. Red female/male ratio for node ‘They are corrupt’ ; yellow 
female/male ratio for node ‘Link between them’, blue university-educated demographic for nodes ‘Distinction’ and ‘Link between them’ 
and green university-educated demographic for nodes ‘Mentality of people’ and ‘Soviet legacy’. 
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It is obvious from the cross tabulation here that some demographic attributes 
are dominant in some nodes. However, this cannot be taken entirely at face 
value and a lot of the nodes provide merely a broad code word under which an 
excerpt is coded, as opposed to a clear binary delineation like ‘agree and 
disagree’ that would show immediate results. Some interesting trends can still 
be seen at first glance.  
RED: For example, for the node ‘They are corrupt’ which relates to the parent 
node ‘Personal contacts’ and happens to be one of a few binary pairs (coupled 
with ‘They are not corrupt’), it is obvious that females are more likely to 
consider personal contacts to be corrupt than men, with the ratio 16/10. This 
finding is explored in greater depth across the empirical chapters and remains a 
strong trend throughout when it comes to male/female ratios for tolerating 
corruption. This type of trend is consistent with previous literature which 
suggests that women tend to be more risk-averse and less tolerant of corruption 
(Dollar, Fishman et al. 2001).  
YELLOW: For the node ‘Link between them’, which refers to a link between 
petty and grand corrupt practices, women are again more likely to consider 
there to be a link, as opposed to a distinction between the two levels of 
corruption than men, with the ratio 25/14. It is important to view the results 
with an amount of perspective, as we know that there were overall more women 
than men taking part in the research, so the gender splits may be less stark than 
they appear at first glance. 
BLUE: It is equally interesting to see that 30 university-educated participants 
consider there to be a link between petty and grand corrupt practices and 19 are 
of the opinion that there is a clear distinction between the two practices. 
Knowing that the study only recruited a little over 40 participants, however, 
some views may apply to several contrasting nodes. For example, 30 and 19 
highlighted in blue in Figure 7 point towards contrasting views, but this would in 
practice constitute more participants than the study realistically recruited. 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that some participants may have presented a 
view that lends itself to both nodes, were sitting on the fence with their 
opinion, or were of the opinion that both kinds of perspective are valid.  
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GREEN: Qualitative interpretation of the data will be able to uncover the level 
of nuance under these basic computations and provide the much-needed context 
for a full interpretation of the participants’ views. In the same vein, under the 
mother node ‘Reasons for corruption in Slovakia’, the child nodes ‘Mentality of 
people’ and ‘Soviet legacy’ have acquired nearly identical number of codes of 
over 30 by university-educated participants. Again, this would constitute well 
over 60 participants if these views were not overlapping, which indicates that 
overlap is inevitable here. This further reinforces the idea that real life 
participant views are rarely black and white but require a deeper insight into the 
particular language used and circumstances described. 
This section has indicated that there is some difference between the amount 
and depth of data acquired by interviews and focus groups. This variation in 
quantity of response was anticipated when designing this research and the 
purpose of combining the two methods was primarily maximising the yield of the 
responses. Secondary to this it was also to observe the differences in the type 
and length of responses and to observe which setting provided the participants 
with the opportunity to address sensitive topics in more detail. It is difficult to 
draw any specific conclusions from as small a sample as the research was able to 
acquire. The valuable conclusion here is, however, that both methods performed 
their objective and elicited different types of responses without one being 
superior to the other in quality. The key to a successful and qualitatively rich 
data collecting exercise, endorsed by my experience on this project, is 
development of good rapport of researcher with the participants, within a 
group, and the willingness of participants to share and elaborate on their views.  
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7.3 Collating nodes under categories 
 
Having investigated the varied nature of content produced by interviews and 
focus groups, this section outlines the rationale behind grouping the existing 
content into categories, as outlined in Chapter 6 to be the next step after coding 
(Green, Willis et al. 2007). The six categories presented below in sections 7.3.1 
to 7.3.6 are comprised of the nodes presented in Chapter 6 in full and can also 
be viewed in full and in their original hierarchy of parent and child nodes in 
Appendix 1. They are presented in their order of appearance going forward to 
the empirical part of the thesis. It is important to emphasise that the main 
connection of the categories is therefore content-based. This is established 
practice of conducting research using thematic analysis with the principles of 
recurrence, repetition and forcefulness in mind (Owen 1984).  
The nodes are presented trying to maintain the original levels of hierarchy of 
parent and child nodes. However, the nodes which received the highest number 
of references have been coloured in red to account for their robustness (these 
are all nodes with 40+ references)44, as opposed to the less content-dominant 
nodes which remained in green (less than 40 references). The objective behind 
this colour-coded presentation of categories is to help visualise the hierarchy of 
the nodes as they relate to the category, but also to point out their robustness, 
which sometimes over-rides their original status. For example, in 7.3.6 in Figure 
13, the child nodes of ‘Reasons for corruption in Slovakia’ actually have 
significantly more references attached to them than their parent node, which 
indicates their superiority in relation to the category. Nearly all six categories 
include at least one red node, of which there are 9, which suggests a fairly even 
spread of dominant nodes across categories.  
 
44 One node in 7.3.3 is coloured in orange as also quite significant with only two less references 
than two very strong nodes in red 
241 
7.3.1 Gratitude payments 
 
Figure 7.3 Visual presentation of the category Gratitude payments. The bright blue bubble 
represents the category, the red box represents node with a high number of references 
and green box represents node with a moderate to low number of references. Source: 
Author 
 
This category is unique in its small composition of nodes, containing only one 
parent and its child node. However, when reading through participant responses, 
I felt that the category must be able to stand on its own not only because it 
received such a large number of references (61), but because of the unique and 
varied content presented within the responses. There were several recurring 
examples given by the participants that related to the type of material or 
immaterial gifts that are to be considered as tokens of gratitude, as opposed to 
bribes (bottles of wine, sausages, flowers, coffee, chocolates, tickets etc). 
There were also indications of a strong difference between perceptions of gift 
giving before and after the desired service took place, which justified a creation 
of another node during the coding process. The participants also alluded to their 
understanding of the law and its take on bribes, which is then juxtaposed with 
the actual legal statutes I was able to consult. Finally, the category bears strong 
endorsement from the analysis of randomly selected online healthcare fora that 
related to this topic (see section 6.4). It was easy to search for these fora using 
buzzwords such as ‘gratitude payments’ ‘what to give to a doctor’, ‘best doctor 
gift’ and similar. The responses from the healthcare fora, combined with the 
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responses of the participants, reinforced the instinctual pull for the category to 
stand on its own. It related directly to RQ1, RQ2 in its discussion of bribes and 
tokens of gratitude and to some extent also to RQ3 and sub question RQ3b. To 
the extent that it also spoke about normalised practices, the category provided 
relevant content for the overarching RQ (see all in Table 7.1). 
 
7.3.2 General perceptions of corruption 
 
Figure 7.4 Visual presentation of the category General perceptions of corruption. The 
bright blue bubble represents the category, the red boxes represent nodes with a high 
number of references and green boxes represent nodes with a moderate to low number of 
references. Source: Author 
 
This category combines together the perceptions of corruption that the 
participants presented in the data collection process, and also nodes that 
related to what shapes one’s awareness of corruption. The ‘Scenarios’ node and 
‘Media scandals’ node were of smaller size in terms of references coded against 
them (8 and 28 respectively), but still presented with the potential to add 
another dimension to the general perception of corruption. For example, several 
participants alluded to not feeling ‘surprised’ at the media presenting yet 
another grand corruption scandal and there were also elements of language such 
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as ‘disappointed’ or ‘disillusioned’. On the other hand, the Scenarios question 
elicited feelings of shame and helplessness, as well as a desire to be able to help 
those who cannot benefit from corrupt practices in healthcare. As contrasting 
views, these two nodes reveal the sceptical but also the vulnerable dimension to 
the perceptions of corruption. If presented alone, the perceptions under the 
node ‘General perceptions of corruption’ would otherwise lack this dimension. 
The comparison of these elements of personal outlook juxtaposed with those of 
a more civic outlook of the participants as members of society make for an 
interesting debate and analysis. Furthermore, the node ‘Neighbours comparison’ 
tended to portray views that had a tendency to temper the overtly negative 
outlook of some participants, alluding to Slovakia ‘not doing too badly’ or 
‘probably on the same level as the Czechs’, which helped mitigate the negative, 
biased outlook of a lot of participants coming into the debate on corruption. 
Lastly, the ‘Definitions of corruption’ node was helpful as it allowed the 
participants to set their own parameters of what they believe corruption is 
before these beliefs were probed by my following questions. This initial outlining 
of what corruption is according to them helped me create a more complete 
picture of where their particular perceptions of corruption really lie in their 
minds and in their socio-economically conditioned outlooks. As such, all 
mentioned nodes in this section were intertwined in their content when stripped 
down to its core, addressed the following question: What do the participants 
think the status quo of corruption is in Slovakia and how does it make them 
feel/think about corruption in their own language and understanding? The 
category therefore directly relates to the overarching research question, as well 
as RQ3 (see Table 7.1).  
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7.3.3 Reasoning and reporting of corruption 
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This category combines the recurring ideas generated by participant responses 
about possible causes of corrupt behaviour in Slovakia, with their opinions on the 
likelihood of the populace reporting corruption. The repetition of content here 
was easy to spot through participants using buzzwords such as ‘mentality’, ‘it is 
within people’, ‘our inheritance’, ‘it’s normal here’, ‘low salaries’ and so on. As 
is obvious from the nodes coded, the overwhelming recurrence of the negative 
response to whether one would, according to my respondents, report corruption, 
is obvious. The child nodes here merely delineate the motives behind not 
reporting. Together these two parent nodes and their child nodes create a 
comprehensive category that addresses both the perceived causes of corruption 
and the knock-on effect of these on the perceived willingness to report 
corruption to the authorities and by proxy the trust of the participants in the 
authorities. The category will be relevant for the overarching RQ, as well as 
RQ3a on the role of trust and RQ1 and 2 as well with their interest in how 
awareness of separate levels of corruption impacts on behaviour (see Table 7.1). 
The floating idea of systemic change is also relevant here, as it complements the 
reasoning of participants not to report corruption.  
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7.3.4 Petty v Grand corruption 
 
Figure 7.6 Visual presentation of the category Petty v Grand. The bright blue bubble 
represents the category, the red box represents node with a high number of references, 
and green boxes represent nodes with a moderate to low number of references. Source: 
Author 
 
This category stands on its own as a representation of two different conceptual 
approaches to a similar label. Both parent nodes associated with the category 
look at petty v grand corruption in different viewpoints of recurring content. 
One addresses it on an abstract level and deals with the participants’ views on 
whether in theory there should be a distinction between petty and grand 
corruption, which of them is more detrimental to society, and whether solutions 
should in theory come as part and parcel of one approach or a completely 
separate set of approaches. On another level, the category then takes this 
theoretical conception of participants and their views and directly juxtaposes 
the participants’ own given examples of what constitutes petty and grand 
corruption in practice. It is obvious that this category will be most relevant for 
addressing RQs 1 and 2 which specifically relate to the difference between grand 
and petty corruption (see Table 7.1) but will have relevance for elements of 
other RQs as well. A lot of the time the participants’ conceptual understanding 
of corruption would be broadly repetitive and congruent with their given 
examples, but there were also occurrences of differing views. For example, 
some participants insisted on corruption being one large problem that needs 
dealt with in a wholesome manner regardless of the level, but would then make 
246 
justifications for examples of petty corruption as ‘not really corruption’ in the 
first place, and not really being a part of the problem, presumably to reinforce 
their own experiences as socially acceptable.  
 
There was in other words a discrepancy between the levels of consciously 
knowing what the issues are and then finding it difficult to reconcile that with 
examples of their own choosing, presumably because these would make the 
situation come to life for the participants and their views would shift. This 
discrepancy is at the heart of the discussion in this category and contributes 
greatly to the objective of the thesis and to the overarching RQ, which is to 
ascertain the extent to which the theoretical split between petty and grand 
corruption often found in literature is reflected in the real life understanding of 
corruption of respondents in Slovakia’s health care (see Table 7.1). 
 
7.3.5 Common corrupt practices 
 
Figure 7.7 Visual presentation of the category Common corrupt practices. The bright blue 
bubble represents the category, the red boxes represent nodes with a high number of 
references, orange box represents the node with nearly as many references as the red 




Due to the previous category’s unique discussion on particularly gratitude 
payments versus bribes, I felt it needed to be separate from the discussion 
presented in this category, Common corrupt practices. This category is one of 
the largest in terms of content and deals with a much broader set of ideas 
relating to corruption. These include the approach to how a bribe/gratitude 
payment is given or paid, where respondents believe that corruption most often 
takes place, how they think the system has and should respond, and the 
importance of using personal connections to get advantageous treatment. The 
nodes seemed to me to display repetition of contextual information, as there 
was a high recurrence of descriptions of corrupt transactions in practice, in the 
respondents’ language. Many respondents identified the healthcare sector as one 
of the most frequently affected by corruption at the start of the interview 
without being prompted, but also identified other sectors which were consistent 
with those described by the literature review of the thesis. In this capacity the 
category relates to the overarching RQ (see Table 7.1). There were specific and 
recurring references made to the manner in which one informs themselves on 
how much is needed for a particular doctor visit and where that information can 
be found. An idea arose from this of an existing network of those with 
experience who share this experience with more people, which subsequently 
causes greater access to the information for others. This part of content related 
directly to the RQ3 which looks for strategies used to carry out corruption. 
In a similar vein, the personal contacts discussion was controversial, but 
provided a forceful discussion of where people’s opinions stood on using personal 
contacts to further their own agenda or standing. This section, full of contrasting 
views on the place of personal connections in corruption, fits in well with the 
language in ‘Mechanisms of corruption’ (a less frequented node) and made for a 
relevant discussion of RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 and the sub questions RQ3a and RQ3b (see 
Table 7.1). Overall, it was interesting to group the recurring ideas and 
awareness that the respondents had on how corruption is actually carried out 
from its inception to transaction, and how this married up with their ideas of 
addressing the problem and the most sustainable way forward for these common 
corrupt practices to subside.  
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7.3.6 Health care corrupt practices 
 
Figure 7.8 Visual 
presentation of the 
category Health care 
corrupt practices. The 
bright blue bubble 
represents the 
category, white boxes 
represent floating 
ideas, red box 
represents a 
dominant content 
node, and green 
boxes represent 
nodes with a 
moderate to low 




The category ‘Health care corrupt practices’ is similar in its conceptualisation to 
the ‘Common corrupt practices’ category. However, due to its specific focus on 
Slovak health care, which is also the case study of the thesis, it is given separate 
depth and room for analysis on a sectoral level. It outlines the discussion about 
which parts of health care, according to the participants’ views, are most 
affected and which party (patient or doctor) is more likely to initiate the corrupt 
exchange. This made it a relevant category for the discussion of RQ3 and its sub 
questions RQ3a and 3b which relate to strategies of carrying out corruption, but 
also to the role of social customs and rules (see Table 7.1). It is important to 
note that the nodes included here directly under the category are not exhaustive 
of the recurrence, repetition or forcefulness of material relating to health care 
that was coded. There were also instances of references depicted in the floating 
nodes around the category, such as ‘Examples’ and ‘Most likely occurrences of 
corruption’, as well as ‘Personal contacts’ and ‘Mechanisms of corruption’. 
However, the dominant portion of the content in these nodes related to their 





The categories presented above represent the rest of the thesis structure from 
here onwards. They will ultimately be drawn to concluding remarks that distil 
them into even fewer overarching themes, in order to complete the qualitative 
thematic analysis steps as outlined by Green et al. (2007). It is important to note 
that the borders between the categories are porous and, as demonstrated by the 
presence of floating ideas in some of the figures above, several parts of one 
category may provide for a different perspective in another. Such open-minded 
approach to grouping qualitative ideas is essential for ensuring a rigorous 
approach to researcher reflexivity, as well as ensuring that the analysis does the 
content justice without artificially keeping to self-devised borders between 
categories.  
 




Chapter 8: Gratitude Payments 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter comes as the first of the empirical body of chapters, addressing the 
most prominent of themes elicited in the data collection process, the divide 
between the conceptual understanding of bribes vis a vis gratitude payments. 
The chapter therefore directly informs the overarching research question (To 
what extent is the theoretical difference between grand and petty corruption 
reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health 
care?), as well as RQ3 (What are the strategies utilised to carry out grand and 
petty corrupt practices?). However, it provides perhaps most insight into the 
RQ3b (To what extent are social rules and customs important in the carrying out 
of corrupt practices?), as the heart of the discussion on gratitude payments 
comes from ascertaining what is acceptable in a culture, based on its social rules 
and customs. 
 I manually conduct thematic and textual analysis of the nodes included in this 
category, namely ‘Corruption v token of gratitude’ and ‘Time scale 
importance’45, through physical reading and annotating of data, as well as with 
the help of NVivo. Investigation of this divide in the language of the participants 
lies at the heart of the discussion which juxtaposes theoretical frameworks of 
corruption as a phenomenon and the real-life understanding of it by participants 
in this research project. Specific, identifiable trends include the language used 
to describe both bribery and gratitude payments and these are summarised in 
the results sections below. 
 
45 An umbrella term to signify the difference between the timing of giving gifts: before and/or after 
procedure/treatment. Generally, giving after would be expected to represent the more 
acceptable option and would not be associated with corruption, but with gratitude. 
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The first step in the category analysis was multiple readings of the two nodes 
that make up the category: ‘Corruption v token of gratitude’ and ‘Time scale 
importance’. It is important to emphasise the necessity of staying close to the 
original coded data, as all ensuing data visualisations, such as word trees 
generated from text frequency search, are dependent on adding sufficient level 
of detail to their appearance. Their accuracy is dependent on being able to cross 
check the content created by NVivo with the content examined manually. This 
was particularly important in this study, as I discovered that NVivo is not always 
able to effectively pull stemmed words from the original Slovak. For example, 
‘pred’ and ‘dopredu’ (both meaning ‘before’) were not pulled out despite 
sharing a word stem when entering the command to NVivo. Manual analysis 
allowed for words with synonymous meaning such as ‘pred’, ‘dopredu’ and even 
‘predtým’ or ‘skôr’ (ahead of time) to combine into larger datasets with the 
same theme by entering them all in the search box like so: ‘pred’ OR ‘dopredu’ 
OR ‘predtým’. The words are highlighted in Examples 8.2 and 8.4 overleaf and 
their translated counterparts in blue boxes for illustration. These are also shown 
overleaf. The manual coding ultimately meant that I was able to guess what the 
trends would be leaning towards before even utilising NVivo further- in this 
manner I was able to arbitrate the results’ accuracy by looking at the original 






Example 8.1 Manual analysis of node ‘Corruption v Gratitude’ translation by author, orange 
represents yellow highlighter in Example 8.2, Source:Author 





Example 8.3 Manual analysis of node ‘Time scale importance’ translation by author, green ticks 
lacking but layout identical for comparison, Source: Author 
Example 8.4 Manual analysis of node ‘Time scale importance’, Source: Author 
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Once carried out, I was able to extract recurring themes from the coded phrases, and these were then colour-coded to show which parts 
were going to be analysed in the NVivo process later on. The themes extracted in Example 8.2 and its translated counterpart were as 
follows:  
1. Examples of tokens of gratitude (pink highlighter) 
2. Timeline of giving expressions (in circles) 
3. Legal distinctions as perceived (yellow highlighter). 
 
The following section discusses the above themes in order, alongside the terminology associated with gratitude payments and bribery, as 
expressed by the participants. Due to the specific nature of the legal language and its prominent presence in another node (‘Legal 
deficiencies’) however, the relevant debate relating to the participants’ awareness of current legislation on bribery will be discussed in the 
category ‘Reasoning and Reporting’. 
8.2 Gratitude payments- Timeline of giving expressions 
 
Following the manual analysis and emerging trends, I performed several word frequency searches within NVivo for this category. The word 
frequencies in Table 8.1 are set for 80 most frequent words in the ‘Corruption vs token of gratitude’ category. This query has generated a 
similar range of words to my manual analysis. You will notice in Table 8.1 that the ‘similar words’ column, however, clearly illustrates the 
shortcoming described above of NVivo not pulling out words of similar grammatical stem alongside the selected word- the column is visibly a 
mere duplication. It is also clear that many of the words generated are words without real meaning on their own- these are for example the 
conjunctions, prepositions, interjections, adverbs, as well as transitive auxiliary verbs (various forms of ‘to be’ or participles of other verbs), 
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or various forms of the same word depending on grammatical gender, number, case, and tense. I have included these categories where 
necessary to illustrate this in the translations. These words are possible to remove from future searches by adding them to the NVivo ‘stop 
word’ list (NVivo is not sophisticated enough to eliminate a whole group of words such as prepositions), but the task would be 
overwhelmingly laborious to do individually, and so the rigorous manual cross checking with the results generated proved to be a sufficient 
and a more content-focused checking tool.  
In Table 8.1 the words highlighted in green refer to the defining terminology of a gratitude payment as opposed to corruption. Yellow words 
are those that refer to specific examples of the gratitude payments and pink words relate to timing terminology. At a mere 80 words span, 
the software has not picked up on some other words encompassed in the original data, for example the singular mention of ‘envelope’ or 
‘tickets’ in the node. It would require a table larger than is visually friendly to present and with the impossibility of spending hours 
deselecting ‘stop words’ off the list, the list itself would have to span several hundred words. I opted for the re-reading of original data 
being a quicker and a more efficient and informative way of filling in for the gaps in the software-generated content.  
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage Similar Words 
poďakovanie (thank you, 
gratitude)  
11 21 1.21% poďakovanie 
niečo(something) 5 18 1.04% niečo 
poďakovať(to thank) 9 13 0.75% poďakovať 
Korupcia(corruption) 8 12 0.69% korupcia 
Proste(simply) 6 12 0.69% proste 
Úplatok(bribe) 7 11 0.63% úplatok 
Človek(a person) 6 10 0.58% človek 
Lebo(because) 4 10 0.58% lebo 
Potom(after) 5 9 0.52% potom 
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Pre(for) 3 9 0.52% pre 
Rozdiel(difference) 7 9 0.52% rozdiel 
Sme(are) 3 9 0.52% sme 
Určite(certainly) 6 9 0.52% určite 
Napríklad(for example) 9 7 0.40% napríklad 
Podľa(due to) 5 7 0.40% podľa 
Toho(it, accusative case) 4 7 0.40% toho 
Ani(neither) 3 6 0.35% ani 
Chcem(I want) 5 6 0.35% chcem 
Korupciu(corruption, accusative 
case) 
8 6 0.35% korupciu 
Nejakú (some) 6 6 0.35% nejakú 
Pozornosť(attention, attention 
payment) 
9 6 0.35% pozornosť 
Toto (this) 4 6 0.35% toto 
gifts 5 5 0.29% gift, gifts 
Bol(was) 3 5 0.29% bol 
Bola(was, feminine) 4 5 0.29% bola 
Bonboniéru(box of chocolates) 10 5 0.29% bonboniéru 
Dala(she gave) 4 5 0.29% dala 
Dáš(you will give) 3 5 0.29% dáš 
Keby(if) 4 5 0.29% keby 
Možno(maybe) 5 5 0.29% možno 
Nejaká(some, feminine) 6 5 0.29% nejaká 
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Nejaký(some, masculine) 6 5 0.29% nejaký 
Neviem (I do not know) 6 5 0.29% neviem 
Taký (the kind, masculine) 4 5 0.29% taký 
Zase (again) 4 5 0.29% zase 
Bolo (it was) 4 4 0.23% bolo 
Fakt (really) 4 4 0.23% fakt 
Finančné (financial) 8 4 0.23% finančné 
Fľašu(bottle, accusative case) 5 4 0.23% fľašu 
Lekárovi(doctor, dative case) 8 4 0.23% lekárovi 
Nič (nothing) 3 4 0.23% nič 
Niekto (someone) 6 4 0.23% niekto 
Prácu (work, accusative case) 5 4 0.23% prácu 
Pred (before) 4 4 0.23% pred 
Príde (will come) 5 4 0.23% príde 
Stale (still) 5 4 0.23% stále 
Tiež (also) 4 4 0.23% tiež 
Tým (by that) 3 4 0.23% tým 
Urobil(he did) 6 4 0.23% urobil 
Všimné (attention payment) 6 4 0.23% všimné 
Vždy (always) 4 4 0.23% vždy 
Berú (they take) 4 3 0.17% berú 
Chceš (you want) 5 3 0.17% chceš 
Dali (they gave) 4 3 0.17% dali 
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Dávam (I give) 5 3 0.17% dávam 
Dostal (he got) 6 3 0.17% dostal 
eur 3 3 0.17% eur 
Jej (hers) 3 3 0.17% jej 
Kávu (coffee, acc case) 4 3 0.17% kávu 
Mal (he had) 3 3 0.17% mal 
Mala (she had) 4 3 0.17% mala 
Myslím (I think) 6 3 0.17% myslím 
Nedá (It cannot) 4 3 0.17% nedá 
Nejaké(some, plural) 6 3 0.17% nejaké 
Nejako (somehow) 6 3 0.17% nejako 
Nemyslím (I do not think) 8 3 0.17% nemyslím 
Netreba (there is no need) 7 3 0.17% netreba 
Niektorí (some, pl) 8 3 0.17% niektorí 
Nikto (nobody) 5 3 0.17% nikto 
Ona (she) 3 3 0.17% ona 
Pocit (feeling) 5 3 0.17% pocit 
Predtým (before, ahead) 7 3 0.17% predtým 
Problem (problem) 7 3 0.17% problém 
Skôr (early) 4 3 0.17% skôr 
Vec (thing) 3 3 0.17% vec 
Veľmi (very) 5 3 0.17% veľmi 
Vína (wine, genitive) 4 3 0.17% vína 
Vlastne (actually) 7 3 0.17% vlastne 
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Vtedy (then) 5 3 0.17% vtedy 
Table 8.1 Word frequency table generated from the node ‘Corruption v Token of Gratitude’, set for 80 most frequent words. Translation of words 
and colour coding added by Author, Source: Author 
Table 8.2 shows a reduced number of words from the NVivo list, a mere 50, because the word frequency search within the child node of 
‘Time scale importance’ was specifically aimed at expressions of timing importance for people’s understanding of corruption vis a vis 
gratitude payments. It is obvious that the same problem with filler words such as prepositions, interjections or conjunctions taking up a lot 
of the count is present here, but the prevalent timeframe-specific words are encompassed in pink. As with the previous table, the generated 
content does not include some expressions that may have only appeared once in the coded node, such as ‘ex post’ (visible in Example 8.2), 
which were then manually added to further content analysis in the NVivo software. It is clear here that the selected words from manual 
analysis in Examples 8.4 and 8.3 are, however, mostly reflected here. This finding indicates that the processes applied are working with a 
sufficient level of reliability. The positioning (i.e., high frequency of use) of these words in the table further reinforces their prominence in 
people’s understanding of the difference between corruption and gratitude payments. In other words, when asked the question: ‘Do you 
make any distinction between a bribe and a token of gratitude?’ the participants would have spontaneously presented the time frame of the 
act as integral to their decision on the terminology- i.e. ‘before’ is gratitude and ‘after’ is a bribe.  
Word Length Count Weighted Percentage Similar Words 
Niečo(something) 5 11 1.50% niečo 
Dopredu (ahead, before) 7 8 1.09% dopredu 
Pred (before) 4 8 1.09% pred 
Určite (certainly) 6 8 1.09% určite 
Korupcia(corruption) 8 7 0.96% korupcia 
Lebo(because) 4 6 0.82% lebo 
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Myslím(I think) 6 6 0.82% myslím 
Predtým(before) 7 6 0.82% predtým 
Človek(a person) 6 5 0.68% človek 
Dáš(you’ll give) 3 5 0.68% dáš 
Lepšie(better) 6 5 0.68% lepšie 
Peniaze(money) 7 5 0.68% peniaze 
Poďakovanie(gratitude payment) 11 5 0.68% poďakovanie 
Podľa(due to) 5 5 0.68% podľa 
Pride(will come) 5 5 0.68% príde 
Skôr(early) 4 5 0.68% skôr 
Bolo(it was) 4 4 0.55% bolo 
Chcem(I want) 5 4 0.55% chcem 
Dám(I’ll give) 3 4 0.55% dám 
Nejaká(some, feminine) 6 4 0.55% nejaká 
Pocit(a feeling) 5 4 0.55% pocit 
Potom(after) 5 4 0.55% potom 
Rozdiel(difference) 7 4 0.55% rozdiel 
Toho(of that) 4 4 0.55% toho 
Tým(by that) 3 4 0.55% tým 
Bonboniéru (box of chocolates) 10 3 0.41% bonboniéru 
Časová(time [line]) 6 3 0.41% časová 
Inak (otherwise) 4 3 0.41% inak 
Každom(every) 6 3 0.41% každom 
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Majú(they have) 4 3 0.41% majú 
Morálne(morally) 7 3 0.41% morálne 
Nebude(it will not be) 6 3 0.41% nebude 
Neviem(I do not know) 6 3 0.41% neviem 
Pretože(because) 7 3 0.41% pretože 
Prípade(case, prepositional case) 7 3 0.41% prípade 
Table 8.2 Word frequency table generated from the node ‘Time scale importance’, set for 50 most frequent words. Translation of words and colour coding added by 
Author, Source: Author 
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For Table 8.2, the targeted search for words of time frame importance was reliant on the 
initial coding process being rigorous enough not to leave any other time adverbs or 
allusions out. I had to conduct yet another re-reading of the original data to ensure that 
this was indeed the case- it was not enough to rely on the software here, but the need to 
be familiar and diligent with the analysis of original data was paramount. Afterwards, I 
was confident that I was able to capture all expressions.  
It was clear that the next step in the analysis of this section would naturally have to be 
the collation of these terms for giving gifts/bribes both before and after the procedure 
and compare their prominence with the demographic attributes of participants. The next 
step in NVivo for this endeavour had to be the collation of these expressions into a whole 
that could then be contrasted with demographics, as NVivo can only compare groups of 
data, not individual expressions. I ran a query in NVivo and was able to save the query 
results having collated all the expressions identical or synonymous to ‘before’ and ‘after’. 
Since, as mentioned above, NVivo was not able to pull out the words needed automatically 
and based on their contextual similarities, I had to manually enter all forms of words 
representative of ‘before’ or ‘after’ semantically (e.g., ‘before’ OR ‘beforehand’ OR 
‘earlier than’ etc.) and search for these as a long group. Subsequently, I created a new 
node with all of these synonymous expressions amalgamated into one and this is visible in 
Figure 8.1 overleaf. This node of amalgamated expressions called ‘before (for gratitude 
payments)’ then behaves as one category/group of data to be able to cross check against 
selected attributes. Figure 8.2 overleaf illustrates how the software has emboldened the 
relevant expressions that I manually collated into one node through a more laborious, but 





Figure 8.1 Node created from results of the text search query for all expressions 
synonymous to or identical with the Slovak equivalents of ‘before’, Source:Author 
Figure 8.2 Example of the emboldened expressions synonymous to or 
identical with the Slovak equivalents for ‘before’ as done by NVivo 12, 
Source:Author 
 
I took both amalgamated nodes consisting of the expressions for ‘before’ and ‘after’ and selected the demographic attributes of gender, age 
categories, and education categories and found these results, as depicted in Figure 8.3 overleaf:  
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Figure 8.3 The two nodes collated for expressions synonymous to or identical with the Slovak equivalents for ‘before’ and ‘after’ in a matrix with 
demographic attributes, Source:Author 
The results show the validation specific demographic groups gave to the time frame importance of corrupt transactions, and the difference 
perceived by participants when assigning the label of ‘corruption/bribe’ or ‘gratitude/thank you’, based on when a gift is given. The results 
are split quite evenly, which suggests that nearly all demographic groups employ this distinction based on the timing of transaction in their 
understanding of corruption vis a vis gratitude payments. It is important to emphasise that this is not necessarily a binary understanding akin 
to ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ or ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Instead, what we are seeing here is a pattern that shows an understanding of the difference 
between payments representing corruption, versus payments representing gratitude in the framework of timing them correctly.
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In other words, these results show the recognition of participants of these 
defining characteristics of timing, which play a significant role in how they 
internally allocate the labels of the unacceptable ‘corruption’, as opposed to the 
acceptable ‘gratitude’. In the manual analysis of all coded references relating to 
time frame, only 4 coded references did not make a distinction between 
corruption and gratitude payments based on the timing of the gift giving. That is 
4 out of 25 entries coded, which points towards a significant trend of responses – 
that the majority of participants distinguish between corruption and gift-giving 
based on the timing of the transaction. This difference of label allocation based 
on timing of the transaction seems to be significant in the participants’ 
justification of their own pardoning of some acts and their condemnation of 
others. 
8.3 Gratitude payments- Examples of tokens of gratitude 
 
The manual and word frequency analysis has highlighted some key expressions as 
examples for what the participants consider to be merely gestures of gratitude, 
as opposed to bribes. The expectation of what these would be was based on the 
theory on informal practices such as blat which specifies the importance of 
goods and foods (Ledeneva 2009). In congruence with this expectation, the 
tokens mentioned are as follows: bottles of alcohol, sausages, flowers, boxes of 
chocolates, coffee, gift baskets or tickets to a show. These are also consistent 
with the examples given by the participants in online fora, who also suggest 
alcoholic beverages or sweets and/or experiential gifts, as seen in Examples 8.5 




Example 8.5 Example of the discussion on theme 
‘What to give a doctor as a thank you?’ on the public 
forum modrykonik.sk, translations in coloured boxes 
by author, Source: modrykonik.sk 
Example 8.6 Example of the discussion on theme 
‘What to give a doctor as a thank you?’ on the 
public forum modrykonik.sk continued, translations 
in coloured boxes by author, Source: 
modrykonik.sk 
 
These examples of language associated with ‘gratitude’ rather than a ‘bribe’ are 
consistent across the board. It was important to be able to map out the exact 
example words and the associations these had with the notion of corruption 
and/or token of gratitude. As is clear from Figure 8.4 (overleaf), the association 
is most frequently with that of ‘gratitude’, with language such as ‘at least’ or 
‘definitely’ when referring to bringing a box of chocolates (or any other of the 
given examples). The respondents clearly feel confident about expressing 
themselves with these examples and there does not seem to be any language of 
condemnation associated with the box of chocolates as a gift given to the 
healthcare staff. It is possible that this is also due to the relatively low assigned 
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value to these gifts, and this is buttressed by the language associated with them, 
which was often word choice such as ‘only [a gift]’, or ‘just something small 
like’. From the literature on informal practices, blat and gratitude payments 
(Heidenheimer 1970, Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000, Ledeneva 2009, Ledeneva 
2009, Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017), I would expect to see this type of 
language to emerge as illustrative of a difference between the negative 
connotations associated with corruption and positive connotations of gratitude. 
From this literature on informal practices, corruption can be classified into three 
groups, ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ambiguous’ with connotations of ‘helping out’, 
‘mutual care’ and even ‘friendly support’ (Ledeneva 2009). Gifts such as those 
described that denote foods or goods (which historically were given due to their 
scarcity in communist societies) fall into the ‘good’ and ‘ambiguous’ categories. 
The participants’ acceptance of these is therefore expected and congruent with 
the indications presented by literature. There are, however, often references to 
a better ‘service’ or ‘attention’ given when such a token of gratitude is 
presented and this seems to indicate that the participants do not see this kind of 
gift as merely a polite gesture, but as a means of securing a good standard of 





Figure 8.4 Word tree generated from the word ‘box of chocolates’ from all nodes in the project codebook. Highlighted sections and translations in red by 
author, contextual words set for 13, Source:Author 
This focus on gifts and informality is one of the key idiosyncrasies when discussing the customs associated with corrupt practices in Slovakia. 
The consistency with which the participants pointed out the very same examples and avoided the label of ‘corruption’ as seen in Figure 8.4, 
as well as made a clear distinction between money-giving and gift-giving, is one of the key findings underlining the demarcation in 
understanding of what is acceptable and what is not. The participants do not necessarily refer to legislation or any type of regulation- these 
responses are instinctive and reflect their understanding as based on real life. 
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When generating the word tree and the text frequency search, I compared the results when generating only from the nodes included in this 
category, as opposed to all the nodes present in the codebook. Figure 8.5 shows the word tree generated only from the category and Figure 
8.4 shows the word tree and associations from all the nodes. It is visually immediately clear that limiting the search to just the category 
nodes takes away a lot of the contextual data otherwise present in the rest of the nodes. I have therefore made sure that for similar text 
searches and word tree generating I use all nodes with a greater contextual reach of words (at least 13+ contextual words) to ensure I am 
not losing any important content or nuance in the textual analysis. As such, the categories serve as a targeted and helpful starting point for 
the analysis of data as a whole, but for exercises such as this one the search had to be expanded beyond the coded category, in order to do 
the presented discourse justice. This is part of the ever-evolving process of researcher reflexivity, as well as the project being 
representative of the qualitative analysis process, which is by nature iterative. 
 




Všade . Všade to máš . Čo pod tým rozumieš ? FG1.2 Ale
neuplácala , ja nedávam ani potom ... Svojej školiteľke som skoro kúpila
mohla byť tolerovaná . Nemyslím si , že finančne , ale takéto ako
mňa . Ale peniaze dám , aby si mala aj niečo lepšie .
dojdeš niekam a pomôžu ti , tak som napríklad určite doniesla
Ale keď potom ako sa mi narodí dieťa dám pôrodníkovi
nabudúce keď som tam bola lebo ďakujem , že ste mi
dáš
až potom . Ale peniaze predtým . FG1.2 Keď chcem niečo
ako poďakovanie podľa mňa . Ale peniaze dám , aby si
alebo fľašu vína , s tým by som problém nemal . Už
ale nedala som jej ju ( smiech ) lebo zase hovno pre
, tak je to podľa mňa znak poďakovania . Časová os je
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8.3.1 Results and discussion 
This part of analysis has highlighted the consistency of certain spontaneous examples 
when asked about the difference between corruption and tokens of gratitude. These 
tokens were condensed to a few most recurring examples: ‘box of chocolates’ which 
received 17 mentions in the codebook, ‘bottles of alcohol’ which received 11 mentions, 
‘coffee’ with 9 and ‘flowers’ with 7. The less frequent ones were a ‘gift basket’ with 2 
and ‘tickets’ and ‘sausages’ with 1. It is worth mentioning that some types of gifts are 
also likely to be conditioned by the location and affluence of the region/household. 
People of fewer means are likely to bring their own produce such as sausages, eggs, 
poultry, preserve or similar in lieu of purchased gifts- the personal touch of this might 
possibly make it even more difficult for healthcare professionals to refuse such a gift for 
fear of offending the giver. Several of the participants raised this particular idea of home 
produce such as eggs or jams being given, mostly by the older generation (their 
grandmothers/mothers) and as such this practice dates back to times of scarcity of goods 
and foods- this folklore trend is likely to have been passed down the generations in 
discourse.46 The language associated with these examples was that of moderation, 
understanding and justification. Such phrases across all examples included:  
• absolútne mi to nevadí (I absolutely do not mind that) 
• s tým by som problém nemal (I don’t have a problem with that) 
• oceniť prácu toho personálu (to appreciate the work of that staff) 
• aspoň nejakú pozornosť (at least something small for them/some thoughtful/attentive 
thing) 
• to neberiem ako korupciu (I don’t see that as corruption). 
The recurring theme therefore is a clear distinction between gratitude or thoughtfulness 
and corruption and bribes. The participants were openly reluctant to associate gifts with 
corruption. There is also remarkable consistency among the examples presented by the 
participants, which points to the rooting of these in customary, learnt, socially 
constructed behaviour. In other words, even if the participants do not have first-hand 
 
46 The cardiologist Viliam Fisher was recently charged with corruption over taking 3,000 EUR, a box of 
chocolates and three ducks by a family where the patient died- the family subsequently requested all the 
‘gifts’ back. (https://dennikn.sk/107361/kardiolog-fischer-sa-priznal-ze-zobral-uplatok-vyviazol-s-
podmienkou/) [last accessed 25/04/2021]. 
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experience with these, it is clear that these examples are what the participants imagine, 
observe and understand to be the reality of gratitude payments, as opposed to bribes.  
 
Figure 8.6 has collated all the grammatical variations of these examples and cross 
tabulated them with some demographic values. The trends are not vastly differing across 
the board, but it is interesting to note that participants around the ages of 30 and 40 tend 
to refer to these examples less than the rest and that university-educated participants 
have a tendency to mention alcohol and sweets more than other examples.  
 
Figure 8.6 Nodes collated from expressions of Slovak equivalents to ‘bottle’, ‘box of chocolates’, 
‘flowers’, ‘coffee’ in a matrix with demographic categories, Source:Author 
 
Females are also more likely to associate gratitude with sweets and coffee than alcohol or 
anything else. This may point to the social and cultural custom of males gifting flowers to 
females in situations of gratitude, apology or shows of respect. Such customs are obvious 
and propagated daily, for example, with every press conference led by the female head 
of state in Slovakia, President Zuzana Čaputová, all present males tend to turn up with 




Figure 8.7 Example of public officials bringing 
flowers to President Zuzana Caputova for 
various meetings, left to right: PM Igor Matovic, 
ex-president Andrej Kiska, Speaker of the 
National Council Boris Kollar, Deputy PM for 






It is also interesting that the ‘coffee’ result from a word tree generated was exclusively 
associated with nurses, as opposed to doctors (5 out of 9 mentions specified ‘to the 
nurse’, ‘the nurses’ station’, ‘for a nurse’, one other specified ‘for a female teacher’) 
and this was always an utterance spoken by a female participant. This is indicative of 
there being another possible trend in gender/status perception of which gifts are 
appropriate to give to which occupation based on either hierarchical position or gender- 
no male doctor was associated with flowers or chocolates. Also, the specificity of the 
coffee (ie a tub of ground beans as opposed to a cup) has ties to such products being 
considered fairly luxurious pre 1990s as imported goods, compared to their ubiquitous 
presence nowadays. The fact that this understanding has survived over the generations is 
indicative of the role tradition plays in constructing these behaviours and general 
understanding of phenomena. Doctors were, on the contrary, associated with ‘bottles’, 
‘tickets’, ‘sausages’ and even ‘envelopes’, which fall into the category of open ‘bribes’ 
rather than gifts and theoretically into the ‘bad’ corruption, as opposed to the ‘good’ and 
‘ambiguous’ (Heidenheimer 1970). Bottles and sausages were almost exclusively noted as 
acceptable by male participants in my research, whereas there was an even split of 
acceptability between mentions of ‘envelopes’- none of the envelope mentions were 
associated with nurses, however. This delineation is also confirmed by recent research 
into the problematic by Stepurko et al. (2013), who confirm on the examples of Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Romania, Hungary and Poland that the perception of in-kind gift giving tends to 
be much less negative than that of hard cash.  
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These selected examples are consistent with independent research conducted into the 
problematic by the Slovak Health Policy Institute in their 2013 study of informal payments 
(Mužik and Szalayová 2013). Here the top three positions were occupied by ‘chocolates 
and other sweets’, ‘bottle of alcohol’, and ‘bouquet of flowers’, followed by ‘cash from 
101-333’ EUR, ‘cash from 34-100’EUR, ‘a symbolic gift (up to 20) EUR’, ‘service 
exchange’, ‘cash up to 33 EUR’, ‘gift over 20 EUR’, ‘eggs, meat and other foods’, ‘cash 
over 334 EUR’ and other (Example 8.7). It is therefore possible that the general 
awareness of the examples presented by the participants of this study is shaped by the 
general public discourse on this topic and these are indeed representative of a real-life 
experience that shapes society’s understanding on the subject. 
 
Examples of informal 
payments 
 
Example 8.7 A table of most frequently-presented gratitude payments to doctors by patients. Left 
column outlines types of gifts as described above with translation on the side, ‘Vyžiadaná 
korupcia= Corruption required’, ‘Nevyžiadaná korupcia= Corruption not prompted’, ‘Prepitné= 
Gratuity’, ‘Spolu= Total’, Source:HPI (2013) 
 
It appears, therefore, that the theoretical assumption associated with RQ3b: ‘Social rules 
and customs are understood as one of the processes of corruption that links corrupt 
practices on grand and petty levels; as such they will prove as important determinants in 
carrying out corrupt practices’ is directly informed by this section, which points to a 
strong significance of tradition and custom conditioning the type of gift given, as well as 
the demarcation between corruption and a token of gratitude as a whole. 
Box of chocolates 
Bottle of alcohol 
Flowers 
Cash 101-333 EUR 
Cash 34-100 EUR 
Symbolic gift (>20 
EUR) 
Service provision 
Cash up to 33 EUR 
Gift over 20 EUR 
Eggs, meat, foods 
Cash over 334 EUR 
Other 
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In a recent debate on the subject of gift v. bribe, held by the weekly news outlet 
tyzden.sk (2020)47, a special prosecutor for corruption Jan Hrivnak has emphasised the 
rampant nature of corruption and bribery in healthcare and has specifically isolated the 
terms ‘justification’ and ‘apology’ or ‘exculpation’ as reasons behind any person’s 
labelling a bribe to be a ‘gift’ or a ‘token of gratitude’/‘token of attention’. ‘Gift’ as a 
term is only used in the Slovak Civil Code and designates something completely different 
to what a ‘bribe’ is under the Slovak Criminal Code. According to Hrivnak, conflating the 
two terms is only beneficial to those who try to excuse their actions to themselves and 
others as not criminally punitive. In real terms, however, neither the timing of the gift 
nor its nature alters its role for the purposes of the law. The debate on this terminology 
lies at the heart of the understanding that the participants portrayed in this section and 
in the research as a whole. It is also in direct connection to the research questions 1 and 
2 specifying the possibility of petty corruption ‘justifying’ grand corruption or vice versa 
in people’s minds.  
  
 




8.4 Gratitude payments- gratitude vs bribery 
Moving on to the concept of ‘bribes’ as opposed to ‘tokens of gratitude’, the notion of 
the ‘envelope’ and ‘money’ was associated with corruption and bribery. The language 
seen in Figure 8.8 overleaf associates the ‘envelope’ with a transaction, as opposed to a 
gesture48. There is talk of ‘price’, ‘the right time’ to pay, and the direct contradiction 
between gifts and envelope in the bottom part of Figure 8.8- one as a token of attention 
and one as a bribe. Conducting the textual analysis in this way, the association of 
language with the different examples represents a difference of understanding for the 
participants. Interestingly, however, five participants (all women) have alluded in their 
responses on gifts and/or envelopes to their child births as reasons for the 
transaction/gift. There was no other spontaneous health care environment mentioned in 
this magnitude with relation to this topic and this was also the case spontaneously 
brought up in the same online forum that I reference in this project (modrykonik.sk). 
 
48 One of the participants actually recounted a story whereby she attempted to give an envelope containing 
tickets to a doctor ex post, but the mere look of the envelope made it completely unacceptable for the 
doctor to accept. It would appear that the symbolic value of the envelope as the more palatable/softened 






Figure 8.8 Word tree generated from both nominative and accusative cases for the word ‘envelope’, contextual words set for 13, translation in red and 
highlighting by author, Source: Author 
A news outlet has picked up on the topic of paying for childbirth being discussed by mothers online and collated the responses in an article 
in 2015, pointing to the illegality of paying extra for childbirth (see Figure 8.9) overleaf.
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Figure 8.9 illustrates the language utilised in this forum and it is notable that the 
similarity of paying extra for childbirth is picked out here too. Other similarities include 
the examples of gratitude payments vis a vis envelope: ie chocolates, coffee, dessert. 
This kind of similarity increases the validity of the expressions used by the participants in 
my study as a representative sample of the type of discourse led on the topic in Slovakia. 
 
Figure 8.9 Example of discourse by mothers on having bribed doctors for childbirths, publicised by 




Targeting the gratitude payment examples first showed association with terminology of 
informality/corruption in the participant discourse. Flipping this approach around to 
target the terminology instead serves as a check of whether similar results will be 
produced. The next step when looking at the tokens of gratitude v corruption theme 
therefore was to show how the terms themselves (i.e., ‘token of gratitude’ or ‘token of 
attention’) fare when searched for and what their associations are. For both 
‘poďakovanie’ (token of gratitude/thank you) and ‘všimné‘ (token of attention), which 
denote the terms the participants liked to use instead of ‘bribe’ or ‘corruption’, the 
results were consistently similar. As seen in Figure 8.10 overleaf, the associations are 
very similar and include the likes of ‘box of chocolates’, ‘bottle of wine’, ‘flowers’, as 
well as language of gratitude (‘return the favour’, ‘my own initiative’) and a clear 




Figure 8.10 A word tree generated from all nodes in codebook for the Slovak equivalent of ‘a thank you’ or ‘a gesture/token of gratitude’ with 
contextual words set for 13, translations in red and highlighted sections by author, Source: Author 
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However, in Figure 8.11 overleaf generated for ‘token of attention’, there is a slight 
variation in the language. The term is still associated with gratitude and the same kinds of 
examples that express it, such as ‘box of chocolates’, ‘flowers’, ‘bottles’ etc. There is 
also a clear distinction by some that this is given as a gratitude payment and not ‘as a 
bribe’. The difference between this kind of payment and a bribe in ‘an envelope’ is also 
emphasised. However, there are also cases where this attention payment is conflated 
with bribery and corruption. One participant answers the question ‘What do you 
understand under ‘corruption’?’ with: ‘As anyone, I would think it is some token of 
attention, some bribe’. Another participant answers in a similar vein to the same 
question: ‘I would probably say that it [corruption] is that token of attention’. There is 
therefore a slight difference of nuance in the participant understanding of this term vis a 
vis its sister term ‘gratitude payment’. It is recommended that deeper textual analysis is 
conducted into these terms in the future, as there seems to be a difference of 
understanding, whereby one term receives more benevolence from the participants than 
the other. This further reinforces the idea that real life understanding of corruption must 
be rooted in a diligent analysis of people’s understanding and people must be forced to 







Figure 8.11 A word tree generated from all nodes in codebook for the Slovak equivalent of ‘a token of attention’ or ‘an expression of thoughtfulness’ with contextual 
words set for 13, translations in red and highlighted sections by author, Source: Author 
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8.5 Gratitude Payments- bribery 
To further illustrate the difference between gratitude payments and bribes, it is 
important to be able to put in contrast the language associated with bribes. Both Figure 
8.12 and Figure 8.13 overleaf refer to the term for bribe in Slovak, ‘úplatok’ or ‘úplatky’- 
in the plural. As is visible from the highlighted language associated with the term, there 
are several mentions of ‘money’, ‘salary’ or ‘pay’, a frequent usage of the verb ‘to take’ 
or ‘to pay’ and also allusions to value judgments, such as ‘greedy’ or ‘profitable’. There 
are several examples of sums that the participants find outrageous- ‘ten grand’ to 
‘millions’ and also a mention of ‘an envelope’. The language is indicative of bribes being 
associated with hard currency more than anything else for the participants and they often 
outline the notion of a bribe as correctly being something beyond regular pay- however, 
this notion seems to exclude their understanding of the acceptable gift giving procedure. 
In this sense, I expected to see an inclination to associate the negative connotations of 
corruption and bribery with money and financial means, as opposed to the widespread 
and condoned practice of gratitude payments, and this is further expanded on in the 





Figure 8.12 A word tree generated from all nodes in codebook for the Slovak equivalent of ‘bribes’ with contextual words set for 13, translations in red and highlighted 




Figure 8.13 A word tree generated from all nodes in codebook for the Slovak equivalent of ‘bribe’ with contextual words set for 13, translations in 
red and highlighted sections by author, Source: Author 
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8.5.1 Results and discussion 
This section of the analysis has focused on the terminology associated with 
bribes and gratitude, the specific language associated with the labels, as well as 
the examples given by participants. With regards to bribery, participants most 
frequently associated the notion of hard cash or an ‘envelope’ with words such 
as ‘pay’, ‘salary’, ‘to pay’, to take’ and also with the examples of childbirth as 
the most frequent instance for such a transaction. There were notions of specific 
sums that the participants associated with bribery, as opposed to gratitude- i.e., 
20-50 EUR seemed to be acceptable for a ‘thank you’ and anything from 
thousand upwards with bribery. There is also indication of the mere object of 
‘envelope’ to signify money and bribery, regardless of contents, as this is likely 
to be used as a more palatable vessel for the delivery of the bribe visually. This 
idea of payment scale, however, was not rooted in any reference to the law by 
the participants, save one, who referenced a belief that the line of demarcation 
was somewhere in the region of 300EUR. The topic of legislation relating to 
bribery and participant allusions to it is explored at greater length in Chapter 
10, which outlines the existing legislation on the subject and juxtaposes this 
with the participant responses.  
However, from the analysis, it was clear that the labels that participants assign 
to informal behaviour, such as ‘gratitude’ or ‘attention’ payments are mostly 
associated with the examples of the immaterial kind. As such they remain mostly 
separate from those of bribery and corruption in the participants’ understanding 
of the phenomenon in real life. This is congruent with the general literature 
consensus on informal practices and corruption, whereby corruption is 
understood to be separable into three categories: good, bad and ambiguous- or 
‘white’, ‘black’, and ‘grey’ (Heidenheimer 1970, Ledeneva 2008, Ledeneva 
2009). Recent research in other post-Soviet countries (Romania, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland) has also confirmed that in-kind gift giving is more 
acceptable than that of hard cash (78% of respondents see hard cash payment as 
negative, only 51% see in-kind gifts as negative) (Stepurko, Pavlova et al. 2013). 
The examples given by participants of foods and produce, as well as the 
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gender/status-specific nuance in their allocation is also reflective of the idea of 
blat as ‘corruption with a human face’ (Ledeneva 2009) and not subject to the 
same amount of condemnation in discourse, as corruption and bribery openly.  
The most notable nuance, however, came when generating a word tree for 
‘attention’ payments, which the participants associated with both bribery and 
explicitly with corruption. The difference in the terminology devised by social 
construct appears to be present and requires further examination for purposes of 
accurate legislation formation. This type of area-specific nuance is congruent 
with the overarching architecture of the corruption phenomenon, which is 
believed to have a ranking specific to the society (Lampert 1984). The 
overarching RQ: ‘To what extent is the theoretical difference between grand 
and petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in 
Slovakia’s health care?’ is informed by this close examination of the difference 
understood between the practice of gratitude-showing and bribe-paying. This is 
done especially through the language utilised by the participants, so mild and 
benevolent with tokens of gratitude (marking this practice as ‘not problematic’ 
and a ‘sign of appreciation’) and so specifically money-oriented and judgmental 
with bribery (‘So they have their salaries increased and they still take bribes’; 
‘they sit there and take the money’; ‘greedy’). It is clear that the difference 
exists in the participant understanding and I would expect this difference to 
appear in the participant responses. However, it was surprising to find that the 
difference is not as clear-cut as initially anticipated (based on previous research 
such as Stepurko et al, 2013) and that more qualitative, textual analysis must be 
conducted in future research, with this identified language ambiguities specified 
to future participants, as the next step in the deeper understanding of 
corruption. 
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Chapter 9: General perceptions of corruption 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter follows the previous empirical chapter on gratitude payments and 
provides a broader view of corruption in real-life by the participants, to allow 
for greater contextual insight into the phenomenon. The chapter explores the 
largest category of coded references within the dataset, and all five nodes 
together (as seen below in Figure 9.1) represent nearly 250 references coded. 
The section is divided along the nodes themselves, as they all encompass 
separate facets of the collective perceptions of corruption, and each of the 
parts is given its own space for analysis. The analysis follows the same pattern of 
thematic and textual analysis throughout, utilising word clouds and manual 
analysis, as well as text frequency search.  
  
Figure 9.1 Visual presentation of the category General perceptions of corruption. The bright 
blue bubble represents the category, the red boxes represent the nodes with a high number 
of references (over 40) and green boxes represent nodes with a moderate to low number of 
references (below 40). Source: Author  
 
The word clouds have been translated within the visualisations to allow for 
better understanding of the positioning of words, their prominence, and thus 
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their underlying value to the participants’ discourse. From a linguistic 
perspective, all the word clouds share a textual feature of vagueness of 
expression. There are several mentions of ‘I don’t know’, ‘somebody’, 
‘somewhere’, ‘somehow’, ‘something’, ‘maybe’/’perhaps’ and variations 
thereof. These expressions point towards an overarching trend of corruption 
being a nebulous concept to describe precisely and this further reinforces the 
need for studies like mine to be conducted. However, there are still interesting 
trends to observe that provide deeper insight into the participants’ 
understanding of corruption and it was absolutely crucial to make sure that the 
initial analytical steps for this category are again conducted manually first to be 
able to pick out trends that go beyond the use of software tools. With its wide 
scope of focus on definitions, understanding and perceptions of corruption, the 
section is instrumental in addressing the overarching research question (To what 
extent is the theoretical difference between grand and petty corruption 
reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health 
care?), as well as RQ3 more specifically (What are the strategies utilised to 
carry out grand and petty corrupt practices?). 
 
9.2 Definitions of corruption 
 
This node was compiled primarily from the responses to the question: ‘What do 
you understand by the term ‘corruption’?’ This question came early on in all the 
interviews and focus groups, in order to gain unfettered access to the 
participants’ instinctive and uncensored responses early on, before they have 
had a chance to answer the rest of the questions and shape their view 
accordingly. This was a crucial steppingstone to getting their genuine responses 
before a level of depth was applied to probing their understanding further with 
additional questions. These included for example: ‘Where do you think 
corruption is most frequent? What kind of conditions are needed for corruption 
to thrive?’ It is obvious from Examples 9.1 and 9.2 (overleaf) that the manual 
analysis was able to pick up on the language used by participants to describe 
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what corruption is, according to their understanding. The green highlighting 
portrays the expressions and word choice that the participants used, and red 
circles narrow this down to specific words relating to the idea of gaining an 
‘advantage’, as this appeared to be a frequent type of response. The responses 
include language such as: výhoda (advantage), uprednostňovať (preferential 
treatment), benefit (benefit), finančný obnos (financial sum), všimné (attention 
payment), úplatky (bribes), pozornosť (attention payment), kontakty (contacts), 
služba (service), protislužba (counter service- exchange of), nabok (on the side), 
navyše (extra) and others. In connection with these words there were frequently 
mentions of: najmä (mainly), typicky (typically), or proste (simply). Whilst this 
indicated that the participants showed insight into the varied nature of corrupt 
transactions and are describing the kinds of corruption they find to be most 
common, it also points to the awareness that corruption is not exclusive to the 
cases described, but rather merely typical. This further points to the need for 
qualitative research to be conducted into corruption, because simple 
quantitative measures involving questionnaires or polls are unable to pick up on 




Example 9.1 and 9.2- Manual analysis of ‘Definitions of corruption’ with translation, green and red sections corresponding. Source: Author 
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The word frequency generated to the 60 most frequent words of this node is 
skewed slightly, due to the inclusion of language fillers, such as prepositions, 
conjunctions, different grammatical forms and cases of the same words- 
shortcomings that relate to NVivo’s inability to pick out similar words in Slovak 
and automatically discard language fillers as described in previous sections. 
However, it is still showing interesting trends which relate to corruption being 
associated with financial advantages, bribes, but also exchange of services, as 
seen in the highlighted words in Table 9.1.  




Niečo (something)  5  35  2.85%  niečo  
Korupcia (corruption)  8  18  1.47%  korupcia  
Môže (it can)  4  16  1.30%  môže  
Peniaze (money)  7  14  1.14%  peniaze  
Nejaký (some kind)  6  10  0.81%  nejaký  
Proste (simply)  6  10  0.81%  proste  
Dám (I will give)  3  9  0.73%  dám  
Nejaké (some kind, neuter)  6  8  0.65%  nejaké  
Podľa (according to)  5  8  0.65%  podľa  
Známosti (acquaintances, 
contacts)  
8  7  0.57%  známosti  
Máš (you have)  3  6  0.49%  máš  
Myslím (I think)  6  6  0.49%  myslím  
Výhodu (advantage, accusative 
case)  
6  6  0.49%  výhodu  
Bonboniéru (box of chocolates)  10  5  0.41%  bonboniéru  
Dáš (you will give)  3  5  0.41%  dáš  
Korupciu (corruption, acc case)  8  5  0.41%  korupciu  
Nemusí (does not have to)  6  5  0.41%  nemusí  
Neviem (I don’t know)  6  5  0.41%  neviem  
Služba (service)  6  5  0.41%  služba  
Zase (again)  4  5  0.41%  zase  
Chcem (I want)  5  4  0.33%  chcem  
Chceš (you want)  5  4  0.33%  chceš  
Dať (to give)  3  4  0.33%  dať  
Dostal (he got)  6  4  0.33%  dostal  
Finančne (financially)  8  4  0.33%  finančne  
Lepšie (better)  6  4  0.33%  lepšie  
Navyše (extra, surplus)  6  4  0.33%  navyše  
Nič (nothing)  3  4  0.33%  nič  
Niekoho (someone)  7  4  0.33%  niekoho  
Občiansky (civil)  9  4  0.33%  občiansky  
Potom (after)  5  4  0.33%  potom  
Presne (exactly)  6  4  0.33%  presne  
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Službu (service, acc)  6  4  0.33%  službu  
Služieb (services)  7  4  0.33%  služieb  
Súhlasím (I agree)  8  4  0.33%  súhlasím  
Úplatky (bribes)  7  4  0.33%  úplatky  
Výmena (exchange)  6  4  0.33%  výmena  
Zákona (the law)  6  4  0.33%  zákona  
Berú (they take)  4  3  0.24%  berú  
Človek (a person)  6  3  0.24%  človek  
Dni (days)  3  3  0.24%  dni  
Dostať (to get)  6  3  0.24%  dostať  
Dva (two)  3  3  0.24%  dva  
Finančná (financial, feminine)  8  3  0.24%  finančná  
Finančné (financial, neuter)  8  3  0.24%  finančné  
Forma (form)  5  3  0.24%  forma  
Ísť (to go)  3  3  0.24%  ísť  
Lekárovi (to the docto)  8  3  0.24%  lekárovi  
Moja (mine)  4  3  0.24%  moja  
Nad (over)  3  3  0.24%  nad  
Nejaká (some kind, feminine)  6  3  0.24%  nejaká  
Pod (under)  3  3  0.24%  pod  
Povedal (he said)  7  3  0.24%  povedal  
Pozornosť (attention payment)  9  3  0.24%  pozornosť  
Prednostne (preferentially)  10  3  0.24%  prednostne  
Protislužba (counter-service)  11  3  0.24%  protislužba  
Protislužbu (counter-
service, acc)  
11  3  0.24%  protislužbu  
Skôr (early, rather)  4  3  0.24%  skôr  
Sme (we are)  3  3  0.24%  sme  
Všimné (attention payment)  6  3  0.24%  všimné 
Table 9.1 Frequency search of node ‘Definitions of corruption’ set at 60 words with 
translations embedded. Highlighting denotes all nouns associated with corruption. Source: 
Author 
As mentioned in the introduction and shown in Table 9.1 above, the word with 
greatest frequency and prominence is the word ‘something’, with nearly twice 
as many occurrences as the second most frequent word, ‘corruption’. While this 
points to the general elusive nature of the definition for corruption, it is also 
important to understand that in spoken language and vernacular, this word can 
also be used in the context of ‘It is something like this…something to do 
with…something that looks like…’ and as such doesn’t necessarily contain 
meaning in and of itself. Having said that, it is obvious from the highlighted 
words in the table that the trends picked out by the manual analysis are visible 
in the software-generated analysis too, increasing the reliability of the findings. 
Corruption is mostly associated with monetary and financial context, but there 
are also several mentions of service exchange, attention payments, contacts, 
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advantages, and preferential treatments. The participants try and make a very 
clear distinction between the language for bribery and that of gratitude but 
when they are asked to conceptualise corruption in their own minds, these 
previously carefully delineated concepts conflate into one. It would indicate 
that the participants are aware of the parallels between these terms. However, 
there is clearly a socially constructed trend leading them to make a distinction 
between these terms for one to be operationally and practically convenient at 
given times.  
 
 
Figure 9.2 Word frequency cloud for node ‘Definitions of corruption’ set at 60 words, the 
size and proximity to the centre denotes prominence of words. Translations embedded in 
red. Source: Author 
The more readily interpreted visual depiction of the frequency results is seen in 
Figure 9.2. The greater the size of the word and its proximity to the centre, the 
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greater its frequency of use and relative weighting to the rest of the words. The 
wide variety of words used to describe corruption both in a synonymic capacity, 
as well as a descriptive capacity, is clear from the depiction. The biggest 
association is that with money, finances, or advantages and there are also 
frequent mentions to services, contacts, and attention. From the perspective of 
verbs, these are centred around the idea of taking, giving, exchanging, getting, 
and wanting. Corruption, in the view of the participants, is therefore a complex 
issue that includes references to monetary, as well as immaterial and informal 
gifts and practices and is not a straightforward definition. It is a definition based 
on conditions, uncertainty, blurred lines, but definitely with a dominant 
transactional dimension to it and elements of personal desire. 
9.3 Corruption in the media 
 
This node was created as an amalgamation of responses to the question: ‘How 
does it make you feel to see a corruption scandal publicised in the media?’ in the 
hope that in their responses, the participants would let me in on the specific 
language they would use to cope with the reality of corruption. It is shown that a 
lot of the time the media do shape the populace’s view of corruption and 
corruption measures taken by the government (Gallina 2013, Naxera 2015) and I 
felt it was important to gauge the participants’ stances on the subject. The 
initial manual analysis (as seen in Examples 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5, 9.6 overleaf) was 
able to delineate three separate sections of interest within the node: in yellow 
the specific language and word choice to describe their feelings is visible, the 
green highlighter represents expressions of language that show a perceived lack 
of consequences in the country for corrupt behaviour, and red boxes represent a 
lethargic, defeatist language as coping mechanism.  
The language in the yellows is quite repetitive and includes expressions of lack 
of surprise, anger, frustration, and helplessness. The green presents the 
judiciary branch and law enforcement in a bad light. This is intriguing because 
the participants also regularly expressed sentiments that suggested they held 
the view not enough cases were being prosecuted. The red, most worryingly, 
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buttresses the impression expressed in an earlier chapter of the thesis, which 
outlines the civil society being quite inactive in the fight against corruption and 
the general passivity in the civil forum  (Buncak, Dzambazovic et al. 2009, 
Nemec 2018). The language used by my participants embodies expressions 
normalising the behaviour, marking corruption as ‘standard’, ‘everyday matter’ 
and makes it clear that in their view there’s nothing that can realistically be 
done about it: ‘What can you as one person do about it? Yeah, but what can you 
do… Everyone does it… One expects this kind of thing in Central 
Europe…Nothing changes… It’s a standard thing these days… It’s really 
commonplace…Nothing gets done’. Interestingly, the participants do not just 
allude to cases of grand corruption, more likely to be televised, but also to those 
cases of petty corruption that have been brought to light and that appear to 
them ‘ridiculous’ in comparison (for example, doctors being victimised for taking 
a duck as informal payments in comparison with millions of EUR of EU funds 
misappropriated for agricultural or road-development projects). It is possible 
that the tolerance of petty corrupt acts gets reinforced in the public rhetoric by 
the specific presentation by the media and juxtaposition of ridiculous cases with 





Example 9.3 and 9.4- Manual analysis of node ‘Media Scandals’ with translation, green and red sections corresponding, orange corresponds to yellow 




Example 9.5 and 9.6- Manual analysis of node ‘Media Scandals’ with translation continued, green and red sections corresponding, orange corresponds to 
yellow highlighter. Source: Author 
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Interestingly, the language used in the green, which points to a perceived lack of 
consequences, is validated by a recent televised debate on the topic Gift vs a 
Bribe by the weekly paper tyzden.sk49. In response to viewer questions, the 
panel (consisting of a Special prosecutor for corruption, Special Court judge for 
corruption, a lawyer specialising in medical litigation, and a data analyst on 
corruption) unanimously agreed that actions falling into the category of petty 
corruption (including gratitude payments regardless of the timing of giving) 
rarely get criminally prosecuted and if they do, the sentence is always explicitly 
symbolic, such as a fine and/or a warning. This room for interpretation, rather 
than explicit rules and regulations, seems to be entirely at the discretion of the 
prosecutor and the judge. It would therefore appear that such feelings of 
perceived lack of repercussions in the language of my participants are at least to 
some extent validated and confirmed by the standards set up by the legal 
handling of the corruption cases coming before the courts. The official 
government statistics on this on its website, vlada.gov.sk/statistiky/, claim 367 
logged cases of corruption in 2015, out of which only 79 were prosecuted and 
the statistic itself has not been updated since 201650. 
Table 9.2 (overleaf) denoting the frequency word search for node ‘Media 
scandal’, set up for 50 most frequent words after manually removing several 
conjunctions and interjections, presents a slightly more nuanced picture than 
the negative outlook of the initial manual analysis. It is interesting that the word 
‘hope’ has made it so far up the list of frequent words, juxtaposed with the 
most frequent word ‘nothing’, both as answers to what publicised corruption 
scandals make the participants feel. It would appear that the view of the 
participants is not entirely glum and uniformly sceptical, but there appears to be 
some balancing of emotions as well. Having said that, the vast majority of the 
highlighted words represent lack of surprise, frustration, expressions of repeated 
 
49 See whole debate shared in a public forum 
here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_kC6b0hxx4 [last accessed 9/11/2020] 
 
50 For more details, visit https://www.vlada.gov.sk/statistiky/ [last accessed 17/02/2021]. 
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behaviour and more worryingly than not, include corruption into everyday 
discourse with words expressing recurrence and embeddedness, such as: ‘again’, 
‘everywhere’, ‘commonplace’, ‘everything’, ‘normal’ or ‘a part of’ [life]. This 
node has been revelatory in its capacity to showcase how my participants really 
feel about everyday displays of corruption in the public platform. More research 
would need to be conducted into ascertaining whether their view is directly 
shaped and influenced by the media’s portrayal of the phenomenon, or rather 
reflected by it. 
Word  Length  Count  Weighted 
Percentage  
Similar Words  
Nič (nothing)  3  9  1.54%  nič  
Človek (a person)  6  7  1.20%  človek  
Pocit (a feeling)  5  6  1.03%  pocit  
Neprekvapuje (it does not 
surprise)  
12  5  0.85%  neprekvapuje  
Ľudia (people)  5  4  0.68%  ľudia  
Niečo (something)  5  4  0.68%  niečo  
Zase (again)  4  4  0.68%  zase  
Dobrý (good)  5  3  0.51%  dobrý  
Nádej (hope)  5  3  0.51%  nádej  
Nejaké (some kind)  6  3  0.51%  nejaké  
Proste (simply)  6  3  0.51%  proste  
Udeje (it will happen)  5  3  0.51%  udeje  
Vela (a lot)  4  3  0.51%  veľa  
Vôbec ([not] at all)  5  3  0.51%  vôbec  
Všade (everywhere)  5  3  0.51%  všade  
Všetko (everything)  6  3  0.51%  všetko  
Berieme (we take)  7  2  0.34%  berieme  
Berú (they take)  4  2  0.34%  berú  
Dostal (he got)  6  2  0.34%  dostal  
Ďalej (further  5  2  0.34%  ďalej  
Fakt (really)  4  2  0.34%  fakt  
Frustrujúce (frustrating)  11  2  0.34%  frustrujúce  
Korupcie (corruption, 
prepositional)  
8  2  0.34%  korupcie  
Ľudí (people)  4  2  0.34%  ľudí  
Môže (it can)  4  2  0.34%  môže  
Môžem (I can)  5  2  0.34%  môžem  
Nedeje (is not happening)  6  2  0.34%  nedeje  
Nejaká (some kind of, feminine)  6  2  0.34%  nejaká  
Nerobím (I don’t do)  7  2  0.34%  nerobím, nerobíme  
Neviem (I don’t know)  6  2  0.34%  neviem  
Nevnímam (I don’t perceive)  8  2  0.34%  nevnímam  
Nijaký (none)  6  2  0.34%  nijaký  
Normálne (normal, standard)  8  2  0.34%  normálne  
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Smiešne (ridiculous, laughable)  7  2  0.34%  smiešne  
Strane (side)  6  2  0.34%  strane  
Súčasť (a part of)  6  2  0.34%  súčasť  
Určite (certainly)  6  2  0.34%  určite  
Úplatky (bribes)  7  2  0.34%  úplatky  
Viem (I know)  4  2  0.34%  viem  
Zas (again)  3  2  0.34%  zas  
Znechutený (disgusted)  10  2  0.34%  znechutený  
Akej (which)  4  1  0.17%  akej  
Aké (which, plural)  3  1  0.17%  aké  
Bariéru (barrier)  7  1  0.17%  bariéru  
Bezmocnosť (helplessness)  10  1  0.17%  bezmocnosť  
Bezplatné (free, fee-free)  9  1  0.17%  bezplatné  
Bežná (commonplace)  5  1  0.17%  bežná  
Bežnú (commonplace, acc case)  5  1  0.17%  bežnú  
Blížim (I am approaching)  6  1  0.17%  blížim  
Boja (they fear)  4  1  0.17%  boja  
Table 9.2 Frequency search of node ‘Media scandal’ set at 60 words with translations 
embedded. Highlighting denotes all nouns associated with feelings about the. media. 
Source: Author 
 
In a visual representation of the frequency shown overleaf in Figure 9.3, it is 
important to note the prominence of the word ‘neprekvapuje’ (‘it does not 
surprise’) and its proximity to the word ‘človek’ (a person). The participants in 
that way are expressing what they believe to be the general feeling of all 
people. I did expect to see language of scepticism, but expressions such as 
‘disgusted’, ‘frustrated’ and ‘helpless’ underline with acute insistence that the 
study and the curbing of corruption is a very relevant endeavour in this region 
(the region as a whole displays trends of significant portions of household 
expenditure being used for subsidising corrupt practices (Szende and Culyer 
2006), and that corruption as a whole is understood by real life participants in 




Figure 9.3 Word frequency cloud for node ‘Media scandals’ set at 50 words, the size and 
proximity to the centre denotes prominence of words. Translations embedded in red. 
Source: Author  
 
 
9.4 Corruption level comparison with neighbouring states 
 
This node did not necessarily look for responses of insight and/or expertise to 
the question: ‘Where do you feel Slovakia ranks with regards to corruption levels 
in comparison to its neighbouring states?’. Rather, the purpose was to make the 
participants think critically about Slovakia’s corruption levels in comparison to 




Example 9.7 and 9.8 Manual analysis of node ‘Neighbours comparison’ with translations embedded. Source: Author 
The Examples 9.7 and 9.8 with embedded translations contain references to similarity between corruption levels among the neighbouring 
countries in yellow, greens are unsure, and reds indicate where participants thought that Slovakia is worse off than other countries 
surrounding it. 
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Interestingly, 13 out of the 19 responses in this node indicated that participants 
thought Slovakia was on a similar level to its neighbours, and the most frequent 
reference of comparison was with the Czech Republic. This underlines the 
ongoing relationship and closeness between the two countries. This observation 
reflects the research already conducted into corruption for the CEE region and 
for the Czech Republic specifically, which shows similarities of corruption levels 
and also similarities of specific sectors affected, including health care, 
education, law enforcement etc (Grodeland, Koshechkina et al. 1998, Puček 
2014, Koudelková, Strielkowski et al. 2015). The main difference lies in the fact 
that while health care may figure on one of the top 5-10 spots of affected 
sectors in the Visegrad Group countries, nowhere is it as consistently high as in 
Slovakia. This may be due to a less active civil society in Slovakia, but also due 
to the worse state of healthcare than in neighbouring countries. A 2016 study 
into the performance of health care systems in the Visegrad countries found 
Slovakia to be the 3rd out of the 4 countries with both the Czech Republic and 
Poland ahead, in terms of health care performance, quality, and efficiency of 
service delivery for the population (Dlouhy 2016). There is evidence to suggest 
that the working conditions for doctors in the neighbouring countries are better 
and a lot of Slovak doctors (over 2,000 in 2017)51 left for primarily the Czech 
Republic, creating the impression that the working conditions and state of 
health care is worse in Slovakia than it is in neighbouring countries, leading to 
more serious problems. Therefore, it appears that the participants’ observations 
in this research project are astute and in line with the research on corruption 
within the Visegrad countries.  
The participants even alluded to thinking that similar types of sectors will be 
affected by corruption, healthcare included. Only 3 responses thought that 
Slovakia was worse off than its neighbouring countries in levels of corruption 
 
51 For more details on the brain drain statistic, visit https://www.techmed.sk/4211-slovenskych-
lekarov-pracuje-v-zahranici/ [last accessed 17/02/2021]. 
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and, on several occasions, references were made to the whole of ‘Central 
Europe’ without any prompting. The language included phrases such as: podobní 
(similar), nie je veľký rozdiel (there’s not a big difference), na rovnakej úrovni 
(on the same level), rovnako (the same), narovnako (the same), veľmi prepojení 
(very interconnected) and similar.  This indicates that the general understanding 
of corruption by participants does not encompass only Slovakia but brings the 
region in spontaneously as one entity. It would be prudent to conduct more 
research on corruption in a qualitative manner within this region going forward, 
as the general indication from participants’ responses here is that there is a 
possibility that any observations from a sector in one country may be relevant 
region-wide and across countries. 
However, as is obvious from Figure 9.4 overleaf, the most prominent and most 
frequently used word when addressing this question is ‘neviem’ (I don’t know) 
and is used 11 times in total within this node, in sharp contrast to the second 
most frequent ‘určite’ (definitely). It is therefore impossible to make any kind of 
definitive conclusions from this particular node, but it is of value to see what 
the participants’ language portrays in terms of their understanding of corruption 
as a concept and that there is a level of contradiction and discrepancy in the 
understanding. They do not see this as a Slovakia-specific issue, but rather as an 
issue that bears a similar look outwardly to states who share a similar history 





Figure 9.4 Word frequency cloud for node ‘Neighbours comparison’ set at 50 words, the 
size and proximity to the centre denotes prominence of words. Translations embedded in 
red. Source: Author 
9.5 General perceptions of corruption  
This section denoting its eponymous node was by far the largest one in number 
of words and references to analyse. It contained a lot of miscellaneous 
information that the participants mentioned in their responses that related to 
nothing specific other than their general observations regarding corruption or 
general information they had, as well as their levels of awareness of corruption. 
This node had over 120 references coded against it and some of these were also 
coded under different nodes that they related to on a direct or marginal level. I 
was able to group some prominent references into several groups under this 
node, in order to give a better idea of what the coded responses related to. 
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Following the principle of repetition and forcefulness, these groups, based on 
their prevalence in the node, included, but were not exclusive to:  
• ‘How widespread is corruption in Slovakia’ (12% of references [of this node]) 
• ‘How corruption used to be and how is it today’ (12% of references) 
• ‘How to tackle corruption’ (10% of references) 
• ‘Has there been any progress made on this front so far’ (5% of references) 
• ‘Why corruption is so widespred’ (17.4% of references) 
• ‘Allusions to fear’ (5.5% of references). 
 
9.5.1 How widespread is corruption in Slovakia? 
Each of these groups included language that was characteristic of a certain 
viewpoint. For the first group addressing the levels of the spread of corruption, 
the corresponding question was: ‘Do you think that corruption is widespread in 
Slovakia? If so, where and why?’ The responses included the following: celkovo 
(overall), všade (everywhere), skoro až súčasť kultúry (almost like a part of the 
culture), všeobecne známy problém (a generally well-known problem), všade 
úplne všade sa kradne (everywhere, stealing is going on everywhere), určite áno 
(definitely yes), áno určite (yes definitely), horší problém proste nie je (there’s 
not a worse problem out there), je to rozsiahle vo všetkých sektoroch (it’s 
widespread across all sectors), na Slovensku určite (in Slovakia definitely), vo 
všetkých oblastiach (in all sectors), bežné (common), rozľahlý problém (a 
widespread problem), súčasť každodenného života (a part of everyday life), ja 
to počúvam z každej strany (I keep hearing this from everywhere), celé 
Slovensko (across all of Slovakia). These responses encompass 15 participants out 
of the 15 references allocated to this group (i.e. 100% of responses) and present 
their unanimous view of corruption being uncontestably widespread across the 
country. In their view, corruption has permeated all sectors and all walks of life 
and the allusions to the problem being ‘standard’ or ‘part of the culture’ point 
to the extent of the phenomenon being ingrained in everyday thinking.  
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9.5.2 How corruption used to be and how is it today? 
The responses in this group of references relate to observations made by the 
participants about the state of corruption in the current climate, as per their 
understanding, and to their knowledge on how corruption has developed over 
the years. The language included the following:  
 
• Now it’s presented more like corruption, before it was something normal (Sa to 
prezentuje viac ako korupcia než predtým sa to bralo ako niečo normálne ELITE1),  
 
• It’s a bit different it’s gone in a different direction- there’s room for corruption 
now (Je to iné, posunulo sa to iným smerom- priestor na korupciu je tam ELITE3),  
 
• It’s everywhere where there is some state department that makes decisions (Kde 
vlastne je nejaký štátny úrad a o niečom rozhoduje ELITE3),  
 
• It’s not getting curbed because the laws are not changing radically (Neustupuje to 
lebo zákony sa nejako radikálne nemenia ELITE5),  
 
• I don’t think that at all that health care is the most affected, but maybe because 
it’s got the greatest tradition of it [corruption]) (To si vôbec nemyslím, že 
zdravotníctvo je najviac ovplyvnené možno to má najväčšiu tradíciu FG4.1),  
 
• Yeah, I think it’s tipping towards phoning someone rather than paying directly 
these days(Áno a skôr že sa to preklápa do toho že zavolám niekomu FG4.4),  
 
• Yeah, it happened to me last time when I was at the doctors and I didn’t give them 
anything and my friend was looking at me saying-  why did you not give them 
anything? Why should I? Well you know, what if you need them again?( Áno mne sa 
minule stalo že keď som bola u doktora pozerala na mňa známa, že a vy ste mu 
nič nedali? Prečo by som mala? No ale to ste mali dať, čo keď ho budete nabudúce 
potrebovať? FG4.4)  
 
• No, people are definitely pissed off about it, some moan about it all the time that 
it’s so visible on the lifestyle they [doctors] have, whether it’s true or not that 
they take money- I mean you cannot be abe to afford some of these things if you 
are just a normal person with normal pay (Nie, ľudí to nasiera určite, niektorí 
pindajú neskutočne, je to vidno na životnom štýle či je to pravda alebo nie- 
nemôžeš si jednoducho dovoliť toho čo si normálny človek nedovolí INT1),  
 
• Things simply do not work and you can try and appear as if you want to do good, 
but if your kid doesn’t get taken to a good school- what are you going to do? (Veci 
proste nefungujú a keď sa chceš tváriť že chceš po dobrom, ale keď ti nezoberú 
decko do dobrej školy, čo spravíš FG4.4).  
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It is obvious here that there is no real pattern of responses in this group, but 
there are allusions to the stagnation of solutions aimed at corruption and lack 
of legislative action perceived. The participants also allude to corruption 
having developed and changed its façade over the years and become more 
serious and ostentatious. There is also evidence of the tradition of giving 
bribes/gifts, as well as receiving judgmental comments by others when this is 
not done.  
9.5.3 How to tackle corruption 
This group of responses outlines the spontaneous opinions given by participants 
not in answer to any particular question, but as observations of how corruption 
could be tackled from their points of view, specifically in health care. The 
language used included the following phrases from the 12 references coded:  
•  If corruption does not start to get punished somehow, then... (Pokiaľ sa nezačne 
tá korupcia nejako trestať, tak...FG4.2) 
 
• I think maybe we should try and copy what another country where the system 
works better does and try adapt that or something... (Ja si myslím, že to 
odpozerať od nejakej inej krajiny a proste skúsiť to prispôsobiť od modelu, kde 
to funguje...FG1.3) 
 
•  That’s not really an answerable question [how to fix it]. Maybe some other type 
of health insurance where you pay for some basic level of care, then higher and 
then even higher... (To je nezodpovedateľné...Možno nejaký iný systém toho 
zdravotného poistenia, že platíš si základné, nejaké vyššie a ešte vyššie...FG1.7) 
 
• But the doctor can refuse it and it [the solution] is a question of when they all 
start doing that really.. (Ale ten doktor to môže odmietnuť. A to je len otázka 
toho, že to začnú konečne odmietať...FG4.1) 
 
•  [about a whistleblower in the workplace]... It’s about the fact that somebody 
went and decided to do it and I admire it, but also know that she will not be 
getting another job in Slovnaft... (Ale je to o tom, ze sa niekto rozhodol a ja to 
takisto obdivujem ale takisto viem, že už v Slovnafte robotu nedostane FG4.1)  
 
• I mean if there were more CT machines for example, then by nature yeah, it 
wouldn’t be that difficult to get an appointment...(Tak keby bolo viac tých CTčiek 
alebo čo tak nie je problém dostať termín...FG4.2) 
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• If there were at least a few exemplary cases, then maybe people would get 
spooked... (Keby bolo aspoň zopár exemplárnych prípadov, tak by sa aspoň niekto 
zľakol...) 
 
• I think it’s about setting an example yourself as an individual... (Ja si myslím, že 
ísť príkladom, to je to, čo máš robiť ako jedinec...FG4.4) 
 
• And there should be greater oversight. And there should be some control of how 
they [doctors] come by property... (A mala by tam byť väčšia kontrola. A nejakým 
spôsobom by mala byť nejaká kontrola nadobudnutia majetku...INT1) 
 
From these responses it is obvious that a few strands of opinions are prevalent 
and these are the contesting opinions of greater oversight/stronger legislation, 
versus the opinion of starting from personal decisions to curb corrupt behaviour. 
There is also a suggestion of fine tuning the health insurance policy, as Slovakia 
currently operates on a half-privatised system. Better insurance policies, 
alongside regulation of predatory pricing, are a suggestion that is made in public 
discourse often, as one of the solutions of illegal bribes for skipping waiting lists 
and similar (UN 2011, Gaitonde, Oxman et al. 2016, Weissman 2016). The same 
suggestion was brought in by two elite interviews from my sample (ELITE2 and 
ELITE5).  
9.5.4 Has there been any progress made on this front so far? 
Several participants expressed the opinion that there has already been some 
progress made in their view. These came predominantly from elite level 
interviews with greater insight into the problematic from within the sector. For 
example, an employee in a pharmaceutical quality assurance firm stated that: 
‘In some branches we have already made fairly significant steps forward. For 
example, in the pricing of medicines- I think we are doing very well there 
because of the European framework of prices, which means we have to work 
with an average of three lowest prices in the EU’ (ELITE8).  Another elite 
interview of a university professor looking into corruption from the point of view 
of international business outlined that: ‘I think this is kind of generational at 
this stage. When we watch these affairs unfold and a lot of the time you see 
the younger workers in the state department and in the public sector come 
forward as whistle-blowers because they can no longer stand by. I would hope 
this trend continues and they are increasingly unable to avert their eyes from 
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this’ (ELITE3). Some members of the public also expressed their hopeful views: 
‘I think it’s moving in the right direction’ (FG3.3) ‘I think the awareness is 
increasing, as is the moral learning curve’ (INT1). Overall, there appears to be 
examples of hopefulness and a definite perception of the participants that 
perpetual corrupt behaviour is not an unalterable outcome in Slovakia.  
9.5.5 Why is corruption so widespread? 
This group of references is the most populated one and offers several strands of 
understanding and reasoning by the participants. The original question that 
prompted most of these responses was: ‘What conditions do you think must exist 
in a society to let corruption thrive and develop?’ The reasons/conditions for 
corruption include by and large economic references to inequality and a badly 
managed transition from centralised to market economy, for example:  
• ‘supply-demand (ponuka-dopyt ELITE1),  
• opening of the market ( otvorenie trhu ELITE3),  
• problems would be of a different nature- competition ( problémy by boli potom 
iné-konkurenčné FG4.1),  
• small market ( malý trh FG4.4),  
• room to manipulate high-level resources ( možnosti manipulácie s vysokými 
zdrojmi INT1),  
• big societal differences ( veľké spoločenské rozdiely INT1),  
• there was no need to steal before because of the massive central planning ( 
predtým kvôli tomu centrálnemu plánovaniu nebola taká potreba kradnúť INT1)’.  
They also include references to an insufficient amount of resources and a failure 
of the system which then lead to the inevitability of corruption:  
• you constantly have to beg [to get what you’re entitled to] ( fakt sa musíte 
doprosovať INT10),  
• the system works so badly ( systém funguje tak zle INT14),  
• the system is so badly set up ( systém je tak zle nastavený INT2),  
• the system is set up in a way that means you can’t get by without corruption 
(systém je nastavený tak, že bez tej korupcie neprejdeš INT4),  
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• it is inevitable- if you don’t want to die, pay (nevyhnutné- nechceš zomrieť, zaplať 
INT2),  
• classic horror stories about not being able to get access to things’ (ELITE7).  
 
Last but not least the participants also presented their views on the remnants of 
traditions and the personal choices that people make to take part in corruption:  
• the people have become more greedy ( ľudia sa stali hamyžnejšími INT1),  
• there is no basic morale here (tu neexistuje základná morálka FG4.4),  
• those grandmothers would always bring those geese and those ducks to the doctors 
(vždy tam tie babky nosili tie husy a kačice tým doktorom FG4.2). 
 
Clearly, the participants are very much aware of the variety of reasons that exist 
and most likely interact to create the conditions for corrupt behaviour. Quite 
astutely, they point out the relation between corruption levels and economic 
factors relating to the transition from centralised Soviet economy to the open 
capitalist market economy, which is the argument made by several scholars in 
literature (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997, Goel and Budak 2006). The 
addressing of the systemic insufficiencies is also mentioned to a comparable 
extent, as well as the factor of morality and personal choice. 
9.5.6 Allusions to fear 
The final group in this category is most likely also the one that had the starkest 
resonance during interviews and focus groups. The participants alluded several 
times to instances of engaging with corruption as a result of fearing for their 
health and loved ones. One elite interview with a doctor from the UK who spent 
some time in the healthcare sector in Slovakia outlined specifically that: ‘they 
may not talk about it outwardly or be particularly proud of the fact that they 
might use these underhand mechanisms to ensure the safety of their families 
and health of their loved ones. (ELITE7)’ Other participants also used similar 
language: ‘Health is basically just fear for your husband, kids, your parents. It’s 
a sensitive subject and it is your life that is at stake’; ‘I don’t think people 
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really think about it too much- If you have to, you’d give a kidney [to get 
well].’ There were also parts of the ‘allusions to fear’ group that actually 
referred to the fear of reporting corruption in light of the possible 
consequences. This was also affected by the recent murder of a Slovak 
investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, who was looking into 
corruption in high echelons of the government and this ultimately toppled the 
last Fico government in 2018: ‘Until you are personally affected by it, you won’t 
really say a word about corruption’. ‘No one wants to end up like Kuciak’. 
However, on two occasions in Focus Group 3 there were also references to the 
courage of the press and certain amount of pride in taken in that: ‘All 
investigative journalists are going forward, they’re not afraid’, ‘It feels like it’s 
finally getting a move on in the right direction’. The Slovak press have actually 
done very well in the past few years in the World Press Freedom Index, ending 
up above France and the UK and the Czech Republic in 2020 and over 50 spaces 
higher than Hungary52. Additionally, there have been fundamental changes in the 
Slovak Prosecutor General’s office in 2020 with several judges (13 to date), as 
well as ex-Chief of Police, ex-Chief of the Criminal Agency (NAKA), and several 
other influential politicians (including the ex-Shadow secretary for justice 
Monika Jankovská) arrested and charged with corruption-related charges and 
their connection to the named defendant in the case of Kuciak’s murder, Marian 
Kočner53. The participants of this study included their observations as private 
citizens on the status quo in their understanding of corruption and its 
development in Slovakia in present day. 
The word cloud generated for this section for ‘General perceptions of 
corruption’ (Figure 9.5 overleaf) resonates deeply for several reasons. First, the 
fact that the word ‘I think’ is at the very centre buttresses the fact that real 
understanding of the participants is explored here, as opposed to possible 
 




zasah-naka-online.html [last accessed 30/11/2020] 
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expressions of certainty like ‘I heard’ or ‘I know’. Other words holding 
prominence are those of, for example: ‘people’, ‘a problem’, ‘corruption’, 
‘definitely’, or ‘everywhere’. It is clear from the general connotation of these 
words and their central position that the participants recognise the connection 
between corruption and its pervasiveness with the role that people, rather than 
society or culture, play in their word choice. In a way, there is a sense of 
encouragement to be derived from this very simple visualisation, as it shows the 
ownership of decision-making. It also shows the grey areas of corruption 
understanding that the general public do not know how to categorise: ‘nothing’, 
‘something’, ‘everywhere’, ‘everyone’, ‘a person’, ‘maybe’, ‘somewhere’, ‘I 
don’t know’, ‘some’, ‘a feeling’ etc. It is these areas that deserve more 
exploration and clarification by future research and systemic measures. 
 
Figure 9.5 Word frequency cloud for node ‘General perceptions of corruption’ set at 50 
words, the size and proximity to the centre denotes prominence of words. Translations 
embedded in red. Source: Author 
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9.6 Conclusions  
 
This chapter has outlined several salient points regarding corruption 
understanding embedded in the participant responses. In the definitions section 
of corruption, it is obvious that the participants are more likely to understand 
corruption in terms of financial gain, but are not ignorant to other shapes that 
corruption can take, for example exchanges of services or certain types of gifts. 
In any case, the idea of gaining an advantage over others is emphasised and at 
the centre of the participant discourse.  
For media, it is clear that the participants show awareness of the problem of 
corruption and their attitudes towards the presentation of corruption in the 
public forum are sceptical and unsurprised. The forcefulness of the language 
displayed in words such as ‘helplessness’, ‘disgust’ and also ‘frustration’ points 
to the participant awareness of the seriousness of the problem and a strong 
condemnation of it. There is also indication of defeatist language throughout 
which denotes the corrupt behaviour explored in the media as culturally 
embedded and normalised. 
The comparison of corruption levels with neighbouring states points to a 
congruence between the participant views and existing literature and theory on 
the subject. The participants mostly believe that Slovakia is doing similarly to its 
neighbouring states with regards to corruption levels and the strongest 
comparison drawn is with the Czech Republic. The participant understanding 
points to the possibility of sectoral recommendations and improvements in 
corruption in one country to have the potential to induce change in similar 
sectors of neighbouring states. The similarity of the socio-economic 
development and of the historical legacies of these countries in CEE contributes 
to the shaping of the understanding of lasting phenomena by the participants.  
Last but not least, the general perceptions of corruption section addresses 
several facets of the phenomenon for participants. The observations of language 
in this section point to the participant belief that corruption is indeed a 
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widespread problem that targets several sectors, and they also provide their 
views on the main factors conditioning the status quo. The participants overall 
believe that the economic disparity in the country is one of the key factors, as is 
a bad systemic set up for healthcare, and also the personal attitudes of 
individuals to corrupt exchanges. The participants believe that individual 
decisions and morality play a part in how corruption has been allowed to spread. 
The recommendations for tackling corruption range from tougher legislation and 
its enforcement to setting an example personally and making the right choices. 
There were also insights provided by mostly elite participants of progress already 
made in the field of corruption. Finally, the participants outlined an interesting 
discussion into the role of fear in corruption, which they believe motivates both 
corrupt exchanges, but can also be utilised in displays of courage, especially by 
the investigative press. The following chapter explores the ideas of reasoning 
behind corrupt exchanges and brings more depth into the concepts explored by 
the participants in this section.  
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Chapter 10: Reasoning and Reporting 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is situated in the middle of the empirical section of the thesis, in 
order to combine the recurring ideas about the general causes of corrupt 
behaviour in Slovakia, with opinions on the likelihood of reporting corruption. 
The nodes within this category therefore relate to two avenues of investigation: 
‘Reasons for corruption’ and the respective child nodes: ‘bureaucracy’, ‘culture 
norm’, ‘deficiency of services’, ‘low living standard’, ‘lack of morals’, 
‘legislative deficiencies’, ‘mentality of people’ and ‘Soviet legacy’; and 
‘Reporting corruption’ and its respective child nodes: ‘Scepticism’, ‘Unlikely to 
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The chapter itself addresses, in a sequential fashion, the perceived causes of 
corruption and their knock-on effect on the perceived willingness to report 
corruption to the authorities- and, by proxy, the trust of the participants in the 
authorities. The chapter addresses the overarching RQ (To what extent is the 
theoretical difference between grand and petty corruption reflected in the 
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real-life understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health care?), as well as RQs 
1 and 2 (How does awareness of grand corruption inform/justify individual 
engagement in petty corruption? And vice versa) by juxtaposing individual 
opinions on causes of corruption with views on the interaction between grand 
and petty corruption (RQ1&RQ2). Due to the high frequency of mentions of 
problems of the ‘system’ that I registered when conducting initial data 
immersion and manual analysis, the category also includes a floating idea of the 
node ‘Systemic change’, in order not to lose touch with any contextual factors 
while conducting analysis (as seen in Figure 10.1). Generally, the analysis follows 
the sequential structure of analysing individual child nodes and conducts word 
frequency searches, as well as presents full phrases for analysis, including 
anecdotal evidence.  
The section pays special attention to the outlining of legislative deficiencies as 
understood by the participants, as this is a trend that has also arisen within the 
Category Gratitude Payments. I provide points of comparison with published 
guidelines on corruption, as advertised by the government on the website 
‘Prevencia Korupcie’ (opis.gov.sk), which is a special platform created by the 
government to make information and legislation on corruption accessible in both 
form and language to the populace. This platform is used primarily to describe 
the laws themselves in laymen’s terms for the populace and exists for those not 
trained in law to derive their own understanding of legislative provisions in 
place. Interestingly, even with this concession, there is a stark difference 
between the understanding of the participants of what constitutes a 
bribe/corruption, and the legislation in place.  
Due to the similarity of content (such as references to behaviour based on values 
held by individuals or integrity) between the child nodes ‘mentality of people’ 
and ‘lack of morals’, I collated these into one section of analysis. It is important 
to reiterate here that corruption is a morally and ethically loaded phenomenon 
(Clarke 1983, Bracking 2007, Rothstein and Eek 2009, Morris and Klesner 2010, 
Bohn 2013, Berkovich 2015) and investigating the understanding of the 
participants on this front is therefore integral to creating a holistic picture of 
understanding in real life. The second part relating to reporting corruption 
outlines the majority of views that corruption is very unlikely to get reported, 
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the reasons behind this understanding, as well as awareness of the reporting 
mechanisms in place.  
From an initial word frequency analysis, as seen in Figure 10.2, of the parent 
node ‘Reasons for corruption in Slovakia’, a trend appears that is visible 
throughout the different branches of the child nodes as well- the prevalence of 
the word ‘people’ in the participant understanding of reasons behind corruption. 
It is worth bearing in mind, therefore, the common denominator of all reasons 
the participants mention as the causes of corruption, is the awareness that it is 
‘people’ who are at the centre. This points to the participant awareness of 
factors such as systemic problems, lack of funding or resources, or historical 
attitudes passed down the generations playing significant parts in corrupt 
behaviour, but also of the fact that all of these are man-made and dependent on 
people’s choices and decisions. The associated verbs such as ‘to want’ or ‘to 
arrange’ along with language such as ‘everyone’, ‘everything’ and ‘possibilities’ 
points to the human capacity for ambition and a wish to get ahead of the rest, 
but also to the high level of permeation of society by corrupt practices. 
 
Figure 10.2 Word frequency cloud of node ‘Reasons for corruption 
in Slovakia’ set to 30 words, translations embedded in red by author. 
Source: Author 
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10.2 Bureaucracy  
One of the themes that arose from the participants being asked the question: ‘Why do you think that corruption is so widespread in 
Slovakia?’ or alternatively ‘What conditions do you think corruption needs to be able to thrive in Slovakia?’ was the idea of excessive 
bureaucracy. As seen in Examples 10.1 and 10.2, the theme of bureaucracy obstructing administrative processes is also joined with the idea 
of trying to make life ‘easier’ for oneself.  
  
Examples 10.1 and 10.2 Manual coding node ‘Bureaucracy’, translation by author; orange highlighted text represents the yellow highlighter. Source: Author 
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Bureaucracy and red tape are a notoriously rampant issue in Slovakia, with the 
Institute for Economic and Social Analysis (INESS) quoting over 222 hours spent 
by entrepreneurs on bureaucratic tasks on average54. This type of difficulty with 
bureaucratic tasks that are extremely time-consuming is most likely also why 
business and entrepreneurship are listed as the highest perceived area of 
corruption in Slovakia (see Chapter 2) right before health care. It would make 
sense for corruption to be rampant in an environment where expediency might 
be required for businesses to be able to function and make a profit. It is 
therefore not surprising that, demographically, all the participants who have 
picked out the theme of bureaucracy so prominently are either entrepreneurs 
themselves or involved with the study of business and entrepreneurship. The 
participants’ understanding of corruption and its prevalence is bound to be 
influenced and shaped by their own experiences and by their own surroundings. 
The idea of business being one of the sectors with the greatest levels of 
corruption in Slovakia is supported by independent polls and research presented 
in Chapter 2. The figures presented there suggest that business and health care 
continuously occupy the top two rankings of sectors affected by corruption. The 
language used by the participants here is also suggestive of corrupt practices 
being excused and seen as almost a reasonable solution to an unpleasant 
situation. The participants talk about ‘problems’, ‘trouble’, ‘torture’ and ‘the 
hard way’ as impressions of working within the confines of the system. The idea 
of bureaucracy being a significant factor in the understanding of corruption and 
partaking in corruption is also congruent with the existing theory and literature 
on informal practices and blat (Heidenheimer 1970, Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 
2000, Ledeneva 2009, Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017), which are outlined 
often in these categories as theoretical grounding for justifying a lot of these 
ideas in real life. The main ideas encompassed in theory of blat and informal 
practices in the Soviet era are those of circumventing the system which is 
stagnant, does not deliver, and is Kafka-esque to navigate in its amounts of 
stamps, referrals, and other bureaucratic tasks. These often involve several 
 
54 For more details, please see: https://www.trend.sk/financie/byrokracia-slovensku-podnikatel-nou-
zabije-222-hodin [last accessed 1/2/2021] 
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Catch-22 situations, where a confirmation from one bureau is often required to 
get a sign off from another, which can refuse to perform the task if there is any 
deviation in formatting of documents, or there are any extenuating 
circumstances. Therefore, circumventing the system which does not provide 
remediation within its bounds is one of the themes explored by the participants. 
However, it is worth mentioning that only 4 participants of the whole sample 
(10%) made the explicit connection between corruption and bureaucracy, which 
is indicative of other reasons having greater bearing on the participants’ 
understanding of causes of corruption.  
 
10.3 Culture norm 
 
The ‘Culture norm’ node denotes the participants’ views on corrupt behaviour 
having gotten ingrained in everyday life and culture to the extent that it has 
become normalised behaviour. Previous literature suggests that corrupt 
behaviour is indeed significantly a cultural problem, however, such theoretical 
assumptions do not indicate direct causality between culture and corruption, 
and are often accompanied by exploration of the ‘logic’ behind the corruption 
(Giordano and Hayoz 2013, Warburton 2013, Kaufmann, Hooghiemstra et al. 
2018). Having spent several years researching the problematic and having 
interviewed my participants for this study, the origins for corrupt behaviour 
seem to require a more complex answer comprising of several interacting 
reasons, rather than one. This is also why many of the answers within this 
category contain several facets of reasoning and several participants are coded 
against multiple nodes as a result. Within the ‘culture norm’ node, the 
participants utilise language that is evocative of corruption gaining a specific 
place in the culture of the society that is akin to ‘tradition’, ‘custom’, a ‘norm’, 
or seen as ‘ubiquitous’. The participants speak of ‘acceptability’ by society, of 
the ‘genetics’ of society containing corrupt behaviour, of corruption having 
taken ‘root’ and as a result of ‘social pressure’ it has become ‘tolerated’ and 
‘taught’. The participants make a point of emphasising the role of trust in the 
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healthcare system, as well as role of trust in the quality of care received. The 
role of trust in corrupt behaviour has been explored in literature before and 
there is indication of trust playing a significant role in people’s behaviour 
(Rothstein and Eek 2009, Morris and Klesner 2010, Batory 2012) towards official 
structures and authority. The word frequency cloud in Figure 10.3 below shows 
once again the prominent position of ‘a person’ in people’s explanations of how 
corrupt behaviour has become ingrained in culture. It is visibly connected with 
the words ‘normal’, ‘corruption’, ‘problem’, ‘society’, ‘again’, as well as 
‘rooted’, and ‘everyone’. At a glance the trends of used language clearly shows 
the interactive nature of corrupt behaviour with the pressures of society in the 
participant understanding. One participant emphasised from her own experience 
with her PhD supervisor, who was of very little help to her, that even though she 
felt unsupported, she still felt she had to get her supervisor something at the 
end of her studies as a thank you: ‘It’s interesting how ubiquitous this is now, 
that even if the person does fuck all for you, you still have that feeling that you 
should get them something…it’s this social norm that dictates it’ (INT4). 
 
Figure 10.3 Word 
frequency cloud of the 
node ‘Culture norm’ set 
at 30 words, translations 
embedded in red by 
author. Source: Author 
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23 out of 24 participants within this node agreed that corruption has the signs of 
being a cultural norm in society, which is nearly 100% of all views coded against 
this node. This indicates the potency of the culture norm view - over a half of 
the entire study sample thought this was the reason behind corruption in 
Slovakia; or at least one of the reasons. Interestingly, when cross tabulated with 
demographic features, 18 out of these participants were university educated, 5 
high school educated, and one primary school educated. This would point to 
greater levels of education creating a more pronounced view of corruption as 
embedded within society through tradition and custom, or, inversely, to a more 
apologetic stance on why corruption takes place, focusing on cultural norm 
rather than on individual agency. However, as mentioned already, several of 
these views are incomplete and several of these participants expressed views on 
reasons behind corruption that were coded against various nodes, not just the 
culture norm node.  
Interestingly, it was females over 50 (7 of them) that constituted the greatest 
demographic group by age and gender to contribute to this node. There was a 
total of 14 females who contributed to this node, as opposed to 10 males, 
scattered relatively evenly across all age ranges. This could potentially point to 
a greater engagement with this justification for corrupt behaviour by females 
and especially females in this given age group. 
The language utilised by the participants included the following phrases, relating 
to social/cultural norm as the root cause of corruption: 
• Akceptácia spoločnosťou (acceptance by society), byť akceptovaný spoločnosťou 
(to be accepted by society) 
 
• Súčasť kultúry (a part of culture), spoločenská norma (a cultural norm) 
 
• Normálne (it is normal), normálny štandard (it’s a normal standard), všetci to berú 
normálne (everybody considers it to be normal), považujeme to za normálne (we 
all take it to be normal) 
 
• Spoločenský tlak (social pressure), spoločnosť je celá blbo nastavená (the society 
as a whole is stupidly set up) 
 
• Pozostatok z tej minulosti (it’s a remnant of the past) 
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• Kultúrna norma (it’s a cultural norm), kultúrny problém (a cultural problem), 
spoločenská kultúra (a social culture) 
 
• Zakorenené (it is rooted in/ deeply rooted), pramení to z nejakej zvyklosti (it 
stems from a custom of some kind), vychádza to z nejakej tradície (it comes from 
some kind of tradition) 
 
• Nás to naučili naši rodičia (we were taught to do it by our parents) 
 
• Zvyknutí proste (we are simply used to it), väčšina našich detí je zvyknutá uplácať 
(most of our kids are used to bribing) 
 
It is apparent from this selection of phrases that participants do associate the 
presence of culture and societal pressure with the shape corruption takes today. 
The role of traditions and customs is emphasised, and this directly informs RQ3a 
and RQ3b. 
10.4 Deficiency of services 
 
One of the densest nodes for references coded (40) is the ‘Deficiency of 
services’ node. This node encompasses all opinions of participants that relate to 
their view that corruption is a result of a lack or a deficiency of service. Several 
participants did approach this question from a supply-demand viewpoint and 
have labelled corruption to be a ‘supply’ problem – that corruption exists in 
response to insufficient healthcare resources. Several others have also pointed 
to the insufficient amount of resources for healthcare such as equipment, 
hospitals, hospital beds or specialists (‘not enough cardiologists, not enough 
neurologists’ (INT1), ‘Doctors are spread really thinly’ (INT13)). The idea of 
doctors being spread thinly is supported by recent research (HPI 2014), whereby 
although specialists in numbers seem to be filled over capacity on paper (health 
insurance companies quote these to be filled to 205% capacity in 2014), there 
are problems with accessing these professionals, especially the following 
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specialties: cardiology, immunology, diabetic clinics, rheumatology, and 
endocrinology. The main problem seen to be causing this is the fact that any 
surgery or clinic can dictate their own opening hours, which are arbitrary, and 
access to specialists is also diminished by their multiple places of employment- 
i.e. several doctors work not only in state hospitals and polyclinics, but also in 
private practices (HPI 2014). Additionally, there is also a significant trend of 
doctors emigrating, causing brain drain that has been on the rise since the 90s 
(Chrancokova, Weibl et al. 2020). The participant responses support this view: 
‘The doctors are leaving and the rest are not managing the demand…’ (FG1.5); ‘I 
think it’s always money…they [Slovakia] have a real problem with brain drain 
and doctors moving abroad…[medicine] is valued as a profession but financially 
devalued’ (ELITE7). Brain drain is not only the issue of emigration but also of the 
rapidly aging trend of healthcare professionals, with the average age of a doctor 
increasing by 2.5 years in the last ten years and the demographic of 60+ doctors 
increasing significantly (HPI 2014). Over half of GPs were working into their 
retirement age in 2013 (Beňová 2014). Doctors are not the only problematic 
group within health care, the lack of nurses is also alarming in Slovakia, with 5.8 
nurses per 1000 inhabitants in 2012 and the OECD average being 8.8 nurses per 
1000 inhabitants (HPI 2014). It appears, therefore, that the number of qualified 
workers is decreasing or in danger of diminishing further by nature of retirement 
and the long-term trend for doctors specifically is that of emigration 
outweighing immigration of healthcare professionals (Mužik 2014, Pažitný 2014).  
Several participants also alluded to deficiency of services not only within health 
care but in all public sectors as a running theme, specifically in nurseries and 
pre-schools: ‘It was the same when you were kids, Dlhé diely (part of Bratislava) 
didn’t have any preschools, there was just one’ (FG4.2); ‘Now education has also 
come into the mix, especially because of lack of preschools (FG4.4)’. This idea 
of deficiency or lack is clearly depicted in the word frequency search in Figure 
10.4 overleaf, where the word itself is repeated 8 times in total among the 
participants included in this node (17 participants in total). Interestingly, 
another trend that is quite obvious and comes across in the discourse is the 



















It was mentioned by several participants (3) that if one has the resources, it is 
possible to turn to private care instead of the state-subsidized care: ‘you go for 
a knee surgery, meniscus or something, and you go to Kramáre (the biggest 
hospital in the country, located in Bratislava) and you don’t pay anything, you go 
to a private clinic and it costs you like 300 but you’d still rather do it because 
you’re guaranteed [a good result]’ (FG1.6); ‘When I had health problems I did 
take advantage of the private clinics…an X-ray would cost you 120 … and if I 
have to choose between having to give the 100 to a doctor under the table in a 
state hospital with all the hassle, or pay outright in the clinic I’d rather pay 
outright…but we don’t have private clinics for all problems’ (FG4.4). It is clear 
from the language described here that there is certain awareness among the 
participants of alternative routes into healthcare, but that these are really only 
available to those who have the means to take advantage of them. The 2014 
Health Policy Institute report describes a typical state-run hospital as ‘over 40 
years old, underfunded, in debt, and in a bad technical condition’ (Pažitný 
2014). It appears from the discourse that unless this is the case, a system with a 
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lack of resources has to be navigated and often the price involved in a bribe may 
even be competitive to that of a private clinic. Private clinics are in fact seen to 
be one of the potential sources of revenue for the country and as one of the 
solutions to the supply-demand problem, with over 9% of all surgeries being 
located in private clinics as of 2014 (HPI 2014) and with over 73% of these 
private clinics belonging to big chains such as ProCare, Wesper or Medcentrum; 
many of which are owned by financial groups such as PENTA, which also owns 
several news outlets and has been associated with several corruption scandals in 
the country, including the 2012 Gorila scandal (see Chapter 5). PENTA’s director, 
Jaroslav Haščák, has in fact been arrested recently to face charges of bribery 
and corruption of government officials55. It appears that while private clinics are 
on the rise, their association with financial groups such as PENTA create greater 
room for grand corruption and monopolisation of the healthcare resource. A way 
to combat this and increase the standard of care in state-run hospitals has been 
the transformation of state-run hospitals into limited companies with the state 
becoming a 100% shareholder (HPI 2014). Several healthcare institutions that 
have undertaken this transformation have been able to acquire better 
equipment, resources, and professionals, and have produced better results and 
patient satisfaction (HPI 2014).  
The language utilised in this section focused on the monetary expressions of 
‘salary’ or ‘pay’ for doctors being insufficient, as well as a general problem of 
insufficient health care resources put in place by the ‘system’ and the state.  
More contextual information on the use of the word ‘deficiency’ is shown in the 
word tree overleaf in Figure 10.5, which picks out, besides the general 
importance of deficiency, one participant’s view which separates petty and 
grand corruption conceptually- i.e. deficiency of resources causes only petty 
corruption. This participant’s response states that it is mainly petty corruption 
that exists ‘because there is some real deficiency of something here’ (FG4.4) 
and their statement goes on to suggest that in the ‘higher echelons the principle 
 
55 For more details, visit: https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/570458-v-hascakovej-pente-
zasahuje-policia/ [last accessed 16/3/2021] 
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is the same, but the origin of the problem is different- there we are talking 
about some groups which function among themselves and are giving each other 
some specific jobs’ (FG4.4). This type of insight is explored more in Chapter 11, 
but the initial idea of petty and grand corruption levels functioning on the same 





Figure 10.5 Word tree generated with the word ‘lack of’ in the node ‘Deficiency of services’, translations embedded in red by author. Source: Author 
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In terms of the demographic data on this node, out of the 17 participants who 
have highlighted deficiency of resources to be the main cause of corruption, or 
one of the main causes, 15 were from the Bratislava region and 13 were 
university educated. This points to the possibility that their view is skewed 
based on living in a large city which is overpopulated and may be struggling 
more than rural and peripheral parts of Slovakia to deliver health care services. 
On the other hand, it may be that these participants simply have a better insight 
in a region which is better at publicising and reporting on its service delivery and 
more prone to take feedback on board from the patients. The education levels 
may point to the participants having a more nuanced insight into causes of 
corruption, but this is not conclusive, and it is likely that there is overlap of 
participants responding to several nodes as possible causes of corruption.  In a 
recent public debate on the topic of ‘Bribe versus Gift’ by the weekly newspaper 
tyzden.sk56, a health care data analyst reported that data points to the lack of 
awareness of what constitutes standard care that everyone is entitled to. This 
misinformation in the public forum about what citizens are entitled to as 
standard level of care leads to artificial attempts to circumvent the system in 
place, out of distrust and scepticism. 
10.5 Lack of morals, mentality of people 
 
This section outlines the views of participants who believe that corruption in 
Slovakia is caused (either exclusively or among other reasons) by the behaviour 
of the individual, namely the lack of moral inhibitions and general mentality of 
the Slovak people. The nodes ‘Lack of morals’ and ‘Mentality of people’ are 
grouped together for analysis, due to their similarity of content, as well as the 
similarity of language used. The reason for their separation in the first place 
 
56 For full debate, visit https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_kC6b0hxx4 [last accessed 
12/12/2020] 
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stemmed from existing literature providing a morally and ethically loaded views 
of corruption (Clarke 1983, Bracking 2007, Bohn 2013) and from specific 
emphasis on ‘ethics’ and ‘morale’ by some participants.  
The nodes together contain 64 references coded, made by 28 participants in 
total. Bearing in mind the total number of participants (over 40), this reinforces 
the notion that there is bound to be overlap across the participants who 
commented on these two nodes, as well as likely overlap of their contributions 
with those in other nodes of this category. Interestingly, there were more 
women than men inclined to subscribe to this understanding (19 women, 9 men) 
and women over 50 (8), over 60 (4) and over 20 (5) were the three largest 
demographic trends indicated. This could potentially show a greater engagement 
of women with introspection and looking for individual decisions as weight-
bearing, rather than blaming a collective trend/culture in society. More research 
juxtaposing some targeted categories of causes to select from may be valuable 
to pursue in future corruption research, to see which measures certain 
demographics may respond to better than others. Subsequently, popular 
branches of health care, such as obstetrics that are more female-targeted and 
appear to be a source of corrupt activity pinpointed by the participants (as seen 
in Chapter 8), may be able to produce a specific set of effective counter 
measures.  
The language included in these two nodes points towards a sceptical view of the 
populace as to the levels of morale and integrity among citizens: 
• It’s about people, that they want to have something different, something more, 
something better (To je proste o ľuďoch, že chcú mať niečo iné, niečo viac, niečo 
lepšie (FG4.1) 
 
• But there is no basic morale here, we all know that (Ale tu neexistuje základná 
morálka, toto všetci vieme (FG4.4) 
 
• There’s this brutal collective bubble there- that it’s not me doing it, it’s all of us. 
When you have a sick parent, what are you going to do? Will you be moralising? 
No, you won’t. (Tam je brutálna bublina toho kolektívneho- že to nerobím ja, to 
robíme všetci. Keď máš chorého rodiča, čo spravíš? Budeš moralizovať? 
Nebudeš.(FG4.4) 
 
• It’s in everyone that question of ethics and morale. Je to v každom prípade otázka 
tej etiky a morálky (INT1) 
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How can you uproot corruption, when people are this greedy? It’ll always be 
around. It's a moral problem. Ako sa dá vykoreniť korupcia, keď ľudia sú 
hamyžní. To bude vždy. Morálny problém.(INT8) 
 
• Everything it in people themselves...it’s still about people... It’s up to your own 
individual decisions. Všetko je v ľuďoch... stále je to v ľuďoch, … Je to na tvojich 
individuálnych rozhodnutiach (INT9) 
 
• It’s [corruption] within everybody...the mentality of Slovaks has always been to 
give something out of gratitude. Je to v každom...mentalita Slovákov bola vždy 
dávať niečo za vďačnosť (ELITE2) 
 
• We’re sceptical and we’re very envious. Sme skeptickí, sme strašne závistliví 
(ELITE2) 
 
• It [corruption] comes from the natural human condition Vychádza to z ľudského 
prirodzenia (ELITE1) 
 
• I find that to be just simply human... I don’t think it will disappear because it 
comes from human nature To sa mi zdá ľudské jednoducho... myslím, že to 
nezmizne, že to ide z ľudskej povahy (FG4.1) 
 
• Everything stems from this insecurity of people, that you try and would give away 
the very last [to be healthy]. Všetko to vychádza z neistoty človeka, že sa snažíš 
a dáš všetko aj posledné... (FG4.1) 
 
• It’s definitely within people, it was done from way back...it’s within people and 
what is this deeply rooted is very difficult to get out of their heads. Určite je to v 
ľuďoch, to sa robilo od nepamäti...je to už v ľuďoch a čo je zakorenené sa veľmi 
ťažko vytĺka z hláv (INT11) 
 
• I think it’s about changing that mentality more than anything. Ide o zmenu tej 
mentality skôr (INT16.2) 
 
• I mean it’s in your subconscious... you have to change the thinking of these people. 
To je tak podvedome proste...musíš zmeniť zmýšľanie tých ľudí (INT5) 
 
• It’s that mentality and as I said before, this problem of order. Because there is no 
order, corruption happens. Corruption can only happen where there is lack of 
order. Je to mentalita, je to nejaký zase ako hovorím poriadok. Keďže tu nie je 
poriadok tak korupcia môže byť len vtedy, keď nie je poriadok. (ELITE4) 
 
The language outlined above provides a selection of the expressions by the 
participants. The participants are aware of the importance of learnt and socially 
constructed behaviour and social pressure, as well as of personal agency and 
importance of individual decision-making. The language suggests an apologetic 
approach to explaining corruption, as if, in Machiavellian terms (Bracking 2007), 
the corrupt streak of mankind is inherent and would manifest itself through 
corrupt behaviour, regardless of other factors such as higher living standard, 
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wages, better systemic measures etc. It is difficult to say whether such an 
opinion is insightful or naïve, but it is important to emphasise that this thesis 
does not stand in a vacuum and participants have shown awareness of other 
factors interacting with this one to create the ‘perfect storm’ of conditions for 
corrupt behaviour to take root.  
The participants have also shown insight into how mentality and moral values 
could be harnessed to battle corruption on a grassroots level and within civil 
society. The existing literature on civil society involvement is not overly 
flattering and suggests there are several challenges faced by civil society that 
lead to its lack of impact. Mungiu-Pippidi (2010) outlines problems with inactive 
civil society, namely the overly generic engagement with anti-corruption 
projects (lacking sectoral specificity), lack of funding for grassroots initiatives, 
the over-reliance on importing anti-corruption objectives from western societies 
into post-communist countries, and the confusion of the two roles of civil 
society. By this she means the small market for anti-corruption movements in 
countries such as Slovakia, leading to NGOs such as Transparency International 
acting as a government consultant but also as a watchdog- the two roles creating 
a conflict of interest. Funding is problematic due to many programmes needing a 
longer lifespan than oftentimes appears in the pitch for external funding to 
present results. The problem of EU funding not being centrally monitored but 
merely distributed by local governments is also emphasised, whereby the EU 
must accept that if the cycle of funding is not amended to provide safeguards 
against local government fund misappropriation, then civil society cannot act as 
a real auditor and monitor of public spending (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010). As a result, 
civil society efforts tend to grow political and paradoxically become associated 
with the rest of the corrupt political system once they get into the parliament 
(visegradinsight.eu quotes Hungarian Momentum, Slovakia’s Together for the 
people and the Pirate Party in Czech Republic as notable examples of civil 
society movements growing political). Mungiu-Pippidi (2010, 2013) states that 
civil society is much better controlled in countries with a larger number of civil 
society organisations, and it is obvious from the graph in Figure 10.6, that 
Slovakia is in the lower positions for this particular criterion. 
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Figure 10.6 Civil Society Organisations and Corruption, Source: Quality of Government 
Standard Dataset, in Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013 
 
The trend is the same with voluntary work organisations and corruption levels, 
where Slovakia, once again, figures in the lower parts of the depiction, 




Figure 10.7 Voluntary work and corruption, Source: Standard Eurobarometer 72, in 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013 
 
However, there were clear indications in my participant responses some 7-10 
years after the publication of the existing theory on the subject, that they are 
aware of the importance of individual decisions and values put into action: 
• ‘Just being informed won’t help, unless everyone participates in the endeavour’ 
(Informovanosť by nepomohla, lebo kým sa na tom nebudú podieľať všetci) 
(FG2.2)  
 
• ‘I mean yes the post socialist countries have a different experience with corruption 
I suppose...but on the other hand it is absolutely a matter of choice and decision 
and your individual decisions’ (Tie post socialistické krajiny majú inú skúsenosť 
s tou korupciou...ale na druhej strane je to aj vec voľby a rozhodnutia… Ale aj 
tvojich individuálnych rozhodnutí) (INT4)  
 
• ‘I think it’s about setting the right example yourself- that's what you can do as an 
individual’ (Ja si myslím, že ísť príkladom. To je to, čo máš robiť ako jedinec) 
(FG4.4)  
 
• ‘Yeah, it’s a question of ethics and morale that there exist some [doctors] still 
who will say even [to their friends] -do you know what I’m sorry I have this lady 
next I can’t see you before those who booked in’ (Áno, určite áno. Zase to otázka 
tej etiky a morálky, že sú takí ešte doteraz čo povedia vieš čo nehnevaj sa mám 
tu túto starú pani beriem to porade, sú takí… )(INT1)  
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• ‘It is dependent on individuals and on the level of morale of that given person- if 
one has a strong sense of integrity, they won’t feel the need to excuse this type 
of behaviour to themselves’ (To závisí od individualít. Záleží aj na tom, aká je 
morálka toho daného človeka. Ak je ten človek natoľko silný, že má tú morálku 
zakomponovanú v tom, tak nebude si to ospravedlňovať )(ELITE1). 
 
 
This indicates that the participants are aware of the shortcomings presented by 
individual choice and their scepticism about believing that most people can do 
the right thing is palpable in their language. However, there is also a strong 
sense of participants realising that they are not powerless in the fight against 
corruption as individuals and that they realise their own role in systemic change. 
Such awareness counters the outlined argument that civil society is in fact 
inactive (Buncak, Dzambazovic et al. 2009, Nemec 2018) and it provides a 
hopeful prospect of the populace taking responsibility for individual decisions in 
this and other social problems going forward. The Slovak Health Policy Institute 
has published a report on all reforms of the healthcare sector to date and 
indicated that while the patient organisations are on balance quite passive in 
their input for legislation generation (only 14 out of 300 submit amendments to 
laws), 77% of their amendments and notes were considered and accepted before 
healthcare legislation was published, which points to a high success rate of their 
input, when engaged (HPI 2014). This further reinforces the notion that bottom-
up change is an effective tool for policy implementation and should be 
encouraged with anti-corruption measures. The thesis therefore contributes 
directly to research conducted into the theory of inactive civil society and anti-
corruption measures within the EU and showcases that the sense of individual 
responsibility is present and under the right circumstances can be harnessed for 




10.6 Soviet legacies 
 
This node encompassed a multitude of views. The question corresponding with 
this node was whether the participants thought that levels of corruption had 
increased/decreased since the Velvet Revolution in 1989, and what their general 
observations were about the magnitude of corruption before and after- i.e., has 
it stayed the same, has it gotten worse, or is it the same level but of a different 
form? There were 34 participants who expressed their views on this question and 
who took to the general narrative of evaluating the power of Soviet legacies to 
impact on corruption levels or outlook today. This, again, indicates the levels of 
repetition and overlap of responses by participants to several nodes- the 
participants clearly do not think, on average, that there is only one significant 
cause of corruption in Slovakia. The importance of several causes interacting is 
further evidence of the multifaceted nature of corruption and the need for more 
research to be conducted into the regional nuances of corruption.  
Out of the responses collated for this node, 14 participants expressed their view 
that corruption levels are higher than they were before 1989. Only 2 of the 14 
participants were in the 20+ age range, and the rest were 40, 50 and 60+ 
participants, with one 80+ participant. Whilst these sample numbers are low, 
these results point to an increased awareness by the older groups compared to 
those in the younger age brackets, as gained from either increased life 
experience in general, or from having actually lived in Slovakia during the 
communist regime. However, the presence of the two younger participants also 
shows the ability of the younger generations to acquire insight through either 
conversation, research or education. Seven participants stated that they think 
that the level of corruption has not changed, merely the presentation or the 
façade of corruption. In other words, they believe that corruption levels have 
stayed the same, but that corruption has adapted to the new conditions of an 
open market, as well as capitalism in general. The idea of associating corruption 
levels in this region with transition economies is explored widely in literature 
(Ellman 2005, Wallace and Latcheva 2006, Fazekas, King et al. 2014, Arapovic, 
Depken et al. 2017). Research shows that the initial expectation of a linear 
338 
transition from centralised market to open market as meaning merely ‘more 
market’ and more opportunities is false. On the contrary, transition records 
show how unstructured economic policy involving large amounts of privatisation 
negatively impacted social securities, such as pensions, GDP and living wage 
(data shows that the share of the poor in former Soviet Union in the 90s rose 
from 3% to 25%) (Ellman 2005). Consequently, it gave rise to kleptocracy, 
increasing corruption especially on the levels of local governments (Ellman 
2005). Literature suggests that some of these impacts are inevitable and that 
some points that give rise to corruption, such as income inequality or 
unemployment are the ‘genetic flaws’ of capitalism as a system and need to be 
mitigated by increased checks and balances (Kornai 2006). There are findings to 
support the notion that within post-communist societies, involvement with the 
‘black’ economy, which arises as a result of too quick a transition with not 
enough safeguards, can be associated with lower levels of trust in the public 
domain and political and legal institutions (Wallace and Latcheva 2006). Such 
involvement in ‘black’ economy seems to spill into the perceptions of public life- 
however, it is not just black economy that impacts on corruption levels. 
Arapovic et al (2017) find evidence of a bilateral Granger causality between 
economic growth and corruption growth; however, this is limited to only one-
year lags. When more than one-year lags are implemented, this causality 
disappears. Rather than dismissing this as a faulty model, Arapovic et al. (2017) 
instead make a more sinister remark that corruption is present and should be 
targeted by more sensitive tools of oversight, as the transmission mechanisms 
between increased government spending, economic growth, and corruption 
levels are short in nature and more elusive to capture (Arapovic, Depken et al. 
2017). More evidence of the relationship between economic transition and 
corruption levels is provided by an investigation of the impact of EU funds on 
grand corruption in CEE (Fazekas, King et al. 2014). Fazekas et al (2014) find 
(using a sample of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) that there is 
significant impact of EU funds on institutionalised corruption, by providing 
additional public resources for corrupt rent seeking, and by failing to implement 
the necessary controls of corruption for these additional resources. In all three 
countries the EU fund spending was shown to be at the same level of risk (if not 
greater) than that of comparable national spending in the three countries 
(Fazekas, King et al. 2014). It is therefore astute that several of my participants 
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were able to pinpoint EU funds as an ideal environment for grand corruption 
practices, but also that they showed awareness of the impact of the transition 
from centralised to open market economy on corruption in Slovakia. 
9 participants stated that they believe that corruption as we know it today has a 
direct connection to the legacies of the Soviet era and has been borne out of the 
previous regime. Two of these participants were in the 20-30 age range, but the 
rest, being all 50+, were speaking from their own direct experience or that of 
their immediate families or friends. Bearing this in mind, I would recommend 
that any research into the Soviet legacies embedded in corrupt practices of this 
region has a unique opportunity to be conducted in the lifetimes of participants 
such as those included in my research- at the point of the next generation, this 
unique insight and experience possessed by this generation will be largely lost. 
The gender split of responses for this node were 19 women and 15 men and the 
biggest demographic group were females over 50 (9). This continuous trend of 
the demographic group of females over 50 could point to greater insight 
displayed by women (especially highly educated women), or simply to greater 
confidence of expression for these women acquired by age and their social roles 
as mothers, colleagues, and/or leaders. It could also point to the fact that more 
women were involved in individual interviews than men and their responses were 
of greater detail, capable of encompassing more information. 
As seen by the word frequency generation in Figure 10.8 overleaf, there is no 
strong indication of any trend other than corruption and its connection with 
‘more’, ‘always’, and ‘people’. What can be derived from Figure 10.8 is the 
consistent trend seen across the nodes in this category of participants believing 
that corruption is long-standing, rooted deeply in society, and can’t be 






cloud of the 
node ‘Soviet 
legacies’ set 
at 30 words, 
translations 
embedded in 
red by author. 
Source:Author  
 
However, the node was not as straightforward to analyse as might seem at first 
glance of the responses outlined above. Several participants presented 
interesting views that added levels of cultural and regional nuance to their 
understanding of corruption and its historical journey within the region:  
 
• ‘I think the levels are the same, it’s just the values that have changed... before 
you could get away with bringing a hen, now some enormous gifts are expected’ 
(Myslím, že úroveň je rovnaká, len zmenili sa hodnoty. Peňažné, tie dary. Sa 
zmenili od toho, že sliepka a teraz sa očakávajú nejaké enronmné dary) (FG2.2) 
 
• ‘I think it’s a different form of the same...doesn’t mean there is less of it today, 
just that they have gotten better at concealing it’ (Myslím si, že je to skôr iná 
forma. To neznamená, že dnes je toho menej, len sa to naučili asi lepšie skrývať.) 
(INT4) 
 
• ‘Especially in these post-communist countries...because of the great lack that was 
there, other routes to reaching goals, such as using your connections, were 
explored’ (Špeciálne v týchto postkomunistických krajinách, kde bol veľký 
nedostatok, používali sa iné cesty ako známosti) (FG4.1) 
 
• ‘I think we used to do this from ancient times. Hens, eggs were brought to doctors 
and the doctor in their white coat that was something on the same level as a 
lawyer you know. These were those types of occupations where a person thinks 
you have to insure the result somehow’ (Určite to je v ľuďoch, sa to robilo od 
nepamäti. Sliepky, vajcia sa nosili doktorom a ten doktor v tom plášti bolo to také 
iné ako takisto aj právnik. Sú to také zamestnania, kde si človek myslí, že to musí 
nejako poistiť.) (INT11) 
341 
• ‘In socialist times we had our own physicians, and it was normal to go see your 
own family doctor. But now you have to go and look for those doctors’ (Keď sme 
mali za socializmu svojho lekára, bralo sa to normálne, že ideš k svojmu lekárovi. 
Ale teraz si musíš tých lekárov hľadať.)(INT13) 
 
• ‘I think in the conditions here in Slovakia it is somehow expected and maybe it’s 
fear which still remains here from that previous time’ (Práve to som hovoril, že 
u nás v podmienkach Slovenskej republiky sa to nejako očakáva a možno je to 
strach, ktorý tu ešte pretrváva z bývalej doby.) (ELITE1) 
 
• ‘Let’s posit the question what era we are talking about here. We have that up 
until ‘89, from ‘89 until the EU accession and after. And where is corruption 
greatest? I think it is from ‘89 to the EU accession time’ (Položme si otázku od 
koľko do koľko rokov. Éra do 89, éra od 89 a teraz éra od EU. A kde tá korupcia je 
najväčšia? Podľa mňa je to v tom období od 89 po vstup do EU.) (ELITE5) 
 
• ‘I think it stems from Slovakia’s history. Communist stuff aside, I think it probably 
stems a lot from the issues Slovakia had in the 90s as well. Where the judiciary 
might not be particularly looked fondly upon and particularly trusted... there’s 
quite a lot of distrust still’ (ELITE7) 
 
• ‘I think it is with the accession the EU that there’s more of it now’ (To je aj tým 
vstupom do EU a teraz mám pocit, že je toho viac.) (FG1.2) 
 
• ‘It used to be a sort of smaller scale and privatisation of property has just allowed 
it to grow...same with grants’ (Toto súkromné vlastníctvo to umožnilo ten vznik 
korupcie. A čo z počutia viem, tak je to vždy tak, že grant sa musí tak navýšiť aby 
sme boli niekomu vďační a peniaze sa tak prelejú. Tak sa to proste robí.) (INT14) 
 
• ‘I think that as far as political secrets go, which were at that time common, or 
more the fact that politics is very much dependent on different areas such as 
health care and education and so I think the impact may be higher... from my own 
research I see the impact of that socialist idea of a doctor or health care in general 
when they were put up on a pedestal, made into an ideal- and these people are 
still milking this image...’ (Ale čo sa týka tých politických tajností, ktoré tu boli 
podľa mňa bežné, alebo tak že politika súvisí s tými rôznymi oblasťami ako je 
zdravotníctvo a školstvo tak si myslím, že ten vplyv je tam väčší. A tým, že ja sa 
venujem tiež zdravotníctvu, tak vidím ten dopad takej tej socialistickej idei ako 
lekára alebo zdravotníctva celkovo, kedy z nich bol spravený taký ideál, 
piedestál- že doteraz z toho tie osoby čerpajú) (INT4) 
 
The language above presents several intriguing ideas about the development of 
corruption in Slovakia and its connection to the previous regime. As previously 
mentioned, theory on this subject frequently links corruption and informal 
practices in post-Soviet societies to the previous regime and practices of blat 
and informal payments (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000, Heidenheimer 2009, 
Ledeneva 2009, Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017). 7 participants have 
expressed that corruption is the country’s ‘inheritance’ (FG3.1) or a ‘remnant’ 
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(16.2) from the previous regime, speaking of a ‘definite’ connection between 
the two (INT5). However, given the number of participants who reacted to this 
node (34), this is only a fifth of the participants who make a direct causal link. 
More often the idea expressed by the participants is that corruption was always 
present, but it has had the opportunity to grow more rampant due to the 
opening of the markets and also due to the opportunities to deal with 
supranational bodies and budgets (such as the EU funds). It is difficult to 
ascertain what corruption looked like exactly in communist times, but there 
seems to be an understanding among the participants that it was more 
“innocent” or somehow acceptable. On the other hand, nowadays with all the 
opportunity for growth, it has become more detrimental to society. Only two 
participants have commented that they think the levels of corruption are 
‘appropriate’ for the time and opportunity presented before and after ‘89- in 
other words, that corruption has not changed at all, but has done well to adapt 
to the imaginary borders created by material opportunities.  
 
The most important observations, however, were those of the medical 
profession itself within corruption. This involved considering not only how 
corruption levels have changed, but how the scope of the profession has allowed 
them to thrive pre and post ’89 in health care. The observations made point to 
the status of the doctor as highly respected and for corrupt practices having 
arisen out of a position of fear and reverence towards the profession from times 
that arguably predate the communist regime. Doctors and lawyers (as well as 
priests) are often portrayed as persons of great importance in the community in 
popular cinema and literature57 and these images are likely to have stuck with 
 
57 For example, the famous work by J. Kalinčiak from the 19th century, Reštavrácia, where a 
powerful village elder runs for re-election and invites the whole village for a meal in his village 
establishment, trading food for votes; or the cult tv series Nemocnica na okraji mesta (The 
hospital on the edge of town) where the national artist Ladislav Chudík plays the upstanding Dr 
Sova, a model of success and integrity for generations to come. Even the Czechoslovak 
comedy hit Slunce Seno (The sun and the Hay) from the 80s with several sequels portrays 
doctors and educated folk as pinnacles of respect in the village- at one point there is a 
competition among neighbouring families as to whose daughter has married better: ‘If you get 
the engineer, then we are going to get a doctor!’ 
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the populace and have been passed down the generations by tradition and 
rearing. While this is difficult to confirm for certain and it would be straying into 
the realm of anthropology and culture studies, it is an intriguing concept to 
consider the impact of tradition and popular culture on the understanding of 
corrupt practices, and by proxy on the lasting impression of some practices 
(gratitude payments and gifts) being more acceptable than others (bribes). The 
lasting impact of communism on the culture of values and survival has also been 
shown with statistical significance in post-communist countries (Sandholtz and 
Taagepera 2005). It is apparent that cultural factors and their development 
under communist regimes do have some impact on corrupt behaviour 
development and should not be disregarded. In some cultures, like the Nauru, it 
has been suggested that tradition and culture can even cause corruption 
(Atkinson and Silverman 1997, Kun, Kun et al. 2004). However, a deeper study of 
cultural traditions and country-specific popular culture of cinema, theatre, and 
literature should be given more emphasis in future research into corruption as 
possible paramount factors impacting on the development of corrupt behaviour. 
Recently, Slovakia has been producing several popular films wrestling with its 
post-communist past and also with its corrupt culture of the 90s, such as Únos, 
Kandidát, Učiteľka, and others, and this is indicative of the theme of corruption 
being very much alive in the public discourse. 
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10.7 Legislative deficiencies 
This node, while only containing the reactions of 12 participants directly, has 
semantically spanned across several different categories, and participants often 
made references to their understanding of the law. Out of the 12 participants 
who considered the lack of legislation or lack of law enforcement to be the 
primary or at least a central reason for corrupt behaviour, 10 were university-
educated. This trend potentially points towards greater level of information 
forming the understanding of corruption within the educated classes and within 
the sample of this study (40+) participants, a quarter of participants subscribing 
to this view is not insignificant. In literature on this, Lee et al. (2013) find that 
risk takers are less likely to view bribes as ‘seriously wrong’, whereas the 
opposite is true for the risk averse. Increased education levels and interest in 
politics is also associated with the feeling that bribery is not justified, which 
points furthermore to the idea that cultural factors, as well as demographic 
factors, impact on the understanding of corruption(Lee and Guven 2013). My 
research was unable to uncover any demographic data attached to reports of TI 
or other watchdogs, who construct polls among the general population, so it is 
left to future research to confirm or disprove the trend exhibited here. 
The opinions and understanding of the participants were spread across several 
nodes and under specific language, such as ‘law’, ‘right’ or ‘legislation’. I have 
performed a word search query across all nodes using these three words and 
their derivatives to showcase the language used by the participants. This is 
visible in Example 10.2 overleaf and is representative of the more detailed 
language used in this particular node as well: ‘the rule of law is failing’, ‘we 
need to make sure that the laws are set up properly’ or the general awareness 
that the laws to curb corruption do indeed exist but lack follow through with 
enforcement and punitive measures. One participant also expressed the view 
that laws themselves are insufficient and regulatory bodies such as the medical 
council should step in with their own disciplinary measures, as should a basic 
pride of professionals to feel that there are rules within their profession that 
should be respected (FG4.1). Another participant pointed out that the main legal 
deficiency in Slovakia is the lack of law on lobbying. As a result, a lot of activity 
that may be recognised abroad as lobbying is labelled as corrupt (ELITE4). 
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Example 10.2 Text search for words ‘law’, ‘right’, and ‘legislation’ with translation by 
author. Source: Author 
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The insight into the problematic is clearly present, and the participants do emphasise 
the need for punitive measures to be as well-defined and as embedded in the legal 
system as the laws themselves- without punitive measures clearly stipulated, the 
legislation appears toothless. However, there are also obvious misconceptions about the 
legal specifications on corrupt behaviour among participants. For example, in the ELITE5 
interview, the participant stipulates that the monetary value difference between a gift 
and a bribe is somewhere in the law (set at around 300 EUR). This is in fact not the 
official stance of the legislation. In Example 10.3 overleaf, taken from the government 
website opis.gov.sk,which provides the most comprehensive and intelligible guidelines 
on corruption for the regular citizen, corruption is in fact not clearly defined. Example 
10.3, called ‘What is corruption’, admits, in the highlighted red box, that ‘corruption is 
not clearly defined in the legal order in terms of a unified definition that would 
encompass the common signs of various types of corrupt behaviour’. The very first 
sentence introduces corruption to the reader in presumably familiar terms and gives 
examples such as ‘an envelope with a certain sum, a holiday, a car, or a different type 
of advantage’. It is clear from this short example that corruption is comprised of several 
facets of behaviour and therefore further research such as this thesis conducts is 
necessary, in order to deepen our understanding of it. The thesis showcases that what is 
perceived by law to be a clear set of guidelines and definitions is often not reflected 
accurately in the participants’ real-life idea of corruption in practice, thus directly 
informing the overarching RQ (To what extent is the theoretical difference between 
grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in 
Slovakia’s health care?) For example, it is apparent that the examples of gift v bribe, so 
laboriously differentiated between by the participants (see Chapter 8) are in fact on 
equal footing in the law- there is no difference between an envelope and a gift of 
chocolate in the eyes of the law, despite the respondents drawing this distinction clearly 




Example 10.3 Screenshot of ‘What is corruption’, as explained on the government website opis.gov.sk, translation by author. Source: 
https://www.opis.gov.sk/co-je-korupcia/ 
This idea of conflating bribery and gift-giving is even more potent when we examine what the website says about the examples of bribes. 
This part of the guidelines is crystal clear and from a legal perspective there is no difference in the Criminal Code between the nature of a 
bribe and of a gift, given under any type of circumstances or with any goal in mind, however innocent. Example 10.4’s last highlighted part 
(overleaf) stipulates that it is immaterial from a legal standpoint whether the bribe was given to obtain an advantage or a bare standard of 
any service- the very fact that an advantage is suggested or conditioned by a bribe when it comes to professional duty is in breach of the 
law. It would therefore appear that the popular understanding of corruption as presented by my participants, who drew lines between the 
acceptability of a gift and the unacceptability of a bribe, based on the timing of giving or the type of gift, do not stem from the law. 
The term corruption is not clearly defined in the 
legal order in terms of a unified definition that 
would encompass the common signs of various types 
of corrupt behaviour. We can, however generally 
state that it denotes antisocial and unlawful 
phenomena in public and private sectors, such as 
crimes of accepting a bribe, bribing, indirect 
bribing, electoral corruption, and sometimes also 









The amount of the bribe (i.e. the monetary value of the 
material asset) is not decisive from a criminal perspective 
(e.g. even a chocolate bar for 1EUR counts). 
A bribe is a thing or a different type of material or immaterial asset 
for which there is no legal right (P131, section 3 of the Criminal 
Code). A bribe can therefore be: 
• A movable asset (e.g. money, car, jewel) or immovable (e.g. a piece 
of land, a flat, different premises) 
• Of a material nature (e.g. fixing of a house, renting of a flat for a 
better rate than standard) 
• Of an immaterial nature (e.g. help with study for entrance exams, 
preferential issuing of a passport or a drivers licence). 
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It is therefore interesting to see that such distinction does not reside within the law but does reside in the popular understanding of 
corruption in Slovakia, as suggested by my participants (see Chapter 8). The website even provides examples of what bribery looks like, 
presumably to facilitate the understanding of the reader: 
                 
Example 10.5 Screenshot of ‘Bribing’, as explained on the government website opis.gov.sk, translation by author. Source: 
https://www.opis.gov.sk/podplacanie/ 
Bribery (as defined by P332-335 of the Criminal Code) means to 
promise, to offer, or to provide a certain material or 
immaterial object from the bribing party, for which the bribed 
party would not normally have a legal right. This is given in 
order for the bribing party to be offered certain advantages in 
return that result in breach of duty in the workplace, official 
position or function, i.e. active corruption.  
 
Example: a stakeholder of a construction company promises to 
the chair of a procurement committee that if a municipal 
project of a park reconstruction is assigned to their firm, this 
firm will renovate the chair’s house for a third of their normal 
fee in return. 
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This principle of understanding bribery was also emphasised in a recent online debate on 
the topic of ‘Gift versus Bribe’ in health care, by the weekly newspaper tyzden.sk58. It 
was made very clear from the outset that anything can constitute a bribe- from the most 
popular coffees and chocolates to the more ostentatious envelopes, cars, or even 
sponsorship gifts to certain departments that are conditioned by preferential treatment. 
It was also made clear that in matters of health care, the provision of health care is in 
fact classified as procurement of public service, and therefore the rules apply even 
more strictly here than elsewhere. However, and this is perhaps where the 
understanding of corruption in more lenient terms comes from for my participants, there 
are marked nuances within the application of the law. Owing to this, there is leniency 
applied by prosecutors in cases with trivial items such as chocolates or coffees and the 
prosecutor may even choose not to pursue the charges against a perpetrator like this. 
There is also the legal provision of ‘Active regret’ in the law, which can be applied if a 
perpetrator or the bribed party decide to confess pre-emptively, and their punishment 
can be significantly reduced or merely symbolic. It is important to point out, however, 
that according to these experts, both agents party to corrupt exchanges are equally 
culpable- i.e., the bribing party and the bribed party, for example.  
The phrase uttered in the debate was that ‘not every bribe is the same and not every 
gift is the same’, alongside the claim that there is personal leniency in the 
interpretation of what is considered to be merely a ‘transgression’ and what is to be 
considered an outright ‘crime’. This level of leniency and room for interpretation only 
facilitate the tailored understanding of corruption by the participants in this study and 
no doubt the wider populace as well.  
 
58 For full debate, visit https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vMQh8VVfW0 [last accessed 12/12/2020]. Here, 
one public prosecutor specialising in corruption, one district judge specialising in corruption cases, a 
lawyer specialising in advocacy of health care corruption, a director of a pharmaceutical firm, and a 
healthcare analyst discussed the nuances of bribes versus gifts. 
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The most clear-cut examples of corruption given by the website opis.gov.sk are those relating to grand corruption and it is therefore not 
surprising that the participants were more likely to condemn that type of corruption more readily than petty- as the assumption is that 
their awareness of these is also greater and better defined. 
 
Example 10.6 Screenshot of ‘Crimes connected to corruption’, as explained on the government website opis.gov.sk, translation by author. Source: 
https://www.opis.gov.sk/trestne-ciny-suvisiace-s-korupciou/ 
 
The level of confusion in the participants’ views on corruption from a legal standpoint, as well as their confusion as to variability of 
punishment, is also reflected in what the website showcases as ‘the most frequent punishments’ for corruption. There is no specification as 
to what example of a crime would ensue which punishment, no statistics indicating which of these is most likely or is most frequently used, 
and no explanation of the terminology for the reader. The severity of the top two punishments alone could potentially account for a trend 
in not reporting corruption out of fear of ending up without whistle-blower protection and in prison. More enlightenment of the populace 
could be administered by governmental sources such as this one, which would in turn facilitate a more unified understanding of corruption 
without this level of nuance and a greater level of visible, standard measures. 
Crimes connected to corruption 
The Criminal Code also outlines the crimes that are connected to 
corruption: 
• The abuse of power of a public official (P326 Criminal Code) 
• The legalisation of revenue from criminal activity (P233-234 
Criminal Code) 
• The machinations connected to tenders or public competition 
(P241 Criminal Code) 
• The machinations connected to public tenders and public 




Example 10.7 Screenshot of ‘The most frequent punishments’, as explained on the government website opis.gov.sk, translation by author. Source: 
https://www.opis.gov.sk/najcastejsie-tresty/ 
 
A point of clarity within the ‘Gift v. Bribe’ debate was the condemnation of the notion of paying bribes to skip waiting lines or to amend 
appointment times. The legal experts on the panel agreed that this particular provision has already been put into law officially and 
appointment time arrangement has been classified as one of the fundamental medical standards of care and is therefore under no 
circumstances to be assigned any other fees.  
The most frequent punishments  
The most frequent punishments for crimes of corruption as defined 
by the Criminal code are: 
• Incarceration (P46 of Criminal Code) 
• Monetary fine (P56-57 of Criminal Code- from 160EUR to 331 930 
EUR) 
• Confiscation of property (P58-59 Criminal Code) 
• Confiscation of material (P60 Criminal Code) 
• Ceasing of activity (P61 Criminal Code) 
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This type of clarity facilitating the future of understanding of corruption seems 1 
to be a particularly effective way of addressing the shortcomings outlined. 2 
However, the government can hardly expect the population to be up to date 3 
with this type of addendums, when websites such as this one containing 4 
information on corruption (opis.gov.sk) go over six years without any updates or 5 
publicising of changes with comprehensible examples. I was able to ask a few 6 
questions live during the aforementioned debate and the panellists agreed with 7 
one of my participants’ views (FG4.1) that laws are not the only regulatory 8 
measure available and that disciplinary action from the official bodies of 9 
professions could also constitute an effective tool in curbing corruption further. 10 
Some panellists even mentioned specific grassroots initiatives that were 11 
undertaken by surgeries themselves, such as wearing stickers ‘I don’t take 12 
bribes’ on top of scrubs or white coats. It does seem reasonable to suggest that 13 
personal initiatives such as this would also facilitate the spreading of 14 
understanding among the general populace and potentially lead to amended 15 
behaviour.  16 
The panellists also agreed unanimously that there is no point at all to distinguish 17 
between grand and petty corrupt activity in practice- from a legal standpoint, 18 
corruption is one phenomenon and needs to be addressed as such. In other 19 
words, one cannot solve petty corruption without addressing grand at the same 20 
time, and vice versa. This was particularly relevant for the thesis and for the 21 
RQs 1 and 2 as well as the overarching RQ and in some contrast to the popular 22 
understanding of the phenomenon by my participants, some of whom did make 23 
the petty-grand distinction and called for separate addressing of the levels (see 24 
Chapter 11). 25 
 26 
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10.8 Low living standard59 (wage) 1 
This node denotes the opinions of participants that the low living standard of 2 
both medical professionals and the general public leads to corrupt behaviour out 3 
of material necessity to supplement existing salary or service. This node has 25 4 
participants coded against it, which suggests that it presents a popular reason 5 
for corrupt behaviour among participants. Out of these 25 participants, 19 6 
thought that low living standard was one of the key problems, which may be 7 
complemented by other, but not as pressing, causes. 17 of them are university-8 
educated, which potentially indicates a greater level of insight into the living 9 
standard and wage situation in the healthcare sector among this demographic 10 
group. The distinction between petty and grand corrupt practices was made by 11 
the participants again, suggesting that the low living standard is only to be 12 
considered as a cause on the petty level. This outlook directly informs RQs 1 and 13 
2 and is embodied by language such as this: 14 
• ‘The small corruption is definitely about that [low living standard]’ (Tá malá je 15 
určite o tom.) (INT13) 16 
 17 
• ‘On the low level [increasing the living standard] would definitely uproot 18 
corruption’ (Na nízkej by to podľa mňa vykorenilo) (FG4.2) 19 
 20 
• ‘They don’t have the salaries they deserve so they have to find it elsewhere’ 21 
(Nemajú proste platy a musia si to nazbierať niekde.) (FG1.2) 22 
 23 
It is apparent that there is awareness among the participants of the medical 24 
profession (and others) being financially undervalued. There is also awareness of 25 
the need to incentivise professionals to not only rid them of the need to 26 
compensate for lack of salary elsewhere, but also to stop the problem with brain 27 
drain that is pointed out by one of the elite participants (ELITE7). In 2017, the 28 
statistical internet portal techmed.sk reports that out of cca 19,000 doctors 29 
graduated in Slovakia, over 4,000 work abroad (https://www.techmed.sk/4211-30 
 
59 This is a direct translation from the Slovak nízka životná úroveň, which in English is better 
thought of as raising the living wage, but for the purposes of transparency I have stuck with the 
original language translation throughout, but the reader should interpret this as low living wage. 
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slovenskych-lekarov-pracuje-v-zahranici/). The largest group (over 2,000) work 1 
in the Czech Republic, second largest group (over 1,000) in Germany, and the 2 
third largest group (over 300) in Great Britain. The other destinations for doctors 3 
include Austria, Sweden, Norway, and other, mostly EU, countries. A Eurostat 4 
report shows that Slovakia has nearly 300 inhabitants per doctor (and over 2,000 5 
per one dentist), but this number does not take into consideration those doctors 6 
who migrated, live and work abroad or the specialty of doctors (SKEU2016 2016). 7 
In other words, while 300 per doctor may not be as high a number as other 8 
countries, there is no ratio of inhabitants to GPs, to specialty doctors, to doctors 9 
working in the private sector- all of which is important to consider when we 10 
discuss the deficiency of services or specialists as possible causes of corruption 11 
in the healthcare service. It is also important to point out that the wages of 12 
doctors have in fact been increasing gradually from the 90s onwards. When in 13 
2000 the average wage of a doctor was only 3% higher than minimum wage, in 14 
2013 this was over 56% higher (HPI 2014). The relative wage in healthcare sector 15 
has increased by the year 2013 to 116.3% of the average wage in the economy 16 
generally (HPI 2014). The wages of doctors have increased to 150% of average 17 
wage by the end of 2020 (platy.sk)60. There is therefore an impetus to keep 18 
increasing the wages of doctors and healthcare professionals and this would be 19 
congruent with the govermental awareness of them being underpaid, which is 20 
expressed by my participants. However, it is also apparent that these wage 21 
increases are not perceived to have amended the situation enough to erase the 22 
notion of doctors being underpaid, which comes through the language of my 23 
participants.  24 
  25 
 26 
 
60 For more detailed breakdown of all healthcare worker wages as a percentage of average living 




Figure 10.9 Population per medical doctor in EU, Source: Slovakia in Figures report, 
Eurostat 2016 
 1 
It has also been suggested by research (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013) that corruption 2 
levels have the potential to increase brain-drain, as well as brain-drain 3 
potentially increasing levels of corruption by decreasing resources available. Due 4 
to the highly educated population in Eastern European countries, but also high 5 
levels of favouritism and corruption, brain-drain decreases chances of economic 6 
recovery for countries such as Slovakia and further deepens the problems of 7 
supply-demand. 8 
 
Figure 10.10 Control of Corruption in EU, Source: World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, in Mungiu-Pippidi 2013 
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The word that often crops up in the participants’ understanding here is the word 1 
‘hodnota’ (value) and its variations as representative of wages: ‘podhodnotení’ 2 
(undervalued), ‘nie sú ohodnotnotení’ (they are not valued enough), and so on. 3 
The participants also spoke of the need to pay fair wages to the healthcare staff 4 
and of ‘pay’ and ‘salary’. Therefore, the arising trend from this node is the 5 
focused understanding of corruption in monetary terms (see also Figure 10.11 6 
below with references to pay and money), and an implication of correlation, if 7 
not causality, between low salaries and increased levels of corruption.  8 
 
Figure 10.11 Word 
frequency cloud 
from node ‘Low 
living standard’ 
set at 30 words, 
translations 




While the participants suggest that lifting the living wage would potentially curb 10 
corrupt practices, research suggests that this is not necessarily true, In fact, it 11 
may not even be a probable outcome, and it has been shown in practice that 12 
topping up salaries may just lead to bribery getting more rampant and out of 13 
hand (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015). Some suggest that topping up salaries 14 
without any other measures in place that control behaviour of employees 15 
effectively doesn’t lead to any significant improvement for curbing corruption 16 
(Lindner 2013). It is therefore important to emphasise here the need for any 17 
solutions to corrupt behaviour to consist of a combination of several factors put 18 
in place, according to the needs and specific nuances of a given country and/or 19 
sector. The thesis directly contributes to the mapping of this landscape to 20 
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facilitate the creation of such measures in the public sector. Guidelines inspired 1 
by data presented in this thesis would ideally address general misconceptions 2 
about gratitude payments being permissible, provide recommendations on 3 
revitalising the healthcare sector to offer more resources and reduce waiting 4 
times, and include professional healthcare boards and councils in ramping up the 5 
disciplinary measures against unprofessional behaviour to restore a sense of 6 
value and professional pride. 7 
There was little support for the idea that low living wage is a key problem for 8 
healthcare workers by the elites interviewed, but two elites working in 9 
healthcare did allude to money and lack thereof being a possible incentive for 10 
taking bribes or leaving the country to work elsewhere and under better 11 
conditions. Several participants from the general populace also did not subscribe 12 
to this view and directly said that they don’t perceive the living standard to be 13 
so bad in Slovakia, that it would justify corrupt behaviour. These participants 14 
thought that it was rather the need to instil effective counter-corruption 15 
measures with emphasis on punishments that was key. Secondly, they also 16 
thought that effective curbing of corruption was a question of a person’s 17 
individual level of integrity and valuing of their own profession. In this sense it 18 
appears that there is an impetus among the participants to perceive corruption 19 
on a deeper and a more complex level of such behaviour reflecting badly on the 20 
profession itself and one’s personal standards should not be affected by the 21 
living standards dictated by salary: ‘Maybe a higher salary would plug some 22 
holes, but this goes deeper than that. It is the personal level and standard of 23 
the given person that is in question here’ (INT13). Another interesting point was 24 
raised by a participant, viewing the living standard as not exclusively subject to 25 
the governmental decisions and economic situation, but rather as a result of 26 
accession to the EU: ‘We used to have a fairly good living standard until we 27 
joined the EU in the role of the EU’s poor relatives…it became about comparing 28 
how it’s possible that I get this amount for the same job that someone 29 
elsewhere [in the EU] gets paid about 5000 for?’ (INT14). This idea of a certain 30 
acquired worldly perspective, shaping the understanding of the populace about 31 
corruption, is worth exploring further. It is possible that the perception of the 32 
living standard often gets conflated with unrealistic expectations and ambitions 33 
of what one would like to receive; and this may be easier a trap to fall into in a 34 
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larger and a prosperous supranational body such as the EU. Such perceptions 1 
may indeed alter the understanding of participants as to their entitlement to 2 
services or standard of living, which may be correlated with their understanding 3 
of some corrupt practices as acceptable.  4 
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10.9 Reporting corruption 1 
 2 
This node outlines responses to the question: ‘Do you think that people are more 3 
likely to report corruption or not? If not, why do you think so?’ It encompasses 4 
general views on reporting corruption but also specific reasons that are outlined 5 
in the three child nodes: ‘Unlikely to report’, ‘Sceptical’, and ‘Where to report’. 6 
As such, this node provides a comprehensive overview of what the participants 7 
think about the levels of reporting corruption and to what extent they are aware 8 
of the specifics of reporting- i.e. who and where to turn to with a particular 9 
corruption query/problem. This node complements the category well, since it 10 
discusses some of the same motivations for not reporting corruption that are 11 
mentioned in above sections on reasons behind corruption: scepticism of the 12 
populace, fear, or disengagement.  13 
Out of the participants coded against the parent node ‘Reporting Corruption’, 15 14 
state that they would definitely not report corruption, 3 would report with a 15 
caveat attached to their response, such as ‘if it did not directly involve me’. One 16 
would report regardless of any negative effect on themselves and 5 were unsure. 17 
Within the parent node, several participants mentioned the possibility of 18 
anonymously reporting or reporting to the media, rather than law enforcement, 19 
due to distrust in the law enforcement procedures. When looking at the numbers 20 
of the calls made to law enforcement agencies, and directly to the government 21 
phone line established for corruption reporting, vis a vis the number of cases 22 
taken forward, I can understand where the distrust comes from (NAKA= National 23 
Criminal Agency of the Slovak Republic): 24 
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Example 10.8 Screenshot of ‘The statistics of calls to the anticorruption hotline of the Slovak 




10.9.1 Sceptical  1 
This node denotes the responses that displayed language of distrust and 2 
scepticism, when participants were asked to provide their reasoning behind why 3 
the populace may be unlikely to report corruption. 17 participants displayed 4 
language of scepticism such as: 5 
• We as a nation are not programmed to perceive the positives…my trust in the 6 
functioning of the legal system and the police in Slovakia etc is relatively low. My 7 
ako národ nie sme nastavení na to vnímať pozitíva...moja dôvera vo fungovanie 8 
právneho systému na Slovensku a polície atď je relatívne nízka. (ELITE1) 9 
 10 
• We are sceptical and terribly envious, we rely on the state, we are aggressive and 11 
arrogant with one another... Sme skeptickí a sme strašne závistliví, spoliehame 12 
sa na štát, sme agresívni a arogantní k sebe... (ELITE2) 13 
 14 
• It’s about how these cases often end and very often it’s the whistle blower who 15 
gets into trouble. Ako často tieto prípady končia a veľmi často ten whistle blower 16 
má z toho problémy. (ELITE3) 17 
 18 
• You just end up having more hassle with it…you will end up getting accused 19 
yourself. Zase s tým maš ty viac poťahovačiek…ešte nakoniec obvinia aj teba 20 
(FG1.2) 21 
 22 
• That national pride really only established itself very late on with us as a nation. 23 
I mean if the French are unhappy about something it’s immediately visible. We 24 
wake up only once we’re neck deep in the shit. Tá národná hrdosť u nás sa 25 
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etablovala až neskoro. Francúzi keď sú s niečím nespokojní je to vidno hneď. My 1 
až keď sme úplne v sračkách (INT1) 2 
 3 
• And in most cases it turns against you. Maybe it’s a bit of a head in the sand 4 
attitude. A ešte vo väčšine prípadov sa to proti vám otočí. Možno je to taký postoj 5 
pštrosa. (INT10) 6 
 7 
• And you keep hearing about it [corruption] and nothing is really getting done about 8 
it. So it’s a bit of scepticism. A stále to počujeme a nič sa s tým nedeje. Takže 9 
taká skepsa. (INT11) 10 
 11 
• I have the feeling that there’s people in every institution who would just sweep it 12 
under the carpet. Mám pocit, že v každej tej inštitúcii sú ľudia, ktorí by to stopili 13 
proste nejako. (INT15) 14 
 15 
• Today too many things get swept under the rug. Everyone knows everyone else 16 
and so it will certainly get tidied away. Dneska sa veľmi veľa vecí ututlá. A každý 17 
každého pozná sa to určite stiahne. (INT3) 18 
 19 
From the language above, the general opinion presents distrust that the 20 
reported case gets dealt with properly in the first place, and secondly the fear 21 
of getting charged with wrongdoing as the reporting party. The participants 22 
express their view that under such conditions it is not worth reporting corruption 23 
in the first place and also allude to the fact that as a nation the Slovaks are 24 
sceptical by nature and are likely to doubt that their efforts would be met with 25 
effective action and appreciation. There is a level of astuteness displayed in the 26 
participant responses- as we know from the recent debate on corruption by the 27 
weekly newspaper tyzden.sk, ‘Gift v Bribe’, both parties are culpable in corrupt 28 
practices and so the fear of participants that they might get prosecuted 29 
themselves is not misplaced. There is no awareness, however, of the mitigating 30 
legal provisions such as ‘active regret’ in the participants’ understanding. These 31 
responses were not only relating to reporting of corruption as one of the parties 32 
within the transaction, but also reporting on having knowledge of corrupt 33 
proceedings that one is not involved in directly. Recently the case of a high-34 
profile young whistle blower Zuzana Hlávková, who reported on tampering with 35 
public procurement tenders in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was publicised and 36 
Miss Hlávková was fired from her position and started working for the Slovak 37 
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chapter of Transparency International61. The participants’ perceptions, 1 
therefore, that involving oneself in reporting corruption causes inconvenience 2 
and hassle, are again not out of place with the public discourse on the topic. 3 
This fear of persecution as the whistle-blower is a common theme throughout my 4 
thesis, and will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. 5 
 6 
10.9.2 Unlikely to report/ Where to report 7 
The ‘Unlikely to report’ node follows on directly from the expressed scepticism 8 
and fear in the above node. 24 out of 30 participants coded against this node 9 
express their belief that people are much more likely not to report corruption 10 
than to report it, and the primary reason stated for this is fear (be it fear for 11 
losing access to privilege or fear of their own safety). The most prominent 12 
examples of the expressions and language of fear are as follows: 13 
• You mean whistle blowers? You’d have to be f***ing crazy to do that these days. I 14 
mean nothing happens anyway… (Akože biele vrany? Na to treba byť jebnutý 15 
dneska. Lebo aj tak sa nič neudeje...) (FG3.3) 16 
 17 
• No one wants to end up like Kuciak62. (Nikto nechce dopadnúť ako Kuciak.) (FG3.1) 18 
 19 
• Definitely not, people are afraid I reckon. (Určite nie. Ľudia sa boja podľa mňa) 20 
(INT11) 21 
 22 
• I would be considering the repercussions, I don’t know if I could be a whistle 23 
blower. Zvažovala by som dôsledky, neviem, či by som vedela byť takou bielou 24 
vranou. (INT15) 25 
 26 
• [about doctors not reporting] I mean the management is scared too, because the 27 
hospital director can replace anyone he wants…everyone is afraid, scared for their 28 
livelihoods. (Aj ten manažment sa bojí, lebo riaditeľ nemocnice reálne môže 29 
vymeniť všetkých…všetci sa boja, aby mali z čoho vyžiť.) (ELITE2) 30 
 31 
 
61 See more about the case here: https://bielavrana.sk/oceneni/2017.html [last accessed 
12/12/2020] 
62 The participant refers to the 2018 killing of the investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée, 
who got killed by members of organised crime after Kuciak discovered a connection between 
high government officials and the organised group and ensuing corrupt activities; see more 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-52188266 [last accessed 12/12/2020] 
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• Yeah, a person is scared for their family getting attacked and so on… (Človek má 1 
starch, aby ti nenapadli rodinu a tak…) (INT7) 2 
 3 
• I would probably opt for something anonymous out of fear for my life. 4 
(Pravdepodobne by som zvolila niečo anonymné z obavy o svoju bezpečnosť) 5 
(INT9) 6 
 7 
• To ensure the safety of their families and health of their loved ones… (ELITE7) 8 
It is apparent that the participants have an understanding of reporting 9 
corruption that stems from public discourse on the matter in the media, as well 10 
as their own unflattering views of the effectiveness of law enforcement- perhaps 11 
even the capacity of the law enforcement to stay impartial and their capacity to 12 
protect whistle blowers. The narrative and language of fear is one of deep 13 
concern and stands as tribute to the necessity of conducting greater levels of 14 
research into corruption, and ultimately provide more effective measures for its 15 
curbing.  16 
The participants showed only mild awareness of the existence of the government 17 
corruption reporting hotline- only 7 out of 30 responded that not only would they 18 
know where to report corruption, but specifically singled out the hotline. 14 19 
participants stated that if they had to report it, they would turn to the police 20 
(but emphasised their distrust in the police). Two would turn to the media and 21 
one would report to Transparency International Slovakia. This is indicative of the 22 
participants’ understanding of reporting corruption being quite varied and based 23 
on personally-conducted research into this, rather than a centralised and an 24 
effective message of the governmental institutions on this. 25 
10.11 Conclusions  26 
 27 
This chapter dealt with a number of important features when it comes to the 28 
understanding of corruption in real life terms.  It outlined a wide variety of 29 
reasons that the participants consider to be pivotal in causing corrupt behaviour 30 
in Slovakia and in the healthcare sector, as per their understanding. The reasons 31 
with the highest number of responses correspond with the initial visualisation of 32 
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the category, as seen below in Figure 10.1, which shows the dominant position 1 



















with a moderate 




The general message to take away from this category is that there is no single 4 
reason that is more relevant to the participant understanding of corruption 5 
development in Slovakia than another. There is significant overlap in the 6 
participant responses, which suggests that they are displaying awareness of the 7 
need for several factors to interact, in order to create the specific conditions for 8 
corruption that Slovakia and its healthcare sector finds itself in today.  9 
There is, however, strong opinion on corruption having become a part of the 10 
cultural outlook of the country and the language and semantic congruence in the 11 
node ‘culture norm’ indicates a strong agreement of participants on this front. 12 
This idea is further explored and reinforced by the discussion within the nodes 13 
‘lack of morals’ and ‘mentality of people’, where participants stress the role of 14 
social pressures and their impact on collective decision-making. However, the 15 
participants also show acute awareness of the importance of individual agency 16 
and decision-making. This is also emphasised by several of the word clouds 17 
included in this section, which tend to have the word for ‘people’ or ‘person’ in 18 
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prominent positions, suggesting that the participants’ focus on the role of 1 
people in the system is strong.  2 
The nodes for ‘Soviet legacies’ and ‘deficiency of services’ again show an 3 
overlap of linear thinking. Many participants think that not only do Soviet 4 
legacies (or legacies of an even more distant past) play a role in the 5 
development of corrupt practices as seen today, but they also draw a connection 6 
between the previous regime’s lack of goods and services and people’s 7 
perception of services still being insufficient to date. This is, of course, not just 8 
the participant perception as stemming from the previous regime, but also their 9 
observation based on real-life experience and the specific examples given as to 10 
the lack of specialists, hospitals, equipment, and resources, as well as brain 11 
drain. This level of insight shows an astute awareness of the state of health care 12 
today. The idea of these particular practices relating to Soviet-specific contexts 13 
is explored mainly in literature on blat and informal practices (Ledeneva, Lovell 14 
et al. 2000, Varese 2000, Ledeneva 2009, Ledeneva 2009, Baez-Camargo and 15 
Ledeneva 2017). The literature points to a correlation between deficiency, 16 
inaccessibility, or unavailability of a service and the flourishing of informal 17 
networks and blat. Within this context, my participants’ views confirm that a 18 
dimension of corruption in this region can be ascribed to a particular way of 19 
practicing corruption- through networks, acquaintances, friendships, and 20 
exchanges of services, just like blat. 21 
The ‘legislative deficiencies’ node provides a discussion on the participants’ 22 
belief that the measures in place are insufficient and ineffective at dealing with 23 
cases of corruption, and also the view that these are very vague and leave too 24 
much room for interpretation. This view is supported by my own research into 25 
the topic, whereby I tried to derive the relevant information from the same type 26 
of source that would be available to the regular citizen to access, such as 27 
governmental websites condensing the information for the populace. This 28 
research laid bare the incomplete nature of the participants’ understanding of 29 
corruption measures in place and, most importantly, the deficiencies in 30 
effective definition of what constitutes corruption and bribes for the citizens. 31 
The participants did instinctively express fear in their general responses over 32 
being implicated in corruption, should they want to report it, but did not know 33 
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for certain that both parties of corrupt exchanges are equally culpable. 1 
Participants also seem to draw a distinction (as seen in Chapter 8) between 2 
gratitude payments and bribes, whereas legally these two are synonymous and a 3 
prosecutor is free to treat them equally, regardless of any mitigating 4 
circumstances that the participants themselves attach to the transactions. As 5 
such, it appears prudent for the regulatory bodies to make this information 6 
clearer for the populace, if they expect their behaviour to change. There is, 7 
however, evidence to suggest that this idea of acceptability of some gifts and 8 
condemnation of others can be traced to popular culture, such as books and 9 
cinematography for the participants. This would potentially provide yet another 10 
dimension of corruption to be explored on top of the standard approach of 11 
theory into Soviet practices and the translatability of blat or informal practices 12 
into modern corruption.  13 
The participants from a large majority believe that people are unlikely to report 14 
corruption due to fear of their own safety, fear of being caused unnecessary 15 
hassle, scepticism over the inefficient procedures in place, and distrust in the 16 
law enforcement agencies. This apprehensive tendency is supported by 17 
Transparency International research, which shows Slovakia to be among the 18 
seven countries in the EU with the weakest whistle-blower protection in place 19 
(Worth 2013).The language brings out the trend of fear and scepticism most 20 
prominently, which is at best a concerning and at worst a socially debilitating 21 
reality. The category also showed the varied understanding of participants as to 22 
where corruption should be reported, which points to mixed messaging reaching 23 
the participants from official bodies, leading to fragmentation of procedures and 24 
inevitable clerical errors and red tape. 25 
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Chapter 11: Petty versus Grand corruption 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter relates to the respondent views on not only recognising a difference 
between grand and petty corruption, but also the potential impact and 
interaction of the two levels. This section follows the simple structure of 
amalgamation of nodes that display similarity of content, as seen in Figure 11.1. 
The opinions of grand and petty corruption are connected with the concrete 
examples that the participants provided to illustrate their views. This was a 
useful tool for checking the consistency of the respondents’ views. For example, 
if a respondent described grand corruption as taking place in the higher echelons 
of government and then gave an example of paying for knee surgery to illustrate 
grand corruption, it would be indicative of inconsistent thinking on their part. 
No such discrepancy occurred, however, and all respondents were congruent 
when describing both their real-life ideas of petty and grand corruption, and 






structure: Petty v 
Grand. The bright 
blue bubble 
represents the 
category, the red 
box represents 
the node with a 




with a moderate 




The chapter therefore investigates the awareness and understanding of the 
terms ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption, and answers to follow-up questions which 
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asked about how participants think about each level of corruption, whether they 
think there’s a link between the two, and which is worse for society as whole. 
Due to the scope of questioning and content, the chapter is relevant for several 
of the research questions, namely the overarching RQ (To what extent is the 
theoretical difference between grand and petty corruption reflected in the 
real-life understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health care?), RQs 1& 2 (How 
does awareness of grand corruption inform/justify individual engagement in 
petty corruption? And vice versa) and also RQ3 (What are the strategies utilised 
to carry out grand and petty corrupt practices?). 
11.2 Petty and Grand corruption as terms 
 
Of the 24 participants under the generic parent node ‘Petty v Grand’, which 
served to collate expressions of recognition of the two levels of corruption, 17 
participants have either heard of the distinction already, or were able to 
envisage corruption on two different levels when asked to describe what they 
thought the two terms meant. 7 participants did not make the distinction and/or 
were unable to describe what they would consider to be petty or grand 
corruption. This indicates that while for some, the terms petty and grand 
corruption (or potentially other corruption pairs on a theoretical level as 
described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2) are either familiar or at least self-
explanatory, there is a third of the participants who were not able to link their 
understanding of corruption to different levels. This may be because the 
participants simply do not make a distinction between different types of corrupt 
practices and see corruption as one problem with no need to distinguish between 
grand and petty. It may also be because they only ever experienced or 
considered one type of corruption and are not aware of other types being at 
play. The language associated with petty corruption most often alluded to ‘low 
levels, ‘everyday type of corruption’, ‘small businesses’, ‘low places’ and the 
language associated with grand corruption included ‘great scale’, ‘high places’, 
‘big firms/financial groups’, ‘politics’, ‘elite circles’ and similar. Apparently, the 
distinction perceived and understood takes place not only in difference of 
locating the corrupt exchanges in different environments, but also in terms of 
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scale of the sum. The particular examples of sums in mind are discussed below 
in the section 11.6 (Examples). 
While there is extensive literature on the different types of dichotomies of 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Heywood 2014, Bussell 2015, Rose-Ackerman 
2016), this distinction in the typology of corruption has been criticised for 
creating artificial boundaries and being misleading (Shehu 2005). There are few 
mentions in published literature evaluating the validity of this distinction in the 
questions posed to the general population, and this is a gap I sought to address 
in this project. I was unable to find any specific polls or questionnaires that 
asked respondents to verbalise their view and understanding of theoretical terms 
such as petty or grand corruption and it appears that these terms have not been 
used in legislation or official government guidelines, which would suggest they 
are not readily used in discourse. It is important to underline the contribution of 
the thesis to the testing of typological terms of corruption on those who should 
be able to navigate the system and their own behaviour in practice accordingly. 
It would be prudent to recommend that all labels associated with corruption 
(i.e. private v public, institutional v personal, petty v grand etc.) are subjected 
to similar questioning. It is important to collate views on what the respondents 
as members of society envisage under these terms if they are to follow any 
guidance with this terminology embedded. 
11.3 Disaggregating petty and grand corruption 
 
The nodes investigated in this section (Distinction between petty and grand 
corruption, Addressing the two types individually) take the general envisioning 
of different levels of corruption further. I was interested to see whether the 
participants are able to not only verbalise their idea of what petty and grand 
corruption could mean, but also whether they think this is a valid distinction to 
make, and whether, as a result, these two levels of corruption should also be 
addressed differently in practical terms. The responses here were often difficult 
to code due to their nuanced content, but overall, 8 out of 22 participants coded 
here made it very clear that they think there are ‘two problems’ at play, rather 
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than one overarching problem of corruption and 3 participants made it very 
clear that there is ‘no difference’ between the two on a practical level. The rest 
of the participants were providing more nuanced views that there is a 
difference, but there is also an underlying principle that is the same for both 
types of corruption. The majority of participants coded here believe that 
corruption is a problem that cannot be clearly split between the levels of petty 
and grand and is to be seen as more nuanced and with similarity of purpose and 
execution in practice. The node, therefore, directly informs overarching RQ and 
RQs 1 and 2, by suggesting that the two levels of corruption share fundamental 
commonalities that cannot be disaggregated, and the theoretical distinction 
drawn between them does not in fact reflect the real-life understanding of 
corruption by participants.  
However, this is not the whole story. When asked whether the levels of 
corruption discussed should be addressed differently in practice, rather than just 
recognised as different problems theoretically, the participants overwhelmingly 
agreed. Out of ten participants coded against this answer, 8 thought that 
corruption on petty and grand levels should be addressed by different measures 
(such as tighter legislation enforcement for grand corruption and raising 
awareness of corruption in schools for petty), regardless of whether they initially 
thought the distinction mattered on a theoretical level. In other words, even 
participants who thought that there is no need or use in disaggregating 
corruption into petty and grand levels theoretically, thought that the measures 
addressing them should be tailored to the specific parameters of the levels of 
corrupt transactions, while functioning as a whole. This finding validates the 
literature’s view on drawing a distinction between the levels of corruption in the 
first place, but not in theoretical conceptualisation, rather, in a practical 
implementation of anti-corruption measures. For example, some participants 
stated that the two types of corruption should be addressed individually, and 
this is due to the different causes of corruption on different levels, e.g., greed 
on grand level and necessity on lower level. They felt that it was unfair to 
compare a doctor being sent to jail immediately for taking a chicken from a 
patient, but at the same time for the authorities not to be held accountable for 
several months, for cases that involve hundreds of thousands of misappropriated 
funds for hospital equipment (INT16.1). They were aware that the ‘systemic 
372 
failing’ exists on both levels (FG4.4) and both types of corruption are principally 
the same, but that the measures taken should address the root causes of 
corruption which they felt were numerous. It is important to point out that 9 out 
of the ten participants were females and all ten were university-educated. 
Whether this points to a potentially greater level of perception held by females 
with higher education on this issue or is the result of sampling bias cannot be 
known for certain. There is, however, evidence in literature to suggest that 
women tend to be less involved in corrupt transactions than men and more 
prone to morally disapprove of corruption, with a lower tolerance for it (Dollar, 
Fishman et al. 2001, Swamy, Knack et al. 2001, Bauhr, Charron et al. 2018, 
Kubbe, Alexander et al. 2019). This is considered to be due to women being both 
more risk averse than men and also due to the processes of gender socialisation, 
whereby girls tend to exercise higher levels of self-control and are directed 
toward more caring and pro-social activities, which shapes their behaviour 
(Dollar, Fishman et al. 2001, Swamy, Knack et al. 2001). Participants were not 
forced to answer all questions and not everyone elected to share their views on 
all questions. However, such high concentrations of demographic groups in 
certain nodes present valuable findings in and of themselves by portraying such 
trends in responses and showing the willingness of the specific groups to expand 
on specific themes. A study by Bauhr et al. (2018) shows that such trends could 
develop into real-life successful anti-corruption measures. In Bauhr’s study, 
women in elected office were shown to be strongly negatively correlated with 
both petty and grand corruption prevalence, and driven by improvement of 
public service delivery (particularly care-oriented services such as education and 
health care) and the breakup of male-dominated clientelist networks (Bauhr, 
Charron et al. 2018). It is therefore important to note that this trend is also 
visible in my study, where women on average tended to engage with more 
questions than men and had more clear-cut views regarding condemnation of 
corrupt practices and behaviour, including informal payments and gratitude 
payments. 
Ultimately, the disaggregation of different levels or types of corruption, as 
presented in literature to date, has some validity in real-life understanding of 
corruption. The participants either made this distinction themselves without 
prompting or were able to instinctively imagine different types of corrupt 
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transactions under each of the terms. At the same time, when it came to 
questions on whether this distinction is present on a practical level, the majority 
of participants felt that this was not the case and that corruption operates on 
the same principle on all levels and that all levels either interact or lead to one 
another- either by setting the wrong example from the top to the bottom levels, 
or, inversely, by bringing bad habits from bottom levels to the top levels. Either 
way, these levels do not exist on their own and cannot be separated in terms of 
their understanding. As participant ELITE1 expressed: ‘It is difficult to imagine a 
reality in which grand corruption would exist but petty would not’. It is 
therefore important to make sure that this fundamental understanding of 
corruption as holistically unacceptable is presented in the public discourse and 
in legislation. This is because there is strong indication by my participants that 
their understanding of corruption sees the two levels as intertwined and feeding 
off of one another- any measures applied to one will have a knock-on effect on 
the other and for effectivity’s sake it is necessary to make sure these measures 
are fit for purpose on both levels. 
However, it is worth encouraging the tailoring of measures for particular sectors 
and industries. This is relevant especially for the involvement of professional 
councils, unions, and other bodies that promote the reputation and 
professionalism codes of conduct and have the power to take away licences and 
impose other disciplinary measures for misconduct on petty levels. Such an 
organisation for health care in Slovakia is for example the Slovak Medical 
Chamber or the ÚDZS (The Slovak Bureau for Medical Care Oversight). The 
website of the Medical chamber does not contain a set of ethical guidelines 
readily accessible to the public and does not specify its remit of operating. Its 
search engine also came up with no results when queried for words such as 
‘corruption’ or ‘bribery’ and the minutes of meetings of the disciplinary 
committee are not made public, nor is there any information provided on the 
activities of the disciplinary committee. For comparison, the British GMC directly 
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addresses these challenges in publicly available Code of Conduct63, Tomorrow’s 
doctors platform, or even MPTS tribunal hearings64. The same is the case for the 
American Medical Association65- both websites have very simple search engines 
which allow for searching for terms such as ‘corruption’ and ‘bribery’, and 
outline their ethical codes and stances on conflicts of interest. The Slovak 
Bureau for Medical Care Oversight, similarly to the Slovak Medical Chamber, 
does not contain any specific information on its activity regarding anti-
corruption measures. It does, however, specify in its remit of operation, that it 
provides ‘quality assurance’ and as a result is able to suggest the levying of 
sanctions or can levy sanctions directly on persons and companies (hospitals) and 
is also concerned with investigating inadequacies in care delivery and suggests 
measures of remediation. As such, the Bureau appears to have a more specific 
role in potentially investigating corrupt behaviour and taking action, but also 
lacks the specific wording to address corrupt behaviour directly.  
 
11.4 Link between petty and grand corruption 
 
This node extends the previous notion that petty and grand levels of corruption 
are interconnected and actively looks for a link between petty and grand 
corruption in conceptual and practical terms. While the nodes in the chapter so 
far may seem similar in content, the reason questions relating to connecting or 
differentiating between the two levels were asked in the particular sequence 
outlined in Appendix 3, was to make sure the participants talked themselves 
through their own understanding of corruption sequentially. The purpose of 
 
63 For more details see https://www.gmc-uk.org/search-results?searchText=corruption [last 
accessed 12/01/2021] 
64 For more details see https://www.mpts-uk.org/hearings-and-decisions [last accessed 12/01/2021] 
65 For more details see https://www.ama-assn.org/about/leadership/ama-conflict-interest-policy [last 
accessed 12/01/2021] 
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multiple questions of similar nature was to ensure that they are able to reliably 
verbalise their own conceptualisation of corruption, as based on their real-life 
experiences that shaped their views, and clear up any ensuing discrepancies. 25 
participants coded here thought that there was a clear link between petty and 
grand corruption practices and only two participants thought explicitly that 
there was no link and these two levels existed independently of each other. The 
language associated with the view that there is a direct link between them 
informs the overarching RQ (To what extent is the theoretical difference 
between grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of 
corruption in Slovakia’s health care?), as well as RQ 1& 2 (How does awareness 
of grand corruption inform/justify individual engagement in petty corruption? 
And vice versa), which relate directly to the idea of one level justifying or 
informing the other.  
• “The principle is the same” Ten princíp je rovnaký 
• “I think that they are connected for sure. It is difficult to imagine a reality in 
which grand corruption exists but petty does not” Ja si myslím, že oni spolu 
súvisia. Ako ťažko si viem predstaviť, že tá vysoká by neexistovala a nízka by 
bola 
• “Yes, of course. They are interconnected” Áno, samozrejme. Súvisia spolu. 
• “It is possible that there is some connection in society, where the petty 
corruption is ordinarily accepted” Je možné, že je nejaký súvis asi 
v spoločnosti, kde je bežne akceptovaná aj tá malá korupcia 
• “It’s both there [grand level] and there [petty level]… There is definitely a 
connection. One has to learn it somewhere, start it somehow…All of corruption 
is intertwined…” Je to aj tam, aj tam...Určite je spojenie. Lebo niekde sa to 
človek musí naučiť, niekde musí začať...Všetka korupcia je previazaná 
• “It’s the same principle, yeah…The principle is the same and everyone will 
better their situation in a way that fits best…Because the principle and the 
values are the very same in both cases” Akože princíp je rovnaký, áno...Ten 
princíp je ten istý a každý si svoju situáciu zlepší tak ako vie...Lebo ten princíp 
a nejaké zásady sú v obidvoch rovnaké 
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• “It’s the same form it takes…It’s the same on different levels…just a different 
form of the same…I think it’s the same…It just happens on different 
levels…there’s only one corruption” Je to taká istá forma...Áno, na iných 
úrovniach...iná forma...Len sa to deje na iných leveloch...Podľa mňa je to to 
isté...Korupcia je len jedna 
• “If a GP takes eggs from an old lady, then he will definitely be taking more 
when he gets into an official ‘function’ [i.e. a job with more oversight and 
influence]…Those people who have got themselves used to the tit for tat system 
then get to the higher positions and take that habit with them…It starts on the 
bottom and goes to the top- therefore they must have learnt it somewhere” 
Obvodný lekár a berie od babičky vajcia, tak určite bude brať viac keď sa 
dostane do funkcie...Tí ľudia, ktorí si zvykli na systém niečo za niečo a potom 
sa dostali na tie vyššie pozície tak si zobrali ten zvyk so sebou...Začína sa to 
dolu a ide to hore- čiže niekde sa to naučili. 
The language highlighted in the responses above relates to several trends 
expressed by the participants. First, there is a high frequency of repeating the 
words ‘principle’, ‘connection’ or ‘interconnection’, suggesting the view of 
corruption levels that is dynamic and where these levels of grand and petty 
corruption share fundamental similarities and are connected. Secondly, the 
participants also allude to the levels of corruption being just different ‘forms’ of 
the same problem. The fact that the participants are able to recognise this 
underlying common denominator of the different shapes that corruption takes, is 
indicative of having developed a sophisticated view of corruption. Nearly all 
participants coded here are university-educated and five of them are elites, 
which could be adding to the levels of sophisticated thinking about corruption. 
Lastly, there are allusions to having ‘learnt’ this behaviour on petty levels and 
transferring it to grand levels, which would directly inform RQ1, which suggests 
that petty corruption affects behaviour in grand levels of corruption. This notion 
in reverse (i.e. informing RQ2) was developed more when participants were 
asked which type of corruption they consider to be worse for society. Here one 
participant specifically said “Grand corruption teaches petty corruption to 
people…A fish definitely rots from the head” Vysoká korupcia učí nízku. Ryba 
smrdí od hlavy určite (INT8). It would therefore appear that there are views (in 
varying levels of significance) to support both RQ1 and 2 in their theoretical 
assumption that one type of corruption is able to justify or inform the actions 
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taken on the other level. It is important to point out that this is a unique 
observation of the thesis that has not been tested out in any type of 
questionnaire or poll about corruption in this region or elsewhere before. The 
awareness displayed by the participants in their answers of one level of 
corruption being able to condition and teach another, and their feeding off of 
one another in a perpetual cycle is one of the key findings of the thesis. This 
means that not only are petty and grand corruption inseparable and interacting, 
but they share a common fundamental architecture. While they may not be 
propelled by similar immediate causes, their fundamental behaviour is 
transferred from one to another and is fit for carrying out purposes on both 
levels.  
11.5 Which type of corruption is worse for society? 
 
The participants were finally asked in this set of questions on petty and grand 
corruption, which one they thought was more detrimental for society- if any. 
The question was designed to make the participants think on a deeper level, 
whether the impact of corruption is to be disaggregated and whether one type 
of corruption is generally worse than the other. On balance, 10 participants have 
expressed their view that grand corruption is worse for society. 4 participants 
thought both were equally detrimental for society and only one participant 
thought that petty was worse. The general reasoning for this was encompassed 
in language that suggested that grand corruption is more ‘dangerous’, 
‘impactful’, ‘more important’, and also provides ‘greater incentives’, which 
makes the resulting effect worse than petty. The participants thought that grand 
corruption had greater reach due to often involving manipulation of public 
resources or state budgets and also enjoys little oversight if the top echelons of 
society [the overseers themselves] are carrying it out. The view that grand 
corruption is worse for society according to my participants is also supported by 
the visual presentation of the word frequency search overleaf, which repeats the 
word ‘grand’ in several forms and puts it in prominent positions.  
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Figure 11.2 Word 
frequency search 
cloud of node 
‘Which is worse’, 
set for 30 words, 
translations 




The participants thought that the petty sums involved in petty, everyday 
corruption could not, in general, add up to the type of sum that would affect as 
large a portion of the population as something that takes place on ministerial 
levels and affects everyone by proxy. It is difficult to say whether this 
demonstrates certain levels of naivete by the participants or lack of information 
about how the collective economy works. Literature shows that informal 
payments, which my participants discount as less impactful, do in fact make up 
a large portion of all healthcare revenue and expenditure in some countries; in 
Russia this figure was recorded at 56% of total national health expenditure in the 
early 2000s (Lewis 2007). The same goes for theories of shadow economies that 
are prevalent in post-communist societies and are sometimes considered to be 
key to the general running of the official economy by injecting cash flow into 
official transactions from unofficial sources, artificially uplifting the collective 
GDP, and addressing problems such as unemployment and efficient use of public 
goods (Dreher and Schneider 2009, Zaman and Goschin 2015, Hoinaru, Buda et 
al. 2020). Therefore, it is apparent from research that petty corruption and 
informal payments, as well as shadow economy and engaging of general 
population in cash-in-hand work or black-market activities, has a significant 
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bearing on the economy. However, we can surmise from the opinions of the 
participants that this information has not sufficiently permeated their awareness 
and their understanding is unable to account for the vastness of impact that the 
amalgamation of several small sums on petty levels has on society.  
11.6 Examples of petty and grand corruption 
 
As outlined above, it was important to make sure that the participants’ 
theoretical understanding of petty and grand corruption corresponded with their 
idea of what this meant in practice. The participants provided several anecdotal 
examples and also the size of sums or example gifts that they associated with 
either type.  
11.6.1 Petty examples 
The examples within petty corruption included specific sums such as 5, 10 or 20 
EUR given to the health professional for anything from getting a specific 
prescription, blood tests, to a ‘contribution’ for a specific doctor surgery (as an 
establishment), but also to 500 EUR for a surgery (as a procedure). The 
participants also included examples such as home-grown strawberries or home-
sourced goods, such as eggs, being offered mostly by the older generation. They 
associated these in-kind gifts with recent experiences or anecdotes which 
suggests that the barter of ‘gifts’ is still flourishing and not being replaced by 
just cash in envelopes. There were also mentions of bribes/gifts to schools and 
nurseries for accepting a child outside of the regular waiting list, paying a small 
sum for having an ID card/passport expedited, arranging an X-Ray examination 
or an ultrasound examination preferentially, or providing tickets to a show for a 
doctor when the participant worked in a culture-oriented organisation. One 
participant, a nursery teacher, described being ‘shoved money at’ from parents 
outside of nursery, asking how much more it would take for their child to be 
taken into the nursery immediately (FG1.7). 
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Chapter 8 presents items such as coffees, alcohol bottles or chocolates to belong 
in the category of a gift (see Chapter 8), i.e. not corruption, according to 
participants. However, in this chapter, the participants were labelling these 
same examples as petty corruption, when asked for an example of what they 
mean by the term. This conflation of terms for the participants was indicative of 
the fact that the difference between petty corruption instances and those of 
gifts and gratitude is blurred and defined by circumstances and justification 
applied to a specific situation. The instances in this node also included four 
mentions of gifts or sums for child births, which is consistent with the findings in 
Chapter 8 (Gratitude payments), where the obstetrics and gynaecology 
(OB&GYN) specialty was also highlighted by respondents to be particularly 
popular in receiving/requesting bribes or gifts. It is also one of the top three 
specialties that were described by Mužik and Szalayová in their 2013 report on 
informal payments in the healthcare sector, where gynaecologists ranked third 
with 24% of all informal payments recorded having been paid to this specialty 
(Mužik and Szalayová 2013). This is potentially due to the fact that birth rate has 
increased in Slovakia from 9.7 per 1000 in 2002 to 10.2 per 1000 in 202066, 
making the specialty more sought out and busier, and for most women, their 
interaction with their OB&GYN is the first serious interaction with healthcare 
professionals, so it has the potential to frame their view of healthcare. In 
Slovakia, it is also possible to select an OB&GYN doctor that will deliver your 
baby specifically- which means that even if there’s another doctor on the rota in 
the hospital, you contractually bind a specific doctor to have to arrive on the 
day and deliver the baby. The standard contract for this in state-run hospitals is 
drawn up between the hospital, the doctor, and the parents. This luxury of 
choice costs the parents 300 EUR on average which is split evenly between the 
hospital and the doctor in question on top of the doctor’s regular salary. In some 
cases, what happens is that this contract gets torn up at the end and the parents 
turn over 200 or 250 EUR to the doctor in question directly in cash, which means 
that the only party losing out is the hospital. The doctor and the parents then 
 
66 For more demographic statistics on Slovakia, visit: https://knoema.com/atlas/Slovakia/Birth-rate. 
[last accessed 16/03/2021]  
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simply claim that there was no agreement in the first place, and it was a lucky 
coincidence that the doctor happened to be there at the time of delivery. Such 
conduct is apparently ubiquitous when it comes to gynaecology and obstetrics 
and with the proliferation of internet discussions and fora where mothers share 
information, it is no wonder that this is a frequent occurrence of corrupt 
activity. The participant who intimated this information did so specifically after 
the interview was wrapped up and asked for this not to be a part of the official 
transcript.  
Interestingly, however, one participant described their viewing of the difference 
between grand and petty corruption as juxtaposing ‘a million [for something] as 
opposed to just a grand’ Akože vo vysokých kruhoch berie akože million a v 
nízkych…akože tisícku? (INT11). It is clear here that if we compare the majority 
of views, which include gifts of small financial value and bribes to the size of 
low double digits of EUR, the perception of this issue must vary based on the 
financial background of the respective participant. In other words, the label 
petty corruption of 20 EUR bears for others the same meaning as petty 
corruption for participant INT11, who quoted 1000 EUR. This type of difference 
observed in the participant responses further underlines the complexity of 
pinning down the precise definitions and understanding of corruption on 
different levels. It also further emphasises the need for conducting more 
qualitative research into different levels of corruption, to thoroughly understand 
where the perceptions of participants are rooted and how they can best be 
harnessed to create a set of comprehensive guidelines and anti-corruption 
measures on different levels.  
It is also important to point out that this variety of sums as ascribed to petty 
corruption can also impact on the notion that grand corruption is considered to 
be worse for society. In other words, if we took the larger sum of 1000 EUR to be 
a representative example of petty corruption, accumulated across the board, 
the financial impact on the sector and the economy as a whole would be vast 
and comparable to that of a grand corruption scandal. However, research shows 
that the sum is not, in fact, entirely relevant, it is more so the amount of people 
who collectively have to pay it. For example, Transparency International’s 
(2017) Global Corruption Barometer Survey of Latin American citizens and those 
382 
of the Caribbean shows that one third of people who used a public resource paid 
a bribe for it67.  This would mean that a third of the 90 million people’s access to 
public services in Latin America, including healthcare, was dependent on extra 
payments, which were most likely illegal. The knock-on effects of this may even 
lead to people postponing seeking medical help, causing delayed and more 
serious diagnoses (Mostert, Njuguna et al. 2015) in the healthcare sector, which 
my participants did not account for in their assessment of which corruption is 
more detrimental. Further effects of petty corruption, which are more insidious 
than those of grand corruption include: the increasing of economic inequality in 
a society, deepening levels of poverty when those who have less are forced to 
make informal payments and bribes, and also deepening the distrust in public 
institutions. Most importantly, however, as has been pointed out by the 
participants who believe that petty and grand corruption are connected, there is 
a cycle of dependency and learning of behaviour that leads from one level to 
another. Bohórquez and Devrim (2012) show that corruption operates within a 
system of networks and suggest that it is very likely that those requiring a bribe 
on a petty level are later required to provide a larger cut to those above them in 
the proverbial “food chain” and so on, which feeds the entire system of corrupt 
behaviour through the strata, all the way up to grand corruption levels 
(Bohórquez and Devrim 2012), thus eradicating any distinctions between them. It 
is therefore important to emphasise the isolated view of corruption impact that 
has been displayed by my participants, who perceive this impact only in terms of 
the superficial decision-making on grand levels and seemingly insignificant 
amounts paid on petty levels. The reach of petty corruption, however, is much 
more complex and its tentacles are much more likely to pervade all walks of 
life, from engagement with public institutions and trust, through the learning of 
corrupt behaviour, to affecting the economy and economic equality.  
 
67 See full article here: https://www.transparency.org/en/news/corruption-on-the-rise-in-latin-
america-and-the-caribbean# [last accessed 02/01/2021] 
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11.6.2 Grand examples 
Examples of grand corruption among the participant responses include primarily 
notions of financial tampering with public tenders or resources. The language 
included references to ‘large sums’, ‘millions’, ‘EU funds’, ‘state budgets’ and 
similar. The participants noted the activities of big financial groups like PENTA68 
building hospitals, for example, and overselling them to the state or turning 
them into private institutions that regular citizens cannot access (ELITE8). 
Financial groups such as PENTA have been notoriously involved in corruption 
scandals (such as Gorila of 2012, see Chapter 5) and discredited as a result69. 
Furthermore, allusions were made to the overpaying of the state hospitals for CT 
machines (more details in Chapter 5, sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2), dubious 
relationships between hospitals and health insurance companies overcharging for 
procedures and pocketing the difference (this point was made by an elite 
participant ELITE 2 with unique insight into the inner workings of one of the 
largest hospitals in Bratislava), EU funds embezzlement, political corruption, and 
election manipulation. The participants were therefore able to show an 
awareness of the difference between grand and petty corruption and their 
examples could all be traced to publicised scandals of grand corruption, covered 
in the media. 3 participants mentioned CT machine fraud, for example, and 3 
others EU fund fraud. There is evidence to suggest that this is a particularly 
astute observation made by the participants, as the impact of EU funds on 
institutionalised corruption is a recognised phenomenon in Central Europe 
(Fazekas, King et al. 2014). In particular, EU funds constitute a considerable part 
of the CEE countries’ GDP and about 50% of public investment per member 
state. In Slovakia, the problems with EU funds that cause the thriving of 
institutionalised grand corruption, relate specifically to not publishing public 
 
68 A financial, investment group, based offshore, but with head office in Slovakia, that has been 
implicated on multiple occasions in tampering with public funds, cronyism, and directly 
implicated in the 2012 Gorila files; see Chapter 5 for details. PENTA’s Executive Officer, 
Jaroslav Hascak, was arrested in December 2020 and charged with corrupt behaviour and 
bribery of state officials. 
69 For more details: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22546311/hascak-of-penta-detained-and-
accused.html [last accessed 05/01/2021]. 
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procurement bids in the official bids journal, which then causes 9% higher 
probability of a single bidder contract award (Fazekas, King et al. 2014). For 
comparison, in Hungary this probability is 20% higher for single bidder contracts 
for EU funds due to leaving only 5 days for bid submission (Fazekas, King et al. 
2014). Grand corruption in the EU fund sphere is shown to be a serious issue in 
Slovakia, where the lengthy decision periods are 17% more likely for EU funded 
procurement procedures than for nationally funded ones; moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that in the CEE region as a whole, corruption in EU funds 
reaches up to high-level politicians, which could mean that EU funds not only 
facilitate, but actively fuel grand corruption (Fazekas, King et al. 2014). 
Three other participants specifically pointed out political/state budgetary fraud. 
The ideas of ‘government contracts’ (štátne zákazky), ‘state budget’ and 
‘tenders’ (štátne peniaze, tendre), and the perpetrators as ‘state officials’, or 
‘oligarchs’ (vládni činitelia, aktivity oligarchov, upper echelons of business 
elites) were prevalent in the language displayed within this node. As the most 
extreme example, one of the participants went as far as to suggest that grand 
corruption examples can stretch to activities or profits that those in power are 
‘willing to kill for’ (FG4.1), alluding to the recent murder of the investigative 
journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée that was abundantly covered by the media 
and has sparked a real increase of interest in corruption in the public forum70.  
There is no doubt, therefore, that the participants have greater capacity to 
observe and envisage the impacts of grand corruption on society, which is 
targeted by the media and presented as the corruption that is being battled by 
the government as well. It is also important not to discount the impact of grand 
corruption on society in favour of the impact of petty. The relatively new 
government of PM Matovič, elected in 2020, ran on an anti-corruption 
programme, and the most recently-elected president Zuzana Čaputová also ran 
on a campaign of anti-corruption and battling big money scams as a lawyer and 
 
70 For more details: https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/03/jan-kuciak-murder-the-crime-and-trial-
that-sparked-a-renaissance-of-civil-society- [last accessed 05/01/2021] 
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an activist, quoting especially the Pezinská Skip affair71, for which she gained the 
prestigious Goldman Prize72. The recent activities of the National Criminal 
Agency (NAKA), which has been active in its prosecution and jailing of ex-
government officials, judges or prosecutors, implicit in the corrupt scandals of 
the 90s, early 2000s, and further, has also been prominent in presenting the 
public with the impact of grand corruption on society. While there do exist 
theories of corrupt activities ‘greasing the wheels’ of the economy (Grodeland, 
Koshechkina et al. 1998), the conclusion most often drawn is that of corruption 
ultimately having a long-term detrimental and corrosive effect on the operations 
of companies and the state economy as a whole (TI, 2014). Furthermore, grand 
corruption has the potential to distort incentives, divert resources (including 
social capital and talent), misallocate resources, and promote rent-seeking 
activities, rather than productive activities (Mauro 1998, Tanzi 1998, Chêne 
2014). Its detrimental impact on society is therefore well-documented, 
undeniable, and astutely picked up on by my participants.  
11.7 Conclusions  
 
The chapter sought to investigate the recognition of participants of a difference 
between grand and petty corruption, but also the potential impact and 
interaction of the two levels. The chapter shows that there is awareness of the 
terminology, or ability to envisage what the terminology of grand and petty 
corruption should evoke. However, the participants on the whole thought that 
disaggregating the terms was not helpful in terms of understanding, only in 
terms of tailoring specific anti-corruption measures to the relevant levels to 
increase their effectiveness. The majority of participants thought there was a 
 
71 In this affair Ms Caputova headed the legal team responsible for opposing the construction of a 
large skip within the residential area of Pezinok, which would have led to an environmental 
disaster in the region and was getting pushed through the system by individuals with vested 
interest in the waste business, ignoring the petitions of the residents against it. 
72 For more details, see https://www.odpady-portal.sk/Dokument/102985/za-kauzu-pezinska-
skladka-si-prevzala-goldmanovu-cenu-zuzana-caputova.aspx [last accessed 05/01/2021] 
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distinct link between the two levels of corruption when it comes to their 
interaction and interdependency. They believe that in real-life terms, corruption 
levels operate on the same principles and feed off of one another. This is an 
important theoretical finding, as research into ascertaining whether corruption 
terminology used in literature is congruent with the real-life view of the 
phenomenon by participants has not yet been conducted. This unique type of 
questioning and analysis therefore directly informs the overarching RQ, as well 
as validates the theoretical assumptions associated with RQs 1 and 2, which 
investigate the impact of one level on the other. The participants thought, on 
average, that grand corruption is worse for society than petty. There appeared 
to be a degree of cognitive dissonance between their appreciation of the 
similarities of grand vs petty corruption and the tendency of corrupt practices 
escalating with seniority. It is possible to note, since the thesis deals with real-
life understanding of corruption, that this level of depreciation is a result of 
certain conflicts of interest among the participants, who maybe seek to 
downplay their own real-life behaviour or experiences.  
Engagement with existing literature, however, shows that this view is likely to 
be affected more by the general presentation of the phenomenon by the media, 
who tend to sensationalise the grand corruption scandals for greater viewer 
engagement, at the expense of an understanding of the reach of both types of 
corruption. The participants tended to understand ‘impact’ mostly under 
financial terms and the examples associated with both levels of corruption were 
also predominantly based on notions of monetary gain. This is to be expected, 
however, as a lay person would not possess the necessary level of insight for an 
evaluation of detrimental effects in healthcare, when observed from a medical, 
diagnostic or prognostic perspective. In real-life terms, the insidious impact of 
corruption on society in the shape of: distorting trust in public institutions, 
promoting detrimental learnt behaviour, misappropriating resources and social 
capital, and creating a culture of sustenance of corrupt behaviour, is not 
considered by the participants to be as impactful as collective finances lost as a 
result of grand corruption.  
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Chapter 12: Common Corrupt Practices 
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter on common corrupt practices deliberately follows chapters that 
have already addressed issues such as gratitude payments, or views on petty and 
grand corruption. This is because the participants’ awareness and 
conceptualisation of corruption naturally feeds into their views and 
understanding of corruption practices in real-life terms. The chapter addresses 
the views that participants have on where corrupt practices are most likely to 
appear in real life, what types of mechanisms people use to take part in corrupt 
transactions, and what role personal contacts and trust play in these 
transactions. Last but not least, the chapter also looks at the participant views 
on whether there should be any systemic changes to address corrupt practices 
and what type of changes within the system these should be. The structure of 
the category is outlined below in Figure 12.1, where all the nodes analysed in 
this chapter can be seen. The reason ‘systemic changes’ were included in this 
category due to the language relating closely to the content within the nodes on 
mechanism and likely occurrences of corruption. This similarity of content ties it 
to what the manifestations of corruption are and the proposed coping 
mechanisms by the participants within the system to address these.  
 
Figure 12.1 Visual presentation of the category Common corrupt practices. The bright 
blue bubble represents the category, the red boxes represent nodes with a high number 
of references, orange box represents the node with nearly as many references as the red 
nodes, and green boxes represent nodes with a moderate to low number of references. 
Source: Author 
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Through investigating the mechanisms and most likely occurrences of corruption, 
the chapter addresses the RQ3 specifically (What are the strategies utilised to 
carry out grand and petty corrupt practices?). However, due to its specific focus 
on trust as well as the role and normalisation of using personal contacts for 
corrupt transaction, it addresses also RQ3a (What is the significance of trust as a 
pre-requisite for corrupt interactions?), RQ3b (To what extent are social rules 
and customs important in the carrying out of corrupt practices?). More 
generally, through its broader investigation of the role of the system and the 
holistic understanding of corrupt practices and their patterns of behaviour in 
real life, it is relevant for the overarching RQ (To what extent is the theoretical 
difference between grand and petty corruption reflected in the real-life 
understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s health care?) as well. 
12.2 Most likely occurrences of corruption 
 
This node encompasses the participants’ views on where they think occurrences 
of corrupt behaviour are most likely to manifest themselves in real life. This 
includes different types of service sectors, as well as potential life situations 
that they think might be particularly vulnerable to eliciting corrupt behaviour. 
Such a broad, open-ended question73 allowed the participants to come up with 
any type of example they felt best represented their idea of this and the 
answers were richly varied. The most frequent localising of occurrences of 
corruption was centred on health care, even without being prompted to choose 
this sector to talk about- 13 out of 31 coded participants against this node 
selected health care. There were, however, also mentions of the 
entrepreneurial sector, politics, and also education (especially pre-schools74). 
 
73 The question read: ‘Where do you think corrupt practices are most likely to occur? Under what 
sort of circumstances would this be? 
74 This includes presents to teachers or also cash payments to teachers from parents of potential 
pre-schoolers who wish to have their child attend a particular pre-school that would be 
advantageous for location, specific language focus of teaching, or other factors. 
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This is congruent with the general findings on where corruption is officially most 
frequently recorded, as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. The participants in 
this research have however chosen health care as the most frequent sector of 
corrupt exchanges, as opposed to the entrepreneur/business sector, which is the 
official finding presented in Chapter 2.3 from 2017. This is most likely due to the 
fact that my sample, albeit inclusive of entrepreneurs, was unable to relate to a 
particular business experience of corruption, whereas health care is a much 
more accessible sector to describe and understand. The language used to answer 
the question: ‘Where or when do you think that most corrupt exchanges are 
most likely to occur?’ included phrases such as: 
• ‘When entrepreneurs are trying to get things done, with like EU funds’ (Potom 
podnikatelia vybavujú nejaké veci, pri Eurofondoch) INT15 
• ‘I think with surgeries or so’ (Myslím si, že pri operáciách alebo čo... FG3.2)  
• ‘I think there is most amount of money in healthcare in Slovakia and that’s also 
where they are stealing the most’ (Ja si myslím, že najviac peňazí na Slovensku 
je v zdravotníctve a tam sa aj najviac a najlepšie kradne ELITE2) 
• ‘I think with procuring hospital equipment and with buying health care 
equipment/tools that are not included in the list of categorised medicines’ 
(Podľa môjho názoru najviac pri zaobstarávaní vybavenia nemocníc a pri 
nakupovaní zdravotníckych pomôcok, ktoré nie sú v zozname kategorizovaných 
liekov ELITE8) 
There was a mix of responses as illustrated above, which include varied sectors 
and ideas. In general, the language patterns in the responses showed a tendency 
to perceive corruption to be present in all walks of life; the participants often 
said that it can be found ‘everywhere’, or ‘totally everywhere’, as seen overleaf 




Example 12.1 Manual coding of node ‘Most likely occurrences of corruption’, yellow 
parts mark areas of corruption that are not healthcare, pink mark healthcare 
mentions, and circles mark expressions that corruption can be found ‘everywhere’, 
Source: Author 
Example 12.2 Manual coding of node ‘Most likely occurrences of corruption’ 
translated, orange corresponds to yellow in Example 12.1, pink to pink, and circles 
mark expressions that corruption can be found ‘everywhere’, Source: Author 
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There were 8 participants in total who expressed that corruption is to be found 
everywhere or in every sector. Other additional patterns included language 
referring to expediting things or getting things done faster than normal, 
enriching oneself (4 mentions). However, most importantly, there were 11 
independent mentions of the word ‘vybaviť’, which is loosely translated as ‘to 
arrange’ something or to ‘get something done’ by another party75. This word has 
a prominent position in the discourse of the participants from Figure 12.2, and 
they consider the situations when one needs to ‘get something done’ to be the 
most likely occurrences of corrupt behaviour.   
 
Figure 12.2 Word frequency cloud of node ‘Most likely occurrences of corruption’, set at 
50 words, translations of selected words in red. Source: Author 
 
75 Linguistically, this word is also very close to the Russian word ‘ustroit’’, which is mentioned in 
Chapter 1 in a similar context, as an element of blat, conceptualised by Ledeneva et al., 2009. 
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From Figure 12.2 and 12.3 overleaf, it is apparent that this word is located in 
prominent positions along with the words for ‘healthcare’, ‘corruption’, and 
‘everywhere’, but also with verbs such as ‘need’ and ‘want’. The participants 
are alluding to not just necessity, therefore, but also personal ambition to be 
the condition under which one is likely to see corrupt behaviour. I was 
interested to see what the word ‘to arrange’ or to ‘get something done’ would 
get most associated with in contextual discourse and the word tree overleaf 
demonstrates its key position when describing all types of ‘arranging’ required 
by the participants. This is not just healthcare provision (although this is the 
prevalent trend), but also mentions of ID cards or passports needing expedited, 
associations with verbs for payment, and also using contacts. It is apparent 
therefore that the word ‘vybaviť’ (to arrange, to get something done) is key to 
the vernacular used to understand and conceptualise corrupt behaviour for the 
participants and its prominence and meaning directly informs the overarching 
RQ.  There are also mentions of ‘necessity’, ‘expediting’, satisfying a person’s 
‘need’, and also one mention of a person being ‘desperate’, in the health care 
context, which prompts corrupt behaviour in order to get to a needed resource. 
The language therefore relates to a speedier procedure or fulfilling a need or a 




Figure 12.3 Word tree of the word ‘vybaviť’ set at 11 context words, highlighting by author, translations in red by author. Source: Author 
394 
12.3 Mechanisms of corruption 
Having established that people are likely to seek out corrupt exchanges when 
they are in urgent need of a service or when they want to enrich themselves, it 
was important to ascertain in what way this behaviour is carried out in real life. 
The idea behind the question for this node76 was to ascertain how people 
approach corrupt exchanges practically. In these practical terms this means 
whether people are more likely to directly enquire about a bribe, or whether 
they are more likely to elicit this information indirectly from someone with 
similar experiences, or to act through a middleman or a broker. Manual coding 
within this node was a helpful tool to be able to distinguish among the different 
approaches to mechanically carrying out corruption and accessing corrupt 
networks. Examples 12.3 and 12.4 overleaf show instances of participants 
passing on the information (patients in a healthcare setting) to one another 
indirectly in pink, and in yellow those who ask the doctor directly.  One of the 
red circles also marks the only instance, where the participant directly alluded 
to using a middleman explicitly. In this case the participant understood the 
function of a middleman to be that of someone able to establish a desired 
connection. It is therefore not necessary for a middleman to be handling any 
money or gifts directly; they can serve as a gatekeeper to a desired resource. In 
this sense, the middleman may not even be consciously aware of their 
indispensability. This type of information provision is very common in corrupt 
exchanges. The wealth of discourse and dissent this theme generated among my 
participants, as well as the connection drawn between the function of a 
middleman and the label itself was significant in understanding the 
conceptualisation of corruption in real life. For some this was a clear-cut facet 
of corruption and for others it was a very sensitive issue to suggest that those 
they consider to be friends could be perceived as avenues to corruption.  
 
76 ‘What kinds of strategies/mechanisms do you think are used to carry out corrupt practices?’ ‘Who 
and how would you approach about this/ who and how do you think people are likely to 




Example 12.3 Manual coding of node ‘Mechanism of corruption’, yellow parts 
mark direct contact with doctor for bribery, pink mark asking other patients 
or friends. Source: Author 
Example 12.4 Manual coding of node ‘Mechanism of corruption’ translated, 
orange corresponds to yellow in Example 12.3, pink to pink. Source: Author 
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It is clear from the Example 12.3 and 12.4 that there is a prevalence of 1 
indirectly obtaining information that aids in carrying out corrupt practices. In 2 
numerical terms, 17 out of 21 participants coded for this node thought that this 3 
information is obtained indirectly among patients or friends/acquaintances, and 4 
often over the phone. 2 participants only thought it was a direct conversation 5 
between those directly party to corrupt exchanges and 2 participants thought it 6 
was a mixture of both acquiring information on one’s own (a research of sorts) 7 
and confirming directly with the recipient of a bribe. There were also a few 8 
instances of suggesting information being passed on over internet fora77, 9 
emphasised by FG4.4, and also an instance of using a ‘mediátor’, which is to be 10 
translated into English as the middleman (suggested by FG2.2). The idea of a 11 
third-party middleman or broker is widely explored in literature (Gould and 12 
Fernandez 1989, Stovel and Shaw 2012, Jancsics 2015) (for details see Chapter 13 
3.3), but with only one explicit mention by my participants in the whole 14 
research project, it may be that the label ‘broker’ is more frequently used in 15 
instances of financial, cyber78, criminal, or grand corruption fraud to avoid paper 16 
trail leading to the main perpetrators. The idea of broker or a middleman within 17 
corrupt transactions is most frequently used to convey that corrupt transactions 18 
are more complex than just a principal-agent model of two parties involved in 19 
corrupt exchanges (Lambsdorff 2007, Drugov, Hamman et al. 2011)- instead, it 20 
suggests that there may be more parties involved in real-life corrupt exchanges, 21 
subject to circumstances. My general-public respondents may not be aware of 22 
this type of behaviour explicitly labelled as ‘middleman’ or ‘broker’ in the 23 
literature published on the subject. However, there are instances of this 24 
behaviour to be seen in Slovak public life. For example, in recent corruption 25 
scandals in Slovakia, several perpetrators have been jailed and accused as 26 
brokers of corrupt or criminal activities, such as Alena Zsuzsová in the case of 27 
 
77 Specifically that of Modrý Koník that I myself use in Chapter 8 
78 Both financial fraud and cyber-attacks institutions have coined the term ‘Man-in-the-middle’ 
attack which aims to obtain sensitive information from a third party, transmitted between two 





the murder of Ján Kuciak. Zsuzsová was supposedly acting on behalf of the main 1 
accused party, mob leader Marian Kočner, by setting the task of murder and 2 
offering a sum for it under Kočner’s instructions79. In a manner closer to my 3 
participants, however, their references to phoning for information on how much 4 
a procedure costs, or contacting a friend of the respective healthcare 5 
professional delivering the procedure, are akin to the essence of a middleman’s 6 
function. This passing on of information that leads to corruption would put the 7 
friend or acquaintance in a position of outsourcing information on behalf of the 8 
healthcare professional, unconsciously or consciously acting as a sort of 9 
middleman for the transaction. In such terms, the idea of a middle stage in the 10 
corrupt transaction goes to show that the principal-agent model of only two 11 
parties involved is in fact not practical in real-life understanding of corruption, 12 
which is more likely to involve more parties to elicit the information necessary 13 
to perpetrate corrupt transactions. My participants were able to show, in real-14 
life terms, that the value of information being passed on through the middle 15 
stage is principally akin to the value of any tangible bribe or a cut from a 16 
transaction that is passed through the middleman. This is because the 17 
middlemen themselves in these situations capitalise on the fact that they are 18 
able to provide valuable information and are able to cash in a return favour of 19 
their own in the future. The thesis therefore contributes to expanding the idea 20 
of brokerage in corrupt practices to include the exchange and value of 21 
information.  22 
Figure 12.4 overleaf shows the word cloud frequency for the ‘mechanisms of 23 
corruption’. According to my participants, the information on bribes or gifts gets 24 
exchanged in the ‘waiting room’ of the respective medical surgery, and it 25 
contains language specifically putting ‘people’ at the centre of the 26 
conceptualisation. ‘People’ or ‘old ladies’, ‘patients’, or ‘person’, and 27 
grammatical variations thereof are frequently repeated, which implies a pattern 28 
of human exchange of the information necessary for carrying out corrupt 29 
 
79 For more information on the case, visit https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/wealthy-
slovak-businessman-cleared-of-plotting-journalist-s-murder-1.4345939 [last accessed 
19/01/2021] 
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practices. The frequent reference to ‘old ladies’ by the participants as those 1 
most likely to be found in waiting rooms of doctor surgeries is a phenomenon 2 
primarily caused by the inefficiency of booking appointments and long waiting 3 
times. As a result, waiting rooms tend to be filled with the retired who can 4 
afford to sit and wait for hours- the younger generations are more likely to give 5 
up sooner, most frequently due to being unable to take any more time off work 6 
or schooling for their check-ups. This, alongside words such as ‘telephone’ and 7 
verbs of ‘I’ll ask’ or ‘I’ll tell’ shows that the participants believe that the most 8 
frequent way of finding out about how to access corruption or how to carry it 9 
out happens on the level of people networks and contacts. These networks were 10 
not described as anything embedded in the system, on the contrary, they were 11 
referred to in subjective terms, suggesting that their origins are organic to the 12 
particular social circle of any one person. In other words, they are created and 13 
accessed on an ad-hoc basis and extended in a spider-diagram fashion between 14 
social circles which can also get connected on a group-to-group basis. This 15 
happens when there is a relationship between two individuals from two different 16 
groups: the network resources of one group are thus transferred to another 17 
group and so on, by nature of vouching for, and embracing, the connecting 18 
person from another group. This finding is directly addressing the RQ3 and its 19 
query about the specific mechanisms and strategies utilised by people to carry 20 
out corrupt practices. 21 
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Figure 12.4 Word frequency cloud of node ‘Mechanism of corruption’, set at 30 words, 
translations of selected words in red. Source: Author 
 
12.4 Personal contacts as corruption 1 
 2 
The role of personal contacts, connections, and networks in corrupt practices 3 
has long been a subject of interest for scholars (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000, 4 
Fan 2002, Michailova and Worm 2003). It was important when addressing RQs3 5 
and overarching RQ to show how, in real life terms, the role of personal 6 
connections facilitates corrupt practices and to what extent the participants 7 
understand this to be true. At first glance, using a word frequency search, it 8 
would appear from Figure 12.5 overleaf that within this node the words and 9 
language most frequently utilised associate personal contacts with corruption, 10 
including phrases such as ‘a kind of’ or ‘a form of’ [corruption], as well as more 11 
definite words such as ‘exactly’ and ‘definitely’. I then returned to the original 12 
data to verify that these phrases are indeed syntactically and semantically used 13 
to describe contacts being ‘definitely’ equivalent to, or at least ‘a form of’ 14 
corruption. All associations included in the word cloud with these expressions 15 
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did indeed relate to corruption- likening or equating contacts to corruption. 1 
Therefore, the prevalent trend from this analytical approach shows the 2 
participants associating or equating using contacts and connections to get ahead 3 
with corruption. 4 
 
Figure 12.5 Word frequency cloud of node ‘Personal contacts’, set at 30 words, 
translations of selected words in red. Source: Author 
 5 
In order to make the distinction between participant views on whether using 6 
personal contacts is corrupt or not, I allocated the two types of views to two 7 
child nodes of the parent node ‘Personal contacts’, as seen in Figure 12.1 in 8 
section 12.1 above. This categorisation was useful to make cross tabulations 9 
with demographic features more feasible for analysis. There were 19 10 
participants coded who thought personal contacts were corrupt and 16 coded 11 
who thought personal contacts were not corrupt. Nearly half of the participants 12 
therefore thought that using personal contacts for personal advantage, such as 13 
getting preferential/higher standard of treatment, or skipping a waiting list at a 14 
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doctor surgery, is a form of corruption. Demographically, it is interesting to note 1 
that most of the 19 participants (13 of them) were females and 10 of these 2 
females were university-educated. This points to a fairly equal divide in levels of 3 
education of all those who thought personal contacts use for private gain is 4 
corrupt; but shows a greater tendency by females to condemn this behaviour. 5 
This is a trend observed across all the empirical chapters and is congruent with 6 
literature suggesting that women are less tolerant of corrupt practices and tend 7 
to be more vocal about their condemnation as well (Swamy, Knack et al. 2001, 8 
Bauhr, Charron et al. 2018). Out of the 16 participants who thought using 9 
personal contacts to gain an advantage was acceptable, there was an equal split 10 
of 8 males and 8 females who held this opinion and roughly a half of each gender 11 
group were university-educated, which points to an even divide on both 12 
demographic fronts. Across the nodes, females were generally more likely to 13 
think that, in real-life terms, using personal contacts for one’s own advantage is 14 
corrupt, and males were more likely to think the opposite. This confirms the 15 
trend already described in previous chapters of females being less likely to 16 
condone corrupt behaviour and being less tolerant of it by extension (Bauhr, 17 
Charron et al. 2018). For an education split, overall, 14/10 university-educated 18 
to high-school and primary-school-educated participants were more likely to 19 
think that using personal contacts for personal gain is corrupt. While the split 20 
may not seem very large at first glance, considering the sample size of over 40 21 
participants, the difference is circa 10% of participants on the side of the 22 
majority.  23 
Beyond the demographic data collected on the node, the language used by 24 
participants in each instance (contacts as corrupt and as not corrupt) showed 25 
some trends and patterns of expression explored in detail in sections below.  26 
12.4.1 Personal contacts not considered as corruption 27 
The participants who believed that using personal connections was acceptable 28 
and not corrupt used several expressions to this effect:  29 
• No, I think corruption is just when I physically give something to someone (Nie, 30 
podľa mňa korupcia je len, keď ja za to niečo niekomu dám fyzicky FG3.2) 31 
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• I don’t think this is some type of corruption (Toto si nemyslím, že je nejaká 1 
korupcia INT10) 2 
• Personal contacts are not corruption to me (Osobné kontakty nie sú pre mňa 3 
korupcia INT8) 4 
Furthermore, they used specific phrases in order to justify the behaviour. These 5 
were centred around ideas of contacts just offering ‘help’, offering simple 6 
‘recommendations’, showing their ‘good will’ or ‘putting in a good word’; even a 7 
lasting relationship being built with the other party as a result:  8 
• No, I don’t think it is corruption, I think that’s my good will and I wouldn’t have 9 
to do it (Podľa mňa nie, je to moja dobrá vôľa, nemusela by som to absolútne 10 
spraviť INT5) 11 
• Well, the personal contact I reckon that’s just like a recommendation, not 12 
directly corruption (No ten osobný kontakt podľa mňa akože len odporučenie nie 13 
je rovno korupcia INT4) 14 
• That’s nor corruption, that’s normal helping out (To nie je korupcia, to je 15 
normálna pomoc FG1.5) 16 
• No, because it doesn’t have to be about money, it can just be about putting in a 17 
good word for me (Nie, pretože to nemusí ísť s peniazmi, to môže byť 18 
o prihovorení sa ELITE4) 19 
• A sort of relationship is born out of this where you don’t have to keep paying, 20 
like once the relationship is established, you take different routes (Vzniká nejaký 21 
vzťah proste, že netreba to stále platiť, ale už keď je ten vzťah tak sa to rieši 22 
inak FG1.3) 23 
It is obvious from these responses that the participants go to great lengths to 24 
justify the use of personal contacts to get an advantage over others and some 25 
even trivialised the behaviour to say that ‘among friends this is okay’ (FG1.2). 26 
One participant even expressed direct knowledge that ‘before the law this is 27 
also considered corruption, yes, but I wouldn’t necessarily see this as corruption 28 
myself’ (FG4.2).  29 
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This level of justification of using personal contacts for private gain is not 1 
unheard of on a global level. Besides the theories of blat and informal practices 2 
and networking in post-communist countries (Ledeneva, Lovell et al. 2000, 3 
Michailova and Worm 2003), the Asian countries (predominantly China) and their 4 
equivalent of blat called guanxi are also permeated with the socially acceptable 5 
use of personal contacts for gain (Fan 2002, So and Walker 2005). Research 6 
shows that these networks are often synonymised outside of their region with 7 
cronyism and simple bribery, but they are deemed acceptable in China, and the 8 
specific emphasis on establishing connections and building social networks (as 9 
suggested by my participant FG1.3 above) is key (So and Walker 2005). The idea 10 
of exchanging services or gifts for having good relationships is also explored and 11 
it has been pointed out that one way of countering this type of behaviour is to 12 
legalise such fees in the form of import licences or having fees embedded in 13 
construction contracts (Schramm and Taube 2003). It is important to emphasise 14 
that the economic impact of these connections and the costs associated with 15 
building advantageous relationships are not insignificant. It has been shown that 16 
households will spend around 10-20% of disposable income to strengthen their 17 
guanxi networks and businessmen in mainland China spend around 5% of 18 
investments solely on gifts to maintain their guanxi networks (Schramm and 19 
Taube 2003). TI (2020) reports that this trend is increasing in Asian countries, 20 
where 22% of those who accessed public services used personal connections to 21 
receive the service they needed. This ranking has India leading with 46% of 22 
public service users who used personal connections in the past 12 months, 23 
Indonesia second with 36% and China third with 32%80. The sectors that were 24 
most prevalent in these countries for this trend, as seen in Figure 12.6, are 25 
comparable to the sectors that my participants have identified in the above 26 
section 12.2 as prevalent for occurrences of corruption, even if there are 27 
differences in dominance of individual sectors. For the Central European 28 
countries, the areas for corruption prevalence are similar to those outlined in 29 
Figure 12.6 overleaf and are explored in detail in Chapter 2. Research shows 30 
that informal payments in CEE healthcare specifically accounted for between 1-31 
 
80 For more details, see https://www.transparency.org/en/news/bribery-or-personal-connections# 
[last accessed 15/01/2021] 
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4.6% of total healthcare expenditure in early 2000s (Williams, Horodnic et al. 1 
2016). Furthermore, the region itself was shown to reflect the trends outlined 2 
already for household expenditure to corrupt practices, and, more disturbingly, 3 
it has been shown that families of patients with lower income proportionately 4 
pay more than others in informal payments (Szende and Culyer 2006). Similar 5 
notions of connections are explored in other contexts as well, for example the 6 
Bulgarian blizki, the UK old boy networks, Israeli protetzia, or Chilean confianza 7 
(Aliyev 2015). All of these theories point towards a more complex structure of 8 
corruption dependent on networks and the collective. 9 
 
Figure 12.6 Percentage of people who used the respective services thanks to personal 
connections in Asian countries in the past 12 months Source: TI, 2020 
12.4.2 Personal contacts usage as corrupt 10 
The language used by the participants to convey their disapproval of using 11 
personal contacts for personal gain was very straightforward to analyse. The 12 
participants made it clear that this approach to accessing services provided the 13 
person in question with ‘an unfair advantage’ and that it was a form of 14 
‘nepotism’. They displayed awareness that a regular person would not be able to 15 
access such a service and it is therefore clearly to be considered a form of 16 
corruption. 17 
• Yeah, what you see is someone getting an advantage without an evident reason 18 
for it (Dochádza k zvýhodneniu niekoho bez evidentného dôvodu ELITE1) 19 
• The favouritism is there a 100% and…it’s not like it is for free (Tá protekcia je 20 
o sto percent...a tiež to nie je zadarmo ELITE2) 21 
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• Yes, there’s definitely the gaining of something that a regular person wouldn’t 1 
be able to get to or doesn’t have access to (Ale áno je tam proste získanie 2 
niečoho, k čomu by sa normálny človek nedostal, alebo nemá prístup ELITE3) 3 
• This [contacts] would be the most frequent form that corruption takes these 4 
days (To je asi tá najčastejšia forma tej korupcie dnes FG4.4) 5 
• Well, there’s always some tit for tat, so, yeah, it’s definitely a form of 6 
corruption (Tak vždy je niečo za niečo, takže určite áno je to forma korupcie 7 
INT2). 8 
It is evident from these responses that the rationale behind considering personal 9 
contacts use to be corrupt is centred on its transactional nature. The 10 
participants under this node do not believe that any advantage gain could come 11 
at no price and are astute enough to consider a favour or a service exchange to 12 
be the price one pays, even if this is not monetary or tangible. This is the main 13 
distinction that I observed when analysing these two opposing nodes, where the 14 
other participants who are condoning the use of personal contacts seem to 15 
display a certain level of naivete or wilful ignorance on the matter. Participant 16 
ELITE8, for example, thought that there was no ‘obvious financial benefit’ to the 17 
other party, which means that using the personal contact to gain an advantage 18 
was not corrupt. INT8 noted that using a personal contact means that the other 19 
party ‘is not expecting anything of me, doesn’t want anything in return’, but 20 
failed to account for the fact that this return favour may not be cashed in 21 
immediately, but possibly over time- at which point it may not appear to be a 22 
cashing in but a whole new friendly request. There appeared to be lack of 23 
awareness that the immediacy of the return value does not have a conceptual 24 
bearing on the fact that this is not a unilateral favour, but could be a bilateral 25 
transaction in most cases. This type of thinking was displayed by the participants 26 
when considering the acceptability of gratitude payments, too (see Chapter 8), 27 
where they thought that the timing of the giving of the gift (i.e., unacceptable 28 
bribe before procedure and acceptable thank-you gift after procedure) had any 29 
bearing on the reality of the act itself. In terms of legislation however, both 30 
actions are an act of corruption and bribery.  31 
  32 
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12.5 The role of trust in corrupt practices 1 
 2 
The role of trust in the conceptualisation of corruption has already been 3 
addressed in Chapter 1, section 1.7, which focuses on trust and ethics. There is 4 
no doubt that corruption, or ‘being’ corrupt, are morally loaded concepts and 5 
intrinsically bring along a discussion of ethics and values. There are indications 6 
in literature of trust and corruption being strongly correlated (2018 BTI report on 7 
Slovakia shows that 85.6% of its respondents believe corruption contributed most 8 
to mistrust in society)81. Batory (2012) also shows that lack of trust and belief in 9 
integrity as a social norm creates conditions for corrupt behaviour to become a 10 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’(Batory 2012). There is also evidence of corrupt 11 
behaviour lowering the trust of the public in the quality of services received, as 12 
well as evidence of low interpersonal trust nurturing corrupt practices, which in 13 
turn undermine trust in government and public institutions (Morris and Klesner 14 
2010, Boardman and Klum 2013). On the other hand, high levels of trust in 15 
individuals have been shown to correlate with stronger democratic institutions 16 
and lower corruption levels in the respective countries and societies (Kubbe 17 
2013). Trust therefore appeared to me as an essential feature of corrupt 18 
behaviour to investigate, elusive a concept as it is, and I was keen on discovering 19 
what the participants thought about the role of trust in real-life conditions of 20 
corrupt behaviour. Not everyone engaged with the question and several 21 
participants found it difficult to understand what is meant by the term, which 22 
led to my reflexively amending the first drafts of the question on trust and often 23 
providing more qualifiers- e.g. ‘Do you think that a certain level of trust is 24 
required between the two parties for a successful corrupt transaction to take 25 
 
81 For full report, see BTI 2018- Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index Report of 2018; 
Slovakia-specific section 
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place? In what way do you think such trust manifests, or do you think it is there 1 
at all? Do you think that trust is important in this/that way?’ and similar82.  2 
Ten out of the 11 participants coded against this node believed that trust did 3 
indeed play a role in corrupt transactions and one participant disagreed with the 4 
notion of trust being important at all. This is to say that nearly a quarter of all 5 
participants believed that trust is significant and necessary for the success of a 6 
corrupt transaction. However, the conceptualisation displayed by the 7 
participants re-defined the idea of trust into the idea more akin to fulfilling 8 
expectations. In other words, the participants understood the need for trust 9 
between the two corrupt parties on the level of securing an expected 10 
behavioural outcome. This is why the language utilised by the participants 11 
reflected ideas of fear, guilt, sharing the blame, “grassing” the other party out, 12 
acting in a calculated way, or reciprocity of action:  13 
• ‘I think it plays a role…it may be the fear that still exists here from past regime 14 
too’ (Ja si myslím, že áno...možno je to strach, ktorý tu ešte pretrváva z bývalej 15 
doby ELITE1) 16 
• ‘Yeah, it’s the system of ‘you do this for me and I’ll be quiet’ (Áno, že ty mi dáš 17 
a ja budem ticho FG2.1) 18 
• ‘Yeah, the risk is always there, there’s an equal share of the blame on both 19 
sides’ (Ale to riziko ideš vždy, na obidvoch stranách je rovnaký diel viny FG3.1) 20 
• ‘…yeah, I am not afraid because I could grass them out as much as the other way 21 
around’ (Nebojím sa, lebo aj ja by som ho mohol natrieť FG3.5) 22 
 
82 I clarified ‘trust’ with the participants as trust between the agents of corruption, rather than trust in 
any public institutions or regulations. Beyond that, however, I let the participants interpret ‘trust’ 
themselves and they unanimously understood this as a feeling of security from liability between 
those involved in the corrupt transaction. 
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• ‘Yes, I think it goes beyond whether I get grassed out because both parties are 1 
automatically in illegality’ (Tam už to nie je o tom, že niekto ma natrie, pretože 2 
v podstate obe strany sú už automaticky v ilegalite INT16.1) 3 
• ‘I think it’s more the calculating nature of it’ (Skôr je to tá vypočítavosť 4 
INT16.2) 5 
• ‘It’s about that reciprocity. Whether the trust is sincere or not, it’s always 6 
conditioned by the other party’ (Tak je to o reciprocite. Tá dôvera, či je 7 
úprimná alebo nie, musí byť vždy podmienená druhou stranou INT4) 8 
Therefore, when we speak about trust in real-life understanding and 9 
conceptualisation of corrupt practices, the participants speak of it in terms of 10 
securing a successful result by the two parties involved, without compromising 11 
themselves or the result. Understanding trust within corruption in terms of 12 
expectation is established in literature as well and my participants’ practical 13 
conceptualisation validates the theory on the subject. Warburton (2013), 14 
Luhmann (1979) and Kubbe (2013) all conceptualise trust within corruption as a 15 
certainty of expectation, laying a basis for cooperation with other people that 16 
will lead to a result that does not incriminate either party. In such terms, the 17 
securing of mutually beneficial behaviour based on a threat of legal action, a 18 
quarter of participants do believe that trust plays a role in corrupt transactions 19 
in real-life understanding of corruption. This idea of securing expected 20 
behaviour due to all parties being liable is also astutely understood by this 21 
quarter of the participants with relation to the Slovak Criminal Code, which 22 
classifies all parties in a corrupt transaction as culpable. In a sense, the Criminal 23 
Code itself adds incentive for the lack of reporting of corruption, due to both 24 
parties being held equally accountable. 25 
  26 
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12.6 Systemic change 1 
 2 
The node entitled ‘Systemic change’ serves as a label to cover the participants’ 3 
views on whether the system set up in Slovak health care works or whether it 4 
needs to change with relation to corrupt practices. This was a broad and open-5 
ended question on purpose, to be able to let the participants have the freedom 6 
to express their views on the functioning of healthcare, but also give room to 7 
express any suggestions they may have about the kind of change they would like 8 
to see from their consumer point of view. The participants, as a result, 9 
expressed their views on whether they thought that corrupt practices in general 10 
were a result of systemic failings and provided details as to the rationale behind 11 
their thoughts on this, as well as their suggestions on possible remediation of the 12 
situation. They were also given the choice of whether they believe that systemic 13 
change (in case they thought this was needed) should come from bottom-up, or 14 
should be streamlined from top to bottom, or a combination of both.  15 
Overall, 27 participants answered this question and 15 of these participants 16 
thought that corruption in Slovakia is predominantly a systemic problem and the 17 
system does need to change fundamentally to respond to this trend. The 18 
language to support this view included phrases such as:  19 
• ‘If we compare ourselves with those countries with low levels of corruption, like 20 
the Scandinavian countries, it is evident that there need to be some systemic 21 
measures put in place’ (Keď ja porovnávam aj s krajinami s tou najnižšou 22 
formou korupcie, teda tie Škandinávske krajiny, tak evidentne treba urobiť 23 
nejaké systémové riešenia ELITE3) 24 
• ‘The system is rotten through and through. We need a complete swap’ over 25 
(Systém je prežratý. Proste kompletná výmena ELITE5) 26 
• ‘Well, the system is not set up well at all, if it was set up to provide standard 27 
pay for standard work and the work is regulated so that people aren’t burnt out 28 
and they work standard hours not like 12 hour-shifts back-to-back. The system is 29 
the problem’ (No systém je zle nastavený, ak by bol systém tak, že normálna 30 
410 
práca za normálnu plácu a aj tá práca je regulovaná tak, že nie sú vyčerpaní, 1 
normálny čas, nerobia dvanástky za sebou. Problém je systém INT8). 2 
The patterns elicited from the language in the transcripts related to 3 
recommendations made by the participants on several specific categories of 4 
improvement. These were recommendations for politicians to get replaced, a 5 
complete swap over of personnel in vulnerable sectors and in parliament, the 6 
increasing of the living wage to counter salary shortages, establishing respect for 7 
people in their jobs and instilling pride in their profession, and also tweaking of 8 
the insurance system to be more helpful to the consumer. Upon conducting 9 
research into the changes already implemented over the years into healthcare, 10 
it turned out that the participant observations and recommendations, based on 11 
their real-life understanding of corruption, were in congruence with a lot of 12 
previous findings.  13 
Systemic changes in the realm of healthcare and beyond have been suggested as 14 
a possible remediation for corrupt practices on several fronts already (Mužik and 15 
Szalayová 2013, 25 2014, Szalay 2014). Szalay (2014) shows the reforms 16 
undertaken by several governments in detail in his Health Policy Institute report 17 
that mostly related to legislation novellas and reforms on insurance policies, 18 
additional payments for medications and curbing informal payments for waiting 19 
times. However, it is emphasised that these novellas are subject to the 20 
government in place and their own political agenda and are therefore subject to 21 
continuous alteration. As a result, some bedrock principles that would have 22 
impacted on corrupt practices in healthcare, are constantly in flux and subject 23 
to change every election cycle. These include the independence of the Bureau 24 
for Medical Care Oversight from the state (crucially currently the only body with 25 
the power to regulate corrupt behaviour outside of the law, as specified in 26 
Chapter 11), the fees for services associated with medical care, as well as the 27 
business model transformation of hospitals into limited companies and more 28 
(2014:7). The official recommendations are connected to lowering the hold that 29 
one of the main insurance companies (VSZP) has on regulating the prices for 30 
procedures and medicines- the state is the sole shareholder of this insurance 31 
company and the state also owns over 50% of the capacity of hospital beds 32 
overall in the country (Szalay 2014). The report recommends splitting up the 33 
insurance company and privatising parts of it to allow for the competitiveness of 34 
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the market to drive the price of care, as opposed to the other private companies 1 
having to follow the lead of the state-owned VSZP. The report also recommends 2 
greater transparency in providing flat rates of insurance, different insurance 3 
packages, a nominal insurance rate, access to a comprehensive consumer rating 4 
of quality of service, and transparency of fee imposition (Szalay 2014). One of 5 
my participants in particular, ELITE6, specifically suggested that reforming the 6 
insurance business in the country would increase quality assurance of service and 7 
curb corrupt practices by providing the consumer with more choice of product:  8 
‘We should mirror the healthcare models of Switzerland where the health care 9 
costs are high but the care itself is more effective. Therefore, up to 5 thousand 10 
for care we should be covering ourselves and if we need more, then from there 11 
upwards let’s be social and have insurance cover…same with the excessive 12 
number of years of maternity leave allowed here- this cripples the 13 
economy…same with antibiotics prescription and resulting overly frequent 14 
doctor visits. Some drugs like antibiotic creams and paracetamol should be 15 
freely available over the counter like it is in the UK- this would reduce the 16 
wasting of time of doctors’ (ELITE6).  17 
It is important to point out that this particular participant has great insight into 18 
health care practices over the world due to their unique work experience abroad 19 
and one cannot expect this level of insight from all participants, or the general 20 
population more broadly. It is therefore important to stress that many of the 21 
opinions held by my participants, while providing evidence of certain possible 22 
trends and views, may not be fully representative of the general population. 23 
However, this view is supported by evidence, when in 2003 fees were put in 24 
place by the government, which applied to: visiting doctors in surgeries (20 25 
Slovak crowns per visit), hospital stay (50 Slovak crowns per day), first aid 26 
provision (60 Slovak crowns), ambulance transport (2 Slovak crowns per km)83. 27 
The doctor visits lowered by 10% and first aid provision (i.e. visits of A&E) by 13% 28 
(Mužik and Szalayová 2013). However, it is not made clear by the report whether 29 
 
83 For reference to current currency, the rate of EUR to SK crown was set at 1EUR=cca 30 crowns 
upon receiving the Euro in 2008 in Slovakia 
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the fees addressed superfluous visits which were time wasting and pointless by 1 
the patients, or if this approach caused the poorer citizens to receive 2 
substandard or no care at all.  3 
However, the idea of standardising care and expectations of healthcare 4 
consumers is something that comes up in discourse on a frequent basis. Both the 5 
Health Policy Institute reports (2013, 2014) and also a healthcare data analyst on 6 
a panel of a recent discussion on bribery in healthcare ‘Gift v Bribe’, remarked 7 
on the problems of lack of standard that is presented to the consumer. This lack 8 
of awareness of what is standard care and what is included in insurance then 9 
leads to greater impulse for informal payments and corrupt practices, to 10 
presumably secure a good level of care. The participants were therefore astute 11 
with their picking up on the need to review insurance policy. With measures 12 
changing with every election cycle, the Health Policy Institute (HPI) report in 13 
2013 suggested a ‘basic package’ of insurance that should be available to all 14 
consumers which, more than anything, clearly states: 15 
• Which services one is entitled to 16 
• What waiting times are acceptable for the relevant procedure 17 
• What the financial impact is outside of the insured levels (Mužik and Szalayová 18 
2013). 19 
Most of all, this information should be transparent and easy to understand for 20 
people to be able to make informed decisions. Additionally, there should also be 21 
clear and comprehensive price lists outside of private or semi-private surgeries 22 
for the consumer to be able to understand before they arrive as to what, if any, 23 
additional charge they are facing. The reports highlight the lack of standard of 24 
care, primarily visible on the difference between waiting times within each 25 
insurance company for the same procedure of a hip replacement (Figure 12.7). 26 
413 
 
Figure 12.7 Comparison of waiting times for hip replacement surgery for the three major 
insurance companies (VSZP, Dovera, Union) in days, last column is an average of all 
insurance companies on the market, Source: Szalay (HPI), 2014 
 1 
It is apparent that the patients face a wide variation of waiting times and the 2 
2013 HPI report calls for standardising these waiting times, with the option of 3 
providing a legal and a transparent way for expediting a procedure based on a 4 
standardised fee (Mužik and Szalayová 2013). The authors suggest that rather 5 
than face informal payments and reshuffling the order of waiting lists without 6 
patient knowledge, these expedited procedures should be transparently 7 
performed on weekends or outside of regular hours for the added fee, to 8 
accommodate for the demand, but not to affect the waiting lists of those 9 
receiving standard care. The selection of concrete physicians for certain 10 
procedures should also be done in a transparent manner for a transparent fee 11 
and this, along with other specific healthcare features of change is discussed in 12 
greater detail in the following chapter.  13 
However, among the more general systemic, anti-corruption changes that have 14 
been recommended but not yet implemented by the government, is the simple 15 
recommendation of making the doctor credentials and assessment public. The 16 
2014 HPI report shows that corrupt behaviour is discussed in the complaints by 17 
patients about doctors that regularly make their way to the Bureau for Medical 18 
Oversight. This is reported along with lack of willingness to treat, lack of 19 
expertise, low quality of service, and unprofessional behaviour (2014:33). The 20 
number of complaints has been steadily increasing from 2005 to 2013 (2014:33) 21 
and making the doctor CVs, their credentials, and work experience a matter of 22 
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public record on hospital websites, or in their surgeries, could provide the 1 
patients with the information they need to make an informed decision. Similarly 2 
to the GMC practice in the UK, where the tribunal records over patient 3 
complaints are made public, the records of the Bureau for Medical Oversight in 4 
Slovakia should be made equally public to increase transparency and quality 5 
assurance. The participants only showcase very general and instinctive ideas of 6 
addressing insurance policy and transparency systemically, but there is clearly 7 
evidence of such suggestions having been made in very specific terms by official 8 
bodies. It could be concluded therefore that all that remains is for an effective 9 
implementation of these recommendations that are called for by official 10 
regulatory bodies, but also instinctively picked up on as problematic by my 11 
participants in their real-life understanding of corruption in healthcare.  12 
12.6.1 Systemic change: bottom-up, top-down, or both? 13 
While the section above primarily discusses the change that has been 14 
recommended but not yet implemented from a sectoral point of view, this 15 
section presents the participant views on where such a change should come 16 
from. There was some overlap in the participant responses and thoughts based 17 
on their real-life understanding of corruption, with 19 unique responses coded 18 
against the three options presented to them. 10 participants thought that 19 
bottom-up change was likely to be more lasting and effective, 7 of whom were 20 
females. However, there were also 10 participants who thought top-down 21 
systemic change was necessary and 6 of these were female participants too. 22 
Bearing in mind that there were only 12 female participants of the 19 coded 23 
against all three options, there is bound to be overlap in their thinking. 6 24 
participants thought that a combination of the two approaches was necessary, 25 
and again, 5 of these participants were females. It is therefore impossible to 26 
draw out a definitive trend of demographic preference of any of the three 27 
options or to show what the prevalent opinion was, as the participants seem to 28 
be accepting that all three approaches have their merits and are needed.  29 
Instead, I wanted to focus on the reasoning behind advocating the approaches, 30 
which show how the real-life experience has shaped their understanding.  31 
The reasons behind a bottom-up approach included: 32 
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• Starting from oneself to implement change 1 
• Realising that the behaviour shown on top levels is learnt ‘somewhere’ on the 2 
bottom levels and it needs addressed there 3 
• Real change would come from enlightening the populace through education, 4 
starting on bottom levels 5 
• The real problem is not valuing people’s work and so learning to respect people 6 
and their work must start early on 7 
• The change will be possible if we start from small surgeries and ambulatory care 8 
and then move up the ranks to implement on higher levels, including then 9 
swapping those in charge. 10 
The reasons behind a top-down approach included: 11 
• Realising that the mob-like effects descend from top levels to all other strata 12 
and need to be dealt with at the top 13 
• Exemplary actions taken at top levels are more likely to resonate with the 14 
bottom levels as well 15 
• Investment into the problems from the top levels is required for bottom levels to 16 
feel the effect of change 17 
• Top level leadership affecting the problem positively would work best but only if 18 
there are competent people in these positions, preferably having gained their 19 
competence and experience on bottom levels. 20 
For the combination of both approaches, the most frequent reasoning was that 21 
change from the top is important but will not work without the introspective 22 
element of starting from oneself to set an example for others and the next 23 
generation.  24 
It is evident that as much as there is overlap of participants against these 25 
individual approaches to systemic change, there is even more overlap in their 26 
reasoning behind these approaches. They display a very sophisticated view of 27 
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what is needed to implement change effectively, and the overlap in responses is 1 
indicative of their awareness that one level of change cannot work without the 2 
other. Any exemplary measures implemented at the top levels will not work 3 
without the engaged and willing populace and civil society. An example in 4 
practice of a failed, solely top-down approach policy is the ‘trickle down 5 
economics’, which was supposed to effectively reduce income inequality and has 6 
now been shown to have the exact opposite effect of increasing income 7 
inequality (Hope and Limberg 2020). Moreover, income inequality has been 8 
positively correlated with increase of corrupt practices, unemployment, and 9 
decrease of economic growth (Gupta, Davoodi et al. 2002, Gyimah-Brempong 10 
2002). Top-down policies such as ‘trickle down economics’ have therefore been 11 
shown not only to fail at curbing inequality and, by extension, corrupt practices, 12 
but actively cause an increase in corrupt practices (You and Khagram 2004). 13 
The value of education on this subject is also recognised by the participants and 14 
it is therefore evident that their real-life understanding of how much corruption 15 
has permeated society and how difficult it is to address its individual facets is 16 
astute and realistic. The importance of an engaged civil society when 17 
implementing change successfully not just in corruption, but also in 18 
environmental engagement, business engagement and social change, is well-19 
documented in literature and proved to be effective (Brinkerhoff 1999, Fowler 20 
2000, Hamann and Acutt 2003, Cooper 2018). For healthcare in Slovakia 21 
specifically, it is shown that an engaged civil society can bring about real change 22 
in healthcare provision and set up. As mentioned earlier, the 2014 HPI report 23 
shows that in 2010-2012 this civil society engaged in healthcare reform and 24 
provision has been very passive and only 14 patient organisations out of the total 25 
300 submitted their notes on only 7 out of 110 legislative acts (Balík and 26 
Starečková 2012). However, 77% of their notes were recognised as crucial and 27 
implemented in the legislative acts themselves, which points to a high level of 28 
success when these organisations got involved (Szalay 2014). Therefore, it would 29 
appear that while top-down change leaves a lot to be desired, bottom-up change 30 
can also use some improvement and if the potential of the two was harnessed 31 
into effective cooperation, the systemic change that the participants realise is 32 
necessary, could take place. 33 
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12.7 Conclusions 1 
 2 
The chapter addressed the participant views on of how corruption is practically 3 
carried out in real-life terms. It sought to show how the participants’ 4 
conceptualisations of corruption as an abstract phenomenon from previous 5 
chapters feed into their awareness of what networks are utilised to commit 6 
corrupt acts. The participants talked about their views on where corruption is 7 
most likely to appear, what sort of mechanisms they thought are utilised to take 8 
part in corruption, and what role trust and personal contacts play in real life 9 
corruption. Finally, the participants tied these views to whether corruption 10 
should be addressed systemically and in what way.  11 
The participants on the whole located healthcare as the most prevalent sector 12 
where corruption can be found and also included other sectors such as 13 
education, entrepreneurship or politics. This identification of sectors is 14 
congruent with published reports on where corruption is detected most, but the 15 
participants’ view is that healthcare is most prevalent, as opposed to the cited 16 
report which marks entrepreneurship as the most vulnerable sector. In real life 17 
terms, therefore, healthcare is seen as most affected by corruption, as the 18 
sector that everyone is likely to have some experience of (be it first-hand or 19 
not). The participants on the whole thought that corruption was widespread and 20 
could be found ‘everywhere’ in public life and the most prevalent expression 21 
associated with most likely occurrences was ‘getting things done’. This indicates 22 
that the sector itself is not as relevant as the circumstances the respondents 23 
believe create an opportunity for getting ahead and producing results of a 24 
quality that is faster, better, and outside of the norm.  25 
With regards to practical mechanisms of carrying out corruption, the 26 
participants were more likely to believe that information on the ‘know-how’ was 27 
more likely to be obtained indirectly through others with a similar experience. In 28 
other words, accessing information on how much something would cost or who to 29 
approach is, in real life terms, more likely to come from personal networks of 30 
acquaintances, family or friends. The participants clearly were not thinking of 31 
these indirect contacts as anything other than those performing a role of a 32 
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source or a favour, but these networks could be conceptualised in theoretical 1 
terms as unwittingly performing the function of a middleman in the corrupt 2 
exchange. The participant discourse was also centred around the idea of 3 
‘people’ asking or telephoning for information, which points to their awareness 4 
of the role that these networks play in carrying out corruption.  5 
Use of personal contacts being equated to corruption was a sensitive subject for 6 
the participants and it elicited some heated debate in the data collection 7 
process. On the whole the majority of participants thought that personal 8 
contacts were equal/synonymous to corruption or at least a form of it. The 9 
majority of these participants were female, which further buttresses the 10 
findings of previous empirical chapters and literature on the subject of women 11 
being less tolerant of corrupt practices than men. 12 
The role of trust in corrupt transactions proved to be seen as significant by a 13 
quarter of all participants. However, the definition of trust for the purposes of 14 
corrupt practices centred around the idea of fulfilling expectations, rather than 15 
trust for its own sake. In other words, the participants believed that it was 16 
necessary for the parties involved in corruption to trust that all parties would 17 
behave in a way that does not incriminate or harm themselves. For these 18 
purposes and for the corrupt context, however, the verbs ‘trust’ and ‘expect’ 19 
are interchangeable. 20 
 21 
Over a half of the participants who responded to the question on systemic 22 
change believed that the system and its procedural shortcomings and loopholes 23 
was one of the predominant culprits in the spread of corruption and believed 24 
that systemic change was needed to remediate this situation. The participants 25 
astutely picked up on the changes that should be implemented, including 26 
swapping over personnel in vulnerable sectors, raising the living wage and 27 
salaries of healthcare staff, greater transparency in processes and also a change 28 
of the insurance policy for healthcare. These and other changes have also been 29 
put forward by official bodies such as the Health Policy Institute in Slovakia and 30 
are therefore congruent with the trends picked up on independently. The 31 
participants show acute awareness of the insufficiencies of the insurance 32 
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companies in providing clarity of message on what is standard care and how best 1 
to receive it.  2 
Last but not least, the participants showed a remarkable level of sophistication 3 
when explaining their views on where systemic change should come from. The 4 
participants did not shake their personal responsibility by suggesting all change 5 
should be merely implemented and enforced from the top positions. Instead, 6 
they showed awareness of the importance of interaction of all levels involved in 7 
change implementation. It was heartening to see that the participants were able 8 
to grasp in their real-life understanding of corruption that as much as the system 9 
needs to adapt to the situation at hand, their own responsibility of starting from 10 
one’s own decisions and setting an example was of significant importance in 11 
their discourse. 12 
  13 
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Chapter 13: Health Care Corrupt Practices 1 
13.1 Introduction 2 
 3 
The final results chapter of the thesis addresses the corrupt practices observed 4 
and perceived specifically in healthcare in Slovakia. This chapter addresses the 5 
final nodes examining whether participants believe it is doctors or patients who 6 
in fact initiate the corrupt exchange (and in which branch of healthcare the 7 
participants believe corrupt practices are most prevalent). This is completely 8 
novel information elicited within corruption research in the healthcare sector; I 9 
was unable to find such level of detail asked by any previous works on the 10 
subject. However, as can be seen from the figure below (Fig 13.1), the category 11 
in its essence encompasses several nodes already addressed in previous chapters 12 
(white and red clouds). In other words, it is necessary for the specific final nodes 13 
in green to be addressed here separately, with previous chapters providing the 14 
necessary insight into these complex ideas.  15 
 
Figure 13.1 Visual 
presentation of the 
category Health care 
corrupt practices. The 
bright blue bubble 
represents the 
category, white boxes 
represent floating 
ideas, red box 
represents a 
dominant content 
node, and green 
boxes represent 
nodes with a 
moderate to low 
number of references. 
Source: Author 
 
The analysis within this chapter is primarily focused on textual elements and 16 
language of participants, but also includes some graphic visualisations of data 17 
trends. By expressing their views on which party is more likely to initiate corrupt 18 
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transactions in real life, the participants are tapping into ideas of social customs 1 
and behavioural trends and therefore directly address RQ3 (What are the 2 
strategies utilised to carry out grand and petty corrupt practices?) and RQ3b (To 3 
what extent are social rules and customs important in the carrying out of 4 
corrupt practices?). However, by sharing their views and real-life understanding 5 
of corruption within branches of healthcare, such as corruption in GP surgeries, 6 
specialist surgeries, or private clinics, the chapter also informs more broadly the 7 
overarching RQ (To what extent is the theoretical difference between grand and 8 
petty corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in 9 
Slovakia’s health care?) by juxtaposing these views with existing literature. 10 
13.2 Patients or doctors? 11 
 12 
The participants coded against this node were answering the question on 13 
whether they thought it was patients or the healthcare staff who were more 14 
likely to initiate a corrupt transaction. In other words, are the patients more 15 
likely to offer a bribe/ coerce or shame the doctor into taking a bribe, or are the 16 
doctors more likely to request one/ threaten lower quality of service by not 17 
receiving one? These types of questions are key to developing an understanding 18 
about the interactions between healthcare providers and patients, and about 19 
corruption in general, and the power balances that exist within the transactions 20 
in real life. Establishing greater understanding about the trends of initiating 21 
corrupt acts could potentially lead to more targeted anti-corruption measures 22 
which would be able to address corruption at its source. Figure 13.2 overleaf 23 
creates the impression of vagueness within the participant responses, and there 24 
is an equal amount of mentions about both doctors and patients in this context. 25 
The participant discourse, therefore, was likely to be speculative unless based 26 
on real experience, but direct experiences were not explored by my questions to 27 
avoid non-participation for fear of self-incrimination. In the general parent node 28 
‘Patient or Doctor’, 6 participants expressed a view that both approaches are 29 
equally plausible and that a combination of both parties offering and requesting 30 
bribes in similar measure is probably the closest to reality. The literature to 31 
date does not address the specific origin of corrupt exchange in the doctor-32 
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patient relationship. The thesis therefore provides a fresh angle of this 1 
relationship in ascertaining whether it is the supply or the demand that bears 2 
greater weight in generating corruption within the health service. The language 3 
included phrases such as:  4 
• The first impulse probably comes from the patients, even though there are 5 
situations known to me where the doctor does have a certain rate or so (Ten 6 
prvý impulz vychádza od tých pacientov, aj keď sú situácie známe, že pán 7 
doktor má nejakú taxu alebo podobne ELITE3) 8 
• I think it will be kind of both sided (Ja si myslím, že je to obojstranné INT10) 9 
• I reckon that’s fifty-fifty. Some will be conscious of it and will take advantage 10 
of it and another might not be but the people will bring it anyway (To bude 11 
fifty-fifty. Niektorý si to uvedomí a ťaží z toho a druhý možno nie a ľudia to aj 12 
tak prinesú INT11). 13 
 
Figure 13.2 Word Frequency Cloud of node ‘Patients or Doctors’, set at 30 words, 
translations embedded in red by author, Source: Author 
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 1 
The participants display awareness that this may not be a clear-cut deal of one 2 
side necessarily offering or receiving and the other side being forced to comply, 3 
and it is likely that a combination of both doctor and patient-led corrupt 4 
practices are present.  The idea of both sides exhibiting corrupt behaviour also 5 
further reinforces the notion explored in the previous chapter on how important 6 
it is to make sure that systemic change in corruption is addressed from both top 7 
and bottom levels simultaneously to be effective. The participants showcase 8 
throughout their discourse a consistency of awareness that no part of corruption 9 
is isolated from the other. The intertwined nature of several levels of corruption 10 
in real life further informs the overarching RQ.  11 
Participant views on each party initiating corrupt exchanges are discussed in 12 
depth below.  13 
13.2.1 Doctors initiating exchange 14 
The participants’ views on the doctor being more likely to take initiative on 15 
corrupt exchanges were smaller in number than the belief that the patients 16 
were more likely to initiate, with an overall 18/11 split of opinions for 17 
patients/doctors. Some of these were, however, part of a discourse that was 18 
likely to encompass a view that both options are possible and therefore cannot 19 
be considered mutually exclusive. However, the language that is associated with 20 
the two options presents interesting patterns.  21 
The participants were likely to refer to the doctors ‘expecting’ a bribe even if 22 
this was not prompted, for the exchange to be almost ‘automatic’, the doctors 23 
to have a known ‘rate’ for the respective procedure. However, in a more passive 24 
way, the participants stated that even if the doctors do not directly request a 25 
bribe (which some thought they were likely to do anyway), they ‘wouldn’t refuse 26 
it’, which they argue then encourages the behaviour of patients by proxy. 27 
Whether this constitutes a doctor-initiated corrupt practice is questionable; 28 
however, it can certainly be thought of as a doctor-enabled practice.  29 
 30 
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The phrases utilised included the following: 1 
• The doctors are so calculating…frustrated that they earn too little in the state 2 
healthcare so they’ve no shame to ask (Lekári sú už tak vychcaní, že si vypýtajú. 3 
Jednak sú frustrovaní, že málo zarábajú v tej štátnej sfére, takže nehanbia sa 4 
zobrať  ELITE2) 5 
• I mean there are situations where you know that the doctor has a specific ‘rate’ 6 
or so (Sú situácie známe, že pán doctor má nejakú taxu alebo podobne ELITE3) 7 
• I don’t necessarily think that they ask for it…but then again, they won’t refuse it 8 
either (Ja neberiem, že ten lekár si to pýta...Ale zase to neodmietne INT13) 9 
• …may be a case where the doctor may hint that there might be something 10 
additional needed (…prípad toho lekára, že naznačil, že niečo treba, bude treba 11 
niečo priložiť INT16.1) 12 
These patterns of discourse alluding to implicit or explicit information on bribes, 13 
or asking for bribes directly, is congruent with the scholarly research on defining 14 
the practical facets of corruption in healthcare. Garcia (2019) outlines the six 15 
most common types of corruption in health service delivery. Among these are 16 
absenteeism (doctors not showing up for work), embezzlement, informal 17 
payments from patients, corruption in service provision not driven by medical 18 
need alone, favouritism and manipulation of data (Garcia 2019). From these six 19 
types of corruption, the patient would realistically only have a way of 20 
influencing informal payments and service provision/favouritism by extension, 21 
but this is still entirely dependent on the response or willingness of the 22 
healthcare professional, who, in this context, is a gatekeeper to the crucial 23 
resource of healthcare for this patient. Chattopadhyay (2013) shows that corrupt 24 
behaviour in medicine by healthcare professionals is rampant, undermines the 25 
trust in healthcare and the reputation of the medical profession itself, prolongs 26 
ill health, and potentially also kills (Chattopadhyay 2013).  Such a situation is 27 
amplified when the service sought after is of a niche nature and there is only a 28 
limited number of specialists in that field available to the patient, which 29 
reduces their options of choice and increases their position of vulnerability and 30 
dependence on the behaviour of the healthcare professional. A 2014 Slovak 31 
Health Policy Institute report notes that while the data of the biggest, 32 
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government-owned healthcare insurer VSZP in Slovakia shows that the capacity 1 
for ambulatory care specialists is supposedly filled to 205%, there is still 2 
reported lack of access to specialists in certain fields. These are namely 3 
cardiology, immunology, diabetology, rheumatology, endocrinology, and others. 4 
The reason for this, according to Szalay (2014) is the reduced working hours of 5 
these specialists and their multiple contracted places of work, often collated 6 
with private practices, which take them away from state ambulatory care 7 
(Szalay 2014).  8 
The idea of absenteeism due to secondary, private sector employment, explored 9 
by Garcia (2019) in a Latin American context, is therefore a relevant trend 10 
picked up on by the literature in Slovakia and also perceived as a problem for 11 
real-life understanding of corruption by my Slovak participants. The lack of 12 
access to these professionals and the demand for them are undoubtedly factors 13 
that affect the access of patients to healthcare as a whole, and also create an 14 
opportunity for extra, informal payments to be dictated or expected. Efforts 15 
aimed specifically at the curbing of corrupt practices of healthcare professionals 16 
have been feeble so far (Szalay 2014). The Slovak Doctors Union (LOZ) has put 17 
forward some proposals on curbing corruption among professionals, but these 18 
were never officially implemented due to their unfinished nature (2014:36). 19 
Similarly, the badge campaign of the LOZ for doctors to wear badges or stickers 20 
‘I don’t take bribes’ has had a very low uptake among professionals, with fewer 21 
than a 1,000 doctors having taken part in the initiative and producing no 22 
significant results in the curbing of corrupt practices (2014:36). It is worth 23 
mentioning that these methods of encouraging better behaviour are reminiscent 24 
of the “stick” methods here, rather than “carrots” in the shape of financial or 25 
other incentives for transparent behaviour of doctors. My research has not shown 26 
any such “carrots” incentives or methods put in place in Slovak healthcare to 27 
encourage better doctor behaviour. No concrete methods save the threat of 28 
legal action over criminal behaviour are currently in place that would apply to 29 
doctors in particular. 30 
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13.2.2 Patients initiating exchange 1 
The option of patients being more likely to initiate the corrupt exchange was 2 
mentioned by 18 participants, making it more popular than doctor-initiated 3 
corruption. However, as I indicated above, there is some overlap in responses of 4 
the participants within this node and several were likely to include both options 5 
operating in a symbiotic relationship as most likely to reflect real-life behaviour. 6 
The literature on informal payments and participant responses to gratitude 7 
payment/bribing behaviour has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1 and 8 
Chapter 8 and these trends are reinforced by findings such as those presented in 9 
Figure 13.3, which outlines the experiences of the public on bribery in 10 
healthcare from 2012 to 2021 in three-year gaps. It is obvious from Figure 13.3 11 
that most respondents report notions of bribery across several specialties. 12 
However, such statistics only provide the information without closer 13 
investigation on the practicality of the corrupt exchange- i.e., who is most likely 14 
to instigate it and what are the reasons behind it? It was therefore important to 15 
collect the participants’ views on the reasoning behind the patients’ impulse to 16 
offer a bribe or a gift to the healthcare professional. 17 
 
Figure 13.3 The bribery trends within different parts of healthcare in response to the 
question “In which department did you pay something on the side?” Source: TI 2021, 
translations author  
The language used by participants to answer these questions centred around: 18 
patients needing something sorted faster and thus feeling the need to pay extra, 19 
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the psychological effect of pressure to appease the professional since health is 1 
at stake, people specifically ‘shoving’ money at healthcare professionals, and 2 
also bribing being a learnt behaviour and a social norm.  3 
• I think that people have now learnt to behave that way, that without bringing 4 
something they won’t even go at all (Podľa mňa ľudia sú tak naučení, že bez 5 
toho aby niečo ponúkli ani nejdú FG2.1) 6 
• I think it’s more about the fact that the person wants to give it [bribe] or they 7 
heard from someone that it is necessary to give it (Čiže skôr ide o to, že ten 8 
človek chce dať alebo od niekoho počul, že treba dať ELITE4) 9 
• The patients want to be done quickly and be off the hook and circumvent the 10 
system to that end (Pacienti chcú byť rýchlo hotoví a ať to z krku a obísť ten 11 
system INT8) 12 
• I agree that the patient probably is more likely to go first into that exchange 13 
than the healthcare professional (Súhlasím asi, že je to možno ten pacient, 14 
ktorý skôr ide do toho ako ten zdravotník INT16.1) 15 
• It’s more likely the patient because they come with the problem and they want 16 
it sorted and they’ll do anything for that to happen (Skôr si myslím, že ten 17 
pacient. Lebo on pride s tým problémom a on ho chce vyriešiť ten problém a 18 
spraví všetko preto. INT16.2) 19 
• People behave in such a way that they are shoving stuff at the doctor and he’s 20 
not even done anything yet (Ale ľudia sú takí, že strkajú tomu doktorovi a ešte 21 
ani nič neurobil INT11) 22 
• A lot of the time the doctors may not even be aware that they were given 23 
something. Like the patients chase them around the hospitals and shove things 24 
at them (Aj doktori sa im tiež stáva, že častokrát nevedia, že im niekto niečo 25 
dal. Akože tí pacienti ich naháňajú po nemocniciach, strkajú im veci INT4) 26 
• I think it’s the psychological effect of being scared for one’s health and for their 27 
life, so they feel it is instrumental to give that attention payment (Ide o ten 28 
psychologický efekt, že keď sa tí ľudia obávajú o svoje zdravie a život tak pre 29 
nich je podstatné dať to všimné INT9) 30 
• Yeah, I think corruption is human-based in healthcare because one values health 31 
above all things (Je teda ľudová. Pretože zdravie si človek viacej cení INT12) 32 
 33 
From the sample of responses above, the reasons provided by my participants on 34 
the real-life motivations that lead patients to drive corrupt exchanges, are as 35 
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varied as the patients themselves. They range from learnt behaviour, through 1 
being scared for one’s health, to wishing to expedite procedures. In other words, 2 
the participants show awareness that there may not be a single root cause 3 
behind the patient behaviour. Rather, there are likely to be several problems at 4 
play, some more deeply rooted in behavioural and societal constructs that are 5 
difficult to unlearn, and some conditioned by circumstances of the particular 6 
healthcare sector. Such learnt behaviour as is referenced by my participants in 7 
real-life understanding of corruption has been shown to have an effect on 8 
corruption levels. For example, it has been shown that societal peer pressure 9 
has an effect on corruption- in other words, the sentiment of ‘if others are doing 10 
it I ought to as well’ is evidenced to be subject to learning and have a real 11 
effect on corruption levels (Momotenko 2015).  12 
There was a distinct sense among the participants of fear of not getting cared 13 
for unless a gift is provided. INT6 noted that ‘people are afraid that the care 14 
will not be what it is supposed to be’ and INT14 gave an example of ‘the elderly 15 
often having their wallets visibly out on their bedside tables in the hospital to 16 
make it obvious that they are ready to pay extra’. It is worth noting that such 17 
fear and uncertainty, among other factors influencing cognitive psychology of 18 
corrupt behaviour, has been shown to increase the likelihood of acting corruptly 19 
(Dupuy and Neset 2018). In their seminal report, Dupuy and Neset (2018) also 20 
found that rationalisation narratives seem to make corruption more acceptable 21 
among participants and that unethical behaviour is more likely to be prevalent in 22 
organisations that do not punish such behaviour. Both of these phenomena have 23 
been explored in this thesis as well- rationalisation narratives can be seen most 24 
prominently in Chapter 8 on Gratitude payments and the idea of professionalism 25 
being a greater part of the agenda of medical overseeing bodies has also been 26 
explored in Chapter 11, as one of the potential ways to counter unprofessional 27 
behaviour.  28 
The report by Dupuy and Neset (2018) is therefore aligned in several ways with 29 
the real-life understanding of corruption displayed here by my participants and 30 
calls for the improvement of information flows about costs of corruption, 31 
rewarding ethical behaviour, and setting basic, organisational integrity 32 
standards. Such increase in information flows about costs of corruption is 33 
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congruent with the recommendation of the Slovak Health Institute report of 1 
2014, which also calls for greater transparency of costs associated with 2 
healthcare and greater transparency of insurance companies as to what 3 
constitutes standardised care (see Chapter 12). It is important to emphasise how 4 
the patterns of language showcased by my participants’ responses fit in with the 5 
general findings and recommendations provided by official bodies, in order to 6 
confirm to what extent real-life understanding of corruption is congruent with 7 
the general findings. The overarching RQ is directly informed by the alignment 8 
of the participant responses with official findings. Such alignment of real-life 9 
understanding with published reports places even greater urgency on taking  10 
action in accordance with the recommendations outlined in reports cited, as 11 
well as confirmed by the findings of this thesis.   12 
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13.3 Where is corruption most frequent? 1 
The participants were given a choice of three branches of healthcare to select 2 
from to identify where they thought corruption was likely to be most 3 
widespread. The three areas were selected because I believed that not only 4 
were the participants most likely to be acquainted with them on a practical 5 
basis, but also because the pilot questioning in the spring of 2019 confirmed this 6 
view and participants themselves identified the delivery of medical care in real 7 
life to be mostly split among: GPs (primary contact practitioners), private 8 
clinics, and specialists. The results from this coded node were very clear-cut and 9 
the vast majority of participants (33, i.e. 75% of the whole sample interviewed) 10 
believed that contact with specialist doctors was the most probable and 11 
frequent environment for corrupt practices to be present. This trend is visible 12 
even when all three nodes (GPs, private clinics, and specialists) were collated 13 
for a word frequency query, the aim of which is to ascertain the most frequent 14 
words and language used in the nodes. The results, as visible in Figure 13.4, 15 
show that the word ‘specialist’, as well as grammatically and semantically 16 
related ‘specialised’, ‘specialists’, ‘specialist’ (as an adjective) and so on, are 17 
well represented and holding several positions of the 30 most frequent words.  18 
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This suggests that the participants were most likely to speak about them in 1 
answering this question, but closer analysis of the original data also confirmed 2 
that these mentions related to affirmative responses to the question- i.e. yes, it 3 
is specialists where this is most likely to happen, as opposed to the other 4 
branches of healthcare delivery. The largest demographic group from these 33 5 
participants were, as is the case in several nodes covered in the thesis, women, 6 
and specifically women over 50 years old. This indicates that women of a certain 7 
age may have greater experience with healthcare when compared to other 8 
groups. Such a trend has been indicated in literature already. For example, a 9 
study of Australian adults (a sample of over 1,400 adults) showed that more 10 
women and participants over the age of 50 sought out information on health 11 
prevention in the health service, compared to other groups, which secured 12 
greater exposure of this group of women to healthcare practice (Deeks, Lombard 13 
et al. 2009). However, a further nuance to be pinpointed here is that, with 14 
regards to specialists, it has been evidenced by the thesis that OB&GYN doctors 15 
tend to be mentioned a lot for informal payment reception and are also shown 16 
to be one of the three most frequent specialties to be taking bribes for mainly 17 
childbirths (Mužik and Szalayová 2013). It is therefore logical that women of this 18 
age are likely to have had this experience already, as opposed to younger 19 
generations of women respondents or male respondents, and this could be 20 
affecting their views.  21 
The language associated with specialist care as most likely to see corrupt 22 
exchanges included specialists being scarce, irreplaceable, in demand, and 23 
references to their jobs being more important and ‘life-saving’ in comparison 24 
with primary care doctors. The idea of disease severity being proportional to 25 
increasing scope for blackmail from the professional, knowing that they are 26 
holding a particular perceived or effective monopoly over the patient’s health, is 27 
a grave and a disturbing finding. This is also reinforced by the language used in 28 
relation to GPs, where the participants specifically associate them with ‘less 29 
serious’ problems and thus see less of a need to “ensure” the outcome of the 30 
consultation through bribery. For private practices, the participants unanimously 31 
thought that there is no reason for corrupt exchanges to take place because: a) 32 
the rate for consultations and potential procedures is set, so there is no reason 33 
to pay extra, and b) because the private practices, in order to compete with the 34 
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cheaper, state-run practices, must be able to rely on their reputation and 1 
cannot afford the negative publicity. There would, therefore, appear to be a 2 
real-life founded rationale for the standardisation of fees in the state-run 3 
healthcare sector, to achieve a similar effect of transparency that puts the 4 
consumer at ease. On the other hand, standardised fees would not address the 5 
negative impact on individuals who take bribes in the state healthcare sector, as 6 
it is not associated with the same negative effect on their reputation as it 7 
appears to be for private clinics. The fees would also not be able to look exactly 8 
the same or reach the same pricing, as the clientele of the private clinics 9 
logically consists of those who are able to afford such fees, as opposed to the 10 
parts of population who are confined to the state-run healthcare provision for 11 
economic reasons. It is therefore uncertain whether lower fees, albeit 12 
standardised, would be able to cater for the expectations of the healthcare 13 
professionals and satisfy them to the point of no further need to engage in 14 
corruption.  15 
The particular language associated with all three avenues of healthcare 16 
provision is presented in Table 13.1 overleaf for the chance to compare the 17 
discourse associated with the three branches on the basis of real-life 18 
understanding. It is obvious from the participants that their real-life 19 
understanding revolves around the belief that specialists hold greater power 20 
over their health in serious situations than GPs. They don’t appear to take into 21 
account that a GP referral is still needed for a visit of a specialist, unless one 22 
selects specialists that allow for direct appointments to be made, for a fee. In 23 
contrast to this, there is no direct self-referral service available for most 24 
specialists in the UK- patients can only be referred to by other doctors or 25 
specialist nurse services (there are private practice exceptions to this, for 26 
example dermatology or psychiatry, but, crucially, these are not deemed life-27 
threatening at first contact).  The participants seem to think that Slovak GPs do 28 
not perform as crucial a function in the healthcare service, as the specialists do: 29 
‘The GP is of a smaller calibre, a bit of a pawn, so to say’ INT12. This is in 30 
direct contrast to the discourse that is propagated in the National Health Service 31 
in the UK, for example, where the GPs are continuously uplifted as the backbone 32 
of the health service and are becoming one of the best-funded branches of 33 
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healthcare84. It is almost as if the ambulatory care provided by the GPs, due to 1 
the giving up of the medically more interesting clinical care, was compensated 2 
for by providing better work-life balance and better pay in Britain- a sort of 3 
“carrot” policy employed by the British General Medical Council. The opposite 4 
seems to be the trend in Slovakia. It is obvious from the participant responses 5 
that it is the specialists who, despite being more likely to engage in corrupt 6 
practices, are held in higher regard as to their expertise, than the GPs. This 7 
disparity of perception, in my opinion, calls for a comparative study into the 8 
perceptions of GPs and their corruption involvement between healthcare 9 
systems such as the one in Slovakia and in the UK.  It is also obvious that the 10 
participants seem to think that private clinics are held in higher regard and 11 
respected more for their transparency, even accepting of the associated cost. It 12 
is therefore a combination of the ease of access, the sparsity of specialist 13 
resources, and their vital and unique role in treating life-limiting disease, which 14 
leads to greater possibility for corruption.15 
 
84 For more information, see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2017/09/21/gps-backbone-health-
service-crisis-deeply-worrying/ or https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(16)00743-1/fulltext [last accessed 24/01/2021] 
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GPs Private Clinics Specialists 
• The GP I think takes you just like everybody 
else and it’s fairly equal there (Obvodný si 
myslím, že ťa berie ako každého a je to 
tam rovnaké FG2.2) 
• The GP is of a smaller calibre, a bit of a 
pawn, so to say (Obvodný lekár je na 
menšej úrovni ako pešiak dá sa povedať 
INT12) 
• Yeah, I agree, you go to the GP with like a 
flu or something, it’s not NOT serious, but 
also not time sensitive (Tiež súhlasím, že k 
obvodnému idem s nejakou chrípkou alebo 
niečo, a je to síce vážne ale netreba to 
súrne riešiť INT16.2) 
• Yeah, the GP won’t realistically do anything 
for you so why would you be giving him 
money you know. It used to be that it’s 
your family doctor and the old ladies think 
of it that way still (Ale zober si to tak, ten 
obvoďák pre teba nič neurobí, prečo by si 
mu dávala money vies. Lebo kedysi to bol 
tvoj rodinný lekár vies, a tie babkz to 
doteraz tak berú INT4) 
• No, you can get to a GP without any issues 
(Nie, tam sa dostaneš úplne bez problémov 
INT8) 
• Well, the private one, I mean, it’s set, 
you have a price list (No súkromnú tam 
máš nastavené a máš cenník FG1.3) 
• They really watch their corruption 
involvement because they don’t want 
to be hurting their good name (Dávajú 
si pozor na tú korupciu aj z toho 
pohľadu, že nechcú škodiť svojmu 
dobrému menu ELITE3) 
• The doctors are in a completely 
different position there, it’s no longer 
necessary there. Or they can’t afford 
to do it there anymore (Tam sú úplne 
inak postavení tí lekári, že tam to už 
nie je nutné. Alebo si to tam už 
nemôžu dovoliť INT1) 
• It’s already coming with a fee; it 
wouldn’t even occur to me to pay again 
(Tam si to človek platí a tam mi to 
nikdy ani nenapadlo INT11) 
• Well, they set that price normally and 
so I don’t have to be thinking whether I 
was “too grateful” or “not grateful 
enough” (Mi to vyrúbia normálne tú 
cenu a ja nemusím rozmýšľať, či som 
bola veľa alebo málo vďačná ELITE4) 
• The more niche the specialisation of 
the doctor, the greater the probability 
that the lack is more pressing (Čím 
vyššia je špecializácia lekára, tým 
väčšia pravdepodobnosť, lebo ten 
nedostatok je tam akútnejší ELITE1) 
• It’s that demand problem there (Tam 
je ten dopytový problém ELITE3) 
• They simply become irreplaceable 
(Stanú sa nenahraditeľnými ELITE8) 
• When it’s about saving a life, a person 
doesn’t look at the price tag anymore 
(Tam ked ide o záchranu života, tam už 
človek nepozerá, že koľko a čo INT13) 
• I mean you go to a specialist when it’s 
literally life and death and that’s 
different and the corruption there is 
more clearly cut (Zatiaľ čo k 
špecialistovi ide človek keď ide reálne 
o život, tak to už je iné a tam tá 
korupcia je asi jasnejšia INT16.2) 
• Yeah, it’s definitely specialists, 
surgeons, surgeries, definitely 
childbirths (Tí špecialisti, chirurgovia, 
zákroky, určite pôrody INT9) 
Table 13.1 Examples of language coded against nodes ‘GPs’, ‘Specialists’, and ‘Private Clinics’, translations by author, Source: Author 
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The idea of specialist care being the most frequent environment for corrupt 
transactions, as understood by my participants, goes directly against the trends 
observed by literature to date (Mužik and Szalayová 2013), which place the GP 
group as the most frequent by a significant margin, as seen in Figure 13.5 
overleaf. The ranking displayed here is in direct contradiction to the views 
expressed by my participants in their real-life understanding of corruption. I am 
not certain to what extent this discrepancy can be accounted for by sample 
selection as my sampling was voluntary, but the snowballing element of 
recruiting later participants may account for a similarity of opinion with those 
participants who acted as gatekeepers.  
 
However, it is important to note, that not only did my participants show a 
leaning towards specialised doctors for informal payments and corrupt practices; 
they completely discounted GPs as unnecessary for these payments in the first 
place. The idea of GPs being those to take informal payments most frequently 
compared with other branches of healthcare, however, is not unheard of in 
Slovakia’s  geographic neighbours. As explored in Chapter 2, Poland shares this 
trend described in the 2013 HPI report, seen in Figure 13.5 overleaf, with the 
greatest portion of informal payments or corrupt practices occurring in the GP 
sector. Incidentally, this figure is consistent with the more recent TI research 
conducted in 2021, visible in Figure 13.3 above, which also found GPs to have 
been the recipients of bribes most frequently. It is therefore clear that more 
research, with a greater and a more regionally representative sample, needs to 
be conducted into this question in Slovakia, to account for the discrepancy 
presented here. It is possible, that since my research only focused on two 
regions of Slovakia, the more rural parts of Slovakia may find that GPs have a 
more prominent standing in their societies and thus greater opportunity to elicit 
bribes and corrupt practices.  Pohontsch et al. (2018) found that rural GPs in 
Germany tend to see themselves as more of a medical “companion” than just 
medical professional and enjoy a closer relationship with their patients, with 




Figure 13.5 The spread of informal payments by specialty, top-down: GP, surgeon, 
gynaecologist, internal medicine, other, orthopaedic surgeon, neurologist, dentist, 
Source: (Mužik and Szalayová 2013) 
 
 
In contrast to urban GPs, this role was considered as beneficial for the treatment 
plans proposed to patients. It is therefore possible that different relationships 
between GPs and patients in different environments can account for differences 
in perception and behaviour, including corrupt behaviour, by both patients and 
doctors. It is worth mentioning that the view of GPs displayed here by my 
participants is not one with a long tradition, as the concept of the highly 
esteemed family doctors in the past existed in Slovakia as well. This can be 
readily observed in realist literature of the 1800s where lawyers, mayors, and 
doctors are always esteemed characters. Two of my participants (INT4 and 
INT13) also emphasise the importance and convenience of these figures in the 
past, both in terms of reputation and respect which put the profession on a 
pedestal in its community and ensured high quality of accessible care. In modern 
terms, however, this tradition does not apply to the occupation of a GP. 
Furthermore, the Slovak HPI report (2013) states clearly that its makeup of 
respondents (nearly 1,200) was not demographically representative of Slovakia’s 
population (and was therefore not statistically significant) but provides no 
further information on the regional placement of respondents. It is therefore 
also possible that the differences between mine and their results stem from 
regional, socioeconomic, or educational variations. Additionally, it may also be 
due to participants being insufficiently informed about the job descriptions and 
functions performed by GPs and/or specialists, which leads to a skewed 
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perspective of the importance of their jobs. The research report from 2013 
equally does not share the types of questions asked by the researchers. The 
wording of research and field questions, as shown by literature (Klopper 2008, 
Agee 2009), is important in the construction of responses by the participants as 
well, which is why all my questions were piloted first. My question for this node 
tried to be as free in its wording as possible: ‘In which of the three branches of 
healthcare do you think corruption is most likely and most frequently taking 
place?’ This question came as one of the last questions in the field purposely, to 
make sure that the participants at this point have considered various facets to 
corruption (such as gifts, service exchange, use of contacts), but have also 
polemicised on informal payments, to be able to really situate all corrupt 
behaviour in healthcare. It may be possible that if the researchers from the HPI 
report asked about informal payments only, forms of payment such as gift giving 
and service exchange were not considered by their participants, leading to 
skewed results, with less accounting for other variables.  
 
13.4 Conclusions  
 
The chapter looked closely at two particular strands of answers from the 
participants. The first related to whether the participants believed that the 
corrupt practices, which they have described and conceptualised in preceding 
chapters, are more likely to be initiated by the doctors (healthcare staff) or by 
the patients. Secondly, the participants shared their views on which branch of 
healthcare (GPs, Specialists, or Private clinics) was most frequently exhibiting 
these corrupt practices.  
The participants expressed a sophisticated view in the first category of 
responses, which included thoughts that both parties (patients and doctors) are 
complicit in the corrupt exchange and are both likely to initiate the transaction 
based on the circumstances involved. However, when broken down, the majority 
of respondents were more likely to believe that the patients are the main 
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initiators of corrupt practices, however, doctors are often seen as enablers by 
virtue of them being known to not refuse bribes when presented to them. The 
idea of vulnerability of patients when put in a specific situation of need was 
touched upon only circumstantially. The literature shows that patients do indeed 
perceive corruption, and bribery specifically, to be rampant in healthcare. The 
participant responses revolved around the idea of bribery being a part of a 
custom (which directly informs sub question RQ3b). Furthermore, the 
participants also referred to bribery as a tool to expedite a procedure, holding 
health as the most precious resource, therefore resorting to extreme ways of 
ensuring successful results. As for doctors, efforts that have been started by 
professional bodies in Slovakia to try and curb corrupt practices among 
professionals that involved a campaign to wear ‘I don’t take bribes’ badges, are 
shown not be successful. This points to the further need to implement systemic 
changes that dictate, regulate, and oversee professional behaviour, rather than 
rely on the initiative of the professionals themselves to be transparent.  
The respondents thought, unanimously and by a great margin (75% of all 
participants of the study), that the most frequent environment for corrupt 
practices is that of state-run specialist clinics. The language associated with the 
GPs and private clinics as the other two options, was dismissive and indicated 
lack of respect for the competence or need of GP services, as well as a comfort 
of pricing transparency of private clinics. In this manner, the GPs were thought 
of as providing lower levels of care, rather than primary care, and their 
necessity for referrals to specialists has been eradicated in many respects by 
specialist surgeries providing the possibility for direct booking by patients, for a 
fee. The participants saw the GPs as dealing with a lower level of seriousness of 
illnesses, which does not require the need for expediting and thus, by extension, 
a bribe. Private clinics were upheld by the participants as places with rates 
already set, which means that there is no need to pay any more and, 
interestingly, gave the impression that private clinics need to look after their 
reputation more to stay in business, which is also why corruption is perhaps not 
perceived to be taking place.  
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Specialists, on the other hand, were seen as those who hold significant power 
over illnesses that are serious and where treatment is time-sensitive, which 
created the impression that bribes and corruption have greater room to grow 
and greater opportunity to sprout. The participants often made references to 
‘life and death’ situations and to child births, which once again confirms the 
previous findings of the thesis, that the obstetrics and gynaecology specialty is 
particularly vulnerable to corruption flourishing. It was clear from the 
participant responses that they believed that the seriousness of the environment 
joint with the lack of resources (i.e., specialists) in several fields created the 
‘perfect storm’ of conditions for corruption to thrive. However, completely 
contrary to my participants’ views, the official report by the Health Policy 
Institute (HPI), commissioned in 2013, shows that the views collected by the 
research team of the HPI point to the opposite direction entirely. According to 
this report, it is the GPs as points of primary contact, that receive the greatest 
number of informal payments, according to the sample of 1,200 respondents. It 
is imperative that more research is conducted into this dissonance between the 
real-life understanding of corruption as presented by my participants, and views 
collected by the HPI report merely five years prior to my research. These five 
years did not contain any marked healthcare reforms or systemic changes to 
change the landscape of healthcare delivery so dramatically, as to account for 
this discrepancy. The HPI disclose, however, that their sample is not 
demographically representative of Slovakia (neither is my sample), and there is 
no information as to the regional distribution of answers (my research is focused 
primarily on two regions of the country). These differences could account for 
some of the differing results. However, it is also important to note that while 
the HPI conducted their research through a quantitative survey route, my 
research is focused on the qualitative understanding of the phenomenon of 
corruption.  
As a result, it was important for this particular question and chapter to come 
after the questions which conceptualised to the participants what corruption 
entails- this included debates on not just bribes and informal payments, but also 
gifts, use of contacts, and exchange of services. It is possible that the responses 
given by my participants are more nuanced, better-informed, and more 
reflective of reality than those collected by the HPI.  
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Chapter 14: Discussion 
14.1 Introduction 
 
The final section of data analysis will discuss the findings outlined in previous 
chapters in the context of the theoretical framework of the project. As set out 
in Chapters 6 and 7, data analysis was carried out in the following four stages: 
data collection, data immersion and coding, creation of categories, and distilling 
themes. The last part of this analysis process, distilling themes from analysed 
categories, is presented in this chapter. The three major themes distilled from 
the six analysed categories are: Mechanisms of corruption, Justification of 
corruption in Slovak discourse, and Causes of corruption. All three themes 
relate to the single case study of Slovakia’s healthcare sector, but the findings 
presented have potential to be relevant for other public sectors, such as law 
enforcement, both in Slovakia, and potentially across the CEE region as well. 
This is due to the sector-specific approach allowing one to see the problem of 
corruption holistically and to tailor appropriate solutions, rather than applying 
binary distinctions of corruption as described in Chapter 1 (e.g. 
political/bureaucratic, institutional/individual, grand/petty), which can present 
in any sector at the same time (Kunicova 2020). A recent World Bank (2020) 
report shows that developing correct diagnostics of corruption within one public 
sector can provide suggestions as to the development of diagnostics and 
solutions in other public sectors, by identifying the overlaps in local leadership 
and potential for stakeholder cooperation (Kunicova 2020).  
The flow chart overleaf (Figure 14.1) outlines the grouping of categories into 
themes and their addressing of the research questions. This is a visualisation of 
the thesis structure, showing connections between individual categories and 
their position within the themes which address the research questions. The chart 
shows the overarching research question at the top being separated into 
individual sub-questions, addressed by three major themes. The relevant 




Figure 14.1 Flowchart of research questions addressed by themes, comprised of the categories explored in the empirical section of the thesis.  
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 1 
The Research Questions in orange and the theoretical expectations deriving from 2 
these, as seen in Figure 14.1 above, are as follows: 3 
 4 
RQ1: How does awareness of grand corruption inform/justify individual engagement in 5 
petty corruption? 6 
RQ2: How does awareness of petty corruption inform/justify individual engagement in 7 
grand corruption? 8 
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption will have no impact on the engagement of 9 
individuals in petty corruption and vice versa. 10 
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in petty 11 
corruption. 12 
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in grand 13 
corruption. 14 
RQ3: What are the strategies utilised to carry out grand and petty corrupt practices? 15 
Theoretical assumption: There will be similarities in the strategies utilised to carry out 16 
grand and petty corrupt practices. 17 
RQ3a- subquestion: What is the significance of trust as a pre-requisite for corrupt 18 
interactions? 19 
Theoretical assumption: Trust is understood as one of the processes of corruption that 20 
links the corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as such it is seen as a condition 21 
more often than it is understood as a result of corrupt practice. 22 
RQ3b- subquestion: To what extent are social rules and customs important in the 23 
carrying out of corrupt practices? 24 
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Theoretical assumption: Social rules and customs are understood as one of the 1 
processes of corruption that links corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as such 2 
they will prove as important determinants in carrying out corrupt practices. 3 
The discussion section will first present the starting points of the thesis derived 4 
from the theoretical part and then tie these in with the individual themes, 5 
findings, relevance to the above research questions, and ensuing 6 
recommendations. 7 
14.2 Theoretical concepts 8 
 9 
The literature review prepared the groundwork for designing the investigation of 10 
corruption in a way that was outlined by the thesis in Chapter 4. The review 11 
presents how corruption has been outlined and addressed by macro-level 12 
research conducted to date by supranational and transnational bodies, such as 13 
the EU, the EC, the OECD, the World Bank, Transparency International, and 14 
others. The review and the conceptualisation chapter (Chapters 1-3) show the 15 
shortcomings of solely quantitative measurement of corruption (Ko and Samajdar 16 
2010) and highlight the need for micro-level, region (and country) specific, local 17 
research to be conducted into corruption (Bernd and McKee 2009), based on the 18 
cultural and regional variations of corrupt behaviour worldwide. There are 19 
significant problems with accurate definitions of corruption and an overt focus 20 
on economic and financial understanding of corruption (Bussell 2015, Rose-21 
Ackerman 2016). Slovakia was pinpointed as a feasible and a valuable case 22 
study, due to:  23 
• its continued high levels of corruption, specifically in the healthcare sector 24 
(Alexa 2007, Eurobarometer 2013, 25 2014, EC 2017, Eurobarometer 2017),  25 
• its potential to unveil recommendations that could apply cross-country due to 26 
corruption investigation and prosecution in the CEE region bearing similarities 27 
(Batory 2012),  28 
• and the unique opportunity for accessing in-depth data on corruption in the 29 
original language.  30 
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I address the literature gap of research into corruption in Slovakia, by taking 1 
Slovakia to be its point of focus, rather than a point of comparison for other CEE 2 
countries, as is usually the case (Gallina 2013). There is little research 3 
conducted into the dichotomy between grand and petty corruption (Habibov 4 
2016) and none that I have been able to identify that verifies the feasibility of 5 
the two terms in real-life understanding and conceptualisation of corruption. 6 
The thesis therefore provided a unique insight into corruption not just in the CEE 7 
region, but in a wider context, informing RQ1 and 2 set out above. 8 
Health care is specifically shown to be a sector of primary concern for corruption 9 
in Slovakia, continuously leading in the rankings for highest levels of corruption 10 
(Ensor 2004, Eurobarometer 2013, EC 2017, Eurobarometer 2017), and a sector 11 
with the unique potential to be accessed by the general population ubiquitously. 12 
For comparison with other public sectors, not everyone may have a 13 
comprehensive experience of sectors such as education or law enforcement. 14 
Individual experience of sectors such as education may vary, for example, 15 
depending on levels of education achieved and regional differences from one 16 
school/institution to another. However, the system of healthcare is sought out 17 
of necessity and standardised across the board, with the same procedure to 18 
follow: i.e. primary care, referral to specialist, hospitalisation.  19 
Conceptually, the theoretical part of the thesis addresses specific areas of 20 
interest and focus, such as the role of a broker or a middleman in corrupt 21 
exchanges (Jancsics 2015), as well as the role of trust in corrupt behaviour. The 22 
ideas of informal practices, networks and gift-giving are also at the centre of 23 
the analysis. There is evidence in other post-communist societies of informal 24 
networks and practices at work (Ledeneva 2009, Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 25 
2017), and of gift-giving as a specific problem in the region (Batory 2012, Straka 26 
2016). The specific types of gifts usually given in the Central European context 27 
(Grodeland, Koshechkina et al. 1998) as examples of coffee, wine or chocolates 28 
were shown to remain as prominent common practices in the case study of 29 
Slovakia in the current day.  30 
There may have been research of a rigorous qualitative nature conducted in the 31 
region into corruption before (Grodeland, Koshechkina et al. 1998, Miller 2001), 32 
445 
however, the thesis has sought to go beyond existing research through a more in-1 
depth thematic and textual analysis, with specific observations made about 2 
linguistic variations and nuances that are used by the participants to describe 3 
their real-life understanding of corruption. It is very difficult to capture real-4 
life understandings of corruption in field work, due to the implications of self-5 
incrimination by the participants. This is why I was unable to locate a research 6 
of comparable depth into real-life understanding, which makes the contribution 7 
of my findings uniquely relevant for further research into corruption. Previous 8 
studies have looked into opinions and views of corruption in a questionnaire or a 9 
structured interview (Miller, Grodeland et al. 1998), as well as secondary data 10 
analysis of corruption perceptions of Slovaks (Dzambazovic 2011), but the ethical 11 
implications of asking direct questions with regards to lived experiences are 12 
serious. This is also why ethnography or field experimentation are extremely 13 
difficult models to adapt to the study of corruption, which could pose serious 14 
danger for both participant and researcher, as well as potentially involve 15 
observing or taking part in illegal activity. My research tackled the ethical 16 
question of self-incrimination by phrasing questions to include ‘awareness’ of 17 
corruption as shaped by the circumstances and environment of participants, 18 
based on what the participants may have ‘heard or observed’ with regards to 19 
displays of corruption. I specifically asked the participants to make sure they do 20 
not incriminate themselves in the phrasing of their answers. Despite these 21 
measures, the participants were often wary to discuss direct and personal 22 
examples of corruption, and creating good rapport was crucial to extract the 23 
depth of narrative and responses I was able to acquire. This shows that research 24 
into corruption and its real-life understanding is challenging for preparation and 25 
execution, is very time-consuming, and dependent on the willingness of 26 
participants to share, indicating a strong selection bias. However, equally, more 27 
research of this nature is vital for expanding this field of study. The 2019 paper 28 
into corruption perceptions in ‘daily life’ of Ukraine by Markovska and Serdyuk is 29 
the only similarly-targeted primary data analysis into real-life understanding of 30 
corruption in the region that I was able to find (Markovska and Serdyuk 2019), 31 
but its focus was centred exclusively on petty levels of corruption.  It has been 32 
shown that an over-reliance on perceptions of corruption, rather than reality, 33 
can have a more devastating effect than corruption itself, increasing levels of 34 
distrust in a society (Melgar, Rossi et al. 2010). It has also been found that the 35 
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need for culturally specific understandings of corruption on the ground is vital in 1 
successful implementation of anti-corruption measures (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). 2 
Therefore, the relevance of studying corruption from a real-life perspective, 3 
which for this research is defined by Schwandt (2001) as the ‘life-world as it is 4 
lived, felt, undergone, made sense of, and accomplished by human beings’ 5 
(Schwandt 2001), cannot be overstated. The research, in its pursuit of the real-6 
life context, is also true to carrying out a rigorous single case study 7 
investigation, as per Yin’s definition which relies on the context of real-life: ‘an 8 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 9 
within its real-life context (Yin, 2015). 10 
Within this real-life context, I have managed to juxtapose the understanding of 11 
corruption as it is ‘made sense of’ in the real world of my participants with the 12 
theoretical underpinnings of corruption and the existing anti-corruption efforts 13 
in Slovakia. I have noted several reforms and anti-corruption measures 14 
implemented in the country to date, but these have so far failed to curb 15 
corruption, especially in the healthcare sector (Sičáková-Beblavá, Šípoš et al. 16 
2011, Nemec 2018, Skolkay 2018). There is room for improvement with regards 17 
to proposed systemic changes, transparency of information for citizens and 18 
consumers, and engagement of civil society (Buncak, Dzambazovic et al. 2009, 19 
Mungiu-Pippidi 2010).  20 
14.3 Justification of corruption in Slovak discourse 21 
 22 
The theme of justification is distilled from the content within categories 23 
Common corrupt practices and Gratitude payments. The most potent finding 24 
within this theme is the intricacies of timing facilitating narratives of justifying 25 
corrupt practices. This applies to both the gift-giving phenomenon and the 26 
middleman/broker concept.  27 
Main findings and RQs addressed:  28 
• Use of a broker/middleman, role of trust and networks (RQ3, RQ3a) 29 
• Timing of gift-giving (RQ3b) 30 
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14.3.1 The middleman/ broker and the role of trust and corruption 1 
networks 2 
The concept of the middleman arose when asking the participants their opinion 3 
on whether using personal contacts for private gain is to be considered corrupt 4 
or not. This was clarified to the participants as, for example, phoning their 5 
friends or acquaintances to refer these to their friends who are doctors for an 6 
expedited appointment, or similar situations. This is a widespread practice in 7 
Slovakia which utilises personal networks of any one citizen and provides an 8 
advantage over someone without this knowledge or opportunity for 9 
acquaintance. The concept of a broker or a middleman in corrupt practice is 10 
conceptualised in literature (Gould and Fernandez 1989, Stovel and Shaw 2012, 11 
Jancsics 2015) and is usually used to convey that corrupt transactions are more 12 
complex than just the popular model of a principal-agent basis for corrupt 13 
exchanges, involving just two parties with separate interests (Lambsdorff 2007, 14 
Drugov, Hamman et al. 2011). It is suggested in literature that, on the contrary, 15 
rather than just a pursuit of the principal-agent economic goals, corrupt 16 
transactions are, in reality, dependent on human motives such as approval, 17 
status, power, or sociability (Granovetter 1992). This is partially addressed in 18 
other theories relating to corruption beyond the principal-agent model, such as 19 
corruption as a collective action problem which highlights the importance of 20 
group dynamics, including trust in others (Marquette and Peiffer 2015). The 21 
middleman or broker is usually mentioned in corruption of a grand scale, 22 
involving cybercrime or financial crime, in order to confuse the paper trail 23 
leading to the perpetrators. However, the concept of middleman in the capacity 24 
explored in this thesis, on a much less formal scale, is only explored in-depth in 25 
Jancsics’s 2015 paper, which outlines several types of brokers on smaller scales 26 
than grand corruption. The author himself actually points out that the broker 27 
phenomenon is rarely examined on this smaller scale and that the reason why 28 
brokers are of specific interest in the CEE and post-communist societies is 29 
because these are network-oriented cultures, which are much more likely to 30 
have a multiplayer transaction form of corruption going on (Sik and Wellman 31 
1999). The prevalence of informal social networks in the CEE countries, and 32 
specifically the phenomenon of the middleman, comes from the historical roots 33 
of these societies which tended to be small-town societies before taken over by 34 
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communism, which would survive economically on the low-risk infrastructure of 1 
illicit informal practices (Sik and Wellman 1999). The thesis fills a specific gap in 2 
the literature which, according to Jancsics, only focuses on the explanation of 3 
such practices, but does not study the micro-dynamics of actual exchanges 4 
(2015:2).  5 
 My findings show that in a real-life understanding of corruption, the middleman 6 
as a disseminator of information and a facilitator plays a crucial part in the 7 
corrupt transaction. The reason that the middleman is not labelled as such by 8 
the participants is simple- the connotation of profit is negative, and they do not 9 
perceive there to be any gain by the middleman; they perceive the middleman 10 
to be a friend or an acquaintance performing a favour. Previous research 11 
confirms, however, that there does not need to be any ‘commission’ from the 12 
transaction for the label of the middleman to apply- to the contrary, the return 13 
resources do not need to be cash at all (Marsden 1982).  The return value or 14 
commission for the broker in this particular concept of generalised reciprocity 15 
(Jancsics 2015) is not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality (Sahlins 1965). The 16 
participants completely fail to conceptualise that the middleman is very likely to 17 
‘cash in’ the favour performed at a later date by requesting a favour themselves 18 
in return. It appears that by the absence of any immediate tangible (or 19 
monetary) gain, the middleman function gets dismissed and is not seen as 20 
facilitating a corrupt exchange. Therefore, the idea of timing played an 21 
important role again- without immediate gain, the middleman is not seen in the 22 
corrupt context at all. The delay in the gain is rather naively then perceived as a 23 
fresh, unrelated favour by the participants. This type of brokerage has been 24 
labelled by Jancsics’s findings (2015) in the case study of Hungary as 25 
‘representative brokerage’, which shows the brokers as members of groups such 26 
as family members, friends, acquaintances, ‘just helping’ these groups by 27 
establishing contact with outsiders. This is different from the other types of 28 
brokerage that Jancsics also conceptualises, such as the gatekeeper broker 29 
where the broker and the agent are members of the same organisation and the 30 
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client is the outsider85. The main difference between the brokerage model 1 
suggested here as a novel concept in the CEE concept and other theories such as 2 
the social network theory (see Chapter 1.4), social exchange theory, and 3 
collective action theory (see Chapter 3.3) is that these theories rely on a general 4 
networking among all members of the group or the collective to achieve the 5 
corrupt outcome. Instead, I am suggesting based on the results obtained, that 6 
the broker is a single person holding power in one or several social groups, 7 
accumulating more potency the greater their circle of dependents. The broker in 8 
my understanding is unlikely to share their reservoir of knowledge among other 9 
members of the group but rather grow in their position of prominence by 10 
accumulating more knowledge, important connections, and favours to be 11 
returned. The representative broker is therefore defined by accumulation of not 12 
material but symbolic or political capital in return for their services, examples 13 
of which are increased recognition, honour, prestige, or status (Bourdieu 1997). 14 
This is congruent with the status of the broker as evidenced by my research. The 15 
reciprocation of favours, expanding the web of influence, and creating a position 16 
of power for future exchanges, is the case for brokers in Slovak health care 17 
corruption. 18 
This topic of conversation among the participants sparked a significant amount 19 
of discussion and dissent on the subject. As was the case with several parts of 20 
similar discourse, the females tended to be much more realistic and critical in 21 
their view of such a practice and as a demographic they have confirmed the 22 
findings of existing literature that females are less tolerant of corrupt practices, 23 
more risk averse, and more attuned to the reality of corruption. Existing 24 
literature suggests that women tend to be less involved in corrupt transactions 25 
than men and more prone to morally disapprove of corruption with a lower 26 
tolerance for it (Dollar, Fishman et al. 2001, Swamy, Knack et al. 2001, Bauhr, 27 
Charron et al. 2018, Kubbe, Alexander et al. 2019). This is considered to be due 28 
 
85 For all types of brokers described by Jancsics, please see Jancsics, D. (2015). ""A friend gave 
me a phone number"- Brokerage in low-level corruption." International Journal of Law, Crime 
and Justice 43: 68-87. 
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to women being both more risk averse than men and also due to the processes of 1 
gender socialisation, whereby girls tend to exercise higher levels of self-control 2 
and are directed toward more caring and pro-social activities, which shapes 3 
their behaviour (Dollar, Fishman et al. 2001, Swamy, Knack et al. 2001). On the 4 
whole, there was a 19/16 split of affirmative opinions on whether using contacts 5 
and networks to gain an advantage is corrupt and most of these assenting 6 
opinions were those of women, and also those of the higher educated 7 
demographic. This was another trend picked up throughout, where those with 8 
higher education showed less tolerance for grey areas of understanding which 9 
practices fall under corruption and are less acceptable than others. The trend of 10 
higher education being correlated with lower levels of acceptability of 11 
corruption is confirmed by my research and was congruent with previous findings 12 
(Lee and Guven 2013).  13 
In practice, the importance of the middleman finding in my research points to 14 
the need to recognise the role of middlemen in corrupt transactions. My findings 15 
show that not only are the middlemen present in most cases of real-life access 16 
to corruption, but they are also instrumental to the success of the outcome. In 17 
practical terms, the client (the one who needs a procedure) will call the 18 
middleman/broker (a friend, family member, or acquaintance) and enquire 19 
about someone that they may be referred to (the agent) for an expedited 20 
procedure/improved quality of care. The middleman/broker will then get in 21 
touch with their contact (the agent) and broker an appointment time, for 22 
example, vouching for either party’s trustworthiness and /or quality. 23 
The invested trust is of crucial importance here and directly confirms the 24 
theoretical assumption conveyed by RQ3a- trust is crucially needed as a pre-25 
requisite for the success of the transaction. The representative brokerage sees 26 
the broker acting as a guarantor of the transaction, reducing the risk of 27 
reciprocal mistrust between corrupt actors (Jancsics 2015). My participants’ 28 
understanding of trust more generally is aligned in this manner, with a quarter 29 
of the participants recognising that trust plays a crucial role in the corrupt 30 
transaction. However, they conceptualised trust between the corrupt parties as 31 
expectation of behaviour being met, fuelled by the fear of consequences. Fric 32 
and Kabele (1999) in their Czech-centric study on corruption show that this type 33 
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of trust in corrupt transactions can ultimately result in the further corrupting of 1 
others. This is done by accumulating a ‘corruption capital’ of information about 2 
the corrupt behaviour of others, securing their future cooperation under an 3 
unspoken threat (Fric and Kabele 1999). This conceptualisation of trust along the 4 
lines of expectations being met, or unspoken threats being made, is mentioned 5 
but not explored in sufficient depth in earlier literature on corruption elsewhere 6 
(Luhmann 1979, Kubbe 2013, Warburton 2013); however, in my research, it is 7 
intertwined inseparably with the function performed by the middleman, who 8 
acts as a guarantor of the expected behaviour to take place. The middleman is 9 
the necessary link between the other two parties and holds all the power in the 10 
transaction- only if they want to, do they make the agent provide the service for 11 
the principal, who is otherwise unknown to the agent. In this way the middleman 12 
is perceived as almost “trustworthily corrupt” – i.e. they need to have a 13 
reputation of being corrupt to be approached, but to also uphold their end of 14 
the bargain. Furthermore, by convincing the agent with their own credibility on 15 
the line, the middleman vouches for the trustworthiness of the principal, 16 
protecting both parties from legal ramifications. The personal investment of the 17 
middleman ensures that the provider of the corrupt service will come through, 18 
in order to maintain the goodwill of the middleman. Without the middleman’s 19 
assurance, there would be no reason for the agent to provide any service to the 20 
principal. 21 
The middleman/broker is therefore a much more opaque, but much more 22 
ubiquitous and key figure than previously thought; they do not have to be 23 
handling any money or reward for their involvement, and there is no need for 24 
them to be conducting any negotiations. Rather, they simply act as a 25 
disseminator of crucial information, and as a connection between the two 26 
parties involved in corruption, investing their own credibility and reputation in 27 
order to facilitate the transaction and provide a guarantee. In this description, 28 
many would recognise the regular workings of business networking, which is 29 
shown to be a practice of legitimate standing in the dynamic and 30 
hypercompetitive environment of entrepreneurship (Kariv, Menzies et al. 2009, 31 
Gay 2014). However, entrepreneurship, by definition, is inherent to the open 32 
market model of capitalism, which depends on competition that drives both 33 
price and quality of service. While the healthcare service can arguably be said to 34 
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benefit from this type of competition (for example procurement of better 1 
equipment); in its essence, it should be a public service delivering a certain 2 
standard of care to all- under the Slovak model of healthcare. By providing an 3 
opportunity to gain priority access to a limited service (eg. a specialist who is in 4 
high demand) independent of clinical need which also benefits the service 5 
provider, it is no longer a matter of entrepreneurial networking, but corruption 6 
proper. There should be more research conducted into the role of the 7 
middleman in this context and more study of these ad-hoc personal networks 8 
created by every person in their life journey, likely to be filled with middlemen 9 
with access to unique information and services. Such networks of personal 10 
contacts for private gain are conceptualised in literature already, in the form of 11 
blat or guanxi (Fan 2002, So and Walker 2005, Ledeneva 2008, Ledeneva 2009), 12 
but the particular language used by my participants to conceal the corrupt 13 
meaning, such as ‘merely a recommendation’, ‘a show of good will’, ‘a favour’, 14 
‘putting in a good word’, has long acted as a cover for the true function and 15 
meaning of these networks, justifying their role in real life corruption in 16 
healthcare. The public’s understanding that this type of behaviour, perceived 17 
and justified by themselves as mere favours, is in fact directly facilitating 18 
corruption with a delayed profit for middlemen involved, should be increased by 19 
information campaigns. This finding directly informs RQ3 and shows the real-life 20 
access to corruption and the practical way it is carried out- most often by 21 
picking up the phone and asking a friend to refer one to the necessary service, 22 
promising a return in the future ‘if there’s ever anything I can do for you’. Often 23 
they also make sure that the necessary price is brought along as a token of 24 
‘gratitude’ or appreciation. This type of behaviour needs to be tackled for what 25 
it really is – manipulating vulnerable people for personal gain in the future.  26 
Mine, joined with Jancsics’s study, are the two studies I could locate conducting 27 
in-depth research into the concept of the middleman/broker in the CEE context. 28 
The results of qualitative studies notoriously bear problems of generalisability in 29 
terms of statistical value. However, a rigorously conducted qualitative study can 30 
form a strong basis for understanding and explaining other social situations, 31 
similar to those investigated in a particular study- this phenomenon is also 32 
known as analytic generalization (Falk and Guenther 2007). In such a manner, 33 
453 
case studies like mine can illuminate the corrupt practices in societies with 1 
similar historical backgrounds and societal environments. 2 
14.3.2 Gift-giving 3 
Gift-giving is considered more acceptable than bribe-giving (Grodeland, 4 
Koshechkina et al. 1998, Straka 2016) and there are indications that the timing 5 
of the specific gift (i.e. after a service is provided) is deemed more acceptable 6 
than providing a gift beforehand, which would constitute bribery of an expected 7 
result. The participants failed to draw a connection between the gift, albeit 8 
given after the procedure, to be expected by the healthcare staff anyway, and 9 
thus conditioning their behaviour. There was a strong cognitive dissonance, 10 
therefore, between the participants’ views on timing constituting a moral 11 
justification of gift giving, and the legal understanding of gift giving, which 12 
draws no distinction between the before or after of the timing of the gift (See 13 
Chapter 10). This type of dichotomy of thinking, where, on the one hand, 14 
corruption is perceived to be a widespread problem, but on the other, some 15 
forms of it are deemed socially acceptable (as shown in a 2006 Slovak Statistical 16 
Institute Report)86, is indicative of what Dzambazovic (2011) labels as ‘societal 17 
schizophrenia’. The claim is that two types of morale are at play at any one time 18 
for the individuals in Slovak society (and other post-communist societies). One is 19 
the ‘public’ morals to be displayed by individuals as anti-corruption 20 
declarations, and the ‘private’ morals to be largely pro-corruption. This 21 
‘schizophrenia’ is explored in more depth by my project and breaks down the 22 
‘private’, pro-corruption morals into practical uses of corruption and specific 23 
language associated with them- gifts, gratitude, attention.   24 
The association of gifts with gratitude was strong in my research and there was 25 
also evidence of the types of gifts previously shown by literature to be frequent 26 
(ie coffee, wine, chocolates as shown by Grodeland et al. 1998) to still remain as 27 
gifts of choice today. This type of gift in post-communist societies dates back to 28 
 
86 For the full report, search for Skrytá ekonomika v neformálnom sektore vo svetle verejnej mienky 
v roku 2006. Bratislava: Štatistický úrad SR 2006. 
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Soviet times, which saw scarcity of certain then-luxury goods, such as chocolates 1 
or coffee. The fact that these have managed to remain in prominent positions in 2 
my participants’ real-life understanding of corruption in healthcare is evidence 3 
of strong impact of tradition and custom in the Slovak case study. This is 4 
indication of customs and traditions being determinants in the particularities of 5 
corrupt behaviour, as stipulated by RQ3b’s theoretical assumption.  6 
However, the thesis was able to uncover further detail to this gift-giving 7 
phenomenon, which related to a gendered approach to giving, resulting in nurses 8 
being gifted with flowers and coffee or chocolates (both of lower monetary 9 
value than other examples), and doctors being gifted with alcohol, home 10 
produce, or tickets to shows. There is clearly a difference in gifts that are given 11 
according to stature in the health care food chain, but also gender variations- 12 
female doctors are more likely to also receive flowers, as are females in any 13 
profession in general (See Chapter 10). The custom of gifting flowers to women 14 
is very strong and can be observed most markedly in the traditional International 15 
Women’s Day celebrations on the 8th March, which were historically also very 16 
prominent in the communist regime. The survival of culture and values in post-17 
communist societies, reminiscent of the examples given here, has been shown 18 
with statistical significance before (Sandholtz and Taagpera 2005) and is 19 
confirmed by my findings. This is further evidence of tradition and custom 20 
dictating particularities of corrupt behaviour in real life.  21 
While the participants showed strong belief that gifting such items after the 22 
healthcare service has been provided is more acceptable morally and practically, 23 
there was little awareness in their narrative that in legal terms the timing of an 24 
unsolicited gift makes no difference and is still considered a bribe. The 25 
participants used very specific linguistic buzzwords to make it obvious that they 26 
were not identifying bribes and gifts as the same practice, involving words such 27 
as ‘gratitude payments’ or ‘attention payments’. These terms present with two 28 
possible interpretations: a token of one’s gratitude, attention, or appreciation of 29 
the work undertaken, or, a token ensuring that extra attention be paid to their 30 
family member in hospital. The participants made a very clear distinction in 31 
their understanding that gifts and tokens are cases of gratitude, as opposed to 32 
envelopes with cash, which were associated with, and recognised as, corrupt 33 
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bribes. The participants failed to recognise, as is written in the Slovak Criminal 1 
Code (See Chapter 10), that all items given in the circumstances of receiving a 2 
service, or trying to receive higher standard of a service, are legally considered 3 
bribes under Slovak Law. I have not been able to locate any surveys in Slovakia 4 
about individuals’ understanding of what corruption is (and is not). The only 5 
surveys available relate to the work conducted by NGOs such as Transparency 6 
International (TI), which relate to gauging opinions on specific, already-7 
generated terminology that the participants are expected to understand, such 8 
as: ‘corruption’, ‘bribery’, ‘whistle-blower’, and others 9 
(https://transparency.sk/sk/prieskumy/). These include questions such as: Do 10 
you think that there is corruption present in the public procurement processes in 11 
Slovakia? The terms ‘corruption’ or ‘public procurement’ are not defined for the 12 
participants by TI. Similarly, the results on the awareness of the whistle-blower 13 
law in Slovakia show that over 40% believe there is no such law present in 14 
Slovakia, while only 30% think that there is 15 
(https://transparency.sk/sk/prieskumy/). Since the law is in fact legally in 16 
action as of 2015, it is obvious that the participants’ perceptions are not 17 
congruent with reality. A better way of approaching this type of research would 18 
be for in-depth interviews to be conducted with the respondents, aiming to show 19 
where their understanding of who a whistle-blower is, and information on 20 
legislation, comes from. Subsequently, it would be prudent to ask the 21 
participants, whether they are aware of this law offering protections and if so, 22 
of what kind. This type of research, however, would be much more time-23 
consuming than a series of quick questions favoured by bodies such as 24 
Transparency International, which may not show actual understanding of the 25 
public. It is possible that many participants who answer ‘no’ to such surveys 26 
simply do not understand the terminology as presented to them. However, if the 27 
research takes time to allow them to conceptualise terms such as ‘corruption’, 28 
‘gift-giving’, or ‘bribe’ in their own language and narrative, their answers 29 
become informed and produce better quality of results, as evidenced by the 30 
depth of my own results and findings.  31 
The terminology, therefore, is extremely important in my participants’ real-life 32 
understanding of gift giving vis a vis corruption or bribes, and is a new finding in 33 
this context. As is evidenced in literature, the corruption phenomenon displays a 34 
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view of its severity specific to society (Lampert 1984). It is shown clearly by my 1 
findings that this is very specific to the Slovak general public, who avail 2 
themselves of terms such as ‘gratitude payment’ or ‘attention payment’, or 3 
make specific references to giving ‘after’ or ‘afterwards’, in order to justify gift 4 
giving and corrupt practices to themselves and their surroundings. Such detail of 5 
understanding that is constructed by the society and perpetuated by the social 6 
networks created around them shows that any systemic measures taken at an 7 
executive level must be clearly communicated to the public, including 8 
addressing the terminology that the public are using to justify the practices in 9 
their own understanding.  10 
  11 
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14.4 Mechanisms of corruption 1 
 2 
This theme encompasses the categories, which relate in greater depth than 3 
others to the practical approach to corrupt transactions in a real-life setting- 4 
i.e. what do people realistically do, step by step, to engage in corruption. These 5 
are namely the categories: Gratitude payments, Health care practices, and Petty 6 
v Grand corruption. While the results of individual findings are described in the 7 
previous chapters in greater detail, this section ties together the bigger picture 8 
of resulting findings in their relation to the individual and the overarching 9 
research question. The relevance to the overarching research question will be 10 
addressed at the very last.  11 
Main findings and RQs addressed: 12 
• Concept of ‘arrangement’ and systemic change (RQ3) 13 
• Petty v Grand corruption distinction not significant (RQ 1 &2) 14 
• Specialists as the most frequent corrupt environment (RQ3) 15 
14.4.1 Arrangement and systemic change 16 
The participants associated several linguistic features with corruption in real-life 17 
understanding. These related to ideas of giving, exchanging, wanting, 18 
expediting; as well as to the ideas of contacts, services, or advantages. The 19 
participants found corruption to be deeply embedded within the society, mostly 20 
in the sense of it being ‘normal’, ‘standard’, or a ‘part of everyday life’. They 21 
thought that the CEE region as a whole had similar levels of corruption and 22 
similar sectors affected, which is confirmed by literature on the subject 23 
(Grodeland, Koshechkina et al. 1998, Puček 2014, Koudelková, Strielkowski et al. 24 
2015), and further buttresses the idea that recommendations and observations 25 
within this thesis could potentially be transferred to a broader context.  26 
However, the most common term when asked to conceptualise and define 27 
corruption for the participants was the term ‘vybaviť’, i.e. when one needs 28 
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something ‘arranged’/ ‘done’/ ‘taken care of’. This term was independently 1 
stated by over a quarter of the participants and it points to the participants 2 
characterising corruption as a way to circumvent the system and the standard in 3 
place. This idea is in congruence with the 1993 findings of the Slovak 4 
Sociological Institute, which show views on the stratification of Slovak society. 5 
The respondents show their belief that the most important ingredient in success 6 
in life in Slovak society is that of having ‘the right connections’ and, in second 7 
place, a certain amount of ‘political capital’- both of these beat ingredients 8 
such as education, hard work, or ambition (Dzambazovic 2011). These views 9 
were only reinforced in a similar 2009 survey, which showed a 23.1 percentage 10 
point increase in the same leading beliefs, which reinforces the view that the 11 
idea of ‘arranging’ something or ‘getting something done’ through contacts is at 12 
the core of corruption understanding for my participants over a decade later 13 
(Dzambazovic 2011). This was also why my field question addressing the role of 14 
contacts and acquaintances was particularly prudent to include and why its 15 
extrapolation into the roles of middlemen/brokers, as described above, is of 16 
particular relevance to the landscape of corruption in Slovakia. 17 
If this is the main characterisation of corruption in my participants’ view, 18 
applicable to grand and petty corruption alike, then systemic factors and 19 
measures are directly linked to the definitions of corruption and should be 20 
inspired by this real-life understanding. The systemic measures in place, as well 21 
as reforms and legal measures are detailed in Chapter 5 and 12. However, the 22 
participants’ views presented (believing that effective systemic change needs to 23 
come from both top-down and bottom-up in equal measure), show a level of 24 
sophistication and awareness of personal responsibility, as well as the role of the 25 
system in curbing corruption. The crux of the problem lies not only in a generally 26 
passive civil society, overreliance on importing anti-corruption practices from 27 
abroad, and lack of effective enforcement of regulations (Buncak, Dzambazovic 28 
et al. 2009, Mungiu-Pippidi 2010), but in the lack of consistency and awareness 29 
of what is standard care for the consumer.  30 
The recommendations on how to standardise care are outlined in the 2013 31 
Health Policy Institute Report, which calls for more conversion of hospitals into 32 
limited companies, in order to achieve higher standard of equipment and wages, 33 
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but also for a revamping of the health insurance system (Mužik and Szalayová 1 
2013). The report outlines the need for different insurance packages with 2 
varying levels of coverage, greater communication of what is included in the 3 
relevant package to the consumer in plain language, and also transparency of 4 
information across the board. According to my findings, the reason such 5 
suggestions have not been successfully implemented stems from addressing the 6 
buy-in from doctors and hospitals separately from the buy-in from insurance 7 
companies. Traditional views of merely raising the salaries of professionals in 8 
order to combat not only corruption, but also brain drain from this region, have 9 
been shown not to work as effectively as predicted (Lindner 2013, Foltz and 10 
Opoku-Agyemang 2015).  11 
In order for systemic change to take root, there has to be simultaneously: 12 
• input from the top, instigating changes such as insurance packages of varying 13 
price and quality and improving the working conditions of professionals, and also 14 
• investment by the healthcare professionals into the proposed changes, such as 15 
providing out-of-hours or weekend surgery for legalised but affordable fees, as 16 
opposed to bribes.  17 
A third, crucial ingredient in a successful implementation of healthcare reform, 18 
shown in participant responses, is increased oversight of professional medical 19 
bodies. Greater transparency of information for patients, as well as revamping 20 
of the insurance packages are measures already suggested by the Slovak Health 21 
Policy Institute, but have not yet been effectively implemented (Mužik 2014).  22 
The thesis shows the shortcomings of professional medical overseeing bodies in 23 
holding doctors accountable in terms of disciplinary measures that hold different 24 
leverage (stripping off of a licence to practise for example) to ‘mere’ criminal 25 
action. Greater involvement of official bodies such as The Slovak Bureau of 26 
Medical Oversight, raising the profile of the profession transparently, as well as 27 
showing zero tolerance of corrupt behaviour, essentially working in a capacity to 28 
protect the patient by proxy (much like the British GMC which acts to regulate 29 
doctors and protect patient interests), is crucial in combating the real-life 30 
instances of corruption in healthcare. This type of recommendation is broached 31 
by Jancsics (2015), who suggests that instilling institution-specific measures such 32 
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as limiting predictability of staff rotations, construction of strict monitoring and 1 
well-designed contracts, or effective punishment measures can only work within 2 
a general organisational culture intolerant of corruption. The need for a 3 
combined approach to successful change implementation is the recommendation 4 
of this thesis, based on the real-life understanding of corruption by my 5 
participants. It emphasises the general understanding of corrupt behaviour to be 6 
the result of several factors at play: values and morality, legal and service 7 
deficiencies and loopholes, custom and tradition, as well as personal choice and 8 
responsibility. All of these are synthesised into a complex set of conditions for 9 
my participants, under which corruption has been able to thrive in society and 10 
which, as a result, need to be addressed at the same time to produce real 11 
change. If some parts are addressed in a vacuum (as has been the case to date), 12 
then all other contributing factors will still be present to create a type of 13 
asymmetry that will enable corruption to trickle in through unplugged holes.  14 
14.4.2 Petty v Grand corruption distinction not significant 15 
This part of analysis sought to build on the ideas of combined approach to 16 
tackling corruption, and to address the theoretical distinction made between 17 
grand and petty corruption levels. Its goal was to show whether this distinction 18 
is applicable in the real-life practise and understanding of corruption. The 19 
Research Questions 1 and 2 are directly addressed here and the findings are of a 20 
two-fold nature.  21 
First, the participants are able to recognise that there are levels of corruption 22 
based on its monetary value (ie grand and petty) and they also believe that the 23 
different levels of corruption are caused by different reasons: ie petty level by 24 
lack of resources available, grand level by personal enrichment ambitions. 25 
Nearly half of all participants were able to conceptualise a distinction along 26 
these lines. So far, there has not been any research project that I could locate 27 
testing the validity of theoretical labels and terminology of this nature, which 28 
marks another unique contribution of the thesis to the theory on corruption. My 29 
recommendation is for all paired terms such as grand v petty, personal v public, 30 
institutional v private and similar types of corruption to be verified in similar 31 
terms among the general population, to ascertain their validity in a real-life 32 
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understanding of corruption. It is not effective to use abstract terms to describe 1 
concrete circumstances that feed into policy development, if such terms have no 2 
bearing on the reality of the phenomenon. Such policies result in a disassociation 3 
of the term from its real-life version and create confusion and lack of adherence 4 
to regulations that are based on a language that the general population does not 5 
find representative of the phenomenon itself. The language in regulations should 6 
be similar to the language used by the general population to describe and 7 
conceptualise the phenomenon, not the other way around- in other words, the 8 
phenomenon-specific policy should ‘do what it says on the tin’ in its description.  9 
The participants support this view, since it arose from their narrative that while 10 
there may be several levels to corruption, in practice, the distinction is not 11 
made. Corruption is a phenomenon that operates on the same principle on all 12 
levels and there is in fact a direct connection between corruption carried out on 13 
a petty and a grand level, which confirms the theoretical assumptions associated 14 
with RQ1 and 2. The two levels, much like I conceptualised in Chapter 1, feed 15 
off of one another and share a connection of being two forms of the same. 16 
According to my findings, one level is able to teach and/or condition the other- 17 
the participants believe that either the perpetrators learn corrupt behaviour on 18 
petty levels that they then transfer to grand level corruption, or those on petty 19 
levels emulate the behaviour displayed as acceptable on grand levels. It is 20 
therefore confirmed that petty and grand corruption share a principal 21 
connection that makes one cause, condition, or enable the other and any 22 
measures undertaken to address the individual levels of corruption need to be 23 
tailored to both types and implemented at the same time, rather than in 24 
isolation. As one participant stated, it is ‘difficult to imagine a reality in which 25 
petty corruption would exist and grand would not’ (ELITE1).  26 
That being said, the participants displayed a remarkable lack of awareness when 27 
it came to impact of both grand and petty corruption, believing that grand 28 
corruption has greater impact on society than petty; failing to take into 29 
consideration the impact of petty corruption that is not measured by financial 30 
loss. This is, for example, instilling bad behaviour into new generations, higher 31 
unemployment, rise of inequality, or lower engagement with the healthcare 32 
service, leading to worsening of conditions. The participants therefore showed a 33 
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great level of sophistication with their understanding of corruption as it takes 1 
place in real-life, but little ability to critically evaluate its impact. Research 2 
shows that cognitive sophistication is a key pre-requisite for being able to 3 
discern credibility of information that participants encounter, which increases 4 
their levels of scepticism when encountered by corrupt practices and 5 
information (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017). It is important to note that such 6 
sophistication, however, is subject to regional differences. What Weitz-Shapiro 7 
and Winters (2017) consider to be sophisticated participants in Brazil, where, by 8 
their own admission, the education system is notoriously under-funded and of 9 
low quality, will be a different metric to that of the CEE countries. Further 10 
research into corruption in countries like Slovakia, should therefore mandatorily 11 
include a mapping of education levels of participants if possible. Raising 12 
awareness about the impact of corruption that goes beyond the financial scope 13 
is sorely needed and recommended as a measure to be applied to the younger 14 
generations in schooling and education. Government subsidies for NGOs such as 15 
Transparency International or Stop Corruption (Zastavme Korupciu) to produce 16 
materials/workshops for school curricula that would fall under the Slovak 17 
equivalent of social studies subjects should be made available. Additionally, 18 
subsidies for university departments of Social Sciences and/or Criminology to 19 
expand syllabi to include college-wide elective courses on corruption should be 20 
made available to boost corruption awareness on all levels of education across 21 
the country.87 Currently, the handful of departments inclusive of Criminology 22 
and Forensic Sciences88 are tied with the study of the law, which leads to the 23 
 
87 The Ministry of Education publishes specific learning outcomes from all school subjects, 
including that of the Ethical Education (the closest thing to social studies in Slovakia), which is 
itself aimed at the moulding of the ‘moral attitudes and regulation of behaviour of students’. The 
students are supposed to be able to ‘develop their moral stances and values, as well as their 
sense of responsibility towards society’. The syllabus itself offers room for including an explicit 
section on corruption within nebulous labels to cover, such as ‘pro-social behaviour’, 
‘professional ethics’, ‘the rules of fair play’ ‘legal and moral values’, even ‘conscience, honour, 
and truth’, or ‘culture as an ethical value’. For a detailed methodical overview of this subject, 
visit https://www.minedu.sk/data/att/7941.pdf [last accessed 6/3/2021].  
88 Three universities in Slovakia contain a Department of Law, but only two (Mateja Bela in Banska 
Bystrica and Komenskeho in Bratislava) have an integrated criminology component. The third, 
Paneuropska univerzita, contains criminology only within the module of criminal law. No specific 
course is provided for corruption as a concept- it is explored only within legal and criminal 
terms. 
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investigation of corruption only in legal terms; whereas a cross-departmental 1 
initiative to include lectures from an anthropological, sociological, historical, 2 
political, and cultural/linguistic perspective would be the best way to approach 3 
topics such as corruption, which span the remit of all the outlined departments. 4 
Vocational and professional programmes, such as medicine, dentistry, or nursing 5 
should also include a specific module on corrupt practices and corrupt 6 
behaviour, as opposed to just a generic ethics component89. This is especially 7 
important since no medical bodies in Slovakia offer any explicit information for 8 
graduates on their websites, with regards to corruption (see Chapter 12 and 13). 9 
Equally, for the wider public, greater media exposure of less grand-level-focused 10 
corruption coverage, but more focus on the understandings of innocuous impact 11 
of corruption, such as rise of unemployment and inequality, should be promoted. 12 
14.4.3 Specialists as the most frequent corrupt environment 13 
Another significant finding of the thesis relates to where corrupt behaviour, 14 
specifically in healthcare, is most prevalent. The reason why this perspective is 15 
important for any future research or regulation implementation, is the need to 16 
target measures precisely and in the areas that are battling the most frequent 17 
instances of corruption. Independent research into this showed that the GP 18 
sector is the most affected sector (Mužik and Szalayová 2013) for informal 19 
payments and bribes, closely followed by several specialties such as obstetrics 20 
and gynaecology, neurology, cardiovascular and so on, as outlined in detail in 21 
Chapter 13.  22 
The thesis, however, presents a radically different finding, where all 23 
participants discounted the GP sector as not likely to be laden with bribes or 24 
informal payments in real-life understanding of corruption. Instead, 75% of my 25 
 
89 Such modules (inclusive of professionalism, vocational and communication skills modules) are 
present in medical schools across the UK, as per the GMC guidelines, which also publishes 
guidelines with a full section on ethical behaviours and dilemmas in a document called 





participants clearly marked specialist doctors as the area with most frequent 1 
corrupt practices; this included both elites and general population. Females 2 
were again the highest percentage, which is congruent with literature on 3 
females being a dominant demographic when it comes to seeking out 4 
information within the health service, indicating that females have more 5 
experience overall with the health service (Deeks, Lombard et al. 2009). 6 
Obstetrics and gynaecology was identified by the participants as the one area 7 
where there is most potential to bribe healthcare providers, and this is not 8 
surprising considering that females were the biggest demographic answering this 9 
question (presumably having increased experience in the field compared with 10 
men). It is also important to point out that this specialty is for many their first or 11 
only serious encounter with the health service due to childbirth; many of my 12 
participants were parents. It also points to a particular vulnerability of the 13 
specialty to harbour instances of corruption, and it is my recommendation that 14 
tightening of measures in the health service targets this specialty concretely.  15 
The identification of frequent corruption in specialties as opposed to GPs is a 16 
vastly different finding obtained by qualitative interviews from that obtained by 17 
survey by Muzik and Szalayova in 2013 on behalf of the Health Policy Institute. 18 
The reasons behind this discrepancy can be multiple, but such a difference calls 19 
for a re-examination of this particular topic, as my finding is completely novel 20 
and in direct contradiction. My participants were, however, given a lot of room 21 
to think about and conceptualise what they understand to be corruption in their 22 
in-depth interviews and focus groups, which may have accounted for a more 23 
detailed answer. In other words, they were given space and time to consider not 24 
just monetary bribes, but also gifts, tokens of gratitude, exchange of service, 25 
and favours as potential forms of corruption, which may account for their 26 
answer being more informed and nuanced. Regional differences as well as 27 
education levels, exposure to healthcare, or phrasing of questions on part of the 28 
2013 research may also account for a difference in data collected, but the fact 29 
that GPs as a possibility was completely disregarded by my participants is an 30 
original finding.  31 
The reasons behind specialists and not GPs being the source of most frequent 32 
corrupt practices for my participants, are multiple. One perspective is that of 33 
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specialists being sparse and specialty surgeries suffering from a reduced 1 
presence of doctors, due to them being stretched very thin across several 2 
practices (even private ones). Additionally, the issue of doctor migration is also 3 
integral to this sparsity of specialists. In 2017, the statistical internet portal 4 
techmed.sk reports that out of cca 19,000 doctors graduated in Slovakia, over 5 
4,000 work abroad (https://www.techmed.sk/4211-slovenskych-lekarov-pracuje-6 
v-zahranici/). As previously mentioned, the largest group (over 2,000) work in 7 
the Czech Republic, second largest group (over 1,000) in Germany and the third 8 
largest group (over 300) in Great Britain. The rapidly aging nature of healthcare 9 
professionals, with over half of GPs working into retirement age in 2013 and lack 10 
of nurses (5.8 nurses per inhabitant as opposed to EU average of 8.8 in 2012) 11 
also contributes to the workforce thinning (Beňová 2014, Mužik 2014). Secondly, 12 
there is the psychological effect of patients visiting specialists, which implies a 13 
certain level of seriousness of illness and uncertainty of outcome. Such 14 
uncertainty has been shown to encourage corrupt behaviour in general (Dupuy 15 
and Neset 2018). Thirdly, as has already been evidenced above, corruption relies 16 
on custom and tradition to survive and this can translate into peer pressure- in 17 
other words, it is customary to inquire about a bribe or to bring one, which then 18 
creates the impetus to appease not only the health professional, but the whole 19 
social network around the service provider. Peer pressure and expectation have 20 
also been shown to promote corrupt behaviour in a number of contexts 21 
(Momotenko 2015). There was also indication of custom and tradition being tied 22 
to communist practices, which further reinforces the idea that corruption in any 23 
given part of the world is going to have a unique outlook and needs to be 24 
observed individually and qualitatively. Lastly, the participants showed evidence 25 
of dismissing GPs as a lower calibre of doctor, insinuating that the problems one 26 
visits a GP for are not serious enough to need to ensure the outcome with a 27 
bribe. This indicates the lack of awareness of job importance for primary care, 28 
as GPs are still needed to make referrals to specialist appointments, but also the 29 
rising trend of these appointments being online and self-bookable for a fee 30 
without the need to visit a GP. Given the stark difference of reputation as 31 
perceived by my participants, and as propagated in global health services such 32 
as the NHS, where GPs are regarded as the backbone of the service and the 33 
gatekeepers of access to specialist services, it is the recommendation of this 34 
thesis for a comparative, cross-country study of perceptions of GPs to be 35 
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conducted. A crucial part of such a study should be the perception of any 1 
respondents as to the frequency and the vulnerability of this sector to corrupt 2 
transactions and practices.  3 
14.5 Causes of corruption 4 
 5 
This section looks to tie in the last remaining strands of the investigation of 6 
corruption, regarding perceived causes of corruption. Focusing on the perceived 7 
causes is relevant as a determinant of what the participants conceptualise 8 
corruption to look like and how they conceptualise it takes place. Therefore, my 9 
findings of corruption in real life taking place within an insufficient system and 10 
within cultural stigma inform the overarching research question and RQ3 at the 11 
same time. The categories that are included in this theme are Reasoning and 12 
Reporting and General perceptions of corruption.  13 
Main findings: 14 
• Soviet/communist legacies + deficiency (RQ3 + overarching RQ) 15 
• Fear as a facilitator of corruption (RQ3) 16 
14.5.1 Soviet/communist legacies and deficiencies in service 17 
provision 18 
The coding process of Reasoning and Reporting separated the responses of 19 
respondents into several labels relating to: bureaucracy, deficiency of services 20 
and legal measures, low living wage, morality and mentality of people, and 21 
Soviet legacies. These were subscribed to by the participants with various levels 22 
of intensity. However, it became clear that there was no single reason for the 23 
participants to engage with and single out above the rest, and all reasons 24 
intertwined to a certain extent, with the legacies of the past at the heart of the 25 
narratives elicited. Bureaucratic red tape was seen as particularly crippling for 26 
entrepreneurship with over 222 hours spent on bureaucratic tasks by 27 
entrepreneurs on average; a result of inefficient administrative processes 28 
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(www.trend.sk). Culture played a significant role, as already described in 1 
findings above, and was inseparably linked in language to the idea of past 2 
legacies, as well as norms arising from the circumstances of lack. The 3 
participants identified deficiency of services to be a huge problem, as 4 
addressed in previous section of findings, quoting specific problems of brain-5 
drain of medical graduates leaving to work abroad for a better wage. This, along 6 
with the aging population of GPs and health professionals in general, painted a 7 
stark picture of the future to come (Benova, 2014). The adverse economic 8 
situation faced by doctors, as well as the healthcare environment with outdated 9 
facilities, poorly equipped hospitals, and procurement embezzlement linked 10 
back to the privatisation problems of transition economies; grappling to date 11 
with the repercussions of an inefficient transition from centralised to market 12 
economy (Ellman 2005, Wallace and Latcheva 2006, Fazekas, King et al. 2014). 13 
The perils of inequality inherent to capitalism and practices of shady deals, 14 
oligarchic tendencies, and informal practices that survived from the previous 15 
regimes provided a fertile ground for the rise of kleptocracy (Kornai 2006), 16 
recognised as another key ingredient in the status quo of corruption by the 17 
findings. Therefore, rather than identifying communist legacies as any concrete, 18 
cliche soundbites or practices, the participants presented their perceptions as 19 
sophisticated and relating to the general journey of the country from the past 20 
into the present, with a particular mix of socio-economic circumstances creating 21 
a unique environment for corruption. This environment is described by Fric 22 
(1999), in the Czech, as well as the Slovak context, to be a ‘type of corrupt 23 
climate’, which is defined as a group of collective ideas and cultural formulae, 24 
which have made the abuse of power, bribing, and reception of bribes a matter 25 
of course, and a customarily excusable act (Fric and Kabele 1999). Dzambazovic 26 
(2011) explains that in the context of Soviet legacies, this state of affairs was 27 
achieved by an ‘ostrich’ strategy of the Soviet leaders sticking their heads into 28 
the sand when alerted to corrupt practices, marginalising the problem of 29 
corruption as something that goes directly against the Soviet ideals of an equal 30 
society and rejecting this type of ‘accusing of honest Soviet workers’ (Vecernik 31 
1998). The problems exacerbated by a slow increase in wages, the narrowing 32 
down of resources, and low quality of services, led to corruption becoming an 33 
‘organic part of the regime’ in the 70s and onwards (Simecka 1990). 34 
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In line with corruption persisting as a ‘climate’ to which all citizens are 1 
subjected, my participants identified the mentality of the people to be likely a 2 
strong determinant of corruption surviving (over half of the participants 3 
subscribed to this view). This was inseparably tied with the idea of legal 4 
loopholes not creating enough of a deterrent to curb corruption. It appears from 5 
my findings that the legal measures in place are not communicated in sufficient 6 
levels of depth and clarity to the general population, and they leave a lot of 7 
room for interpretation, perpetuating the notion that one can get away with 8 
corruption under the right circumstances. Prosecutors can apply the measure of 9 
‘Active Regret’ to any proceeding, effectively permitting them to choose to not 10 
pursue acts of petty corruption by their own discretion, and thus the system can 11 
create the impression of lack of punitive measures (especially for those with 12 
political connections). 13 
The findings show that while the participants agreed (over a quarter) that 14 
corruption has increased since 1989, several responses indicated that corruption 15 
then and now is the same level, but a different form- in other words, corruption 16 
has managed to adapt to the new order. Only a quarter of participants linked 17 
corruption today directly to corruption in the communist times, believing that 18 
there is a unique connection that does not exist in countries without a post-19 
communist past, but this could be said of any unique set of circumstances 20 
worldwide. Those who linked corruption to the previous regime and identified 21 
practices such as use of personal contacts for private gain, favour exchange, or 22 
gifts such as home produce (ducks, geese, eggs, sausages), coffee or chocolates 23 
as staples of the previous regime, were over 40 years old. An important finding 24 
presents itself of there being a limited amount of time (i.e., the lifespan of 25 
participants such as these) to explore this with more in-depth study of practices 26 
to be narrated by those who have the memory and the personal experience of 27 
both regimes. This type of anecdotal evidence is crucial in the qualitative 28 
approach to research, as this unique information is likely to be completely lost 29 
once this generation is no longer alive. Overall, the participants made links to 30 
communist practices specifically, but also made more opaque links to the past 31 
shaping the future, as would be the case anywhere in the world. The past of the 32 
post-communist societies, however, has contributed to the general image that 33 
corruption has taken on today, with tropes such as gift-giving and gift similarity 34 
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sustaining themselves through tradition and custom. The participants made an 1 
astute observation when speaking about the factor of mentality and moral values 2 
coming into play, believing that the real change or uprooting of these practices 3 
would have to come from setting an example for the future generation, rather 4 
than instilling the same set of values and customs that will perpetuate these 5 
practices further. In alignment with previously outlined findings, it was largely 6 
women who recognised this responsibility, in a 19/9 ratio.  7 
14.5.2 Fear as a facilitator of corruption 8 
Fear is often given as a reason for not reporting corruption to official bodies 9 
(Global Corruption Barometer, 2010). In the Slovak context, fear of one’s safety 10 
as a deterrent of reporting corruption goes hand in hand with lack of positive 11 
examples of punishing corrupt behaviour (Dzambazovic 2011). However, there is 12 
reason to believe that any research conducted into this particular perception is 13 
likely to be different in the current context, whereby Slovakia has seen a very 14 
thorough and active fight against corruption from 2018-2020, sparked in part by 15 
the execution of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée. Since 16 
then, the National Criminal Agency (NAKA) has conducted several operations of 17 
‘cleansing’ the official institutions of the judiciary and law enforcement of 18 
corrupt actors- as a result, many heads of departments, as well as prominent 19 
political figures were imprisoned and sentenced for crimes of corruption. It 20 
stands to reason that such examples of punishment may go some way to 21 
encouraging anti-corruption initiatives among the general public as well. Fear as 22 
both a motivator and as a deterrent was one of the most significant, but also 23 
worrying findings of the thesis. The participants presented narratives of fear in 24 
two contexts: 25 
• Fear as a determinant of corrupt practice 26 
• Fear as a deterrent from reporting corrupt practice.  27 
The strongest motivation for bribes and informal payments in healthcare 28 
stemmed from described feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, apprehension- in 29 
short, fear- over loved ones not receiving the care they may need. There was a 30 
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strong indication that the more serious the health problem, the more probable 1 
bribe-giving is, in order to secure the desired, successful result. This sense of 2 
fear for the health and safety of one’s family is an important finding that needs 3 
addressed on a fundamental level of public discourse. It is not clear whether it 4 
stems from the participants and the general population not having enough 5 
confidence in the professionalism or competence of the healthcare staff, or 6 
whether this is some assurance they attempt to buy that borders on superstition- 7 
i.e., ‘if I do not pay and the surgery goes badly, I only have myself to blame’. I 8 
believe this to be an extreme view that would be putting lives at risk on a level 9 
that is incompatible with any ethical standard of care held by a medical 10 
professional. There is no evidence that I could find that the level of healthcare 11 
in its fundamental willingness and ability to deliver a professional service is 12 
dependent on a petty bribe. There is also no evidence that I was able to find to 13 
suggest that any healthcare professional would be able to deliberately mistreat 14 
a patient as a result of not receiving a bribe and my participants did not show 15 
evidence of believing this view either. There is, however, scope for further 16 
research to look into the possibilities of not direct mistreatment, but 17 
inadvertent undertreatment as a result of bribe refusal. The 2013 HPI report 18 
shows a high element of subjectivity in the participant responses, whereby the 19 
respondents were happier with health services received if they happened as a 20 
result of an informal payment initiated by themselves, rather than by the doctor 21 
(Mužik and Szalayová 2013). This points towards the importance of the 22 
‘mentality’ argument as the motivator for corrupt practices- it is almost 23 
suggestive of a certain psychological moment in the patient’s understanding of 24 
care delivery, where they feel more secure in quality of care, having ‘ensured’ a 25 
positive result by their own initiative. 26 
However, there needs to be an honest public discussion about the levels of care 27 
outside of the respective surgery or operating theatre. This relates to post-28 
operative care on the wards, the hospital facilities, access to private hospital 29 
rooms, and being able to choose a named surgeon based on a transparent 30 
publishing of their credentials. Most participants believed that the care they 31 
would receive would be sub-par if they did not pay extra to secure better 32 
quality; this needs to be addressed not only by reforming the system of 33 
insurance with buy-in from hospitals, as well as professionals, but also by a 34 
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strong promotional campaign of the competence of healthcare professionals. 1 
The reputation of the occupation itself and its status must be lifted in the eyes 2 
of the public and this agitation should start at the level of medical institutions 3 
and universities. In other words, the confidence and faith of the general 4 
population must be restored by investing in healthcare- into facilities, but also 5 
into a highly skilled social capital within the ranks of the healthcare staff. The 6 
public should not feel fear of receiving substandard, incompetent, or insufficient 7 
care at the hands of the professionals who easily find employment in better 8 
funded healthcare services abroad (statistics I presented earlier show at least 9 
4000 graduates of 19000 each year find employment abroad, namely Germany, 10 
the Czech Republic and the UK), and who thrive in these systems with the skills 11 
they acquired in Slovak education.  12 
Secondly, fear was explored as the main reason behind not reporting corruption 13 
to the authorities. Admittedly, scepticism that the case would get dealt with 14 
effectively was also a running theme of discouragement. However, fear was 15 
mentioned explicitly by over half of the participants. This fear included fear for 16 
one’s own safety, the safety of their loved ones, but also of being harassed by 17 
the official structures to the point that the good deed of reporting corruption 18 
would become an unbearable hassle. The participants gave examples of similar 19 
real-life stories, for example the murder of the investigative journalist Ján 20 
Kuciak and his fiancée, or the firing of the whistle-blower Zuzana Hlávková from 21 
her position in the Foreign Ministry (see Chapter 5). This level of failure of the 22 
system to shield and protect those who fight against corruption is recognised by 23 
literature as well, which shows Slovakia to be one of the 7 countries with the 24 
weakest whistle-blower protection in place (see Chapter 5).  25 
The participants were right to pick up on the shortcomings outlined and it is my 26 
hope that the cracking down on corruption by the Slovak Criminal Agency (NAKA) 27 
in the past year and a half would now produce less reluctance to reporting 28 
corruption to the authorities. In the past year and a half, several public 29 
institutions, such as the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well as institutions 30 
and justice departments that deal with corruption, the anti-corruption 31 
department in the police force, and the HQ of the police force itself, were 32 
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‘purged’ of individuals who have been charged with corruption and conspiracy90. 1 
The modern public discourse is indicative of impending improvements and 2 
greater robustness of the system. It is the recommendation of this thesis that 3 
reporting of corruption gets propagated by these revitalised institutions to the 4 
broader public and that the procedure of reporting is simplified and clarified. 5 
Only 7 of my participants were aware of there being a corruption reporting 6 
hotline set up by the government, and several participants distrusted the 7 
structures in place so much that they would rather turn to the media or 8 
Transparency International to report cases of corruption than the local law 9 
enforcement.  10 
A similar trend is seen across other countries from the previous communist bloc 11 
with regards to underreporting of corruption. The Bulgarian National Statistical 12 
Institute, for example, published its data in 2015 suggesting that in 1989 there 13 
were 355 people found guilty of corruption and embezzlement, with a steadily 14 
declining trend, hitting only 17 in 2015 (NSI 2015)91, without any indication, 15 
however that cases of corruption have effectively decreased. Similarly, a recent 16 
2019 statistic gained from over 1000 respondents in Romania shows that 28% of 17 
respondents would not report corruption because ‘everyone knows about these 18 
cases and no one reports them’, 27% because it is ‘difficult to prove anything’, 19 
27% because ‘reporting it would be pointless because those responsible will not 20 
be punished’, 25% because ‘there is no protection for those who report 21 
corruption’, and 19% because they ‘don’t know where to report it to’92. This type 22 
of narrative, especially reasons hinting at scepticism that the system would be 23 
able to punish the culprits, fearing for one’s own safety, and not knowing where 24 
to effectively report, are congruent with the findings in my research. The 25 
process on how and where to report corruption was unclear to most of my 26 
participants and very few would consider doing it in the first place.   27 
 
90 For more details see https://www.trend.sk/spravy/naka-mala-zadrzat-specialneho-prokuratora-
dusana-kovacika-dovody-zatial-nie-su-zname [last accessed 24/02/2021]. 
91 For more similar statistics, visit https://www.nsi.bg/en [last accessed 6/3/2021]. 
92 For the full statistic, please visit: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1113513/romania-reasons-




Rationale and objectives 3 
The initial aims of the project were ambitious in their addressing of theoretical 4 
gaps in corruption research, while also conducting an empirical study of 5 
corruption on the ground. As outlined in the introduction chapter, I have 6 
selected a relevant case study of Slovak healthcare to study corruption for 7 
several reasons: Slovakia is one of the countries in the EU that has consistently 8 
high levels of corruption (especially in healthcare) and presents an illustrative 9 
example of post-communist democracies tackling corruption in the region 10 
(Eurobarometer 2013, Eurobarometer 2017). Furthermore, a Slovak-specific 11 
study also presented with a unique opportunity to conduct research with 12 
Slovakia as its focus, outside of research that originates in the country itself. 13 
Such original-language research, however, is rarely translated for the 14 
international audience. This project provided an opportunity to bring original-15 
language research to the forefront of broader international research into 16 
corruption, enriching the scholarly field on corruption in post-communist 17 
contexts.  18 
 19 
How could I provide a fresh angle on corruption research and not get lost in 20 
statistical generalisation? The process of approaching corruption in a qualitative 21 
manner stemmed from a rigorous review of literature which highlighted some 22 
key trends. Generally, it became obvious that an economic focus on corruption, 23 
generating macro-level reports, is the more prevalent approach to study of 24 
corruption (Bussell 2015, Rose-Ackerman 2016). The focus on typology of 25 
corruption was also clear, but without evidence as to how terminology was 26 
generated beyond theoretical conceptualisations of authors themselves (Shehu 27 
2005). The problems of corruption measurement were also one of the main 28 
themes elicited, and I sought to tackle these with my methodology (Kenny 2006, 29 
Knack 2006, Weber Abramo 2007, Olken 2009). A key issue arising from these 30 
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approaches and measurements was the reductionist approach to corruption by 1 
previous research, disaggregating and reducing corruption to its individual 2 
facets, homing in on financial consequences of corruption as comfortably 3 
measurable. It became clear that a deeper, qualitative study of corruption based 4 
on an interpretivist approach would be able to present a level of detail that was 5 
not previously achieved. I wanted to bring the narrative and language that 6 
people use in their own lives to describe and comprehend corruption to the 7 
centre of future corruption research and debate. In such a way I was able to 8 
show whether the typology existing is reflective of what people ‘on the ground’ 9 
understand corruption to be, and within this study, several aspects of corruption 10 
were thus explored within the Slovak context. These were namely the concepts 11 
of time, trust, fear, brokerage and power, networks, and cultural customs. Trust 12 
and fear proved to be important determinants of corrupt transactions, but also 13 
deterrents to corruption reporting. The idea of brokerage was one of the most 14 
significant findings, proving to be much more prominent in real-life transactions 15 
than the simple principal-agent model previously suggested by literature. The 16 
importance of networks was inextricably bound to brokerage, showing the 17 
potency of ad hoc interpersonal relationships to be paradigm-generating in how 18 
corruption was carried out in practical terms. 19 
Scope of project 20 
Applying the process of deduction, the general concepts (i.e., time, trust, fear, 21 
brokerage, cultural customs) were whittled down to specific understandings of 22 
anti-corruption policies present, the anthropological, sociological, and cultural 23 
attributes of corruption in this context, and were finally reduced to questions 24 
used in the field (Appendix 3). I opted for in-depth interviews and focus groups 25 
combination of methods to be able to capture detailed narrative relating to 26 
these questions, as well as to maximise chances of engagement by the 27 
participants (Byrne 2012). Ethical challenges were significant with buzzwords 28 
‘corruption’ and ‘healthcare’ present in the title of the thesis, and the 29 
wellbeing, safety, and confidentiality of participants were at the centre of my 30 
methodology. I was acutely aware that it would be challenging to recruit and to 31 
get participants to open up about a sensitive, taboo topic such as corruption 32 
without self-incrimination (Brannen 1988, Lee 1993). As a result, I had to make 33 
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compromises in the recruitment process, relying on snowballing a lot of the 1 
time, and only being able to encompass two regions of the country, which posed 2 
limitations of validity and generalisability in a wider context. I do not claim that 3 
the sample was representative of the larger population, but I endeavoured to 4 
acquire a wide range of age groups, educational levels, and a varied set of 5 
employment for the sample, albeit an even split of all these categories was not 6 
possible to achieve in each focus group. In an ideal context, I would have been 7 
able to interview a representative and a much larger sample, but this was not 8 
possible with the time and resource constraints put on the project as a self-9 
funded researcher, with one year out of the three of the project being taken up 10 
by a pandemic. However, since I employed a rigorous model of study, there is 11 
potential for analytic generalisation to apply to similar social environments 12 
within the region (Falk and Guenther 2007), which share a similar socio-13 
economic and historical journey, and a semi-privatised model of healthcare- 14 
parallels are drawn in the work with other members of the Visegrad Group, for 15 
example.  16 
 17 
The empirical chapters of the thesis grappled at length with several abstract 18 
concepts relating to corruption. Concepts such as trust, fear, and importance of 19 
time were at the heart of the narratives elicited, alongside more concrete 20 
concepts of corruption brokerage, employment of networks, significance of gifts, 21 
and particularities of the healthcare sector. The real strength of the methods 22 
lies in the deliberately selected, worded, and piloted open-ended questions and 23 
their sequence that allowed the participants to think deeply about corruption in 24 
ways they may not have considered before. This led to them being able to 25 
develop their own narrative and use specific vernacular that formed patterns of 26 
repetition for the analysis, which showed the similarities of how people thought 27 
about corruption in a real-life context. These included language about gifts, 28 
gratitude and attention payments, ‘arranging’ or ‘getting something done’ as 29 
equivalent with corruption, and ‘helping’ or ‘putting in a good word’ as 30 
synonyms to brokering corrupt deals. As a result, several key findings emerged 31 
that addressed the research questions and should get explored in more detail in 32 
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future research. These findings are outlined in the following, final section of the 1 
thesis, embedded in the architecture of the thesis research questions. 2 
 3 
Findings and Research Questions  4 
 RQ1 & 2  5 
‘It is difficult to imagine a reality in which petty corruption exists and 6 
grand would not’ ELITE1  7 
RQ1: How does awareness of grand corruption inform/justify individual engagement in petty 
corruption? 
RQ2: How does awareness of petty corruption inform/justify individual engagement in grand 
corruption? 
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption will have no impact on the engagement of individuals in petty 
corruption and vice versa. 
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in petty corruption. 
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption will inform/justify individual engagement in grand corruption. 
Based on findings regarding petty and grand corruption outlined in section 14.4, 8 
the hypotheses H1a and H1b have been confirmed. There is evidence of 9 
awareness of grand and petty corruption informing/justifying individual 10 
engagement in petty or grand corruption. The participant responses relating to 11 
real-life understanding of corruption showed that there is awareness of one level 12 
of corruption either conditioning or causing the other. There was evidence of 13 
participants believing that it is either learned behaviour at the petty level that 14 
perpetuates to grand level of corruption, or, conversely, that the petty level 15 
corrupt acts are carried out due to emulating the trends set on grand levels. 16 
There was a level of sophistication of understanding displayed, whereby 17 
participants could pinpoint that there are different factors impacting on each 18 
477 
level of corruption (e.g., lack of services impacting on petty levels more than 1 
profiteering, which impacted more on grand levels), but the principle of 2 
behaviour on both levels was shared. This principle of hypothesising this 3 
connection is based on the petty experience of participants and their ability to 4 
compare the strategies exhibited with those on grand levels, based on the 5 
available evidence of public perceptions. As the thesis has demonstrated, 6 
namely through its presentation of the media frequently highlighting corruption 7 
scandals and arrests of high-ranking officials, often drawing clear links between 8 
involved actors and even publishing transcripts of recorded secret meetings of 9 
grand corruption scandals (such as the Gorila scandal, see Chapter 5), public 10 
discourse is saturated with awareness of how grand corruption is carried out. In 11 
theoretical terms, therefore, the participants were able to connect their own 12 
experience of carrying out corruption with the corrupt practices as observed in 13 
public discourse. This is a unique finding which shows that the conceptualisation 14 
of corruption as existing exclusively on several different levels is only valid to a 15 
certain extent, as in practice, these levels are inseparably linked and feed off 16 
of one another in the behaviour displayed. The definition of corrupt ‘strategies’ 17 
that exhibit similarity on both grand and petty levels, as labelled by the thesis 18 
(and described in Chapter 1.4), follows Warburton’s (2013) idea of ‘dynamic 19 
networks and relationships’. In other words, the thesis hypothesises, based on its 20 
own results and the public discourse that informs the views of the participants, 21 
that the common strategies used on both petty and grand levels are namely 22 
the use of personal contacts and networks in order to gain an advantage. 23 
All typological distinctions between levels of corruption as stipulated by 24 
literature should be verified in a similar manner by future, qualitative research. 25 
The implications of such verification on policy and regulation construction are 26 
significant, as such documents are often inaccessible to the wider public and 27 
suffer from ambiguity (Schane 1963, Caplan 1988) unless, potentially, the 28 
language in them is reflective of the real-life understanding of the phenomenon. 29 
This proves to be the case here, too, where a lot of participants were unaware 30 
of whistle-blower protection laws, of there being no difference between a gift 31 
and a bribe in the law, and also of where and how to report corruption. It stands 32 
to reason that inclusion of such language in official policy will make it more 33 
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accessible and understandable to the greater public, creating greater 1 
opportunity for them to adhere to any ensuing regulations.  2 
RQ3  3 
 4 
RQ3: What are the strategies utilised to carry out grand and petty corrupt practices? 
Theoretical assumption: There will be similarities in the strategies utilised to carry out grand 
and petty corrupt practices. 
  5 
The findings in sections 14.3, 14.4, and 14.5 all relate to the particular 6 
strategies utilised by people to carry out corrupt transactions. The findings 7 
confirm that there was little distinction drawn between the principles of 8 
carrying out petty and carrying out grand corruption. Both levels were 9 
understood to behave and manifest in similar terms; both levels related to the 10 
ideas of gift-giving, networks, use of a broker/middleman, and the concept of 11 
‘arranging’ something outside of regular structures. Both levels incorporated 12 
the ideas of fear and trust as both conditions of corrupt practices and 13 
deterrents of reporting corruption. All of these concepts, recognised as valid 14 
and important by the participants in real-life understanding of corruption, are 15 
applicable to both levels of corruption. In other words, grand levels benefit as 16 
much as petty from interpersonal contacts and networks, frequently utilise third 17 
parties acting as brokers/middlemen, and require certain levels of trust between 18 
the individual parties for a successful corrupt transaction. The only difference is 19 
the sums or types of goods and services that are in question on either level, but 20 
the fundamental strategies employed by corrupt parties remain the same, 21 
confirming the theoretical assumption of RQ3. Moreover, as indicated by the 22 
answered RQ1 & 2, these strategies are learned from, or passed on to, one level 23 
to the other: creating a perpetual vicious circle of corruption sustaining itself 24 
across the strata of society.  25 
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The implication of this finding has as much bearing on theoretical 1 
conceptualisation of corruption as for the empirical study of it. Future research 2 
should recognise the need to approach corruption from a holistic perspective, 3 
rather than assume that principal differences exist between corruption taking 4 
place on different levels. To the contrary, corruption in future research should 5 
be approached with the understanding that all levels of corruption share core 6 
normative features and that one level cannot be disaggregated from the other in 7 
any anti-corruption measures implemented.  8 
The importance of the middleman was one of the most significant findings of 9 
the thesis. The middleman/broker was a vital figure in nearly all corrupt 10 
transactions described by my participants, despite their reluctance to see the 11 
broker as a corrupt figure. The reason this was ignored by the participants was 12 
their naïve belief that the broker required nothing in return for their ‘help’, 13 
when the truth is that the return value is most often cashed in by the broker in a 14 
reciprocal service at a later date. The broker was conceptualised by the 15 
participants in the ‘representative brokerage’ model (Jancsics, 2015), posing as 16 
member of the same group as those they were ‘helping’. The broker would then 17 
be able to, through their connections and networks, acquire a specific service 18 
from an agent for the clients. The pernicious nature of this opaque, but 19 
ubiquitous brokerage lies in the fact that all of these networks are ad hoc and 20 
informal and can reproduce ad infinitum. The broker does not belong to just one 21 
group, but through informal connections can be tied to several social groups, the 22 
members of which can pass contact details of the broker to more groups, thus 23 
increasing the broker’s prominence. The broker does not share their influence or 24 
reservoir of information and contacts with the rest of the group, which makes 25 
their position unique in this context, unlike the theories of social network (SNT) 26 
or corruption as a collective action problem. The SNT suggests the growing of 27 
connections within a network according to the individual needs and desires of 28 
group actors, for example (Warburton 2013). In my conceptualisation, the 29 
connections do not expand for the benefit of the group and among members of 30 
the group, but buttress the dominant position of the individual broker alone. The 31 
more people the broker ‘helps’ by accessing privileged areas of health care 32 
independent of clinical need, the greater the broker’s influence, power, and 33 
standing. Since this is a concept dependent entirely on organic, ad hoc social 34 
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networking that is not tied to just one country or region, I expect that the role 1 
of the broker as a standalone powerful figure in this sense would exist in more 2 
countries and contexts. As such, it should be explored in more case studies by 3 
future research, to confirm that representative brokerage is the most common 4 
and most pressing to address by anti-corruption measures in real, everyday life. 5 
Gift-giving was another significant finding, inseparably tied to the communist 6 
legacies in the participants’ views. The participants made a distinction between 7 
gifts and bribes that was inconsistent with the legal definition of bribes in Slovak 8 
Criminal Code, which does not take timing of the gift into consideration. 9 
However, for the participants, the concept of time was extremely important and 10 
justified their engagement in corruption by suggesting that as long as a gift is 11 
given after the service, it has no negative connotations. A similar provision of 12 
time leniency was made for the broker as outlined above, whereby as long as 13 
the return value was not requested immediately, the broker was not associated 14 
with corruption. It is the recommendation of the thesis that the wording in the 15 
Criminal Code is reviewed to include the language the participants used to 16 
justify their involvement in corrupt practices and state in plain terms that 17 
‘gratitude payments’ or ‘attention payments’, and all other permutations of 18 
these, regardless of when they are given, are considered a bribe and are subject 19 
to prosecution. A constant update of language in official policy documents is 20 
necessary, as language is as diverse as humans themselves, incessantly 21 
developing, and with a limitless potential for production of varied facets of 22 
communication (Greenberg 1971, Chomsky 1980, Nowak and Krakauer 1999). The 23 
regulations must keep up with these developments through qualitative research, 24 
in order for the people to have no basis for justifying corrupt behaviour.  25 
RQ3a  26 
 27 
 28 
RQ3a- subquestion: What is the significance of trust as a pre-requisite for corrupt interactions? 
Theoretical assumption: Trust is understood as one of the processes of corruption that links 
the corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as such it is seen as a condition more often 
than it is understood as a result of corrupt practice. 
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The role of trust in my participants’ real-life understanding of corruption 1 
primarily aligned itself with the existing literature on the subject, which defines 2 
trust as fulfilling expectations of behaviour (as opposed to the colloquially-3 
accepted definition of trust, which, as per the OED, would be: ‘firm belief in 4 
the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something; confidence or faith in 5 
a person or thing, or in an attribute of a person or thing93’. In other words, the 6 
theoretical assumption was confirmed, whereby trust was seen more as a pre-7 
requisite for a successful corrupt transaction, than as a result of one. However, 8 
there was also an indication that a relationship resembling trust develops as a 9 
result of a successful corrupt transaction between the parties involved, which 10 
then spurs on possible future corrupt transactions and expands the networks of 11 
middlemen between individual social networks. The individual findings therefore 12 
organically intertwine themselves in the understanding and the narrative of the 13 
participants. 14 
In a similar manner, the role of fear in the corrupt transaction was also 15 
significant and seen as both a pre-requisite for engaging in corruption, but also 16 
as a deterrent in reporting it. The participants showed that fear for lack of care 17 
for their loved ones or sub-optimal care were integral to engaging in corrupt 18 
practices. They also intimated that fear for their own safety was a contributing 19 
factor to not reporting corruption. This level of fear needs to be addressed both 20 
by systemic measures that make the reporting process clearer, safer, and more 21 
robust, but also by an information campaign that would boost the standing of 22 
care in people’s minds (as outlined in detailed suggestions in Chapter 14). More 23 
than the level of care, there is also problems with lack of awareness as to the 24 
standard of care available to the general population and I recommend that this 25 
is a priority for the revamping of the health insurance packages, as well as for 26 
government guidelines.  27 
 
93 For more contextual information and etymology of the definition, visit https://www-oed-
com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/Entry/207004?rskey=OgpOuN&result=1#eid [last accessed 
8/3/2021] 
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RQ3b  1 
RQ3b- sub question: To what extent are social rules and customs important in the carrying out 
of corrupt practices? 
Theoretical assumption: Social rules and customs are understood as one of the processes of 
corruption that links corrupt practices on grand and petty levels; as such they will prove as 
important determinants in carrying out corrupt practices. 
 2 
Social rules and customs were shown to lie at the heart of the real-life 3 
understanding of corruption. It is social rules and customs that encompassed the 4 
gift-giving phenomenon, the types of gifts considered acceptable, the 5 
acceptability (or lack thereof) of corrupt practices, and peer pressure. These 6 
were inextricably linked to the communist legacies of the previous regime, 7 
which, according to my participants, played a key role in determining the image 8 
corruption takes on today. This is visible in the outlook of the gifts themselves, 9 
which bear resemblance to those from communist times (alcohol, chocolates, 10 
coffee). While the participants did not unanimously draw a causal link between 11 
communist practices and corruption today, the language implied a shared set of 12 
values and customs taken over from the past regime and then deliberately or 13 
inadvertently taught forward to the next generation. The theoretical assumption 14 
is therefore confirmed for RQ3b and the role of communist legacies in this region 15 
is shown to affect not only people’s mindset and opinion of corrupt practices, 16 
but also the particular elements of corruption as transferred from the past to 17 
the present. This includes the very particular set of socio-economic 18 
circumstances that impacted on corrupt practices in the early transitions from a 19 
centralised to a market economy, creating unique opportunities for privatisation 20 
and kleptocracy.  21 
This finding underlines the crucial importance of qualitative research to be 22 
conducted into corruption on a more frequent basis and in a regional or country-23 
specific setting, to be able to pick up on differences and insights such as 24 
this. Future research may look into whether gift-giving in the shape seen in 25 
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Slovakia is seen elsewhere or whether the gifts that survived in Slovakia may not 1 
be prevalent in other post-communist societies, which may now have converted 2 
to completely cash payments, for example. These types of differences will have 3 
significant bearing on the tailoring of specific anti-corruption measures for 4 
different societies and contexts. 5 
OVERARCHING RESEARCH QUESTION: 6 
To what extent is the theoretical difference between grand and petty 7 
corruption reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in Slovakia’s 8 
healthcare?   9 
In light of the above findings, the theoretical difference between grand and 10 
petty corruption is only reflected in the real-life understanding of corruption in 11 
Slovakia’s healthcare to a certain extent. The findings show an awareness of 12 
there being different factors impacting on corruption on grand and petty levels, 13 
but also an indisputable and profound link of similar strategies of contacts and 14 
networks used between the two levels, which turns them into one holistic 15 
phenomenon. Previous findings in literature are confirmed throughout, but there 16 
are certain discrepancies shown that make for unique findings and disprove the 17 
theory on corruption in these cases. For example, the principal-agent theory of 18 
corruption is ultimately disproved on both grand and petty levels in the real-life 19 
understanding of corruption, which incorporates the use of a single-person 20 
middleman on a very frequent basis. This also disproves other theoretical 21 
assumptions about corrupt practices in this region, such as the social network 22 
theory or corruption as a collective action problem- instead, the broker as a 23 
lone, but powerful figure dominates the arena of corrupt transactions and 24 
domains, always looking to capitalise on their own position before sharing 25 
information with the rest of the group. Furthermore, the existing finding on the 26 
GP sector in healthcare to be most impacted by corruption was completely 27 
disproved by the findings of the thesis, which showed the GP sector to be the 28 
least affected, as opposed to that of specialist doctors and surgeries. Further 29 
research into the GP sector and corruption is called for and a comparative study 30 
into levels of corruption in corresponding branches of healthcare in different 31 
countries too. A comparative study would provide the scope to capture levels 32 
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and manifestations of corruption in this sector elsewhere compared to Slovakia, 1 
clarify views on the GP profession and its position in healthcare in a real-life 2 
understanding by people, and also contribute to any potential targeted anti-3 
corruption policy for the GP/ specialist sector. 4 
Overall, the thesis has shown that there are elements of cognitive dissonance 5 
between the theoretical conceptualisation of corruption and the real-life 6 
understanding of it. The case study of Slovakia’s healthcare sector has shown 7 
that corruption is fundamentally bred on the basis of asymmetry between what 8 
is available as care in real-life, what is standard care on paper, and what can be 9 
delivered within the constraints of the system. This asymmetry relates to the 10 
perceptions and realities of standard of care, working conditions of professionals 11 
and their oversight, and the health insurance business. These factors joined with 12 
the cultural and socio-economic factors outlined by the thesis together create a 13 
breeding ground for an environment where goal posts are constantly being 14 
shifted for both the care provider and the care recipient, but never at the same 15 
time. The addressing of corruption therefore cannot be expected to work on 16 
individual, separated levels- it must be achieved by a set of measures that will 17 
work together to address the existing asymmetry at once. The most impactful 18 
start to this, according to my findings, is: to boost the levels of education on 19 
corruption, to invest in healthcare as the most precious resource that it is, to 20 
clarify the language in existing legislation and policy to include the vernacular 21 
used by the people in real life, to revamp the existing health insurance packages 22 
in a transparent manner, and to instil a sense of confidence in healthcare 23 
professionals. Finally, instilling a greater sense of ethics, and standards of 24 
professionalism beyond criminal measures would hopefully result in greater 25 
levels of corruption rejection and a greater sense of pride in one’s work for the 26 
healthcare professional. The quality of care received by those who can’t afford 27 
to bribe is, after all, the real measure of any society.  28 
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Appendix 1  
Nodes of the project 
Name  Description  Files  References  
Corruption vs token of gratitude    35  61  
Time scale importance  The distinction of giving a bribe before or after medical treatment is an emergent key characteristic 
for people  
25  33  
Definitions of corruption  Responses to the question on what people understand to be corruption  41  61  
Examples  Examples of grand and petty corruption taking place in everyday situations for the respondents. Some 
are specific as to levels, which are depicted in child notes   
27  51  
Grand    25  33  
Petty    23  35  
General perception of corruption  General comments about corruption, its status and levels, its prevalence in society  37  126  
Neighbours comparison  Perceptions on how Slovakia is placed compared to its neighbouring states  19  22  
Mechanism of corruption  How people think corruption takes place- ie, where do they get information, how do they know who 
to pay etc.  
21  28  
Media scandals  How does finding out about corruption scandals make the respondents feel about the state of 
corruption?  
27  28  
Most likely occurrences of corruption  Where do people think/perceive corruption to be most likely to take place? With reference to real life 
situations or to sectors  
31  38  
Patient or doctor  Who is more likely to initiate the corrupt exchange? Specific delineation captured in children nodes  12  16  
Doctor initiates    12  15  
Patient initiates    19  22  
Personal contacts  People’s opinions on whether using personal contacts should be seen as corrupt behaviour  32  50  
They are corrupt    19  26  
They are not corrupt    16  23  
Petty and Grand  Do people distinguish between the two types?   24  26  
Address separately  Should they be addressed separately  9  10  
Distinction  Is there a distinction between grand and petty  19  22  
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Link between them  Is there a link between the two types of corruption  30  39  
Which is worse  Which type is worse for society?   16  17  
Reasons for corruption in Slovakia  What do people see as causes for corruption in Slovakia? Who or what is responsible?  10  16  
Bureaucracy    5  7  
Culture Norm    24  39  
Deficiency of services    17  40  
Lack of morals    11  18  
Legislative deficiencies    12  20  
Low living standard    25  39  
Mentality of people    27  46  
Soviet legacy    34  51  
Reporting corruption  Do respondents think that people are likely to report corruption? If so, do they know where to report 
it?  
30  36  
Sceptical that it gets looked at    17  18  
Unlikely to report    30  37  
Where to report    30  34  
Scenarios  When presented with a few health care scenarios, what are people’s responses? Do they feel 
outraged at the injustice of someone skipping the queue? Or do they feel envious?   
4  8  
Systemic change  Should the system change or does it function as it is? If it should change, what kind of change should 
this be?  
27  41  
Change bottom-top    10  12  
Change top-bottom    10  10  
Combination of both    6  6  
Trust  Is there an element of trust required between corrupt parties for corruption to successfully take 
place?  
11  11  
Where is it most frequent  Where do respondents think that corruption is most prevalent in health care?   1  1  
GP    10  10  
Private clinics    17  22  









1. Can you think of any situations where corruption occurs usually?  
1a V akých situáciách podľa vás najčastejšie dochádza ku korupcii?  
2. What do you understand by the term corruption? Have you heard the 
term grand and petty corruption before?  
2a. Čo rozumiete pod pojmom korupcia? Už ste počuli výraz vysoká a nízka 
korupcia?  
3. I am now going to present you with the definitions of grand and petty 
corruption for the purpose of this project. Do you think that the 
definitions presented to you are a fair representation of your idea of 
corruption? Is your idea of grand and petty corruption different?   
3a. Teraz vám predstavím definície vysokej a nízkej korupcie podľa tézy p
rojektu. 
Do akej miery odrážajú tieto definície vašu predstavu o vysokej a nízkej k
orupcii?  
Grand Corruption   
Abuse of power and/or distortion of centralised policies or 
resources at a managerial level within public services, with the 
purpose of the few benefiting at the expense of the many.   
Zneužitie moci a/alebo narušenie centrálneho poriadku, politiky a zdrojov na 
riadiacej pozícii v rámci verejných služieb, za účelom prospechu mála na úkor 
väčšiny.  
Short example: Inflated prices for procurement of hospital 
equipment or outsourcing hospital services such as a CT scan or an 
MRI scan by insurance companies to private facilities for a much 
greater price than the market standard.     
  
Petty Corruption   
‘Everyday’ customary payment of bribes, or other material and 
immaterial means of motivating officials to 
amend their behaviour to facilitate higher quality or faster 
reception of service provision.  
Každodenné, bežné platby úplatkov alebo iných materiálnych či nemateriáln
ych kompenzácií, ako motivácia pre verejných činiteľov upraviť správanie a
lebo reguly za cieľom obstarania služby rýchlejšie alebo vyššej kvality ako j
e norma.  
Short example: Paying a bribe to a nurse/doctor to skip waiting 
times for check-ups or minor procedures; offering a gift to the 
health professional for preferential treatment in the respective 
hospital ward.  
  
4. Why do you think corruption occurs? Do you think corruption is an 
ethical problem or a cultural norm?  
4a Prečo si myslíte, že dochádza ku korupcii? Myslíte si, že korupcia je mo
rálnym problémom alebo je kultúrnou normou?  
5. How bad do you think grand corruption is? Do you think it is worse 
than petty corruption? Does your answer alter when addressing health 
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care? Could you elaborate? Do you think they are different and if so, 
how in the healthcare context?  
5a Ako vážny je podľa vás problem vysokej korupcie? Myslíte si, že je horší
 ako stav nízkej korupcie? Líši sa váš názor ak sa bavíme vo sfére zdravotní
ctva?  
6. How do you perceive corruption in the health sector?  
6a Ako vnímate korupciu v zdravotníctve?  
7. Do you think corruption is widespread in Slovakia? If so, why?   
7a Myslíte si, že korupcia na Slovensku je rozsiahla?  
8. How would you rank Slovakia’s position in terms of its corruption 
levels with its immediate neighbours/V4? What do you think are the 
main issues of corruption abroad? Which do you think are the most 
affected sectors? Which sector of the economy seems to be the most 
corrupt one in Slovakia and why? If not then which one and why? How 
do you think this compares abroad?  
8a Kam 
by ste zaradili Slovensko v úrovni korupcie v porovnaní so susedskými kraji
nami? Aké problémy s korupciou majú podľa vás susedské krajiny V4?   
9. Do you think that the healthcare sector is corrupt? If so, why do you 
think that this sector in particular is corrupt?  
9a Myslíte si, že existuje korupcia v zdravotníctve?  Ak áno, prečo si myslíte, 
že práve tento sektor je ovplyvnený korupciou v porovnaní s ostatnými?  
10. How do you feel when you hear about a corruption scandal in the 
news or read about it in the paper (for example the select few receiving 
goods or products or government contracts unexpectedly or 
undeservedly in your opinion)? Do you feel a sense of injustice? Do you 
know of any such scandals or occurrences recently? Do you feel like such 
occurrences justify the every man’s corrupt behaviour? (also asked 
differently in 17, 28, 30, 31- this is central Research question)  
10a Ako sa cítite, keď sa z médií dozviete o korupcii? Máte pocit bezprávia? 
Viete o nejakých nedávnych škandáloch?  
11. OPTIONAL SCENARIO: I will read you a few scenarios, can you please 
tell me how these make you feel?    
You are in a waiting room in your GP surgery; you have now been waiting 
for two hours to be seen. You have moved up from being 20th in line 
to being 13th. Someone has now walked in to the waiting room, 
knocked on the door of the surgery. The nurse opens and greets the 
patient; they clearly know each other. The nurse ushers the patient 
in before the person who is now first in line. How does that make 
you feel?  
  
Your parent is long-term hospitalised and is on a ward of 40 patients, with 
2 nurses working around the clock. You pop in to see your 
parent everyday and every week you bring the nurse on duty a box 
of chocolates and a packet of nice coffee to make sure your parent 
is looked after. You notice that the patient in the bed next to your 
parent has much dirtier sheets and has not been taken for a shower 
for several days. You also notice that they do not have anyone 
visiting them or paying special attention to the nurses. How does 
this make you feel?  
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12. ** Please be careful not to mention anything that could incriminate 
you or anyone personally in this question** Have you witnessed/heard of 
instances of corruption? Can you tell me what happened? (here several 
follow ups will be asked depending on the response to elicit as much 
information as possible- for example ‘What was the reason for providing 
a bribe’ ‘Do you think that the service received in this case was better 
or worse because of involvement in corruption’ ‘How did the given third 
party know who to ask about what is accepted for whatever procedure’ 
etc)  
12a **Prosím, nespomeňte nič, čo by vás alebo niekoho osobne inkriminov
alo** Máte nejakú vedomosť o korupcii, viete o niekom so skúsenosťou s k
orupciou v zdravotníctve? Môžete mi povedať, čo sa stalo?  
13. What do you think are the conditions needed for corruption to take 
place in real life? Do you think trust plays a role? If so, in what way do 
you think it is important? (similar concepts in 13, 15, 20)  
13a Aké podmienky sú podľa vás potrebné na to, 
aby sa reálne udiala korupcia? Myslíte si, že hrá určitú rolu aj dôvera? Ak áno, 
v akom zmysle podľa vás?  
  
14. How do you think corruption is carried out?  Who and how do you 
think gets approached for corrupt transaction to take place? Where do 
you think one can find information on how corruption can be carried 
out? (similar in 15)  
14a Ako podľa vás dochádza ku korupcii? Koho podľa vás ľudia oslovia, za 
účelom korupčného chovania? Ako a kde sa podľa vás dá získať informácia 
o špecifických častiach korupčného chovania?  
15. Do you consider the use of personal contacts and connections to be 
a form of corruption? What do you think is the importance of having the 
right contacts to receive quality healthcare? If so where would you class 
this, within petty or grand and what do you think of this? (also asked 
differently in 19)  
15a Považujete využitie osobných kontaktov za formu korupcie? Myslíte si, 
že je dôležité mať tie správne kontakty na to aby sa vám dostalo kvalitnej 
zdravotnej starostlivosti? Zaradili by ste využitie kontaktov do nízkej alebo 
vysokej korupcie?  
16. Do you think some people have greater access to underground 
informal networks than others? If so why? Ie do you think there is a class 
issue even with corrupt networks of privilege? If this proves true 
then this questions the whole existence of corruption because if there 
is preferential treatment within preferential treatment itself, 
the meta analysis of such questions the whole validity of the first level 
in the first place.  
17. Why do you think that the healthcare sector is corrupt?  
17a Prečo si myslíte, že je korupcia v zdravotníctve?  
18. Who or what do you think is responsible for health care corruption?  
18a Kto alebo čo je podľa vás zodpovedný za korupciu v zdravotníctve?  
19. Where in health care do you think is corruption at its highest level? 
Within GPs, specialised health care clinics, specialty doctors, state or 
private facilities?  
19a V ktorej časti zdravotníctva je podľa vás korupcia vysoká? Obvodný lekár,
 špecializované kliniky, špecialisti, štátne alebo súkromné zariadenia?  
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20. How do you think the behaviour of healthcare professionals 
facilitates or hinders corruption? What is your view of healthcare 
professionals and their behaviour towards patients in this concept? Do 
you think it should change? If so, how?  
20a Akým spôsobom podľa vás správanie zdravotného personálu pomáha 
alebo zabraňuje korupcii? Aký je váš pohľad na túto skutočnosť? Myslíte si, 
že by sa to malo zmeniť? Ak áno, akým spôsobom?  
21. Do you think that the gravity of the medical context dictates the 
doctor’s or the patient’s conduct? Ie do you think that the graver the 
issue the more likely one is to engage in corruption in order to mitigate 
a negative result?  
21a Myslíte si, že vážnosť zdravotného stavu pacienta určuje správanie pa
cienta alebo personálu v tejto problematike? Inými slovami, máte pocit, ž
e čím vážnejší je určitý prípad, tým je väčšia pravdepodobnosť, že sa paci
ent rozhodne pre úplatok?  
22. Do you think that the healthcare authorities are corrupt? (this 
question will be amended for elite interviews so as not to 
antagonise) (maybe include scenario here)  
22a Myslíte si, že sú funkcionári v zdravotníctve skorumpovaní?  
23. How do you understand the difference between giving a token of 
‘thanks’ to a doctor and inducement of corruption? What are the most 
important criteria of distinction? This goes to the eternal debate on 
gratitude tokens and/or corruption. Is the timeline important? Ie does 
gifting after matter more than before or is there an expectation at the 
‘before’ stage to receive later anyway, in which case is the timeline 
argument moot altogether?  
23a Aký je podľa vás rozdiel medzi “poďakovaním sa” 
a korupciou? Aké sú podľa vás rozdiely?  
24. Do you think people generally condemn corruption in the healthcare 
sector or other sectors or only once they have ‘skin in the game’ so to 
say? Ie when they are negatively affected by someone else taking 
advantage of corrupt practices to get ahead on their account?  
24a Myslíte si, že ľudia väčšinou odsudzujú korupciu v zdravotníctve len ke
ď sú negatívne ovplyvnení?   
25. Is there a specific amount of people’s budget that you think people 
put away or save up for to accommodate corrupt behaviour such as 
bribes or gifts? Ie some safety net budget in case something happens 
that needs taken care of in this manner?  
25a Máte pocit, že v rodinách existuje konkrétny rozpočet na úplatky aleb
o dary? Na horšie časy?  
26. Do you think things should change or do you think they work well as 
they stand? This goes to the grease in wheels vs sand in wheels debate.  
26a Myslíte si, že by sa mali veci zmeniť, alebo system funguje tak ako mo
mentálne je?  
27. Do you think that corruption levels are better or worse since 1989 in 
Slovakia?  
27a Myslíte si, že úroveň korupcie na Slovensku je vyššia alebo nižšia ako 
pred Novembrom 1989?  
28. How do you think Slovakia’s past has influenced the people’s ability 
to receive reform attempts by the government positively? Do you think 
this will ever change?  
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28a 
Do akej miery myslíte, že história Slovenska ovplyvnila schopnosť ľudí pozi
tívne vnímať vládne reformy? Myslíte si, že sa tento trend niekedy zmení?  
29. Do you think there is a connection between high and low 
level corruption?  
29a Myslíte si, že existuje spojenie medzi vysokou a nízkou korupciou?  
30. Do you think that corruption of healthcare authorities makes it easier 
for low-level corruption to occur? Do you think that the opposite is true?  
30a Myslíte si, že korupcia vo vedení zdravotníctva ospravedlňuje nízku fo
rmu korupcie? Myslíte si, že je to naopak?  
31. Have you got insight into the systemic factors preconditioning the 
need for corruption to survive? (elite-specific)  
31a Viete o nejakých systemických faktoroch, ktoré robia korupciu nevyhn
utnú v danom čase?  
32. Do you think that the prevalence of petty corruption encourages the 
grand corruption taking place in healthcare and other sectors?  
32a Máte pocit, že množstvo existujúcej nízkej korupcie ospavedlňuje kor
upciu na vyšších miestach v zdravotníctve a iných sektoroch? Myslíte si, že
 je to naopak?  
33. In your professional experience and capacity, how do you see 
corruption today? (elite-specific)  
33a Z vašej skúsenosti a pozície, ako vidíte korupciu dnes vy?  
34. Do you think greater education on the subject would help people 
engage in both kinds of corruption less? Do you think this is relevant to 
health care? Any suggestions of what you think could work?  
34a Myslíte si, že väčšia informovanosť ľudí o problematike by pomohla zn
íženiu korupcie? Čo myslíte, že by fungovalo najlepšie?  
35. Would you report corruption if you saw it? If so, would you know 
where to turn to?  
35a Nahlásili by ste korupciu ak by ste sa s ňou stretli? 







Research Questions and Field Questions  
  
Research Question (RQ)  Hypotheses or Theoretical 
assumptions  
Categories addressing RQs  Field question examples, addressing RQs. This is orientational, however, not exhaustive 
of all questions and follow-ups asked, allowing for the potential for several questions to 
address more than just one RQ, dependent on answers.  
Overarching research question 
(RQ): To what extent is the 
theoretical difference between 
grand and petty corruption 
reflected in the real-life 
understanding of corruption in 
Slovakia’s health care?  




and reporting  










• Can you think of any situations where corruption occurs usually?   
• Why do you think corruption occurs? Do you think corruption is an 
ethical problem or a cultural norm?  
• How do you perceive corruption in the health sector?   
• Do you think corruption is widespread in Slovakia? If so, why?   
• How do you feel when you hear about a corruption scandal in the news 
or read about it in the paper?  
• Please be careful not to mention anything that could incriminate you or 
anyone personally in this question** Have you witnessed/heard of instances 
of corruption? Can you tell me what happened?   
• What do you think are the conditions needed for corruption to take 
place in real life?  
• Who or what do you think is responsible for health care corruption?   
• Do you think things should change or do you think they work well as they 
stand?  
RQ1: How does awareness of 
grand corruption inform/justify 
individual engagement in petty 
corruption?  
H0a: Awareness of grand corruption 
will have no impact on the 
engagement of individuals in petty 
corruption and vice versa.   
H1a: Awareness of grand corruption 
will inform/justify individual 
engagement in petty corruption.  








and Reporting  
• What do you understand by the term corruption? Have you heard the 
term grand and petty corruption before?   
• I am now going to present you with the definitions of grand and petty 
corruption for the purpose of this project. Do you think that the definitions 
presented to you are a fair representation of your idea of corruption? Is your 
idea of grand and petty corruption different?    
• How bad do you think grand corruption is? Do you think it is worse 
than petty corruption?  
495 
• How do you understand the difference between giving a token of 
‘thanks’ to a doctor and inducement of corruption? What are the most 
important criteria of distinction?  
• Do you think people generally condemn corruption in the healthcare 
sector or other sectors or only once they have ‘skin in the game’ so to say?  
• Do you think that corruption levels are better or worse since 1989 in 
Slovakia?   
• Would you report corruption if you saw it? If so, would you know where 
to turn to?   
RQ2: How does awareness of 
petty corruption inform/justify 
individual engagement in grand 
corruption?  
H0b: Awareness of grand corruption 
will have no impact on the 
engagement of individuals in petty 
corruption and vice versa.  
H1b: Awareness of petty corruption 
will inform/justify individual 
engagement in grand corruption.   
  








and Reporting  
• How bad do you think grand corruption is? Do you think it is worse 
than petty corruption? (vice versa)  
• How do you feel when you hear about a corruption scandal in the news 
or read about it in the paper?  
• Do you think there is a connection between high and low 
level corruption?  
• Do you think that corruption of health care authorities makes it easier 
for low-level corruption to occur?   
• Do you think that the prevalence of petty corruption encourages the 
grand corruption taking place in health care and other sectors?   
  
RQ3: What are the strategies 
utilised to carry out grand and 
petty corrupt practices?  
Theoretical assumption: There will be 
similarities in the strategies utilised to 













• Petty v 
Grand  
• What do you think are the conditions needed for corruption to take 
place in real life?  
• How do you think corruption is carried out?  Who and how do you think 
gets approached for corrupt transaction to take place? Where do you think 
one can find information on how corruption can be carried out?   
• Do you consider the use of personal contacts and connections to be a 
form of corruption?   
• How do you think the behaviour of healthcare professionals facilitates or 
hinders corruption? What is your view of healthcare professionals and their 
behaviour towards patients in this concept?  
• How do you understand the difference between giving a token of 
‘thanks’ to a doctor and inducement of corruption? What are the most 
important criteria of distinction?  
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RQ3a- subquestion: What is the 
significance of trust as a pre-
requisite for corrupt interactions?  
Theoretical assumption: Trust is 
understood as one of the processes of 
corruption that links the corrupt 
practices on grand and petty levels; as 
such it is seen as a condition more 
often than it is understood as a result 







• What do you think are the conditions needed for corruption to take 
place in real life? Do you think trust plays a role? If so, in what way do you 
think it is important?  
• What do you think is the importance of having the right contacts to 
receive quality healthcare? If so, where would you class this, within petty or 
grand and what do you think of this?   
  
RQ3b- subquestion: To what 
extent are social rules and 
customs important in the carrying 
out of corrupt practices?  
Theoretical assumption: Social rules 
and customs are understood as one 
of the processes of corruption that 
links corrupt practices on grand and 
petty levels; as such they will prove as 
important determinants in carrying 









• How do you understand the difference between giving a token of 
‘thanks’ to a doctor and inducement of corruption? What are the most 
important criteria of distinction?  
• Is there a specific amount of people’s budget that you think people put 
away or save up for to accommodate corrupt behaviour such as bribes or 
gifts?  
• Do you think people generally condemn corruption in the healthcare 
sector or other sectors or only once they have ‘skin in the game’ so to say?  
497 
Bibliography 
25, E. C. R. A. (2014). "Slovakia to the EU Anti-Corruption Report' Brussels 2014, COM(2014) 38 
final." 
Agbiboa, D. (2012). "Between Corruption and Development: The Political Economy of State 
Robbery in Nigeria." Journal of Business Ethics 108(3): 325-345. 
Agee, J. (2009). "Developing qualitative research questions: a reflective process." International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 22(4): 431-447. 
Alexa, N. (2007). "Corruption trends in Central Europe." The Analyst-Central and Eastern 
European Review 4. 
Aliyev, H. (2015). "Post-Soviet informality: towards theory-building." International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy 35(3/4): 182-198. 
Andvig, J. C., F. Odd-Helg, I. Amundse, T. Sissener and T. Soreide (2001). "Corruption: A Review of 
Contemporary Research." Chr. Michelsen Institute 7. 
Anon (1999). Paying for health care. Sofia, Bulgaria, Klan. 
Arapovic, A., C. A. Depken and M. Hadzikadic (2017). "Corruption in Transition Economies: Cause 
or Effect?" Zagreb Iternational Review of Economics and Business 20(1): 113-123. 
Arigo, D., S. Pagoto, L. Carter-Harris, S. E. Lillie and C. Nebeker (2018). "Using social media for 
health research: Methodological and ethical considerations for recruitment and intervention 
delivery." Digital Health 4: 1-15. 
Armat, M. R., H. Sharifi, A. Heydari, A. Assarroudi and M. Rad (2018). "Inductive and Deductive: 
Ambiguous Labels in Qualitative Content Analysis." The Qualitative Report 23(1): 219-221. 
Ashforth, B. E. and V. Anand (2003). "The normalization of corruption in organizations." Research 
in Organisational Behaviour 25: 1-52. 
Atkinson, P. and J. Flint (2001). "Access in hidden and hard-to-reach populations: snowball 
research strategies." Social Research Update 33: 1-5. 
Atkinson, P. and D. Silverman (1997). "Kundera's Immortality: The interview society and the 
invention of the self." Qualitative Inquiry 3: 304-325. 
Baez-Camargo, C. and A. Ledeneva (2017). "Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? 
Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania." Slavonic 
and East European Review 95(1): 49-+. 
Balík, P. and L. Starečková (2012). Analýza postavenia pacientov v súčasnom zdravotníctve. 
Bratislava, Health Policy Institute. 
Balliet, D., N. P. Li, S. J. Macfarlan and M. Van Vugt (2011). "Sex Differences in Cooperation: A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Social Dilemmas." Psychological Bulletin 137(6): 881-909. 
  498 
Barr, A. and E. A. Feigenbaum (1981). Chapter V. Understanding Spoken Language. The Handbook 
of Artificial Intelligence. A. Barr and E. A. Feigenbaum. Stanford, CA, HeurisTech Press. 
Batory, A. (2012). "Political Cycles and Organizational Life Cycles: Delegation to Anticorruption 
Agencies in Central Europe." Governance 25. 
Batory, A. (2012). "Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target 
compliance perspective." Regulation and Governance 6. 
Bauhr, M. and N. Charron (2017). "Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral 
Accountability." Comparative Political Studies 51(4): 415-446. 
Bauhr, M., N. Charron and L. Wangnerud (2018). "Exclusion or interests? Why females in elected 
office reduce petty and grand corruption." European Journal of Political Research 58(4). 
Baumeister, R. F. and K. L. Sommer (1997). "What do men want? Gender differences and two 
spheres of belongingness: comment on Cross and Madson." Psychological Bulletin 122(1): 38-44. 
Beblavy, M. (2009). "Conditions for Effective Large-Scale Anticorruption Efforts and the Role of 
External Actors: What Does the Slovak Experience Tell Us?" Public Administration and 
Development 29: 180-192. 
Beblavy, M. and E. Sicakova-Beblava (2014). "The Changing Faces of Europeanisation: How Did the 
European Union Influence Corruption in Slovakia Before and After Accession?" Europe-Asia 
Studies 66(4): 536-556. 
Beňová, Z. (2014). Čakacie lehoty u obvodného lekára? O pár rokov realita [Waiting times at the 
GP? Might be a reality in a few years]. pravda.sk [online]. Bratislava [online]. 
Berkovich, I. (2015). "The Corrupted industry and the Wagon-Wheel Effect: A Cross-country 
exploration of the effect of government corruption on public service effectiveness." 
Administration and Society. 
Berlinski, B. C. (1997). "The dark figure of corruption." Policy Review 155. 
Bernd, R. and M. McKee (2009). "Health reform in central and eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union." Lancet 374. 
Blasszauer, B. (1997). "Petty corruption in health care." Journal of Medical Ethics 23: 133-134. 
Bloor, M., J. Frankland, M. Thomas and K. Robson (2011). Composition of Groups. Focus Groups in 
Social Research. London, SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 19-36. 
Blumer, H. (1928). Method in social psychology, Ph.D. dissertation. IL, University of Chicago. 
Blumer, H. (1939). Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences: An Appraisal of Thomas Zanniecki's 
'The Polish Peasant in Europe and America'. NY, Social Science Research Council. 
Boardman, C. and V. Klum (2013). Corruption and Anti-Corruption. Corruption and Anti-
Corruption. P. Larmour and N. Wolanin, ANU Press. 
Bohn, S. (2013). Justifying corrupt exchanges: rational-choice corruptors. (Dys-) Functionalities of 
Corruption: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism. T. Debiel and A. Gawrich. 
Heidelberg, Springer VS. 3. 
  499 
Bohórquez, E. and D. Devrim (2012). Cracking the myth of petty bribery. Notes internacionals. 
Barcelona, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. 
Bolden, R. and J. Moscarola (2000). "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide." Social Science 
Computer Review 18(4): 450-460. 
Bourdieu, P. (1997). Marginalia- some additional notes of the gift. The Logic of the Gift. A. D. 
Schrift. New York, Routledge. 
Bracking, S. (2007). "Corruption and Development The Anti-Corruption Campaigns Editor's 
Preface." Corruption and Development: The Anti-Corruption Campaigns: Xii-Xiii. 
Brannen, J. (1988). "The Study of Sensitive Subjects." Sociological Review 36(3): 552-563. 
Braun, V. and V. Clarke (2006). "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology." Qualitative Research 
Psychology 3: 77-101. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (1999). "State-Civil Society Networks for Policy Implementation in Developing 
Countries." Policy Studies Review 16(1). 
Brooks, G. (2016). Criminology of Corruption: Theoretical Approaches. Wolverhampton, UK, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brooks, G., D. Walsh, C. Lewis and H. Kim (2013). The Prevention of corruption: Investigation, 
enforcement and governance. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
BTI (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report: Slovakia. Country Report. S. Donner, H. Hartmann, R. 
Schwarz and S. Steinkamp, Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. 
Bucholtz, M. (2000). "The politics of transcription." Journal of Pragmatics 32: 1439-1465. 
Buncak, J., R. Dzambazovic, M. Hrabovsky and J. Sopoci (2009). Nazory obcanov na buducnost 
Slovenska. Bratislava, Academy of Sciences. 
Burgess, J., C. Limb and C. M. Harrison (1988). "Exploring environmental valkues through the 
medium of small groups: 1. Theory and practice." Environment and Planning A 20(3): 309-326. 
Bussell, J., Rose-Ackerman, S. (2015). "Typologies of corruption: a pragmatic approach." 
Byrne, B. (2012). Qualitative Interviewing. Researching Society and Culture. C. Seale. London, 
Sage. 
Cameron, J. (2005). Focusing on the Focus Group. Qualitative Research Methods in Human 
Geography. I. Hay. Melbourne, Oxford University Press. 
Caplan, A. L. (1988). "Professional Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding." University of 
Pennsylvania Scholarly Commons Centre for Bioethics Papers. 
Castle, S. (2010). E.U. Cash Tunnel Ends in Slovakia. New York Times. online. 
Charmaz, K. (2002). "Stories and silences: Disclosures and self in chronic illness." Qualitative 
Inquiry 8(8): 302-328. 
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing Grounded Theory. London, Sage. 
  500 
Chattopadhyay, S. (2013). "Corruption in healthcare and medicine: Why should physicians and 
bioethicists care and what should they do?" Indian Journal of Medical Ethics X(3). 
Chêne, M. (2014). The Impact of Corruption on Growth and Inequality. T. International, 
Transparency International  
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and Representations. New York, Columbia University Press. 
Chrancokova, M., G. Weibl and D. Dokupilova (2020). The Brain Drain of People from Slovakia. 
51st International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development, Rabat Varazdin, 
Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship Agency (VADEA). 
Clarke, M. (1983). Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control. London, Frances Pinter 
Publishers (Ltd). 
Clarke, M. e. (1983). Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control. London, Frances Pinter 
Publishers (Ltd). 
Clough, P. and C. Nutbrown (2002). A student’s guide to methodology: Justifying enquiry. London, 
SAGE. 
Code, S. C. (2005). Trestné činy korupcie 300/2005. Bratislava Slovakia, Euro Kodex. 300/2005 Z.z. 
Trestný zákon, §328-336a. 
Cook, G. (1990). "Transcribing infinity." Journal of Pragmatics 14: 1-24. 
Cooper, R. (2018). What is Civil Society, its role and value in 2018? K4D Knowledge, evidence and 
learning for development. UK Department for International Development. 
Cox, T. (2013). Social Change and Social Policy. Developments in Central and East European 
Politics. S. White, P. G. Lewis and J. Batt. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 5: 241-256. 
Crabtree, B. and W. Miller (1999). A template approach to text analysis: Developing and using 
codebooks. Doing qualitative research. B. Crabtree and W. Miller. Newbury Park, CA, Sage: 163-
177. 
Cresswell, J. W. and J. D. Cresswell (2018). Research design: qualitative, quantitative & mixed 
methods approaches. London, SAGE. 
Cross, S. E. and L. Madson (1997). "Models of the self: self-construals and gender." Psychological 
Bulletin 122(1): 5-37. 
Daly, J., A. Kellehear and M. Gliksman (1997). The public health researcher: A methodological 
approach. Melbourne, Australia, Oxford University Press. 
Dancikova, Z., P. Nechala and E. Skacal (2016). Whistleblower protection is only on paper. 
Bratislava, Transparency International. 
Davidson, C. (2009). "Transcription: Imperatives for Qualitative Research." International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 8(2). 
De Maria, W. (2008). "Measurements and markets: Deconstructing the corruption perception 
index." International Journal of Public Sector Management 21(7): 777-797. 
  501 
Debiel, T. and A. Gawrich (2013). (Dys-)Functionalities of corrupion: comparative perspectives and 
methodological pluralism. (Dys-)Functionalities of Corruption: Comparative Perspectives and 
Methodological Pluralism. T. Debiel and A. Gawrich. Heidelberg, Springer VS. 3. 
Deegan-Krause, K. (2013). “Slovakia”. The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. S. 
Berglund, J. Ekman, K. Deegan-Krause and T. Knutsen. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar: 255-290. 
Deeks, A., C. Lombard, J. Muchelmore and H. Teede (2009). "The effects of gender and age on 
health related behaviours." BMC Public Health 9(213). 
Della porta, D. and A. Vannucci (1999). Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of 
POlitical Corruption. New York, de Gruyter. 
Denzin, N. K. and Y. S. e. Lincoln (1998). Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. London, 
Sage. 
Deterding, N. M. and M. C. Waters (2018). "Flexible Coding of In-depth Interviews: A Twenty-first-
century Approach." Sociological Methods & Research: 1-32. 
Dexter, L. A. (1970). Elite and Specialised Interviewing. IL, Northwestern University Press. 
Dey, I. (1993). Quaitative Data Analysis. A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists. London, 
Routledge. 
Dickson-Swift, V., E. James and P. Liamputtong (2008). Undertaking sensitive research in the 
health and social sciences : managing boundaries, emotions and risks. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Dimitrova-Grajzl, V. and E. Simon (2010). "Political Trust and Historical Legacy: The Effects of 
Varieties of Socialism." East European Politics and Societies 24: 206-228. 
Dlouhy, M. (2016). "International Comparison of Health System Performance in Visegrad 
Countries." Casopis ceskeho lekarstvi 155(5): 242-246. 
Doig, A. and R. Theobald (2000). Corruption and Democratisation. London, Frank Cass. 
Dollar, D., R. Fishman and R. Gatti (2001). "Are women really the fairer sex? Corruption and 
women in government." Journal of Economimc Behaviour and Organization 26(4): 423-429. 
Dreher, A. and F. Schneider (2009). "Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis." 
Public Choice 144: 215-238. 
Drugov, M., J. Hamman and D. Serra (2011). "Intermediaries in Corruption: an Experiment." 
Florida State University Working Papers. 
Duncan, N. (2006). The Non-perception Based Measurement of Corruptiomn: A Review of Issues 
and Methods from a Policy Perspective. Measuring Corruption. A. Shacklock and F. Galtung. 
London, Routledge. 
Dupuy, K. and S. Neset (2018). The cognitive psychology of corruption: Micro-level explanations 
for unethical behaviour. U4. D. Jackson. Norway, U4 Anti-Corruption Centre at the Chr. Michelsen 
Institute. 2. 
Duranti, A. (2007). "Transcripts, like shadows on a wall." Mind, Culture and Activity 13(4): 301-
310. 
  502 
Dzambazovic, R. (2011). Verejné vnímanie korupcie v období po roku 1989 [Public perception of 
corruption post-1989]. Sociálna inklúzia: teoreticko-metodologické a sociálno-politické súvislosti v 
sociologickej perspektíve. VEGA 1/0056/10, Forum Historiae. 
Eaden, J., M. K. Mayberry and J. F. Mayberry (1999). "Questionnaires: the use and abuse of social 
survey methods in medical research." Postgraudate Medicine Journal 75: 397-400. 
EC (2014). European Commission: Annex Slovakia to the EU Anti-Corruption Report. EU Anti-
Corruption Report. European Commission. 
EC (2016). European Commission Education and Training Monitor 2016. European Commission. 
EC (2017). Special Eurobarometer 470 Report: Corruption. E. Commission. European Commission. 
EC (2018). European Commission: Ako vnímame korupciu [How we perceive corruption]. 
https://ec.europa.eu/. 
Ellman, M. (2005). "Transition: Intended and Unintended Processes." Comparative Economic 
Studies 47: 595-614. 
Ensor, T. (2004). "Informal payments for health care in transition economies." Social Science & 
Medicine 58(2): 237-246. 
Eurobarometer (2013). Special Barometer 397: Corruption Report. European Commission. 
Eurobarometer (2017). Eurobarometer Special Report 470; Corruption. European Commission. 
Falk, I. and J. Guenther (2007). Generalising from qualitative research: case studies from VET in 
contexts. AVETRA 2007- 10th Annual Conference, Victoria University, Footscray Park. 
Fan, Y. (2002). "Guanxi’s Consequences: Personal Gains at Social Cost." Journal of Business and 
Ethics 38. 
Fazekas, M., J. Chvalkovska, J. Skuhrovec, I. J. Toth and L. P. King (2013). Are EU funds a corruption 
risk? Working Paper Series: CRB-WP/2013:03, Corruption Research Center Budapest. 
Fazekas, M. and L. P. King (2018). "Perils of development funding? The tale of EU Funds." 
Regulation and Governance. 
Fazekas, M., L. P. King, J. Chvalkovska, J. Skuhrovec and I. J. Toth (2014). Are EU funds a corruption 
risk? The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Working Paper 
series: CRCB-WP/2013:03. Budapest, Corruption Research Center Budapest. 
Fereday, J. and E. Muir-Cochrane (2006). "Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid 
Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development." International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 5(1). 
Ferrie, J. (2018). Lecture in series Applied Qualitative Methods, University of Glasgow. 
Foltz, J. D. and K. A. Opoku-Agyemang (2015). Do Higher Salaries Lower Petty Corruption? A Policy 
Experiment on West Africa’s Highways, UC Berkeley. 
Fowler, A. (2000). Civil Society, NGDOs and Social Development: Changing the Rules of the Game. 
Geneva 2000 Occasional Paper. U. N. R. I. f. S. Development. Geneva, United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development. 
  503 
Fric, P. (1999). Korupcni klima v CR. Korupce na cesky zpusob. P. Fric. Prague, G plus G: 73-115. 
Fric, P. and J. Kabele (1999). Korupce jako socialni fenomen. Korupce na cesky zpusob. P. Fric. 
Prague, Nakladatelstvi G plus G. 
Gaitonde, R., A. D. Oxman, P. O. Okebukola and G. Rada (2016). Interventions to reduce 
corruption in the health sector (Review), Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. 
Gallina, N. (2013). Analysing Informality: A Case-Study Based Concept applied to the Czech 
Republic. Informality in Eastern Europe: Structures, political Cultures and Social Practices. C. 
Giordano and N. Hayoz. Bern, Switzerland, Peter Lang AG. 11: 141-159. 
Gallina, N. (2013). Anti-corruption revisited: the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. (Dys-) 
Functionalities of Corruption: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism. T. Debiel 
and A. Gawrich. Heidelberg, Springer VS. 3. 
Garcia, P. (2019). "Corruption in global health: the open secret." The Lancet 394: 2119-2124. 
Gay, B. (2014). "Open innovation, networking, and business model dynamics: the two sides." 
Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 3. 
Gelinas, L., R. Pierce, S. Winkler, I. G. Cohen, H. F. Lynch and B. E. Bierer (2017). "Using Social 
Media as a Research Recruitment Tool: Ethical Issues and Recommendations." American Journal 
of Bioethics 17(3): 3-14. 
Gerber, A. and D. Green (2011). "Field Experiments and Natural Experiments." The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Science. 
Gibson, K., J. Cameron and A. Veno (1999). Negotiating Restructuring and Sustainability: A Study 
of Communities Experiencing Rapid Social Change. Melbourne, AHURI, Australian Housing and 
Urban Research Institute Working Paper. 
Gill, P., K. Stewart, E. Treasure and B. Chadwick (2008). "Methods of data collection in qualitative 
research: interviews and focus groups." British Dental Journal 204(6). 
Giordano, C. and N. Hayoz (2013). Introduction: Exploring Informality in Eastern Europe through 
Different Disciplines. Informality in Eastern Europe: Structures, Political Cultures and Social 
Practices. C. Giordano and N. Hayoz. Bern, Switzerland, Peter Lang AG. 11: 9-27. 
Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory. 
Mill Valley, CA, Sociology Press. 
Glaser, B. G. and A. L. Strauss (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research, Wiedenfeld & Nicholson. 
Goel, R. and J. Budak (2006). "Corruption in transition economies: Effects of government size, 
country size and economic reforms." Journal of Economics and Finance 30(2): 240-250. 
Goel, R. K., Nelson, M.A., Naretta, M.A (2012). "The internet as an indicator of corruption 
awareness." 28. 
Gould, R. and R. M. Fernandez (1989). "Structures of mediation: a formal approach to brokerage 
in transaction networks." Sociol. Methodol. 19: 89-126. 
  504 
Graneheim, U. H. and B. Lundman (2004). "Qualitative Content Analysis in Nursing Research: 
Concepts, procedures and measures to achieve trustworthiness." Nurse Education Today 24: 105-
112. 
Granovetter, M. (1992). Problems of explanation in economic sociology. Networks and 
Organisations: Structure, Form, and Action. N. Nohria and R. G. Eccles. Boston, Harvard Business 
School. 
Gray, J. (2009). "International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and 
Investor Risk." American Journal of Political Science 53(4): 931-949. 
Green, J., K. Willis, E. Hughes, R. Small, N. Welch, L. Gibbs and J. Daly (2007). "Generating best 
evidence from qualitative research: the role of data analysis." Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Public Health 31(6). 
Greenberg, J. H. (1971). Language, Culture and Communication. Stanford, CA, Stanford University 
Press. 
Greene, J. C. and V. J. Caracelli (1997). "Defining and describing the paradigm issue in mixed-
method evaluation." New Directions for Evaluation(74): 5-17. 
Grochova, L., Otahal, T. (2013). "How does corruption in Central and Eastern Europe Hurt 
Economic Growth? Granger Test of Causality." Ekonomicky casopis 6. 
Grodeland, A. B. and A. Aasland (2011). "Fighting corruption in public procurement in post-
communist states: Obstacles and solutions." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44: 17-32. 
Grodeland, A. B., T. Y. Koshechkina and W. L. Miller (1998). "'Foolish to give and yet more foolish 
not to take' - In-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes 
and contacts." Europe-Asia Studies 50(4): 651-677. 
Gupta, S., H. R. Davoodi and R. Alonso-Terme (2002). Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality 
and Poverty? Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. S. Gupta and G. Abed, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Gustafsson, J. (2017). Single case studies vs. multiple case studies: A comparative study. H. 
University. Halmstad, Sweden. 
Gyimah-Brempong, K. (2002). "Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa." 
Economics of Governance 3: 183-209. 
Habibov, N. (2016). "Effect of corruption on healthcare satisfaction in post-soviet nations: A cross-
country instrumental variable analysis of twelve countries." Social Science & Medicine 152: 119-
124. 
Hamann, R. and N. Acutt (2003). "How should civil society (and the government) respond to 
‘corporate social responsibility’? A critique of business motivations and the potential for 
partnerships." Development Southern Africa 20(2). 
Hammersley, M. (1989). The Dilemma of Qualitative Method: Herbert Blumer and the Chicago 
Tradition. London, Routledge. 
Hamo, M., S. Blunt-Kulka and G. Hacohen (2004). "From observation to transcription and back: 
Theory, practice, and interpretation in the analysis of children’s naturally occurring discourse. ." 
Research on Language and Social Interaction 37(1): 71-92. 
  505 
Haughton, T. (2013). The Other New Europeans. Developments in Central & East European Politics 
5. S. White, P. G. Lewis and J. Batt. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Haughton, T. (2014). "Exit, choice and legacy: explaining the patterns of party politics in post-
communist Slovakia." East European Politics 30(2): 210-229. 
Heidenheimer, A. J. (1970). Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New 
Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books. 
Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnston, M., Ed. (2009). Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts. New 
Brunswick,NJ, Transaction Publishers. 
Heywood, P. (2014). Measuring Corruption. Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption. P. 
Heywood. London, Routledge: 137-152. 
Heywood, P., Ed. (2014). Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption. London, Routledge. 
Hindess, B. (2013). Good government and corruption. Corruption and Anti-Corruption. P. Larmour 
and N. Wolanin, ANU Press. 
Hoinaru, R., D. Buda, S. N. Borlea, V. L. Vaidean and M. V. Achim (2020). "The Impacy of 
Corruption and Shadow Economy on the Economic and Sustainable Development. Do they “Sand 
the Wheels” or “Grease the Wheels”?" Sustainability 12. 
Holbrook, B. and P. Jackson (1996). "Shopping around: Focus group research in North London." 
Area 28(2): 136-142. 
Holland, J., C. Ramazanoglu, S. Sharpe and R. Thomson (1994). "Power and desire: The 
embodiment of female sexuality." Feminist Review (46): 21-38. 
Holmes, L. (1997). "Corruption as the crisis of the post-communist state." Crime Law Soc Change 
27. 
Holmes, L. (2006). Rotten States?: corruption, post-communism and neoliberalism, Duke 
University Press. 
Holzer, J., Mares, M., Ed. (2016). Challenges to Democracies in East Central Europe. London, 
Routledge. 
Hope, D. and J. Limberg (2020). The Economic Consequences of Major Tax Cuts for the Rich. 
Working Papers. London School of Economics, LSE International Inequalities Institute. 
Howard, M. (2002). "The weakness of post-communist civil societies." Journal of Democracy 
13(1): 157-169. 
HPI (2014). 10 rokov reformy zdravotníctva  [10 Years of Health Policy Reforms]. Bratislava, Health 
Policy Institute. 
Ijereweme, O. B. (2015). "Anatomy of Corruption in the NIgerian Public Sector: Theoretical 
Perspectives and Some Empirical Explanations." SAGE Open. 
Iloie, R. E. (2015). "Connections between FDI, Corruption Index and Country Risk Assessments in 
Central and Eastern Europe." Emerging Markets Queries in Finance and Business 2014, Emqfb 
2014 32: 626-633. 
  506 
Ivanov, K. (2007). The limits of a Global Campaign against Corruption. Corruption and 
Development: The Anti-Corruption Campaigns. S. Bracking. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jancsics, D. (2013). "Petty corruption in Central and Eastern Europe: the client's perspective." 
Crime Law Social Change 60: 319-341. 
Jancsics, D. (2015). ""A friend gave me a phone number"- Brokerage in low-level corruption." 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 43: 68-87. 
Johnson, J. and D. Hardoon (2012). Why, when and how to use the Global Corruption Barometer. 
Bergen, Norway, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 
Kariv, D., T. V. Menzies, G. A. Brenner and L. J. Filion (2009). "Transnational networking and 
business performance: Ethnic entrepreneurs in Canada." Entrepreneurship & Regional 
Development 21(3). 
Karklins, R. (2005). The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-communist Societies. Armonk, 
NY, M.E. Sharpe. 
Katsenelinboigen, A. (1983). Corruption in the USSR. Corruption: Causes, Consequences and 
Control. M. e. Clarke. London, Frances Pinter (Publishers), Ltd. 
Kaufmann, D. and P. Siegelbaum (1997). "Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies." 
Journal of International Affairs 50(2): 419-458. 
Kaufmann, W., R. Hooghiemstra and M. K. Feeney (2018). "Formal institutions, informal 
institutions, and red tape: A comparative study." Public Administration 96: 386-403. 
Kenny, C. (2006). "Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure." World 
Bank Working Paper 4099. 
Kitzinger, J. (1994). Focus Groups: method of madness? Challenge and Innovation: 
Methodological Advances in Social Research on HIV/AIDS. M. Boulton. London, Taylor and Francis. 
Kitzinger, J. (1994). "The methodology of focus groups: The importance of interaction between 
research participants." Sociology of Health and Illness 16: 103-121. 
Klopper, H. (2008). "The qualitative research proposal." Curationis 31(4): 62-72. 
Knack, S. (2006). "Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the 
Cross-Country Indicators." World Bank Working Paper 3968. 
Ko, K. and A. Samajdar (2010). "Evaluation of international corruption indexes: Should we believe 
them or not?" The Social Science Journal 47. 
Kohlami, L. (2013). "The Never-Ending Fight: Economic and Political Corruption in Hungary." 
DANUBE: Law and Economics Review 4(1): 67-82. 
Kornai, J. (2006). "The great transformation of Central Eastern Europe." Economics of Transition 
14(2): 207-244. 
Kostadinova, T. (2012). Political Corruption in Eastern Europe: Politics after Communism. London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
  507 
Koudelková, P., W. Strielkowski and D. Hejlová (2015). "Corruption and System Change in the 
Czech Republic: Firm-Level Evidence." DANUBE: Law and Economics Review 6(1): 25-46. 
Krajanova, D. (2010). Máme zrušiť už skončený mýtny tender. SME. 
Krastev, I. (2004). Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption, Central 
European University Press. 
Krueger, R. A. (1993). When to use focus groups and why. Successful Focus Groups: Advancing the 
State of the Art. D. Morgan. Newbury Park,  CA, Sage Publications: 3-19. 
Krueger, R. A. (1994). Focus Groups: a Practical Guide for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks, SAGE. 
Kubbe, I. (2013). Corruption and trust: a model design. (Dys-) Functionalities of Corruption: 
Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism. T. Debiel and A. Gawrich. Heidelberg, 
Springer VS. 3. 
Kubbe, I., A. Alexander and L. Wangnerud (2019). The effect of gender on corruption. QOG 
Working Paper Series. Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg (Quality of Government Institute). 
Kun, R., R. Kun and W. Togomae (2004). Nauru national integrity systems: country study report. 
Blackburn South, Transparency International. 
Kunicova, J. (2020). Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against 
Corruption. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand Oaks, 
CA, Sage. 
Kvale, S. (2011). Ethical Issues of Interviewing. Doing Interviews. London, SAGE: 24-32. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007). The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform. New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lampert, N. (1983). "Privilege in the Soviet-Union - a Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism - 
Matthews,M." History 68(224): 542-543. 
Lampert, N. (1984). "“Law and Order in the USSR: The Case of Economic and Official Crime’." 
Soviet Studies 36(3): 366-385. 
Lancet (2006). "Corruption in health care costs lives." The Lancet (Editorial) 367. 
Larmour, P. (2011). "Anti-Anticorruption: Barry Hindess' Recent Work on Corruption." Alternatives 
36(1): 48-55. 
Lauth, H. (2000). "Informal Institutions and Democracy." Democratization 7(4): 21-50. 
Lawler, E. and L. Hipp (2010). "Corruption as Social Exchange." Advances in Group Processes 27: 
269-296. 
Lawless, B. and Y. Chen (2018). "Developing a Method of Critical Thematic Analysis for Qualitative 
Communication Inquiry." Howard Journal of Communications 0(0): 1-15. 
Lawson, C., J. Nemec and V. Šagát (2012). "Health Care Reforms in the Slovak and Czech Republics 
1989-2011: The Same or Different Tracks?" Ekonomie. 
  508 
Ledeneva, A. (2008). "Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China." Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 50: 118-144. 
Ledeneva, A. (2009). "“Blat”: Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" Social Research 
76(1): 257-288. 
Ledeneva, A. (2009). "Corruption in postcommunist societies in Europe: A re-examination." 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10(1). 
Ledeneva, A., R. Bratu and P. Koker (2017). "Corruption Studies for the Twenty-First Century: 
Paradigm Shifts and Innovative Approaches." Slavonic and East European Review 95(1): 1-20. 
Ledeneva, A., S. Lovell and A. Rogachevskii, (ed.) (2000). Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating 
Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s. London, Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Lee, R. M. (1993). Doing Research on Sensitive Topics. London, Sage. 
Lee, W. S. and C. Guven (2013). "Engaging in corruption: The influence of cultural values and 
contagion effects at the microlevel." Journal of Economic Psychology 39: 287-300. 
Lesko, M. (2017). Chudák každý, čo po nich tú káru bude ťahať ďalej [What a shame for anyone 
who has to pull the wagon after this lot]. Bratislava, Premedia. 
Leung, L. (2015). "Validity, reliability, and generalizability in qualitative research." Journal of 
Family Medicine and Primary Care 4(3): 324-327. 
Leven, B. (2005). "Corruption and reforms: A case of Poland's medical sector." Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 38(4): 447-455. 
Levy, J. S. (2008). "Case studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference." Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 25: 1-18. 
Lewis, M. (2007). "Informal Payments and the Financing of Health Care in Developing and 
Transition Countries." Health Affairs 26(4): 984-997. 
Linde, J. and G. Erlingsson (2012). "The Eroding Effect of Corruption on System Support in 
Sweden." Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions. 
Lindner, S. (2013). Salary top-ups and their impact on corruption. CHR Michelsen Institute, 
Transparency International. 
Lindquist, K. A., J. MacCormack and H. Shablack (2015). "The role of language in emotion: 
predictions from psychological constructionism." Frontiers in Psychology 6(444). 
Loffe, H. and L. Yardley (2004). Content and thematic analysis. Research methods for Clinical and 
Health Psychology. L. Yardley and D. F. Marks. London, Sage: 56-69. 
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power: two works by Niklas Luhmann. Chichester, Wiley. 
Mackey, T. K. and B. A. Liang (2012). "Combating healthcare corruption and fraud with improved 
global health governance." Bmc International Health and Human Rights 12. 
Markovska, A. and A. Serdyuk (2019). The perception of corruption in the daily life of Ukraine. 
  509 
Marquette, H. and C. Peiffer (2015). Corruption and Collective Action. Developmental Leadership 
Program. Birmingham, University of Birmingham. 
Marsden, P. (1982). Brokerage behaviour in restricted exchange networks. Social Structure and 
Network Analysis. P. Marsden and N. Lin. London, Sage. 
Marsh, D. and P. Furlong (2017). A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political 
Science. Theory and Methods in Political Science. V. Lowndes, D. Marsh and G. Stoker. New York, 
Macmillan International Higher Education: 17-41. 
Mauro, P. (1998). "Corruption: Causes, consequences, and agenda for further research." Finance 
and Development 35(1). 
McKee, M. (1991). "Health services in central and eastern Europe: past problems and future 
prospects." Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 45: 260. 
McKee, M. (1991). "Health services in central and eastern Europe: past problems and future 
prospects." Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 45: 260-265. 
Melgar, N., M. Rossi and T. Smith (2010). "The percecption of corruption." International Journal of 
Public Opinion 22(1). 
Merton, R., M. Fiske and P. Kendall (1990). The Focused Interview. Glencoe, The Free Press. 
Meyer, G. e. (2008). Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Meyer-Sahling, J. (2009). Sustainability of Civil Service Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe Five 
Years after EU Accession. Sigma Papers 44. Paris, OECD. 
Michailova, S. and V. Worm (2003). "Personal Networking in Russia and China: Blat and Guanxi." 
European Management Journal 21(4). 
Miles, M. B. and M. Huberman (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Press. 
Millard, F. (2013). The Czech Republic Hungary and Poland. Developments in Central and East 
European Politics 5. S. White, P. G. Lewis and J. Batt. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 5. 
Miller, W. I., Grodeland, A.B., Koshechkina, T.Y. (2001). A Culture of Corruption: Coping with 
Government in Post-Communist Europe. Budapest, CEU Press. 
Miller, W. L., A. B. Grodeland and T. Y. Koshechkina (1998). "Are the people victims or 
accomplices: the use of presents and bribes to influence officials in Eastern Europe." Crime, Law 
and Social Change 29(4). 
Miller, W. L., A. B. Grodeland and T. Y. Koshechkina (2000). "‘If you pay, we’ll operate 
immediately’." Journal of Medical Ethics 26: 305-311. 
Momotenko, I. (2015). Investigating the Peer Effect on Corruption. Prague, CERGE-EI. 
Morgan, D. (2011). Conducting and Analyzing Focus Groups. Focus Groups as Qualitative 
Research. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 46-65. 
Morgan, D. (2011). Planning and Research Design for Focus Groups. Focus Groups as Qualitative 
Research. Thousand Oaks, SAGE: 31-45. 
  510 
Morgan, D. (2011). The Uses of Focus Groups. Focus Groups as Qualitative Research. Thousand 
Oaks, SAGE: 18-30. 
Moroff, H. and D. Schmidt-Pfister (2010). "Anti-corruption movements, mechanisms, and 
machines- an introduction." Global Crime 11(2). 
Morris, S. D. and J. L. Klesner (2010). "Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and 
Evidence From Mexico." Comparative Political Studies 43(10): 1258-1285. 
Morse, J. (1991). Qualitative Nursing Research: A Contemporary Dialogue. Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
Morse, J. (1994). Critical Issues in Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
Mostert, S., F. Njuguna, G. Olbara, S. Sindano, N. Sitaresmi and E. Supriyadi (2015). "Corruption in 
health-care systems and its effect on cancer care in Africa." Cancer Health-Care Systems in Africa 
16(8): 394-404. 
Moszynski, P. (2006). "Corruption in health care "kills en masse"." BMJ 332. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). "Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment." Journal of Democracy 17(3): 
86-99. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2010). The Experience of Civil Society as an Anti-Corruption Actor in East 
Central Europe. ERCAS Working Papers. ERCAS. Berlin, European Research Centre for Anti-
Corruption and State-Building. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013). The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Controlling Corruption in the 
European Union. Berlin, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building 
(ERCAS). 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The quest for good governance: how societies develop control of 
corruption. Cambridge, CUP. 
Mužik, R. (2014). Manažment ľudských zdrojov v zdravotníctve [Human resources management in 
health care]. Master, Trenčianska univerzita Alexandra Dubčeka. 
Mužik, R. and A. Szalayová (2013). Analýza neformálnych platieb v zdravotníctve na Slovensku 
[Analysis of informal payments in Slovak health care]. Bratislava, Slovakia, Health Policy Institute. 
Naxera, V. (2015). "Corruption Perception in the Czech Republic." Politics in Central Europe 11(1). 
Nelson, C., P. A. Treichler and L. Grossberg (1992). Cultural studies. Cultural Studies. L. Grossberg, 
C. Nelson and P. A. Treichler. NY, Routledge. 
Nemec, J. (2018). "Public Administration Reforms in Slovakia: Limited Outcomes (Why?)." The 
NISPACEE Journal of Public Administration and Policy XI(1). 
Neuman Stanivukovic, S. (2010). The Introduction of Regional Self-Governance in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. EU Conditionality vis-a-vis Domestic Societal Pressures. Civil Society in 
Central and Eastern Europe. S. Fischer and H. Pleines. Stuttgart, ibidem. 7. 
Nowak, M. A. and D. C. Krakauer (1999). "The evolution of language." Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 96(14). 
  511 
Nye, J. S. (1967). "Corruption and Political Development - Cost-Benefit Analysis." American 
Political Science Review 61(2): 417-427. 
Nye, J. S. (1967). "Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis." American 
Political Science Association 61(2). 
Oakley, A. (1981). Interviewing women: a contradiction in terms. Doing Feminist Research. H. 
Roberts. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Oliver, D., J. M. Serovich and T. L. Mason (2005). "Constraints and opportunities with interview 
transcription: Towards reflection in qualitative research." Social Forces 84(2): 1273-1289. 
Olken, B. A. (2009). "Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality." Journal of Public Economics 
93(7-8): 950-964. 
Olken, B. A. and R. Pande (2012). Corruption in Developing Countries. Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab's Governance Initiative, DFID. 
Osoba, S. O. (1996). "Corruption in Nigeria: historical perspectives." Review of African Political 
Economy 23(69). 
Owen, W. (1984). "Interpretive themes in relational communication." Quarterly Journal of Speech 
70: 274-287. 
Owton, H. and J. Allen-Collinson (2013). Close but not too close, Qualitative Methods in 
Psychology. Qualitative Methods in Psychology, BPS: Emotionalities and relationalities. 
Huddersfield University. 
Park, S., A. Griffin and D. Gill (2012). "Working with words: exploring textual analysis in medical 
education research." Medical Education 46: 372-380. 
Pažitný, e. a. (2014). Modernizácia slovenských nemocníc: Základné rámce zdravotnej politiky 
2014-2016 [Modernisation of Slovak hospitals: Basic framework of healthcare policy 2014-2016]. 
Bratislava, Health Policy Institute. 
Pejovich, S. (1999). "The effects of the interaction of formal and informal institutions on social 
stability and economic development." Journal of Markets and Morality 2: 164-181. 
Plaček, M., M. Puček and F. Ochrana (2018). "Identifying Corruption Risk: A Comparison of 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic." Journal of Comparatice Policy Analysis. 
Pohontsch, N. J., H. Hansen, I. Schafer and M. Scherer (2018). "General practitioners’ perception 
of being a doctor in urban vs. rural regions in Germany- a focus group study." Family Practice 
35(2): 209-215. 
Polit, D. F. and C. T. Beck (2004). Nursing Research: Principles and Methods. Philadelphia, PA, 
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 
Polkinghorne, D. E. (2005). "Language and Meaning: Data Collection in Qualitative Research." 
Journal of Counseling Psychology 52(2): 137-145. 
Powell, R. A. and H. M. Single (1996). "Methodology Matters V: Focus Groups." International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care 8(5): 499-504. 
  512 
Puček, M. (2014). "Do Higher Expenditures on Civil Servants Lead to a Reduced Corruption Risk? 
Analysis of Czech Regions." Ekonomicky casopis 62(2): 150-166. 
Ragacova, K. (2009). Busel preverí Tomanovej sociálne podniky [Brussels will check up on 
Tomanova’s social companies]. SME. Bratislava, SME. 
Reno, W. (1995). Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rice, P. and D. Ezzy (1999). Qualitative research methods: A health focus. Melbourne, Oxford 
University Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, S., Palifke, B.J., Ed. (2016). Corruption and government: Causes, Consequences 
and Reform. Cambridge, CUP. 
Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust and Inequality in 
International Perspective. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 
Rothstein, B. and D. Eek (2009). "Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental 
Approach." Rationality and Society 21(1): 81-112. 
Rothstein, B. and J. Teorell (2014). Causes of Corruption. Routledge Handbook of Political 
Corruption. P. Heywood. London, Routledge: 79-91. 
Rothstein, B. and J. Teorell (2014). Causes of Corruption. Routledge Handbook of Political 
Corruption. P. Heywood. 79-91. 
Rumyantseva, N. L. (2005). "Taxonomy of corruption in higher education." Peabody Journal of 
Education 80(1). 
Ruttkayova, M. (2013). Škandály sú aj u nás, tresty chýbajú [Scandals are on our doorstep, 
punishments still missing]. hnonline.sk. 
Sadiq, M. and M. Abdullahi (2013). "Corruption as the bane of Nigeria’s development." 
International Journal of Economic Development Research and Investment 4(1): 83-93. 
Sahlins, M. (1965). On the sociology of primitive exchange. The Relevance of Models for Sovial 
Anthropology. M. Banton. New York, Praeger. 
Sakwa, R. (2012). Democratisation. The Routledge Handbook of Russian politics and society. G. 
Gill and J. Young. London, Routledge: 33-44. 
Sandholtz, W. and R. Taagepera (2005). "Corruption, Culture, and Communism." International 
Review of Sociology 15(1): 109-131. 
Saunders, B., J. Sim, T. Kingstone, S. Baker, J. Waterfield, B. Bartlam, H. Burroughs and C. Jinks 
(2017). "Saturation in qualitative research: exploring its conceptualization and 
operationalization." Qual Quant 52: 1893-1907. 
Schane, S. (1963). Ambiguity and Misunderstanding in the Law. The Language of the Law. D. 
Melinkoff. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
  513 
Schramm, M. and M. Taube (2003). "The Institutional Economics of legal institutions, Guanxi, and 
Corruption in the PR China." 
Schwandt, T. A. (2001). Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
Scott, G. and R. Garner (2013). Doing Qualitative Research: Designs, Methods, and Techniques. NJ, 
Pearson. 
Seale, C., Ed. (2012). Researching Society and Culture. London, SAGE Publications, Ltd. 
Seidel, J. and U. Kelle (1995). Different functions of coding in the analysis of textual data. 
Computer-aided Qualitative Data Analysis: Theory, Procedures and Practice. U. Kelle. London, 
Sage. 
Seidman, I. (1998). Interiewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and 
the Social Sciences. NY, Teachers College Press Columbia University. 
Shaw, E. (1981). Group dynamics: the psychology of small group behavious. New York, NY, 
McGraw-Hill. 
Shaw, J. and S. Porter (2015). "Constructing rich false memories of committing crime." 
Psychological Science 26: 291-301. 
Shehu, A. Y. (2005). "Combating corruption in Nigeria- Bliss or bluster?" Journal of Financial Crime 
12(1). 
Shields, L. and A. Twycross (2008). "Content Analysis." Paediatric Nursing 20(38). 
Sičáková-Beblavá, E., G. Šípoš and M. Kurian (2011). "Korupcia a protikorupčná politika na 
Slovensku 1989-2010 [Corruption and anti-corruption policy in Slovakia 1989-2010]." Forum 
Historiae 2. 
Sieber, J. E. and B. Stanley (1988). "Ethical and Professional Dimensions of Socially Sensitive 
Research." American Psychologist 43(1): 49-55. 
Sik, E. and B. Wellman (1999). Network capital in capitalist, communist and post-communist 
countries. Networks in the Global Village: Life in Contemporary Communities. B. Wellman. Oxford, 
Westview Press. 
Silverman, D. (2006). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and 
Interaction. London, SAGE. 
Simecka, M. (1990). Obnovenie poriadku [Renewing the order]. Bratislava, Archa. 
Sipos, G. (2016). "TI case study: Slovakia's health sector'." Transparency International Slovakia. 
Šípoš, G. and M. Šimalčík (2017) "Všetko, čo potrebujete vedieť o stíhaní korupcie na Slovensku 
[All you need to know about prosecuting corruption in Slovakia]." 
SITA (2017). Korupcia je na Slovensku rozšírená a zvyšuje sa, ukázal prieskum podnikateľov 
[Corruption in Slovakia is widespread and keeps rising, shows a recent poll of entrepreneurs]. 
Pravda, https://spravy.prvda.sk/. 
SKEU2016 (2016). Slovak Republic in Figures 2016. Bratislava, Statistical Office of the Slovak 
Republic: 35. 
  514 
Skolkay, A. (2018). "Partial state capture by a single oligarchic group: The Gorilla Case in Slovakia." 
Central European Political Studies Review XX(2): 182-203. 
Smith, K. E. (2005). "Problematising power relations in 'elite' interviews." Geoforum 37: 643-653. 
So, Y. L. and A. Walker (2005). Explaining Guanxi: The Chinese Business Network. New York, 
Routledge. 
Sommersguter-Reichmann, M., C. Wild, A. Stepan, G. Reichmann and A. Fried (2018). "Individual 
and Institutional Corruption in European and US Healthcare: Overview and Link of Various 
Corruption Typologies." Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 16(3): 289-302. 
Stepurko, T., M. Pavlova, I. Gryga and W. Groot (2013). "Informal payments for health care 
services - Corruption or gratitude? A study on public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six 
Central and Eastern European countries." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46(4): 419-
431. 
Stewart, D., P. Shamdasani and D. Rook (2011). Analyzing Focus Group Data. Focus Groups. 
Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 109-133. 
Stewart, D., P. Shamdasani and D. Rook (2011). Focus Groups in Practice. Focus Groups. Thousand 
Oaks, SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 135-151. 
Stewart, D., P. Shamdasani and D. Rook (2011). Group Dynamics and Focus Group Research. Focus 
Groups. Thousand Oaks, SAGE. 
Stewart, D., P. Shamdasani and D. Rook (2011). Other Group Methods. Focus Groups. Thousand 
Oaks, SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 153-161. 
Stewart, D., P. Shamdasani and D. Rook (2011). Recruiting Focus Group Participants and Designing 
the Interview Guide. Focus Groups. Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Ltd.: 51-68. 
Stovel, K. and L. Shaw (2012). "Brokerage." Annu. Rev. Sociol. 38: 139-158. 
Straka, R. (2016). "Darovanie a korupcia v zdravotníctve." Solen 11(6). 
Suleiman, N., Othman, Z. (2017). "Corruption Typology: A Review of Literature." Chinese Business 
Review 16(2). 
Sutton, J. and Z. Austin (2015). "Qualitative Research: Data Collection, Analysis, and 
Management." CJPH 68(3). 
Swamy, A., S. Knack, Y. Lee and O. Azfar (2001). "Gender and corruption." Journal of Development 
Economics 64(1): 25-55. 
Sykes, G. M. and D. Matza (1957). "Techniques of neutralisation: A theory of delinquency." 
American Sociological Review 22(6): 664-670. 
Szalay, T. (2014). 10 Rokov Reformy Zdravotníctva [10 Years of Health Care Reform]. Bratislava, 
Health Policy Institute. 
Szende, A. and A. J. Culyer (2006). "The inequity of informal payments for health care: The case of 
Hungary." Health Policy 75: 262-271. 
  515 
Tanzi, V. (1998). "Corruption around the world - Causes, consequences, scope, and cures." 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45(4): 559-594. 
Tesch, R. (1990). Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software Tools. Basingstoke, Falmer. 
Theobald, R. (1990). Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment. Durham, Duke University 
Press. 
Thompson, R. and L. Gorbunova (2003). "Health care access, utilisation and spending in 
Kazakhstan: Findings from a household survey." in preparation. 
Tillmann-Healy, L. M. (2003). "Friendship as method." Qualitative Inquiry 9(5): 729-749. 
Tishchenko, P. and B. Yudin (1996). "Moral status of fetuses in Russia." Bulletin of Medical Ethics 
119: 13-15. 
Twinn, S. (1997). "An exploratory study examining the influence of translation on the validity and 
reliability of qualitative data in nursing research." Journal of Advanced Nursing 26: 418-423. 
UN (2011). Fighting Corruption in the Health Sector (Methods, Tools and Good Practices). P. 
Matsheza, A. R. Timilsina and A. Atutyunova. NY United Nations Bureau for Development Policy. 
van Nes, F., T. Abma, H. Jonsson and D. Deeg (2010). "Language differences in qualitative 
research: is meaning lost in translation?" Eur J Ageing 7: 313-316. 
Varese, F. (2000). Pervasive corruption in economic crime in Russia. Economic Crime in Russia. A. 
Ledeneva and M. Kurkchiyan. London, Kluwer Law international. 
Vecernik, J. (1998). Občan a tržní ekonomika. Příjmy, nerovnost a politické postoje v české 
společnosti [The citizen and market economy. Income, inequality, and political attitudes in Czech 
society]. Prague, Nakladatelstvi Lidove noviny. 
Wallace, C. and R. Latcheva (2006). "Economic Transformation Outside the Law: Corruption, Trust 
in Public Institutions and the Informal Economy in Transition Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe." Europe-Asia Studies 58(1): 81-102. 
Warburton, J. (2013). Corruption as a social process: from dyads to networks. Corruption and 
Anti-Corruption. P. Larmour and N. Wolanin, ANU Press: 231. 
Warner, C. (2014). Sources of Corruption in the European Union. Routledge Handbook of Political 
Corruption. P. Heywood. London, Routledge: 121-131. 
Warren, M. E. (2004). "What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?" American Journal of 
Political Science 48(2). 
Warren, M. E. (2014). The meaning of Corruption in Democracies. Routledge Handbook of Political 
Corruption. P. Heywood. London, Routledge: 42-55. 
Weber Abramo, C. (2007). "How Much Do Perceptions of Corruption Really Tell Us?" Economics 
Discussion Papers 2007-19. 
Wei, S. J. (1997). How taxing is corruption on international investors? National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
  516 
Weissman, S. (2016). "Perspective: Skyrocketing health care costs are caused by political 
corruption."   Retrieved 30th November, 2020, from 
https://centerforhealthjournalism.org/2016/06/22/former-hospital-president-skyrocketing-
healthcare-costs-are-caused-political-corruption. 
Weitz-Shapiro, R. and M. Winters (2017). "Can Citizens Discern? Information Credibility, Political 
Sophistication, and the Punishment of Corruption in Brazil." The Journal of Politics 79(1). 
Wierciński, H. (2017). ""Children of the transformation" - an ethnography of healthcare reform 
and Polish primary care." Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie 142: 23-48. 
Williams, C., I. A. Horodnic and A. V. Horodnic (2016). "Who is making informal payments for 
public healthcare in East-Central Europe? An evaluation of socio-economic and spatial variations." 
Eastern Journal of European Studies 7(1). 
Willis, B. (2014) "The Advantages and Limitations of Single Case Study Analysis." 
Worth, M. (2013). Whistleblowing in Europe legal protections for whistleblowers in the EU, 
Transparency International. 
Wysmulek, I. (2017). "Corruption in schools? The scale and sources of corruption perceptions in 
Poland." Edukacja. An Interdisciplinary approach: 41-55. 
Yaru, M. A. (2009). "Economic perspective of corruption in public sector: A theoretical 
explanations and lessons in Nigeria." Ilorin Journal of Business and Statistics. 
Yin, R. (2015). Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks, California, SAGE. 
You, J.-s. and S. Khagram (2004). Inequality and Corruption. Faculty Research Working Papers 
Series. Harvard University, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
Zakaria, P. (2012). "Is corruption an enemy of civil society? The case of Central and Eastern 
Europe." International Political Science Review 34(4): 351-371. 
Zaloznaya, M. (2012). "Organizational cultures as agents of differential association: explaining the 
variation in bribery practices in Ukrainian universities." Crime Law Soc Change 58. 
Zaman, G. and Z. Goschin (2015). "Shadow economy and economic growth in Romania. Cons and 
pros." Procedia Econ. Financ. 22: 80-87. 
517 
 
